eastern, important congressional hearings and other public affairs events through out the day and weekdays to 5:00 and 9:00 p.m. eastern. catch washington today for a fast-paced report of the day. listen to c-span any time, just tell your smart speaker play c-span radio. c-span, powered by cable. >> live to a discussion on the russell/ukraine war and impact on the way future wars could be far. the international institute for strategic study is the host of this event. live coverage on c-span. [indiscernible chatter] [laughter]

>> good morning, everybody.

welcome. it is great to have the physical audience here present with us today. welcome to all of our viewers online and in particular, we are pleased we have the opportunity to broadcast this over c-span, fox news, and another -- number of other outlets across the internet. glad to have everyone here. i and executive director of iiss americas. the international office for strategic studies in london. today's event is ukraine, back to the future, (of warfare?) we are going to be talking about lessons learned of the current conflict and what it might mean for future conflict. for those online, please look for the q&a function on zoom and go ahead and type your questions into the q&a box and we will try

to get to them through our moderator in the course of today's event. our moderator is dr. larry rubin, an associate fellow of our institute, also an associate professor at the same none school for international school of affairs at georgia tech. here present with him in the room is air force major general for scriven's ski, the defense attache from washington dc -- of ukraine from washington dc. first we have the distinguished professor of practice at the school, managing partner of west exec advisors, former undersecretary for defense for policy at the junta gone, cofounder of see nass and many other credentials. to round out our panel is our senior fellow for cyber and future conflict, dialing in today from our blurring -- our

berlin office where he is located. let me set the scene. the unprovoked aggression by russia against ukraine shocked the world with a new war in europe once unthinkable. in this conflict emerging and disrupting technologies have been deployed on a large-scale with mixed results. traditional capabilities are employed in novel and asymmetric ways. our panel will discuss these developments and try to offer lessons were featured warfare based on observations of today. with that, larry, over to you. larry: thank you very much and thank you for your attendance in person and online. we really appreciate it. we have a fascinating panel we have heard so i will not belabor any my introductions are framing anymore than necessary. i will go for the first question and speakers will answer the question and then go forward

after -- at which time we will turn it to q&a for both in-person and virtual audience. let me start with the first question and we will switch the order up a little bit from what you see online. i will start with franz. the first question, not really sure whether to look straight at the camera or the screen we see but i want to ask, how has the war changed the european defense community government and nongovernment thinks about the plans and plans for the future war? >> thank you very much. it's great to be a part of this panel. i think the answer is simple. first and foremost, conventional warfare is back in the minds of policymakers and militaries of europe and that has not been the case over the last couple years, really hybrid warfare, counterinsurgency and so forth have dominated the military discourse.

in europe. i think this is one of the major takeaways here that policymakers are really discussing conventional warfare. now, what does this mean? it means on the one hand, there is at least -- beginning of discussions about perhaps whether we have overestimated capabilities, countries such as russia and the information domain are for our future conflict and i think you poses significant questions when it comes to european force structure, similarly to what is happening in the united states. though you always had a reverse debate in europe vis-a-vis the united states and the u.s. -- a lot of time is spent for lawmakers in certain elements of the military to give up legacy platforms and other capabilities

where in europe is the other way around. it's about convincing european countries not to give up conventional capabilities at least over the last decade and restore capability for conventional warfare because over last decade, this was not seen as an issue. european policies -- issue european policymakers needed to take seriously. i think the debate is going in various directions and going -- i'm going to perhaps mention a few. one is the big debate in europe, lucky we do with our reserve forces -- what can we do without reserve forces? there is a big debate how to better integrate reserve forces into defense planning, whether we need to switch to more total defense, concepts and then out to go about this in a sustainable manner.

not a big issue in that issue but also what popped up in the united states is the worn ukraine has led to an depths looks of the stockpiles most nato countries and european countries in general really have one income super scission guidance for munitions and the result is something for the first time i see policymakers take a serious look at. the problem the worn ukraine -- third problem the worn ukraine has presented to european policymakers is there are still significant interoperability challenges in nato and also countries that are not part of nato who use nato standards. as it turns out, 150 millimeter round used to thousands of germans cannot be used in a french palliser and vice versa.

