c-span is your unfiltered view of government, funded by these television companies and more, including comcast. >> do you think that this is a community center? no, it is way more. >> comcast is partnering with community centers to create wi-fi enabled computer so students can get the tools they need to be ready for anything. announcer: comcast supports a public service along with other television providers, giving you a front row seat to democracy. host: we are joined by timothy fry, who is a professor of post-soviet foreign policy at columbia university. he is also the author of several books on russia and russian leadership. weak strongmen: the limits of power in putin's russia. you have been studying vladimir putin for some time. how would you characterize his

current leadership? guest: the invasion of ukraine marks a very different strategy for president putin. in past conflicts around crimea, georgia, syria he had been much more driven by events. he was much more opportunistic taking advantages of what the situation would give him. there was always a precipitating event that led him to introduce troops. this isn't to invade ukraine, it is far different. there is no precipitating event. the action was planned and telegraphed much in advance. the scope and scale of the actions is so much greater than his past behavior. we can look at the decision to use force in ukraine really is a departure from past practice. host: given vladimir putin's view on ukraine, we've talked about this with our viewers a number of times, was it faded to

have happened? did it matter if president biden was in there or president trump? was this a piece of vladimir putin's foreign policy he needed to accomplish? guest: i think that when historians write this conflict and political scientists analyze it they will overestimate the extent to which this was inevitable. much seems inevitable in retrospect. at the same time i think that we are all surprised by the invasion. certainly many russians are shocked by the invasion. they didn't expect this. putin did not expect ukrainian resistance to be so strong. he was surprised by how the west reacted. i think we need to recognize that this was a voluntary decision by a single individual taken with consultation from

likely a subset of the dozen or so people on the security council in russia. we should also remember that the reason that politicians give for why they do things are often not the real reason. part of the reason why putin has made this claim that ukrainians and russians are one people is because i think he does believe that. it is not a view that is widely held by russians and certainly not by ukrainians, but it is also an instrumental view that he tries to use, because he thinks that politically it is palatable. the western alliances have always been strong, even under president trump. there would be great consequences of the foreign invasion of ukraine. this is more driven by single individual and domestic politics in russia than by the west's actions. host: knowing what you know

about vladimir putin and his history, do you think that he has gamed this out beyond potential, eventual conquest of ukraine? guest: leaders are often quite optimistic about what they can accomplish during war. this is not unique to putin. i think that the russia-kyiv strategy, he was very confident. they didn't introduce their full set of troops the way they might have if they expected greater resistance. i think he is very surprised by the government in kyiv, that they didn't flee, they decided to stand and fight. he seems to have this odd notion that there is a -- a dis column in ukraine waiting to be liberated.

i think that he has misread the situation and part of that is general optimism that politicians have when they go to war. part of it is also likely due to the fact that he is very isolated. he sees a very small number of people on a regular basis. for people outside of that inner circle, they have to wait for 14 days in quarantine to meet with him due to his fear of catching covid. all of these reasons suggest president putin has really misread the ukrainian situation. host: i want to invite our listeners and viewers in on the conversation with timothy fry will stop the line for democrats is (202) 748-8000. republicans, (202) 748-8001. independents and others, (202) 748-8002. as you dewpoint your interest to a recent piece by our guest at foreignaffairs.com, the headline is putin's war at home, how

conflict in ukraine complicates his balancing act. you wrote, "for almost two decades putin deftly balanced the dual threats that confront all autocrats, coups from other elites and protests from the masses. a booming economy in the first half of the century allowed him to consolidate power and his successful annexation of crimea in 2014 insured his place in russian history. yet as the warm glow of his crimea success faded, putin has struggled to find a narrative to legitimate his rule." what do you mean by "warm glow?" guest: after the annexation of prime you president putin -- annexation of crimea president putin's approval ratings jumped. this allowed him a four-year period -- he relied on

oppression, certainly, but he could also rely on the genuine support of a large section of the population. what has changed his economic growth has been stagnant for a decade. the foreign policy success of the annexation of crimea at home has worn off. there is a great deal of food and fatigue within russia. he has been in power for 22 years and people don't expect great initiatives or a new direction for the country from him. propaganda doesn't seem to be working as well as many russians are going away from state television towards social media to get their news. in the last three years putin has had to rely heavily on oppression. the role of security services at home and abroad have increased dramatically. even among the foreign policy elite i don't think that there is a lot of support for this invasion of ukraine. i want to

