lower income students access -- that is why we are providing lower income students access. >> cox along with these other television providers, giving you a front row seat to democracy. >> this morning on "washington journal," after a look at the news and some viewer calls, georgetown university's matthew kroenig discusses the u.s. effort to support ukraine. and then marc selverstone discusses the cuban missile crisis. we sure to join the conversation with your phone calls, facebook comments, and tweets. >> many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead, months in which our patience and will will be tested.

months in which annunciation will keep our names, but the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing. ♪ host: that was president john f. kennedy from october 22, 1962, addressing the nation in the midst of the cuban missile crisis. 60 years ago today, president kennedy was shown photographs of soviet nuclear missile installations under construction in cuba, 90 miles off the coast of florida, putting the eastern united states at risk of a nuclear attack. this morning, we want to get your thoughts on this historic anniversary, a milestone which comes as today russia is threatening to use nuclear weapons amid that country's ongoing invasion of ukraine. we want to hear from you. if you are in the eastern or

central time zone, call (202) 748-8000. if you are a mountain or pacific time zone resident, call us at (202) 748-8001. if you lived through the cuban missile crisis, if you remember those moments, we want you to call us at (202) 748-8002. you can also text us at (202) 748-8003. find us on facebook.com/c-span. we are also at twitter and instagram. let's hear a little bit more from president kennedy's televised address on october 22, 1962, where he first informed the american people of the presence of nuclear missile sites in cuba. [video clip] >> good evening, my fellow

citizens. this government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the soviet military buildup on the island of cuba. within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive sites are now in preparation on that island. it can be none other than to provide nuclear strike capability against the western hemisphere. while receiving the limit every information of this nature last tuesday morning at 9:00 a.m., i direct the agency to step up. having now confirmed and completed our evaluation, our decision on a course of action, this government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in

full detail. the characteristic of these new missile sites indicates two distinct types of installations. several of them include medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1000 nautical miles. each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking washington, d.c., the panama canal, cape canaveral, mexico city, or any other city in the southeastern part of the united states, central america, or the caribbean area. additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for medium-range listed missiles capable of traveling twice as far, capable of striking most of the major cities in the western hemisphere, ranging as far north as hudson bay, canada, and as far south as lima, peru. host: so again, we will be

talking this morning, all this morning about the 60th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis. and i want to bring to your attention this is this weekend's "wall street journal," and their review section cover story has the headline, how to keep the ukraine conflict from going nuclear." down in the article, which talks a lot about the current nuclear threat from russia, i want to read a portion of it i have highlighted. it says, "the world narrowly avoided armageddon in 1962. the decision-making surrounding the cuban missile crisis and the terrifying possibilities had it turned out differently had been the subject of intense study ever since. had russian and american leaders today learned the right lessons from that close call, most of the evidence is reassuring, but

there is no escaping the fact that mr. putin has demonstrated a rash temperament and vengeful instincts, both in his decision to start a war of aggression against ukraine and in his approval of its brutal conduct." and then this essay goes on on wall street journal's website to lay out five lessons that can be learned from the cuban missile crisis that could be applied again to that current -- the current nuclear threat from russia within its war with ukraine. i want to bring up there was a recent poll by reuters tracking the russia-ukraine crisis. it was a poll dated october 10, so just about a week ago. it says that two thirds of americans are concerned the war

may escalate if ukraine is provided longer-range weapons that could hit undisputed russian territories, and 58% are afraid we are headed toward nuclear war with russia. that being said, despite this, most americans, 66%, continue to support the u.s. providing weapons to ukraine, although this is down seven points from late april. and it concludes ultimately, though, 73% of americans say the united states should continue to support ukraine despite russia threatening to use nuclear weapons. again, that is a poll from about a week ago from reuters. as you might recall, earlier this month president biden spoke about the threat of nuclear war

posed by russia. this is an article in reuters dated october 6. it says, u.s. president joe biden said russian president vladimir putin's threats to use nuclear weapons threatens to bring about the biggest threat since the cuban missile crisis, adding washington was trying to figure out putin's offramp. the white house has said repeatedly that it has seen no indication that russia is preparing to use nuclear weapons and despite what it calls putin's nuclear saber rattling. but biden on thursday made clear he was keeping a worried eye on putin and how he might react as ukraine's military makes gains against russian invaders. so let's bring up what he said in those remarks. he was speaking to democratic

donors in new york earlier this month. and this is a portion of what president biden said at the time. he said, we have not faced the prospect of armageddon since kennedy and the cuban missile crisis. putin is not joking when he talks about the potential use of tactical and nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons because his military is, you might say, significantly underperforming. i don't think there is any such thing as an ability to easily use a tactical nuclear weapon and not end up with armageddon. again, that was from president biden. however, he was asked about those remarks on cnn earlier this week. here is a portion of what biden said. [video clip] >> you recently said this is the first time since the cuban missile crisis there is a legitimate possibility of somebody using a nuclear weapon, which could lead to armageddon.

that is the word you used. how realistic is it, do you think, that he would attack with a nuclear weapon? >> i don't think he would, but it responsible for him to talk about it. for him to say he may use a tactical nuclear weapon in ukraine, the whole point i was making was it could lead to a horrible outcome. not because anybody intends to turn it into a world war, but once you use a nuclear weapon, the mistakes that can be made, miscalculations, who knows what would happen? host: so again, we are talking today about the 60th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis and what lessons could be learned as there is another threat of nuclear attacks now also involving russia. let's go to some of your calls now. but i want to remind you of the phone lines. if you are in the central or

eastern time zones, (202) 748-8000. mountain and pacific time zones, if you live there, (202) 748-8001. if you lived through the cuban missile crisis and want to share what you remember from those times, call us at (202) 748-8002 . our first caller of the morning is eric in massachusetts. eric is in the eastern and central time zone. eric, what is your comment or your thought about the cuban missile crisis on this 60th anniversary? caller: well, a lot of pressure. i am the first person of the day so it is really a lot of pressure. but anyways, some of my thoughts are obviously the cuban missile crisis was a crazy time. let's be honest, it was a long time ago. i think we have to keep that in focus. i think one of the things we

have now is more command and control of communication. i think one of the things about back then was the communication from, well, what came out was the submarine that was in the area, the russian sub. they were ready to launch the missile. and the commanding was on -- and the commander was unwilling to do that. the whole russian, what we call the nuclear crisis situation, it was actually the commander of the submarine that was unwilling to launch the missile because he had orders. but the problem is the orders were -- they took 12 hours before they could ever get new orders. but that aside, i guess we will talk about the ukraine crisis right now. putin wants ukraine. he is not going to drop a nuclear bomb in there.

he wants the assets, the crops, everything. he is not going to drop a nuclear bomb there. in fact, we have done more talking about nuclear armageddon that he has -- than he has. p put it out there, but mr. biden, president biden, he talks about nuclear armageddon every day. in the media, they talk about nuclear armageddon. of course that is always an option, but they are not going to do that because they want the country. they are not going in there because they want to destroy it. they want it for assets. they want it for economic ability. you are not going to drop a nuclear bomb on something you want. host: point taken. thank you for being our first caller of the day. you did great. let's go to doug in south dakota. doug, you are saying you remember those times. tell me about what you member

about that era -- tell me what you remember about that era. caller: i remember very well i was part of the second group in the aerial infantry. host: where were you stationed? caller: north carolina. host: ok. caller: we were among the first to go had there been an invasion . probably the most interesting that happened though, i had come home to south dakota to leave to go, believe it or not. what surprised me over those years was why they would let anybody go and leave. this was a few days before the crisis hit the peak. anyway, i received a telegram 6:00 in the morning saying, you better get back to your unit. so it took me 2.5 days to get

back. and when i got there, everyone was gone. they had already pre-deployed or whatever to florida. that was the most interesting thing. literally, two days later, that had been a saturday, two days later, the entire outfit came back because sunday was what they called day 13 of the crisis . kennedy had made a deal. it was literally over, if you will, two days later. the troops arrived and asked me where i was. and i laughed and said, where were you? that kind of ended the story. extremely interesting. host: you have a very interesting account from that day. thank you for sharing with us today. let's talk now to joseph. joseph is in pennsylvania.