there are interoperability challenges even within an alliance such as nato that has been around for decades and set standards. i think this is a big take away from the conflict as well. if i'm just permitted to perhaps make one last point before handing it back to the moderator is we have had really a lot of panels over the last months about lessons learned, about this ongoing war in ukraine and perhaps it has also been looking at some of the lessons some people could take in the worn ukraine, specifically with emerging technology who capability -- technological capabilities. every war is very context specific in terms of geography forces that oppose one another and so forth.

this is very much true of the warren ukraine. i think if we extrapolate too much and make too many general assumptions or generalizations from the war, we risk being fairly unprepared or betting on the wrong horse in the next war. twitter, it is the 49th anniversary of another world war and they rate -- israeli defense force during the war had a tough time the first few days of the conflict because they took the wrong lessons from the war. they fought previously the six days war and has a pay for the mistakes they made. i think it is important to focus on some of the wrong lessons. i think one of the wrong lessons we are taking, at least in europe from this conflict and perhaps in the united states, is this idea of safe haven. the reason why you have this big role commercial companies are playing in ukraine, starling said light constellations,

various internet -- high-tech companies, including google, microsoft, and so forth, supporting ukraine and so forth, is because these companies essentially can operate from safe havens that you might not have in the great power war involving china and the united states. safe havens that prevent these companies being targeted by kinetic weapons systems such as hypersonic missiles or weapons by non-kinetic means, really strong offensive cyber capabilities that could be used, i know that's a whole separate subject earbud perhaps making a mistake on over relying on commercially available off-the-shelf solutions and in a future power because what we're saying works so well in ukraine but it works because the

starling constellations can only work because there are ground stations in turkey, lithuania, and poland that provide this capability in the russians cannot hit these ground stations with precision strikes. i think we need to take a hard look at some of the wrong lessons to be taken from this conflict and perhaps let me say thank you and i'm looking forward to a good discussion. dr. rubin: thank you so much for that and for highlighting a couple important issues, the role of the commercial sector in particular as well as also how hard it is to analyze in the middle of the conflict. the example he will -- the example you brought up, if you would look at the beginning of the conflict, it would look different from when the resupply efforts for the israelis to cold. i want to turn our attention to ukraine and to ask the attache to the united states, what do you think the ukrainian armed

forces demonstrated -- they have demonstrated an impressive ingenuity in the use of technology old and new in her fight against russia. can you talk a little about the thinking behind this asymmetrical response to the russian attack? >> thank you very much and thank you for inviting me here. i would like to start this again, ukraine and civilian area was attacked by a run and we have casualties among the population. the war, which continues in ukraine, is a war against ukrainian country, ukrainian nation, and ukrainian population. i just want to mention 420 kids were killed. we should confirm how many kids were killed today attacked by iranian drones. we sought to look at the situation and how we are fighting, combining old and new

weapons and technology. i should say the worn ukraine started 80 years ago and 24 february it was a full-scale invasion which will have full range of modern conventional warfare. only weapons's were not used. ballistic missiles launched from submarines, electronic warfare, uav, all dress you need more than technology was used. not to mention cyber attacks and critical infrastructure. this is the armed forces reform and as we so we know who -- we say we know we are fighting and it just happens we are fighting with big soviet army. despite that, there were a few

major mistakes done as the previous figure mentioned was the overestimation of russian military capabilities and underestimation of ukrainian will to fight and defend this country. also was big mistake from russian side. and her estimate international community unification to assist ukraine and i should say the result of the support, it would not be possible to sustain, it would not be possible to save many lives of our civilians and to save some of our infrastructure. i was talking about technologies, i would say we could talk hours from information technology, artificial intelligence, different applications with cell phone we developed in ukraine just to give you an example. one application was greenlight.

you can transform iphone into nightvision goggles. another implication, who are you? it helps on checkpoints everywhere to identify is a right person or not. also applications that allow people everywhere to know that missile attack is going into go to shelter. even these kinds of stuff, these technology used in ukraine. what is important also as a previous speaker mentioned, starling. this is giving unique capability for not only for civilian infrastructure but also to support some command and control as well. what is very important and why do we have some success is because we have very good acr

picture. we use the situation is a good tool to conduct our operations and this is also done with our own means, which was provided by our partners. not to mention specific situation, you know we received since 2014. we received some [indiscernible] but at that time, we did not have self-propelled vest and houses. we had old soviet 152 and 122. we managed to combine all soviet control devices with ipod social was done by our people who are engineers who volunteered to do it. we managed to create with commercial cameras, to create