emphasize that this is a decision taken by a small group in russia, but when you have an autocratic regime around an individual that is how foreign policy decisions of this magnitude are made. host: biden imposes new sanctions on oligarchs. who are these oligarchs, and why are they important in vladimir putin's rule? guest: the oligarchs come in a variety of flavors. that is not a very precise term. there are the business oligarchs, like the one who owns the chelsea football club, or alexey who runs a steel company. they have taken advantage of their proximity to the kremlin to tilt the playing field in their favor and to grow rich. there are other oligarchs who run state companies who are appointed by putin in the gas

sector, energy sector, banking sector. those economic set of elites have been gradually pushed out over the last eight years. elites that are really making the call on national security and foreign policy are a small group of elites who have been under sanctions for some time, including the head of the security services, the defense minister, the head of the security council, and the head of foreign intelligence. that is pretty much putin's war cabinet. the sanctions for them have a somewhat different effect. they have no expectation that they will ever be accepted in western society the way that his economic elites have been. it looks like they are willing to really tie their fate to putin's decision to invade ukraine, and it would be very difficult to peel them off.

host: to reiterate what you just said in your piece you said this about sanctions. they will stoke broader economic uncertainty potentially erasing one of putin's greatest achievements. the real damage to the russian economy will come less from sanctions and the entrenchment in power of those who resist modernization and it will widen the gap between those who want to bring the russian economy into the 21st century and those who do not. i've heard russia's economy, size-wise, compared to italy. no knock on italy, but why does vladimir putin not when they broader global economy for russia? guest: the inner circle on which he relies and the elites on which he relies benefit from slow growth in russia, even as the country as a whole grows slowly the profits that they are

able to gain from their monopolistic positions within russia and their business transactions abroad backed by the kremlin allow them to grow fantastically rich. and buy apartments in new york, milan, london, have super yachts that are being gradually seized across the world. putin's balancing act in the economy is that he allows enough corruption to permit his inner circle to grow fantastically wealthy. he has to be careful that the corruption does not become so large that the economy completely tanks. then he invites the possibility of mass mobilization as you saw in belarus and kazakhstan recently. it is not outside the realm of possibility. one thing that would be interesting to watch is if the russian public, who have just

seen their currency declined by 40%, experiencing bank runs, and the economy has ground to a halt for the near future, whether the public blames vladimir putin for inviting the sanctions or whether he blames the west for levying sanctions. host: one of the super yachts that you mentioned is this solarist owned by a russian oligarch in barcelona, one of several yachts docked in barcelona. one click question before calls, what do you make of russia's vladimir putin's closer ties with xi jinping, with china? guest: it is a complex, multifaceted relationship. russia is a natural resource-rich country and china needs natural resources.

they form natural trading partners. there is also a great deal of skepticism between the elites in both countries about the true intentions on the others. they share a long border. they compete for influences in various parts of the world. at the same time, the relationship is closer than it has been, xi jinping and vitamin putin have a good personal relationship, security ties have increased somewhat, and they continue to view each other as in cooperation and also being competitors. a good friend in the russian foreign policy establishment explains that for china and russia the motto is not always with each other, because they do have different interests. for example, china is ukraine's biggest trading partner.

china and russia are not always with each other, but they are never against each other. the idea that neither will stab each other in the back even if they have disagreements. host: let's hear from alan in fayetteville, north carolina. caller: good morning, sir. it is almost sickening to hear these republicans call in and voice their opinion of anything about this war. look at the cpac convention they had last week. you understand? i invite them to watch john bolton's segment you have going on at 11:00. he totally dismantles everything that the republicans are saying. it is sickening. it is. now they want to voice their opinion on this war? give me a break. look at what they left the white

house. i can't even talk about it. host: that part of vladimir putin's strategy, counting on political disagreements in the united states? guest: that is a small part of the problem. if anything, the one issue that brings democrats and republicans together is the strategy towards ukraine and russia. there is the trumpian wing of the republican party has advocated for closer personal ties with vladimir putin and less willing to criticize him, but if we look over the larger arc certainly republicans and democrats in congress are much closer to each other >> you can watch the rest of this segment on our website your we take you live now to the pentagon where john kirby is providing