joseph, what do you want to share or what is your comment today? caller: i am in massachusetts. host: i'm sorry. thank you. caller: yeah, i was a trump supporter. i support the man. he had the right formula. i voted for him because of many reasons. if you look at what president trump was trying to do, it was the right formula to bring peace to the world. he was talking on socialism in mexico. he talked to the president in iran. he is a part of nato, a bridge between europe and asia. he was talking to russia, vladimir putin. he was talking to north korea, kim jong-un. president trump had the right formula. i have been to cuba twice.

i thought i wanted to live there because i am a communist. i love america. i have been living here for years. i never thought i would say this, i feel sorry for america. america utilizes 60% to 70% of street drugs. the chinese opium crisis days. host: joseph, bringing you back to the cuban missile crisis, i know you brought up president trump. what do you think about the crisis or the current threat? what do you think president biden should be doing? caller: that is what i was trying to get at what i was talking to speed up. i support president biden because he is the president but i do not support his policy. america, we have become a country of liars. we are not caring like america used to be. that is what the problem is.

how can you disrespect russia, the second most powerful military in the history of mankind? you want to expand nato and get ukraine to side with him. what do you think russia is going to do, sit by there? in the caribbean, let the sleeping dogs lie. we don't go poke the sleeping bear. russia was asleep. now it is awake. we need to bring back people in the white house that look at life realistically. that is what president trump was doing. hopefully president trump will run again and the world will respect america. the world will not respect you if you don't respect them. we go around disrespecting people. it has to do with the culture. it is the drug culture. host: we got your point. joseph, i am going to move on

now to tina in richmond, virginia. tina, you remember through the cuban missile crisis. how old were you and what do you remember? caller: i was just a kid. we were living in northern virginia. my dad was in the military. i was still in school, of course. i remember how angry my dad was and how nervous everyone was. my mother was extremely nervous. we kids were kind of just watching what was happening and not really understanding. host: why was your dad angry? was he angry at the russians, the u.s. strategy? caller: no, not with the u.s. p was very supportive of what the u.s. was doing -- he was very supportive of what the u.s. was doing. he was appalled that they would come that close and that they would even try to get that close to us. he was in naval intelligence.

made a huge difference. what i noticed is some of our neighbors, some of them had already been building underground bunkers. they were that scared about the whole situation. host: so they began to build underground bunkers during that time just in case? caller: yeah. it really was a scary time. those are my most vivid memories of it. i don't remember it lasting a great deal of time. it was over relatively quickly. i remember my dad. he did not lose his temper very often, but he did about that that the russians would try to do something like that. host: thank you for sharing with us this morning. we will go to christopher. christopher is in california. what thoughts or comments do you want to share with us my christopher -- us, christopher?

caller: hi. thank you for taking my call. i have an uncle who was alive during the cuban missile crisis, and he talks about it from time to time. it seems like he thought things could be over just like that. that is how scared everybody was. host: with things being over, he thought nuclear attacks wiping out parts of the country.yes caller: -- caller: yes. i think president biden should be trying to negotiate peace. that is the smartest thing to do because this is a new russia and the united states have been taking either side of all the conflicts around the world, even in syria. i remember reading about that a couple years ago. and third, that interview, i did not watch it on cnn.

but it just seems crazy that the president was mentioning armageddon. like is he making a redline? is he saying we are going to respond in the whole planet is -- one nu e gets set off, i cannot imagine we are talking about that. host: our next caller is elias in philadelphia. caller: yes, good morning. to everybody on c-span, good morning. i was not born yet, but my father was a young marine. he was waiting on the president's orders. host: did your father tell you any stories? caller: he said he was afraid. he was scared. he was a marine. he did not want to kill anybody.

he was happy to crisis did not go the way it looked like it was going. so he was happy it was resolved. host: what do you think as far as how -- do you think are any lessons learned from then that we can apply today to russia or are the two much different situations? caller: they should apply more peaceful negotiations, more diplomacy. i will go back to it is called the peace and friendship treaty of morocco. it was signed by president washington and mahatma the third of morocco, the priest and friendship treaty of morocco, 1786, i believe. we should stick more to treaties and more diplomacy and more peaceful negotiations. host: all right. our next caller is timothy.

timothy is in crystal lake, illinois. go ahead, timothy. caller: hi. ok. i was not alive when it happened. i am not of that age but i thought about it and everything and decided to make a few points. i will compare the cuban crisis to the current situation in ukraine. ok, cuba was never a u.s. state or part of the usa, but his government changed -- its government changed and we went ballistic. now come ukraine was part of russia for 1000 years, right? until the last 30 years, very recently. the borders of ukraine were created very modern. so ukraine is basically russia for centuries. but we want to say it is a completely different country. understandably upset. what if the usa lost the cold

war? china had a huge alliance to opposing america? what if california seceded? what if there was a coup and -- in california and it is full of chinese? that is what it would be like in ukraine right now. we need to be skeptical of the government and not be reinforcing them all the time. adversarial media about we need that again. we need democrats for peace. i know they think putin equals trump, but use your brains. host: i have a question for you because it seems like you are very some pathetic to russia, but what do you make of the fact that russia is the one that -- i know historically there have been different boundaries, but if ukraine is a country and has boundaries, do you falter russia at all for invading into another

country -- fault russia at all for invading into another country? caller: i think it was a mistake and i am not for russia, but at the same time, the usa is creating the situation with expansion. even russians think they have been encircled. it makes putin stronger, whatever we do, because they feel afraid. we want democracy, to back off, and be peaceful. that will help russia. host: got it. let's go to another caller. william in eureka, california. ok. let me pull you up. there you are. go ahead. caller: yes. good morning. these people are so off-topic. it upsets me. i was 17 years of age, just graduated high school, and went into the military because i signed up two years before in the reserves. ok? i would to san diego, went

through boot camp and all of that. i was assigned to a destroyer. we went to sail to washington for the world's fair to represent the u.s. navy. all of a sudden over the loudspeaker, it said, all military personnel report back to your duty stations. it did not scare me at that point because i did not know what was going on. we got back to the ship and i said, what is going on? he said, we have to load up with ammunition. i said, for what, there -- i sent, for what? there is no -- i said, for what? there is no war. going to cuba. i was 17, just a kid. an overgrown child, i guess. but anyway -- host: how close did you all get? you said they sent you all to cuba. how close did you get? caller: we got almost there. almost there.

so close. but anyway, while everybody is confused on the ship, the captain came on and said what was going on. well, everybody knew. when everybody knew what was going on, i talked to my leading p.o., which was a guy who had been in all kinds of circumstances, he was ready to retire. i said, what is going on? he said, i am not going. i said, what do you mean? we are not stopping anywhere. we are going straight to cuba. he says, you see this hand? i am a cook. the fingers go right through the meat. i was shocked. he said, i am not bsing. i am not going to cuba. host: go ahead. finish what you were saying.