picture, to have it on the ipod of commanders in the area so when we're talking about net centric warfare, we used to talk 10 to 15 years ago, this is working now. at the same time, using -- she will remember when a couple decades ago the idea was we don't need tanks anymore. we don't need heavy weaponry anymore because we are going to have crisis management operation 6000 kilometers from russell. that was the idea. now, the situation changed that many countries want manned battle tanks and they show that's effective during this type of warfare. talking about good question was ability. you can imagine how we have at this moment up to seven

platforms of self-propelled 155's. we have more than dozens of platforms of armored vehicles and this situation about how to maintain, how to support them and so on. but again, we are talking about interoperability. still when you fight for your country, you find a way to deal with this complicated issues as well. i just started talking about iranian uavs. uavs became important part of warfare in ukraine. we have our own uavs. we have uavs provided by our partners, mainly icr uavs, but what was effective is [indiscernible] they were quite effective but there are other equipment and uavs which we would like to

acquire as well, and also we use some other uavs which are quite effective. what is very important, and defense. air defense to have full scare air defense -- full-scale l defense -- air defense. we are grateful for partners who provide defense systems and many of them we can say proven. i would say that's modern warfare in ukraine is unique combination of some approaches from world war ii, huge tanks and so on, with modern technology, which allows ukrainian forces to fight. also what is important and what supports our success is maneuverability of our forces. we do not have people to put

trenches 2500, there's which we have. from this 1000 kilometers, it is frontline. so we have to be very maneuverable. we use small-group tactics. what is more important, we created during this a very powerful noncommissioned office which allows us to transfer authorities to the units over there. this helps a lot. which russians do not have. they still send general into trenches and that is the reason why russian generals were killed. i would probably stop on this and i'm ready to entertain any questions if there are. dr. rubin: thank you very much for those enlightening comments. now i will turn to michelle. what lessons can and should the u.s. take away from the war

regarding the use of advance and not so advanced technology. -- technology? it plays off of what boris was saying. and is the immersion -- emerging interceptor technologies, is this a useful way to think about things or should we change the way we classify these technologies? michelle: wonderful to be with you. thank you for hosting this important conversation and to the general for participating in sharing his perspective. before i turn to the technology question, i think one of the things we are seeing in how this war is playing out in ukraine is there are foundational elements that are critical to success like ob on technology. the first was the willingness of allies like the united states and others to declassify intelligence early to deny putin

the narrative, to deny his use of disinformation and put the facts out so that the world could see what russia was doing that was a critical foundation on which to build the international coalition in support of ukraine. second was figuring out the mechanisms for real-time information sharing with ukrainian forces so that they could benefit from information not only that they were gathering but allies and partners were gathering that is a lot of work, a lot of lessons learned, and we should learn them going forward. a third, just in the nick of time, the ukrainians moved a lot of their government data and information to the cloud so it was not vulnerable on physical servers that could be targeted i

think working with them on cyber defense to enable secure command-and-control and communication has been an absolutely critical foundational element. fourth, the training and concept development work done precrisis, as the gentleman mentioned, post crimea, a number of nato countries sent advisers to work with the ukrainian military to train them, help them develop operational concepts, advise and assist them. a lot of these were special operation forces in the intervening years between karin you and the february invasion. when ukraine confronted a superior, initially better equipped force, they had concepts ready to go in terms of how they would sabotage tank calls, how they would disrupt logistics, destroy stockpiles of

equipment and so forth. that advance work was absolutely critical, particularly to the early successes ukraine hat in the war and difficulties russia encountered. in addition, i think you cannot overestimate the importance of the asymmetric will to fight. ukrainians are fighting for their homeland, freedom, democracy, sovereignty, and the willingness of the population to resist and the ability to organize that population has been critical. the lesson i take away from that , as we look at others who could be vulnerable to authoritarian aggression in the future, we have to start working now to invest in making them porcupines much harder to invade successfully, well before a crisis.

we need to focus on that now. all of that said, turning to the question of technology, i think access to the best western technology, especially precision long-range fires like the high marsh system, especially air and missile defense systems like stingers and others, has made a huge difference to ukraine's performance on the battlefield and has greatly complicated life for russian forces. in addition, i do think there has been great value in integrating a number of commercial, off-the-shelf systems. whether it is the starling system or ground stations work secure communications but also an array of unmanned uavs for everything from eyes to strike.

i think that says -- this has been a critical piece of the equipment. i think we need to do more thinking about how we need to leverage commercial systems in the future, especially if you do not have this safe haven to operate from. i think you kane -- ukraine's geography which unfortunately borders on several naval states has offered tremendous advantage for western partners to supply and resupply ukraine, but we cannot count on that favorable geography in other cases. think taiwan under pressure or aggression from china. that means we have to put more emphasis on building up stocks, munitions, and systems in

advance, providing more commercial and defense equipment in advance, and again concept development and training before a crisis, having a strategy for asymmetric layers of defense, having those concepts developed not only on people -- on paper but trained to come a mastered by the host nation and really helping countries to be that prepared. and by the way, on the snow, not only can that help with defense but it can potentially make the difference in terms of deterrence. i think one of the things the chinese are studying right now is resistance. i think russ -- russia was shocked at the degree and strength of ukrainian resistance. i think china has never thought

about taiwan, the taiwanese people resisting. now they are going back to the drawing board and thinking about what would happen to our military plan if they did? are we prepared with that? can we deal with that? these are investments we need to be making not only to improve the defense should a crisis emerge but really to bolster deterrence so the conflict does not happen in the first place. dr. rubin: thank you very much for those great comments.

if not, i will start with one of the online ones. please, if you feel comfortable, state your name and your institution. maybe not your neighbors institution or something like that. the ukrainian institute of defense analyses. are we taking the long -- wrong lessons from ukraine? it seems to me like an anomaly. when you look at the key challenges facing the u.s. it would be counterinsurgency potentially in a taiwan set reo. i would like -- scenario. i would like your red action -- reaction to that. second, are we seeing a pivot to the end of soviet era technology. it appears that the soviet

equipment russia is using has been a tremendous failure. >> would you like for everyone to address that? >> sure. >> we will go through everyone this time. then, unless it is directed, you can chime in virtually and see about that. we will come back this way, michelle, then boris. >> i think that is a great question. what unites situations such as ukraine and taiwan, two brief points here. first, ukraine has shown, and this is not something new, the effectiveness of combined operations -- arms operations, essentially. combined arms operations in

modern and future warfare will be essential to preserve your power. combined arms operations are the foundational for what in nato will be called multi-domain operations. it is combined arms operations on steroids across multiple domains. this is where the direction of future warfare is heading. the theory of victory, essentially, at the operational level for the u.s. in a war against china or taiwan is dependent on the effectiveness of all the main operations. this is how, i think, you connect ukraine with taiwan at the tactical and operational level. the second point is any conventional war involving great powers will be a prolonged conference -- conflict, most likely. it will not be quick or fast or over very soon.

so, you will likely have a significant level of attrition here. that is a key lesson to take from ukraine at, and a lesson you can potentially take from ukraine and applied to situations such as taiwan. it would be very important not to constantly keep wargaming the first couple days of a conflict over taiwan between china and the united states. let's talk about gaming it at day 40, 50, 60, 80, 90 and take into account what capabilities would be lost at that stage. attrition and to maneuver will be a very critical element in any future great power confrontation. this is a key lesson from ukraine. >> michelle, do you want to? >> i agree with the premise that we really have to evaluate each scenario unto itself, and

context really does matter. the needs of deterrence and a in different contexts can vary greatly. but i do think there are lessons that do -- that we do obtain. the importance of thinking asymmetrically. breaking out of the confines of attrition based warfare when we think about, say, a taiwan scenario vis-à-vis china. to think about, how would we focus on vulnerabilities we can exploit? here, just as russian logistics proved very vulnerable in ukraine, talk about projecting power across 200 kilometers of ocean to get to taiwan. there is a lot of vulnerability that can be exploited in terms of any power projection from

china to taiwan. similarly, vulnerability of singapore isr and their control networks under attack from cyber and electronic warfare and other means. the lessons i have already mentioned, the importance of preparing in advance. years of training, concept relevant, advising, assisting, equipping. that is even more important in taiwan, which as an island, will not have the kind of safe haven for ongoing supply that ukraine has had in this situation. i think there is some critical areas where we need to focus. that is helping a country like taiwan build more robust networks to enable faster, better decisions than the adversary. that goes for us as well and our allies.