caller: go ahead. host: i was going to send you all almost got to cuba. if you had landed, if you all made it to the island, what were your orders? what did you think you were going to cuba to do? caller: that was very unclear because, like i said, we loaded up with ammunition and we were a destroyer. we were down there to protect aircraft carrier. bombard cuba with long-range projectiles, i guess. i don't know. host: i am glad you never found out. thank you for sharing your memories from that time. let's bring up someone else who remembers the cuban missile crisis. this is david in georgia. what do you remember from then, david? david, are you with us? we might have to come back to you, david. let's try robert in plano,

texas. oh, there you go, david. you are back. david, are you there? ok let's go to robert. robert in plano, texas, what do you remember from that time? caller: i was a sophomore in high school, and i remember watching the program. the cuban missile crisis came up and the main thing i remember was my dad, a democrat all his life. that is why i was watching john f. kennedy and all those

presentations. i think it was a senator. they were debating with khrushchev. i do not know exactly what was going on, but i remember that they had a condition that the united states had to back off or they would not remove the missiles from cuba. our member the senator telling them, i will stay until health freezes over -- hell freezes over if you do not remove those missiles. i did not know what he was talking about. i think that was his answer to khrushchev. i remember that from 50 something years ago.

i think the day that biden is trying to be strong, but you don't know what to do with putin. my prayers go out to him. i am an american, and i think biden is a true american. that is all i am going to say. host: thank you for sharing your thoughts. i did bring up a picture. the caller mentioned senator stephenson, who at the time was the ambassador to the united nations, so he was among the people who had some role in those negotiations and high-level talks during the cuban missile crisis, so i wanted to show a picture of president kennedy with senator

stephenson in 1960. this is on foreign policy's website. this is bill in new york. what do you remember about the cuban missile crisis? caller: i was 13. we were sitting around the dinner table because the president had announced missiles from cuba and my father said to my mother, do you think we should build a bomb shelter in the basement? her response to him was that is a good idea. that way when the russians attack i will be out shopping with nana, you will be at work come and the kids will be at school, and the neighbors can use it. they did not take it seriously. th knew there was a possibility, buthey were not afraid. what i say to everybody who

wants to back off on protecting the ukraine, i will use patrick henry. is life so dear and peace so sweet as to purchase it at the price of chains and slavery? that is all i have to say. there is a movie called the 13 days which to picks the entire time. a long film, but it is worth watching. host: is that movie based on a book? i believe it is. someone else who remembers the cuban missile crisis is margaret in texas. tell us what your memories are from then, margaret. caller: i am 94 years old, so i was an adult. my background is teaching history of literacy. it reminded me of how terrible our foreign policy can be.

the people loved fidel. it was a popular revolution for those people but it was unpopular with business interests in the u.s. who were just taking everything that was of any value from the cubans. fidel came to the u.s. first and addressed congress and asked for our help. how stupid congress was that instead of listening to him and the people of cuba the business interests, because they wanted to go back and take the railroads, take the sugar, the gambling interests that were popular in cuba wanted to go back in and take everything that they had lost with the revolution. that is what it reminds me of.

the stupidity of foreign policy when we allow interests like business interests of the united states to dominate congress for them to make decisions that are favorable to business. that is all i have to say. host: as a historian who is also an adult during those times, you mentioned the business community but also was there particularly from the government this anti-communist, anti-dictator, pro-democracy that also made them really skeptical and opposed to fidel castro not just for what perhaps they would want out of the cuban nation but posed to him on principle as being in leadership? what can you tell us about that caller: when fidel went in, it

was a communist country. he was popular. they started to educate the people. at the time he went in, 99% of the people were illiterate. 10 years later, the literacy was greater then in the united states. his policies were popular to the people, the very poor people of cuba. he was not a communist. when he came to the united states to ask for help. you have to remember that. we drove him into the arms of moscow. he was looking worldwide for help. when he first went in, he had no money. they had absconded with the treasury and he asked his helpers -- his administration, if you could call it that then, what do we do to get money fast? they said tourism.

that will bring money in fast, faster than anything else. they had nothing at all and had to build it from scratch. they had to look for help from other countries. he came to the u.s. first. we denied him. host: let's talk now to maria from maryland. what are your comments and thoughts this morning? caller: my thoughts are that we need to remember that as a country we need to be careful with the choice of words we select. using the word armageddon is a strong word and it gives people the thought that something big may happen and could happen and people begin to get very nervous about a war or armageddon.

i also think what happened basically is we have to remember all these people have bunkers and their family and friends will be safe while all of us out here will be targeted. i think that this is the way we have seen big things happening in countries like germany with jews and all that so we have to be careful of what we say out there and what we say to the regular people. host: so you think it was a mistake for president biden to use the terminology armageddon? caller: i do think that is a mistake. maybe he is just trying to give us -- i do not think that should

be a word that should be used. host: all right. let's hear now from craig in oklahoma. what are your thoughts? caller: thank you to c-span and your good work there on the show. i have an observation. the cuban missile crisis was part of what i call the moral evolution of war. at the beginning of it quit mcnamara and bobby kennedy were saying -- they were taking the world were two mindset of we had these and we will use them. but the world had changed since world war two and now both sides had weapons. so they had to evolve to the point of knowledge and that and so did khrushchev, that we both have these and there was a providential stop order because

everybody has them now. providence put a wall between everybody and said you cannot use them. it is foolish to use them. even out today when biden said armageddon, i am a staunch republican. i would not agree with his policies and will not vote for him, but i agree with biden saying armageddon because he is her mining putin there is a providential stop order on this type of war. we cannot do it. it is important to remind putin we are not in world war two. putin made a statement. america bombed turow from a -- hiroshima. it is like he has gone back to the world war two mindset and we are past that. we are at a stop order. you cannot use the more you destroy everyone. i think biden was right and reminding him of that and that is my perception on that.

host: let's speak now to joseph in north hollywood, california. you're on, joseph. caller: i was at a military base in 1962 during the crisis and i remember how afraid everybody was. i remember they actually had troop movements from the base. it was a big training base and they had troop movements, young military recruits going to various places in the united states as trained people moved to florida, mostly paratroopers. i remember how serious the whole thing was to everybody. i would love to see them tone this stuff down because people who actually do the fighting -- i remember how afraid they were.

thank you. host: let's talk to jim in west virginia. what do you remember about the cuban missile crisis? caller: i was born in 1953 and raised in florida outside miami. i remember a fire alarm going off and everybody having to get under a desk and put our head between our legs. i lived on east 2nd avenue. as a child, we put a dummy of castro with a noose around his neck from our tree. he would not believe the people, the cubans that stopped, clapped, cried, laughed, were scared and thought the police would come and arrest everyone. they democrats do not understand

how the latins can be republican. all you have to do is look at where they come from. host: ok. let's go now to rob in phoenix, arizona. what do you remember about the cuban missile crisis? caller: i was a young guy. i remember the drills. host: you are breaking up a little bit. caller: i was in second grade. can you hear me now? host: a little better. you were in second grade. caller: i remember the duck and cover drills that were taking place in elementary school.

my parents did not emphasize this to kids, to us, what was going on at that time here and i think it was because my parents were not trying to make us into ideologues. i remember the kids around me, their parents were in the defense industry and they became a little more cold warriors and what i call trumpeters today. myself, i have been always for peace and trying to understand the geopolitical situation of the united states. i want to say something about my father, who is a world war two veteran. he used to say you cannot believe how many of those soviets died during the second world war. we really did not honor this fight of the soviets and we gave

them six years. -- but putin has done, but we believe we were above. host: i'm going to have to let you go because you're stunning to break up again a little bit. we cannot really hear you. let's talk to kathy in verona, wisconsin. how old were you and what do you remember about the crisis? caller: i was 12 years old. i remember everybody walking around in a fog and the church is filled up. because people were terrified. these people are calling in with the idea of russia and castro

and all those people being misunderstood is a load of crap. after you live through something like that you never forget it. i would never trust any russian government official as long as i live. they are monsters. the fact that donald trump even talk to them, he is older than i am. he must have remembered this. and you never forget something like this because you do not know if you're going to live to see the sunrise the next day. if it had not been for the kennedys, i do not think we would be alive today. i think the country would have been blown to bits because they were able to somehow understand the dynamics of how to make them back down. host: we are talking today on

the 60th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis on this morning's washington journal. we will continue our discussion after the break. we have two guests. first, georgetown university's matthew kroenig, who also discussed the potential nuclear threat posed by russia and later university of virginia presidential program chair will join us on the program. ♪ >> c-span's campaign 2022 coverage continues with candidate debates from around the country, including live tonight at 7:00 p.m. eastern from indiana. incumbent senator tom young debates challengers. monday, the georgia governor takes on little collectivist stacey abrams.