that is a key decision. it is absolutely critical. ukraine has been able to achieve it in many instances with our help. to russia's detriment. the same has to be true in other conflicts where we are supporting partners in the future. similarly, human/machine capability, platforms to use unmanned systems to either comp locate or thwart adversarial attacks is really does complicate or -- complicate or thwart adversarial attacks is really critical. it is less a question of trading off legacy systems and more a question of marrying them. we will have legacy aspects of the force that will be with us for many years. the question is, how do we add new capabilities to those that translate into a new source of advantage, both from a

technology perspective, and again, the notion of new operational concepts that leverage legacy and emerging capabilities in new ways to increase impact, either for deterrent or defense. >> i have a question. go ahead. >> allow me not to comment on taiwan. [laughter] i will go directly to ukraine. first of all, thank you, michelle. notice a change of doctrines and concepts in ukraine. this was very important. there was a doctrine education advisory group under ukraine and a defense reform advisory board. these two institutions rewrote field manuals, concept

doctrines, everything that allows us to fight now. what we see from the russian side is an absolute absence of modern systems, unity of command. still, no one knows who is commander of operations on the ground. there are some commanders in the donbass area, some in the southern area. it is an absolute absence of unity of command. the cisco question asked about soviet weapons. we see soviet and russian weapons that were widely advertised by the russian side, new without ecosystems abroad. this is like cartoons. you notice on new russian tanks, a type of barbecue grill on the type of the tank.

they advertise their tanks can survive whatever. that's not the case. so, they started to put these girls on the top of tanks. -- grills on the top of tanks. i believe that many countries that are consumers of russian soviet weapons will reconsider this and reach for another type of weapon. at the same time, given the big quantity of soviet weapons in ukraine, we can still fight. we can add to this some modern technology. a good example. this is not secret, it was in the media. when we used anti-rocket missiles against russian air defense, everyone said it was not possible to use the weapon type of air to surface missile from soviet made fighters. it is possible.

you just need to put some ability to think and do it. we are grateful to partners who managed to assist us in this. i would say at this time, we use a unique combination of all type of weapons, including self propelled 152, 122, with new quality and capabilities like m1 or nine. i can name all the seven platforms we have that are very effective including routers that help us control. this is a unique combination to repel russian aggression. >> great. thank you. i will turn to one of our many questions online from michael gordon.

i will turn to the general first. michael gordon, of the wall street journal. how effective have iranian drones been and on what -- what bases is russia using? are they in crimea? can you reflect more on how this has advised or informed your thinking about warfare, to think about these bases in russia or crimea? >> if russia asked iran to provide drones, for us that is a signal that the russian defense industry is going down. there is no other way. how are they effective? every day you see statistics where we are shooting down 3, 5, 6 with russian names.

these are three to three meters. it has around 40 or 50 kg of explosives. it is equipped with -- it flies with the help of gps, russian, chinese, and european systems. four systems that exist in the world for global positioning, it can fly. it is very noisy and very slow. you can hear it from 10 kilometers. but the quantity, we do not know how many of them russia has. i will not disclose where they are based to now. we are monitoring where they are based. we are taking appropriate measures. but, what we see, that they are mainly focused on civilian infrastructure because most

critical infrastructure is somehow protected. they try to hit areas where people live. today's attack on --zapor izhzhia and yesterday's attack on kyiv was a good example of this. but it is easy to find. you just need enough quantity of air defense. sa8 is very effective. german parts are very effective. 23 millimeters are also very effective against these. also, we are looking to destroy the places where they are based and controlled. high marks are very effective to destroy this type of target.

>> great, thank you. i will turn back to our in person audience now. i will go to the gentleman in the front row. as long as you do not do it out. >> good, thank you, tom duffy from the national war college. a question about wrong lessons and cyber war. up until the conflict, we saw a lot of speculation about the role of cyber war. not only kinetics, in the war itself. it seems to be the dog that has bit. i would be interested in your views on right lessons or wrong lessons about the role of cyber in modern conflict. >> thank you for that question. it is a big known unknown under the conflict and it is difficult. access to open sources, so to speak.