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>> there are a lot of places to get political information, but only at c-span do you get it straight from the source. no matter where you are from or where you stand on issues, c-span is america's network, unfiltered, unbiased, word for word. if it happens here or here or here or anywhere that matters, america is watching on c-span. powered by cable. >> washington journal continues. host: now we have georgetown university's matthew kroenig. he joins us to discuss the potential nuclear threat posed by russia, plus nato's effort to support ukraine. thank you for joining us. caller: good -- guest: good morning. it is a pleasure to be on the show. host: a lot of attention has

come to this memo you wrote your you dressed it to the president on the atlantic council's website. i am going to read the summary. bottom line up front is how it is labeled, but it says russia might use nuclear weapons to achieve its goals and the war in ukraine, a risk that has only grown as russian forces confront ukrainian counteroffensive's. such nuclear use could advance military aims, undermined u.s. interests, and set off a committed terran catastrophe unseen since 1945. to deter such a disaster, the united states should issue public, vague threat of serious consequences for any russian use nuclear weapons and be prepared to follow through with conditional military strikes on russian forces if deterrence fails. tell me how you came to the conclusion, that the u.s. should

take this threat seriously, should make it clear they are willing to respond forcefully to any threats. guest: that was a good summary. i came to the conclusion in two parts. first, we should take this threat seriously. this is part of russian strategy and doctrine, the idea that they would use nuclear weapons, maybe even early in the conflict to avoid losing a conventional war to a rival. this is in their doctrine, something they have practiced. they have built 2000 weapons for this purpose. we should take this seriously. so what should we do about it? why has he not use nuclear weapons already? he has been making these threats since february but has not done it yet. the reason is he is deterred and worried about the possibility of u.s. or nato intervention, so

the memo recommends let's keep doing that. continue to play on those fears and encourage the white house to make these threats that there will be catastrophic consequences for russia. i hope that is enough to deter him, but it is possible that deterrence would fail and he would use nuclear weapons anyway . and then washington has the problem of how should it respond? doing nothing would be weak. putin could use a second or third or fourth nuclear weapon. spotting with nuclear weapons runs the risk nuclear escalation, so i recommend this option of a conventional strike directly to show putin there was a real cost and try to limit the risk of uncontrolled nuclear escalation. host: as you know, the cuban missile crisis started 60 years ago today. if we go back to president biden's remarks saying there is

the threat of armageddon, i want to ask you, what do you think of that comparison of the cuban missile crisis today? do you think it is a fair comparison? guest: yes. i have thought about the cuban missile crisis. my 2018 book on u.s. nuclear strategy has a chapter on the cuban missile crisis, so there are similarities and differences. the two main differences are the risk that nuclear weapons could be used by russia is greater now than it was during the cuban mess crisis. people forget this, but it was the united states that went on nuclear high alert and that was enough to convince the soviets to remove the missiles. the soviet union was not really making explicit nuclear threats. now russia is and there is a

risk that they will use nuclear weapons. i do not know what percent output on it. the other difference is i do not think this is the risk of armageddon. the cuban missile crisis could have led to a direct u.s.-russian nuclear exchange. it is still hard for me to see how that happens in ukraine today. what we are really talking about is putin using battlefield nuclear weapons in ukraine. if the united states responded to my recommendations, that would be a targeted, conventional strike against russian forces. things could always escalate, but it is hard for me to see how we get to a direct strategic nuclear exchange today. that is what was on the table during the cuban missile crisis. host: still comparing the lessons learned from the cuban missile crisis, are there any you would suggest when it comes

to de-escalation that we could apply today? guest: the lesson we sometimes forget is that we are afraid of nuclear war but so is vladimir putin and the people around him. in the cuban missile crisis, the united states essentially achieved its goals and avoided war by a show of strength, showing we would defend our interests and going on nuclear high alert in making these threats, ultimately forcing moscow to back down. we need to remember those lessons today as well. there are some who say this is dangerous and we should back down and get out of ukraine. the downside of that is you incentivize putin's nuclear blackmail. you teach him and other dictators if you make nuclear threats and use nuclear weapons you can take your neighbors and do whatever you want.

that is not the kind of world we want to live in, so the lesson today is the united states should stand firm and clearly communicate to putin the consequences of continuing to attack ukraine, of using nuclear weapons. with any luck, we can achieve our objective and prevent nuclear weapons from being used at the same time. host: we are talking today about the 60th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis. we are also during this hour applying it to the current russian invasion of ukraine and the nuclear threat there. i want to remind you our phone lines are open. if you are in the eastern or central time zone, call us at (202) 748-8000. mountain and pacific time zone, call us at (202) 748-8001. if you lived through the cuban

missile crisis, if you remember that time, call us at (202) 748-8002. we want your questions for mr. kroenig. we want your thoughts and comments and we will get to them in a moment. i want to get back to you. you mentioned the threat of nuclear -- use of nuclear weapons today is not necessarily the missiles that could wipe out countries. you think it would be more targeted on the battlefields in ukraine. but what do you think is the calculus that putin is making when he determines whether to use nuclear weapons and how? guest: we do not need to speculate much because they have

built the weapons for it. essentially, the first step of the strategy is to make the nuclear threats. we have seen that since february. we are seeing that in recent weeks, so the hope is that the threats enough would be enough to get the adversary to back down. in this situation, the ukrainians, the west, the white house would say, do we really want to risk a nuclear war over this? let's just sue for peace on terms favorable. if that does not work, the next step of the doctrine is essentially for a demonstration strike, so may be in nuclear test, maybe a nuclear weapon over an uninhabited part of maybe on a single military target, again with the same goal. this is getting real now. do you really want to fight a nuclear war? he might be right.

as a final step, if he is losing a conventional war with a neighbor, the idea is to use these tactical nuclear weapons to win the war to use them against the enemy'conventional forces. you do not build it 2000 nuclear weapons fors you can -- against the enemy's conventional forces. you do not build to have -- 2000 nuclear weapons for a small demonstration. he puts nuclear weapons on mines, on torpedoes to go after ships, on depth charges to go after submarines.

essentially any weapons system you can imagine, the russians have a nuke on it. host: you mentioned if boudin perceives -- putin perceives himself as losing, he can deploy nuclear weapons. there have been battlefield losses. there is a morale issue in russia. do you think he has a redline? if so, what do you think that redline is? guest: putin himself is probably torn right now. he sees the attraction of using nuclear weapons for all of the reasons i have laid out. he worries about the consequences. you are right that the ukrainian counteroffensive has put putin

on the defensive. he is losing territory. that is why we have seen the increased rise of nuclear threats. if the russian position in ukraine and ukrainian forces are pushing russian forces out of eastern ukraine, may be even out of crimea, couldn't is facing humiliating defeat -- putin is facing a humiliating defeat. will he be removed from office and killed in the streets of moscow? if he faces a humiliating defeat, using nuclear weapons is more attractive than losing decisively. host: let's go to the phone lines now. we are talking about the cuban missile crisis and the threat of

nuclear warfare today. we have the eastern and central time zones, (202) 748-8000. mountain and pacific, (202) 748-8002. -- mountain and pacific, (202) 748-8001. if you remember the incident, (202) 748-8002. our first caller remembers the incident. do you have a question for matthew kroenig? caller: we were driving to michigan. i said to my dad, " get out of

here, this is a big target!" with the cuban missile crisis, i did not worry about it. we had to pull missiles out of turkey. didn't we have missiles in turkey, and that is why cuba was being targeted? this whole thing with putin and ukraine, this war, i have never been so scared in my life of the crisis in the world today. remember the body counts -- every week, 100 dead, 200 dead. this is armageddon we are looking at. biden did not misspeak. this is almost out of his hands now. every nato country has their special forces. cia has their special fighting forces in their. it is not only brave ukrainians fighting putin's invasion.

putin is getting his but kicked. we will push him so far. god forbid we -- once those things launch, the world is over. it is only a matter of time before you are burned up. i think biden is doing the right thing. guest: thanks, ron, for calling in. the jupiter missiles were a key part of the cuban missile crisis and part of the way that the u.s. got them to back down was nuclear threats. a key piece of that back channel diplomacy was kennedy offering to remove the u.s. missiles in turkey if khrushchev removed the russian missiles in cuba. on biden's control over the crisis, i have a slightly

different interpretation. i think biden has been trying to manage the escalation. right now the big debate is should we be providing attack muscles with a longer range that would allow the ukrainians to strike further into russia? biden has decided that would be too risky. the biden administration is trying carefully to manage the risks while supporting the ukrainians. host: up next is vince in idaho falls, idaho. thank caller: caller: you for taking my call -- caller: thank you for taking my call. the thing that impresses me the most is all you moderators are top-notch people. i do not know how you handle all those callers!

you are even cited. you are -- you are even sided. i am glad your guest is on. he is very good. he has started to clear up the difference between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and what they can do. in terms of capacity, they can be just a flash. to put that in perspective, we had a kiloton at hiroshima and nagasaki. we had negative on weapons -- megaton weapons.

they could be in the air, they could be torpedoed. my question is in light of what we know how good we are and the fact that we have not really entered the war to use our own forces, should we supply ukraine with our own nuclear weapons? thank you. host: matthew? guest: i joined the color in complementing the washington journal, you as a moderator -- caller in complementing the washington journal and you as a moderator. you are right.

some of these russian nuclear weapons are sub-kiloton, which would be much smaller than the strike on hiroshima. some of these smaller nuclear weapons, if you use them against the white house, georgetown would be fine. it could have a devastating local impact, say, on the ukrainian military base, but without creating a lot of collateral damage. this is why it would be attractive to putin. in terms of whether the united states would provide some of its tactical nuclear weapons to ukraine, that is going too far. there is a nuclear nonproliferation treaty the u.s. helped to set up that tries to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so helping ukraine, giving ukraine nuclear weapons, would be a

violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty so i do not think the u.s. will go there. it will continue to provide ukraine conventional weapons. if putin -- the u.s. would respond by giving the ukraine more conventional weapons. this would have to get really bad before the u.s. thought about using its own nuclear weapons. host: our next caller is tim in minneapolis. caller: hi, tia and matthew. i would like to thank ron and michigan for his service and his comment. i thought it was very thoughtful. i was stationed in germany near the iron curtain in the early 80's. i have an aversion to walls. i like to remind people that

talk of armageddon was not too strong, although there are a lot of people who just think it is going to happen. i do not accept that. not without a fight. we are 102nds to midnight -- 102nds to midnight -- women -- we are 100 seconds to midnight, so i encourage world leaders to do whatever it takes to get to the table. as far as the soviets placing missiles in cuba, it was a reactionary thing that they were doing because we had placed missiles in turkey. i think that all goes down to the leaders of our country are

so worried about so-called leftists coming to power that they are willing to accept a christian dictator in place of them. remember guys like tim was shea and what he did in guatemala in the 50's. this is all reactionary. i would like to remind people too the wealthy in the governments of the world already have a place to go. we don't. get to the table. host: let's let matthew respond. guest: the comment on america electing a christian dictator, i assume that means support for vladimir putin. that has gone away. americans do see putin as an enemy, do see russia as a threat, i think rightly.

this will end in diplomacy one way or another. as long as we avoid armageddon, and most wars do. i do not see a short-term prospect for negotiation. the ukrainians are fighting for their sovereignty, the ukrainians are fighting for their sovereignty. zelenskyy has said until he takes this territory back, there is nothing to talk about. i think putin is not really looking to negotiate. he is looking to increase his position on the battlefield. -- improve his position on the battlefield. it reflects the balance of military power on the battlefield. both sides are trying to get into the best position. we are just not there yet. host: on the line for those who

remember the cuban missile crisis is donna in vero beach, florida. caller: good morning. i was just a teenager, but it was like the convoy in the sky going southbound toward miami. there were jets, cargo, planes, helicopters. it was a constant drone. that was the most vivid thing in my mind. yes, in our household, maybe not government wise, armageddon was spoken about. kennedy did not back down. he did the right thing, and it was taken care of in a matter of days. this situation we are in now with putin, you cannot back down -- biden cannot back down. . they need to get to the table,

-- they need to get to the table. our country cannot be unnoticed. it we need to stand up for what is right. that is what i want to matthew, and to see if he concurs with my thoughts. guest: thanks for sharing those memories about the cuban missile crisis. i have only read about it in the history books, of course, so that firsthand experience is valuable. i think you are right that kennedy handled the missile crisis well. he considered a number of different options. he could have just backed down and let the missiles remain in cuba. others were arguing for more aggressive steps. others were arguing for direct strikes against the island. he found this middle path of

unable him -- a naval embargo of the island. that was the recipe that worked. as biden thinks about how to respond in ukraine, i think he is thinking about it in a similar way. he cannot back down and let putin get away with this. he has been conscious to keep the u.s. out of direct military involvement with ukraine. he is looking for this middle path, making some tough statements. j sullivan, the national security survivor said that if putin uses nuclear weapons, there would be" catastrophic consequences," for russia and the u.s. would respond " decisively." that reminds me of some of the deterrent to language u.s.

leaders used during the cold war. i hope we can find this middle path worked during the cuban missile crisis in a way that will help the united states to again achieve its objectives without direct military conflict involving the united states and ukraine. host: we actually have a portion of that interview ready to review. this is national security advisor jake sullivan during an interview with nbc news late last month warning russia of what moscow would face if it chose to use nuclear weapons. [video clip] >> let me say it plainly. if russia crosses this line, there will be catastrophic consequences for russia. the united states will respond decisively. in private channels we have spelled out exactly what that

mean, but we went credibility while speaking to senior leadership in russia without getting into a rhetorical tit for tat publicly, but we will not hesitate to saying publicly that there will be catastrophic consequences for russia. >> you have used that word twice. host: " catastrophic," as you mentioned, matthew. he mentioned they are purposely being vague. guest:i recommended -- guest: i recommended in my letter to the president these deliberately vague threats. that is what the united states used to do in the cold war. and ray kissinger would talk about the incalculable cons -- henry kissinger would talk about the incalculable consequences the russians would face. they do not want to take options off the table. you want to vladimir putin to

worry about the worst. maybe it means a war. it may be sullivan means a nuclear attack. you want putin to worry that all options are on the table. the danger of saying " if you do x, we will do y," the danger is putin saying "y isn't so bad. i'm going to go ahead and use nuclear weapons." you do not want to strain yourself into a specific response. your viewers may remember the obama redline incident with syria about 10 years ago. obama said he would respond if syria used chemical weapons. syria did use chemical weapons and obama decided he did not want to respond. if you say something more deliberately vague like, " catastrophic consequences," that

gives you more flexibility to respond at the time and pick a response that makes sense. host: steve is in webster, massachusetts. though ahead. -- go ahead. caller: i was in the intel community for 40 years. 20 years active duty in the army. i would like to call balls and strikes and make 2 points. we are not looking at this through the russian perspective. we only look at it through the western lens, which makes sense. it russia does have some sort of claim to the donetsk and luhansk area. you have the immortal regiment, patriotism in russia.there

are a lot of factors in russia's favor. more importantly, i see this as a conflict between the western powers, the new liberal order, and i would like to say bricks in a sense, but we have this developing hegemony between russia, china, india, iran, we could throw in brazil as an oil producing nation, and even south africa. i mentioned bricks. the communists in the largest party -- what putin wants to do is draw this into the winter. it is a conflict between the green energy of the west, backed by the united nations and the oil that is necessary for china and india to develop their nations and russia gets oil to the market. i would like to see your perspective on this, mr. kroenig