what has been happening is as the conflict has progressed we have ascertained that russia has indeed used offensive cyber capabilities quite successfully on a number of occasions. but, the effect of these operations, because, by success, i mean, russian upper tours were effective in penetrating ukrainian networks. but the effect of these operations are temporary. not really long-term. i think there is some debate to be had about how effective such operations will be in any future confrontation. again, i would really advocate against taking too many lessons from what has been happening in ukraine. because, there are very specific circumstances that perhaps made russian offensive cyber capabilities less usable than in other contingencies.

there is a fair assumption to be made that the russians did not employ offensive cyber operations simply because they were not planning to deploy these capabilities because they thought they would -- there would not be much of a war in any case. they were probably trying to preserve ukrainian critical infrastructure, rather than destroy it. because, they intended to use it. they were using it in the first phase of the invention just to communicate with one another. i think there perhaps was not a sophisticated cyber targeting plan that was embedded in the overall campaign. then, a plan was essentially carved up by the fsb and with its many deficiencies. we have seen deficiencies at the conventional level. you might as well assume that each of the deficiencies happened in the cyber realm. the second point, is it is

extremely hard if you do not plan for offensive cyber operations months ahead of the conventional war, it will be truly difficult to come up with ad hoc cyber capabilities. we tend to make perhaps for assumptions that russia has a certain cyber arsenal, but, it's cyber arsenal is primarily targeted at native capabilities and you cannot really transfer offensive cyber capability used to target and potentially takedown nato capabilities to target all of a sudden ukrainian critical information infrastructure. the second point. the wrong lessons. the relative immunity under which certain western support transferred to the cyber front. you have government agencies from the u.k., the u.s., other like-minded countries supporting

ukraine. you have tech companies supporting ukraine. ukraine has a very particular, very decentralized critical information infrastructure that makes it extremely difficult to achieve effects at a large-scale. but, i think this role, again, regarding safe havens, this also applies when it comes to external support ukraine is receiving and i think that a great power more involving nato and the united states directly, countries such as russia and china would perhaps use kinetic means, jamming capabilities, electronic warfare, and so forth to disrupt the support that is not really happening at this stage. we cannot really know, perhaps because of russia's fear of escalation or the fear of retaliation from the united states, that means highly

sophisticated and cyber power. these are some of the points i think are worth thinking about. >> i will turn to the next question so we get a few others. >> the institute for the study of war. i have a two part question. the first part is for the general. what are the capabilities in the next six to 12 months that would be most transformative on the battlefield from the ukrainian perspective? is it more of the same weapons systems you are receiving in higher quantity, or are there new capabilities that would be more important? what are the assessed redlines from the western perspective preventing us from fulfilling some ukrainian request for additional capability? >> the second part is not for me?

well, i can tell you that seven months ago when the war started, when we were looking for capabilities like crime mark -- like hyde park, the answer was no. everybody believed that ukraine would get up in three days. arms and weapons for guerrilla warfare. when the world saw bucha atrocities, that was a game changer on the ground. the range was higher then russian artillery and we managed to fight with good results with russian artillery. then, later in the spring we received high mark a game changer. there was a distance of 80 kilometers.

we managed to destroy a lot of russian ammunition, logistics, and everything. on the temporarily occupied ukrainian territory. in this way we cut russian forces from supply chains and so on. as we advance, we are looking to the future. we are still looking for artillery. probably, self-propelled is most effective. we are looking for grounds that are effective thanks to our partners. we have received some of them. they are very effective. we are looking for long range missiles for himars. still we need to hit some targets on the occupied ukrainian territory.

in the future we will shift, in any case to other fighter jets. we are moving to switch to other western equipment like armored vehicles or tanks. but, we can produce a lot ourselves. the way is to create joint ventures for something like this with ukrainian defense industries. it was capable to produce ballistic missiles and so on in the past. so, that is the way ahead to obtain these capabilities. that was a very short answer. >> thank you for the short but comprehensive answer. i will turn, michelle. >> i cannot tell you what i can see from the outside, not being in the administration. i think there is a very strong

desire to support ukraine in general, but particularly, at this moment where the momentum has shifted and the ukrainian military is taking munitions and having real success. i think everybody is hoping for some continued push before winter sets in and before the russian mobilization of additional personnel arrives in the field. i think the issue has always been, how do we balance supporting ukraine with managing the rest of escalation to a broader russia/nato conflict? that frame remains, that as the general noted, as the war has evolved, as ukrainian needs have evolved, as ukrainian success has increased, i think that the comfort level has increased, in