. host: go ahead, matthew. guest: thank you for your service and those insights. first, you are right that russia does have historical claims in ukraine. you could go back even further to the 800's in kyiv, which russians see as the historic founding of russia in kyiv. the united states could claim rightly that the philippines used to be part of the american empire, but i do not think anybody believes the united states would be justified to invade the philippines to take it back. just because there are historical claims does not m ean put in is justified. i think you are also right that

there are various cleavages in the international system. they became more apparent after the invasion of ukraine. you said you see 2 blocs emerging. i think i see 3 blocs emerging. nato is now unified. it is getting stronger with the addition of finland and sweden. germany and poland agreed to spend more on defense. just not demott -- not just democracies in europe, but japan has agreed to join in the sanctions against russia. second, i think we see these aggressive revisionist a dictator is working more closely together. russia, china, and iran in particular with iran providing drones and missiles to aid russia's war effort.

that is the second bloc. the third is a new non-alliance movement, south africa, brazil, indonesia. these countries are not siding with putin, but they are not siding with us either. they are hanging back. if they can get a good deal economically by yang russian hardware -- by yang russian hardware, they will do that -- economically buying russian hardware, they will do that. host: john in camden, maine, what do you remember from the cuban missile crisis? caller: good morning, matthew. i appreciate you being on the air. i was 20 years old at the time. i grew up in a little town 10

miles from an air force base in omaha. when this happened, it was very surreal. you had to keep telling yourself, " yes, there could be a wholesale exchange of nuclear weapons." you are tuned to the tv. i remember very well. as a 20-year-old, i graduated from a tech school and i was working at an air force base in oklahoma as a technician on the atlas f-series icbm site. i was aware of what we could do. i thought back then it would be very easy for the war to get out of hand because we had less information to go by. we had less eyes and the sky over russia. the reason i think we go into this mess -- got into this mess is because of our energy

policy. with the nord stream 2 completing, we essentially would be paying for his war. that has come to reality, except the nord stream 2 has been decapitated for the time being. it is really our president who has put us in this position, and that is very unfortunate. we should have had far more self-sustaining energy policy, which we were on track to do before resident biden was elected. thank you very much. guest: thanks for sharing those memories. you would have been near one of the targets had cuba resulted in a major exchange. that is something i think about, living in the washington dc area. we would be on the target list.

on energy policy, i think that is a piece of it. putin's calculation was complicated. his use of military force in georgia in 2008, his military intervention in syria, i think the fact that all of those worked were one of the things that led him to be overly optimistic in ukraine, but i think that russia is part of it. he realized the europeans were vulnerable. i think he thought that he could break or divide nato. we see now that the free world is decoupling from russian energy, almost overnight, trying to find alternative sources of energy. the lesson for me is we should not repeat the same mistakes with china. we realize we have vulnerabilities in our supply chain with, china and rather than wait for a crisis like a chinese invasion of taiwan and

trying to decouple immediately, it would be better for the u.s. and its allies to have a plan to selectively decouple and to secure these supply chains now before we get into a crisis. let's go now to bill host: in denver -- host: let's go now to bill in denver. caller: thank you for taking my call. i agree that ambiguity makes the most strategic sense about what the western response would be, but in terms of what objectively we should actually do, what does intensify yang everything the west is doing -- intensifying everything the west is doing makes sense? at least my understanding, in

the status quo with that set of policies in place, russia is losing the war. maybe i'm wrong. tactical nuclear use, given the distribution of ukrainian forces, isn't going to change that reality on the battlefield. nuclear use of that scale in ukraine would harm russian forces with nuclear fallout in russia itself. is that true? that -- wouldn't the response that makes the most sense to further increase the measures we are currently taking? tactical use by russia would immediately lose india, because

they have a powerful interest in nuclear -- host: go ahead, matthew. guest: good comment. in this memo to the president i wrote that was mentioned, the first option i look at is exactly that. let's do what we are doing, but do more of it. more sanctions, more arms to the ukrainians, more reinforcement of nato's eastern flank. what i worry about is that it is not enough. we have said " catastrophic consequences," if putin uses nuclear weapons. there is a chance that putin says " that worked!

i'm going to use a second nuclear weapon, a third nuclear weapon, a fourth." he could turn the tide of the war in ukraine. he built 2000 of these for a reason. i worry about the precedent that it sets. if kim jong-un and the iranians say, " tactical nuclear weapons are important. putin used them and the americans didn't respond." i think a direct, conventional response against russia would be enough to do that, while still managing the escalation risks. host: on the 60th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis, we have been chatting this morning with georgetown university's matthew kroenig. thank you for joining us, matthew.

next on washington journal, we will continue our discussion of the 60th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis with the university of virginia miller center representative marc selverstone. ♪ >> tonight on q when they, northeastern -- q&a margaret shares her book, examining the violence faced by blacks in the south during the jim crow era. >> the south is where the violence was concentrated. that is where folks were disenfranchised. they had no real ability to

affect their political realities, because they had no jurors, they had no judges, they had no police officers. at they were completely exposed, not only to the violence at the hands of law enforcement, but also at the hands of bus drivers and others who felt their role was to enforce jim crow. >> margaret burnham with her book " by hands now known," on c-span q & a. you can listen to q&a on the c-span now a this election day the powerpp. of >> -- c-span now app. >> from now until election

night, follow c-span coverage of debates, rallies and candidate events, events as they happen on tv and on the c-span now app. on demand on their website and find our election data website. ♪ >> c-spanshop.org is c-span's online store. browse through our latest collection of c-span products, apparel, home decor and accessories. there is something for every c-span fan and every purchase helps us support our nonprofit operations. shop now at c-span jopp.org -- c-span shop.org. >> there are a lot of places to get political information, but

only at c-span do you get it straight from the source. no matter where you are from or where you stand on the issues, c-span's america has network. unfiltered, unbiased, word for word. if it happens here, or here, or here, or here, or anywhere that matters, america is watching on c-span, powered by cable. >> washington journal continues. host: back this morning. we now have university of virginia miller center chair marc selverstone. thank you for joining us on the 60th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis. let's start today -- about october 16, 1962 is when president john f. kennedy was shown a photograph taken by a plane over cuba. what did these pictures show/ guest: they revealed -- what did

these pictures show? >> they revealed the existence of the soviet missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. president kennedy twice the previous month said that if the soviets placed offensive weapons systems in cuba, the gravest consequences would arise. kennedy had laid down his redline twice, once on september 4 because there was chatter in washington that the soviets were bringing missiles into cuba, and there were pictures revealing that they were. those missiles turned out to be surface to air missiles. the ballistic missiles could land on the united states, and there were two kinds that the soviets were trying to bring in. medium-range missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles, which would have

covered no less then the united states. when kennedy was shown pictures of these likely installations that were going up on the 16th of october, 1962 that was gravely concerning, so he decided to gather together the seniormost officials in his government,, defense, state, intelligence, as well as others he was particularly close with to figure out what to do about it. or jeanette for kennedy, he was able to -- fortunately for kennedy, he was able to keep this under wraps for about a week. kennedy would not go public with this information until the following monday when he delivered his televised address to the american people, laying out what the soviets had done and what he proposed to do about it, which was a blockade of cuba

in order to get those missiles created and moved off of -- crated and moved off of cuba. from the 22nd all the way to the end of the crisis on october 28, there was a lot of diplomatic wrangling, threats, bargaining, back channel diplomacy to try to figure out how to get the weapons off and what to give khrushchev, essentially, in return as a diplomatic bargain. host: first of all, we are showing now a map on the atomicarchive.com. a 1200 mile range from cuba, it almost looks like half or so of the united states. the 2500 mile range missile gets everything other than northern

california and the upper pacific northwest. i wanted to make sure people could visualize what that range looks like. let's back up a second. the state of the cold war, because all of this is happening in the cold war. could you contextualize this crisis within the cold war story? guest: and within kennedy's story as well, which is significantly. the cold war had been raging. there were debates about when the cold war began but since the late 1940's, there was this global contest, ideological as well as geographical, between two systems -- the western, capitalist, open democratic system, and the much more closed, authoritarian,

totalitarian, communist system led by the soviet union. over the course of the 1940's and into the 1950's, both sides emerged as armed camps, especially in western europe where you had the nato, representing most of the western democracies then -- the cold war had expanded through the 1950's around the world, particularly to asia. when china became communist in 1949, that was seen as a grave blow to the west. that same year the soviet union detonated its first nuclear device. the west no longer had a monopoly on atomic weapons. during the course of the 1950's both sides set out to try to enhance their power territorially as well as militarily. by the late 1950's there was a

real concern about soviet missiles, and this is particularly true after the launch of sputnik in october of 1957, which proved that the soviets had this ballistic capability, a missile that could circle the globe and land on the united states. the u.s. did not have that. beginning in 1957 there was a push to enhance the west's nato's capabilities to combat that soviet offensive threat. deals were struck with a variety of european countries, particularly turkey and italy, subsequently, to place intermediate range ballistic missiles on the rim of the soviet union. what we start to see are these 2 armed camps facing off with

missiles. that is what kennedy is confronted with when he becomes president in '61. that is militarily what is going on, but specifically in the caribbean, fidel castro had deposed bautista who had been the dictator in cuba in early 1959, and over the next several months had made increasingly charged statements, indicating his displeasure with the united states, although there was some possibility that there would be a rapprochement. the eisenhower administration became concerned about what it saw as a leftist turn in the cuban revolution and during the latter part of the year into

1950, the eisenhower administration prepared plans to overthrow castro. those plans do not get implemented in the eisenhower administration so they fall on kennedy's desk when he becomes president in 1961. it is one of the first things kennedy has to do with -- deal with. should he change it? kennedy decides to change it a little bit, which arguably affected his prospects a little bit, but the upshot was there was an effort to depose castro that we usually refer to as the bay of pigs debacle. host: they sent a bunch of exiled cubans to go back to cuba to try to overthrow castro. guest: exactly. it was a plan that was essentially run by the cia, not by the defense department. it was a brilliant disaster as people have referred to it. a zillion things went wrong, and

we could get into that, but one of the implications of that failed coup is that kennedy got a real blackeye. he took responsibility for it. he was the chief executive of the u.s. government and it was his responsibility, but he was very upset with a number of the facets of his government, which had implications for how he would handle national security affairs moving forward, but it set the stage for continuing u.s. displeasure with castro for the next several years. by the end of 1961 there is a full-blown sabotage plan ultimately to destabilize and even to assassinate fidel castro to overthrow that government. castro knew about it. the soviets knew about it. arguably one of the reasons

those soviet ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, moved into cuba was to protect the cuban revolution. if the united states was going to try it again, they might as well support efforts to try yet again. host: they bonded together, russia and cuba. guest: yes. host: let me ask you, the group of advisers became a big part of this cuban missile crisis. can you talk about this group, who was in it? guest: it is referred to ex-con, which was a rump organization of the national security officials. you have robert mcnamara, dean

rest, director of central intelligence john cohen, and you have deputies for several of them as well. you have george ball, who is the number two at the state department, you have roswell fitzpatrick who is number two at the defense department. you have others. coming in and out robert f. kennedy was part of that. john f. kennedy brought in others who are particularly important to him because they had expertise in soviet affairs or they were particularly sensitive to the president's mind and could help him express his desires. tim sorensen, his speechwriter had been with kennedy longer than anybody else in the upper reaches of government.

you also have thompson, who was the previous u.s. ambassador to the soviet union. he was the guy kennedy would turn to again and again as well as another figure, also a previous ambassador to the soviet union. he tried to figure out what khrushchev was up to. why the devil would he do this? one of the features of this secret portion of the missile crisis, we often refer to it as the 13 days of the crisis, 6 or 7 of those days were days that only the u.s. knew about. the public crisis -- " why the devil would he do this?" that is almost an exact quote.

he fixes on a couple of reasons, but primarily for him, it is about berlin, khrushchev is trying to put these missiles into cuba to leverage the united states to sign a peace deal that would turn the full sovereignty of berlin, and in west berlin you still had three occupying western powers left over from world war ii, to get them out of there. it had been a thorn in the side of khrushchev and the east germans, that they rectify with the building of the berlin wall in august of 1961, but it was still unsatisfactory for khrushchev. there were all kinds of hassles that were going on. these issues transit between the two sides. khrushchev said again and again, particularly in 1962, we will

settle this by november. this is going to go to east germany. kennedy once he sees that the missiles are in cuba and reflects on all of these signals he is getting about khrushchev and berlin, he puts two and two together and goes, " that is what it is." host: we will be listening to recordings from the cuban missile crisis in real time, but we will also be opening up the phone lines, so i want to go ahead and give you the numbers so you can start dialing in with your thoughts about the cuban missile crisis or your questions for marc selverstone. the numbers again, if you are in the eastern or central time zones, (202) 748-8000. if you are in mountain or

pacific time zones, (202) 748-8001. if you lived through it, if you remember the cuban missile crisis, we want you to call (202) 748-8002. we talked about that ex-com group of advisers. i want to play you some tapes, taking you into the white house. here is some of the deliberations in october 1962 between president kennedy and those advisors. these audiotapes are compiled by the university of virginia's miller center. [video clip]

host: that was air force general curtis lemay. he said " you are in a pretty bad fix." what role did general lemay play in the crisis and what was president kennedy's relationship with the chief of staff? guest: the clip we heard comes

from the third day of the crisis after kennedy is really on the move towards this position of imposing a blockade. it was largely a consensus position by then, although there would still be some wrangling for the next couple of days, but lemay and the joint chiefs were dead set against it. they thought, as we heard in the clip, that this was a pretty weak response. at another point in that conversation, lemay says this is the bad as the appeasement at munich, and those were fighting words for jfk whose father joseph kennedy was the ambassador to the court of st. james during the 1930's and hitler's provocations in the late 1930's, 1940 and

appeasement and joe kennedy got a new mix together. it is indicative of the relationship, the challenging relationship, i would say, kennedy had with the joint chiefs and the military by and large. relations were not at their best through the course of 1961, particularly because of the bay of pigs and what happened there. thinking kennedy should have essentially gone in and supported those cuban fighters, who were valiantly trying to overthrow castro, and claim their country back. kennedy had changed the way the operation would go. he wanted to downplay u.s. responsibility for it, certainly any indication that the united states was supporting these refugees, even though the evidence to that effect was numerous and flowing freely in

the papers before hand. they were dumbfounded, really that kennedy didn't do anything about it. he took a real hit with the joint chiefs. not publicly. publicly his approval ratings went through the roof, but again and again, the chiefs thought that kennedy, when push came to shove, would not act to defend u.s. interests. it is not only with cuba, but with laos, which was the other global security crisis kennedy faced. the outgoing president eisenhower recommended that if things looked really bad and it looked like to the communists were going to take over in laos, the u.s. should act militarily to prevent that. host: eisenhower was willing to be more aggressive. guest: kennedy had a military background too.