terms of providing ukraine with more and more sophisticated equipment. my understanding is the focus is now on artillery, himars, and also armored vehicles, tanks. personnel carriers and the like. i think that the focus is on immediate needs that can make a difference in sustaining momentum on the battlefield. this also raises two longer-term issues. one is, longer-term security cooperation and security assistance commitment to ukraine through foreign military financing, foreign military sales. that is where we can get into a more sustained support for helping the ukrainian military rebuild and re-equip overtime. this also raises questions about the industrial base. honestly, there are a number of things where u.s. stocks have dwindled to quite low levels

because we have supplied so much to ukraine. in many cases, things like javelins, stingers, they are out of production. the question of, how do we replenish stocks and invest in a more agile, more robust, more responsive industrial base? in the u.s., but also, potentially, and a collaboration with partners and allies. that is a larger, longer-term question we need to come back to an address. >> excuse me. two quick points here. first, i would really like to move the discussion from talking about weapons systems. individual

>> excuse me, yeah. i guess there are two points here. the first one is, i would like awaited discussion not just talking about weapon systems. yes individual and systems are of a certain importance but they will not be a decisive factor in this ongoing war. and i go back to what i said. i think the real importance here in our systems that enable effective application -- just one example, high marks have been able to -- through russian air defense capabilities -- have been able to use the db2 drones. a lot of people thought that the drones would not have been usable or wrong in such a scenario -- usable for a scenario area but there -- but

it did happen because of the combination of effective integration of systems. and in the previous comment, about -- for a structure that integrates a legacy platform with technological capabilities i think this will be key for any structure in europe and the u.s. over the next couple of decades. my second point is, i think we underestimate how critically short we are in europe and the u.s. when it comes to certain mission types. i think these are serious conversations we need to be having and i am sure it is happening at the moment. but at this rate, ukrainian forces are using titian's -- as supply. and i don't see anyway here we need to find solution very fast.

>> thank you very much. i would like to ask a quick lightning round. we are coming to the end of the hour. the question comes from senator nunn a big picture question for a lot of people might be i will add them at the indian a little bit d believe russia will continue to use -- lose ground and continue to use weapons of mass destruction? >> this is not a question for the general -- well, i do not have an answer on this question. at the same time, we see that russia hijacked the -- pump station and started to like will -- blackmail the world with nuclear tactical happens a few months ago as they capture the subdivision of the power station. so that is an example of what they will do.

and a couple days ago, they arrested is power operation and is difficult to see what is going on there. this is the biggest power station in the world. in general. what is in the head of russian leadership -- i cannot commit. otherwise i use difficult expressions. plaques are there comments from our panelists? >> i think we know the russian doctrine is escalate to de-escalate putting -- that of a conflict early to try to constrain or restrain your adversary. i think the -- is having an effect but it is hard for me to imagine who is actually using a nuclear weapon unless you got to a weight where he really did not

have anything to show for his invasion. he is truly losing. i do worry at that point if his back is up against the wall. if ukraine is fully successful, unfortunately, this additional mobilization he has just ordered it is doubling down. time -- the outcome of the campaign and i think one of the things we have to do collectively is to really work on deterring the use to help putin understand the extraordinary and catastrophic cost that russia would suffer from not only the u.s. nato but from the international community. talking about making himself and russia a permanent pariah and sanctions permanent as long as he is in power.

it could be a disastrous decision for russia let alone everybody else. so we really have to work to convince him of that so the threat remains a threat and it does not translate into actionable -- actual demonstrations. >> if i can just run at the -- a brief comment in their a demonstration would not solve the military problems and grain. i do not think ukraine would capitulate because of the administration over the black. for example, i think western support would double down with something like that if something like that would have happened and it would have no impact whatsoever in my opinion on the military fortunes on the round of russian forces so it is -- it should be taken seriously but at this stage in judge it be unlikely. >> thank you very much for this

event. there were a number of questions in the audience -- both audiences we did not get to my apologies. those who can stay in person will be able to ask our in person panelist here afterwards and be able to continue the conversation going forward. i want to thank the institute for -- studies for hosting us here and all of those livestreaming we appreciate it. c-span in particular as well as fox news. we will hopefully have more events like this in the future. and i know that we will continue to do this -- thank you also from my school and thank you for your attendance we appreciate it very much. [applause] [indiscernible]

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