in the south pacific in world war ii, he understood what combat was all about. because of his position, he also had some questions about the wisdom of the brass above him. he had the junior officer's skepticism of those in charge, and they had some skepticism about this whippersnapper young president. that lasted throughout the course of 1961 throughout a variety of additional concerns. the berlin wall being one of them. by the time we get to 1962, they have had several experiences, which did them have muddied the waters. they are not comfortable with each other. kennedy does not like what he has seen in terms of plans for, essentially an nuclear

conflagration. if we try to take berlin, what happens as a result? what happens if there is a major escalation? a single integrated operational plan from 1962, let everything go. fire it all, not only at the soviets, but the chinese as well. kennedy was beside himself. " we call ourselves the human race," after hearing those plans. host: we are going to get to more recordings, but i want to take some calls now. we have john in baton rouge, louisiana. what do you remember about the cuban missile crisis? caller: thank you for taking my call. i want to educate all the people that do not know what that era, what happened. i remember. kubo what -- kubo was like the

united states. we-- cuba was like the united states. we used to go there to gamble, until castro took over. castro and kennedy got into it. then khrushchev took a valuable situation, came into cuba, wind against kennedy and brought all these nuclear things in -- went against kennedy and brought all these nuclear things in. same thing is happening in ukraine. russia is supposed to be the united states' ally, but think about what is going on in the united states. i was there. we had chaos, danger, nuclear war. you can make your own decisions. we.are in ukraine -- we are in ukraine. all our troops are there.

look at what is going on. you cannot say that russia is not going to think that we have nuclear weapons in ukraine, so take it from there united states. mr. stallone was a very intelligent man. what he said was host: let us let our guest respond to that comment. guest: certainly, there is a concern today about ukraine. as many commentators have observed, this may be one of the more dangerous moments in world history since back in october of 1962. i would just say that, in october of 62, for a variety of reasons, kennedy and he were

able to find their way to a peaceful resolution, largely because of signaling they were doing to each other the ability to have that channel of conversations to better understand bottom lines and opportunities for for concluding the crisis peacefully. there were several moments where things could have gone very differently. i would say today is a little different. host: we received a text message, it simply says prime minister khrushchev was a bunch mentor man -- much better man than putin. we have heard from many callers today that say khrushchev and his relationship with the united

states was much different than putin and his relationship. can you explain what the differences? -- difference is? guest: i am not a putin expert or necessarily a khrushchev expert, but the histories are different. khrushchev lips to the horrors of the 1930's, 1940's -- lived through the horrors of the 1930's, 1940's, world war ii. he understood what the war meant when it came to the soviet union. i think he was a little bit chastened as a result. khrushchev and putin grew up in very different errors. but i would say -- eras. but i would say the challenges that entity and khrushchev were facing at the time -- kennedy and khrushchev were facing at the time were a norm is, yet they both worked their way --

enormous -- it they both worked their way toward accommodation, understanding there was flexibility they both had in their positions. this was not the first time cuba had been a flashpoint in the kennedy administration. in some respects, the current crisis is more intractable. the positions have hardened a little bit. it may be tougher to come to a conclusion, particularly because there is a shooting war going on. that was not the case. of course, major anderson died on october 27, his plane was shot down. some other american flyers had been killed, as well. but between the u.s. and soviet union did not happen to make sure it would not have been.

host: this is mick in ohio. what is your comment or question? caller: good morning, thank you for taking my call. i just tuned in, forgive me if i missed the stream of consciousness. there's so much to unpack. i think we are on the threshold of disaster here, much more than october of 62. it is not being reported by mainstream media, of course. propaganda against russia, all-pro ukrainian. there is a back story, a lot more to it, going back to the crimea situation. also, the overthrow of a democratically elected president of ukraine. with the neolibs, the same cheerleaders were chicken hawks who got us into iraq and several

other middle eastern countries illegally and immorally. they are behind this, also. people like victoria nuland, jake sullivan, they are proteges of the neocons. host: where are you getting your information about the root cause of the russia ukraine conflict? caller: from veterans, retired military, cia analysts, youtube. i do not feel mainstream media is giving us the truth. host: did you have anything you want to that? -- add to that? guest: in 19 62, the media landscape was very different. it was possible for what was developing down in cuba to

develop without a lot of eyeballs placed on it. the kennedy administration is able to deliberate, essentially in secret, for six days or so. about what to do once it discovered the soviets were placing medium-range missiles in cuba, had intended to place intermediate range missiles in cuba. 2400 miles. in an extraordinary turn of events, they have time to work through solution, without the prying eyes of the world. even large parts of the u.s. government. that is not the case. there is a lot more transparency today through the kind of media we all know. so things moved a little more slowly in 1962, there was more

opportunity for the liberation and the shooting war had not started. i think that is what really saved the world from something that could have been absolutely horrific, that was the challenge. to prevent the missiles from flying to begin with, because nobody knew when it would stop. you do not want to try to find that out. the challenge for kennedy and khrushchev was to bargain their way toward some kind of resolution, with each side giving in a little bit. it is ultimately how the crisis got resolved. host: we are going to listen to more of those recordings. talk about the miller center's presidential recording project. what is it, and how do you have these tapes? guest: we all have them. they are tapes that were made -- it is not just by the kennedy administration.

administrations going back to franklin roosevelt also made these tapes. roosevelt, truman, eisenhower, kennedy, johnson and nixon. those are the six presidencies for which we have these secret tapes, tapes that were made surreptitiously that only a handful of people knew about. the president, maybe one or two advisors, and some technical experts at the white house. we believe they were made largely on the instruction of the presidents themselves and would be useful later on in helping them write their memoirs. there's also some indication that at times, they were used in real-time, and conversation with other officials. we hear lyndon johnson, perhaps, even reading part of a transcript from a tape that had been made on his orders.

the miller center has been doing this work on these presidential recordings since 1998, it is an extraordinary project. we publish thieves through the university of virginia press. we are moot -- these through the university of virginia press. we are moving through them, the kennedy tapes for the first ones we transcribed back in the latter part of the 20th century. we continue to transcribe them into the 21st. they provide an extraordinary window onto what happens in the white house, the very highest councils of power, what was the president thinking? who was he talking to? what advice is he getting? was he warned not to do something or encouraged to do certain things? what did he say? invariably, there is a question about, didn't he realize he had pushed the button? he knew what he was saying was being taped?

there is an element of that, i would say early on in some of the conversations. particularly for kennedy, who had to physically activate a switch to turn the machine on. a machine that captured 248 hours of his conversation, that is a lot of time. as we have come to realize, a small part of this -- we have been doing this since 1998 -- it is extraordinary to hear kennedy and his advisors grapple their way toward the conclusion of these crises in real time, with nobody else in the room knowing they were being taped. kennedy, we believe at times, forgetting he was grabbing all of the stuff on tape. it is an amazing window into decision-making at the highest levels. host: on that note, we are going to listen to another recording. for those who are audio only, we are showing -- if you can find a

video either in real-time on c-span, on our website, our app, or go back later. these are recordings from 19 six to do, they are not the clearest audio. they're the best we can do. on the video, you can see the transcript and read the transcript. this recording is from october 22, 1962. it is jfk consulting with former president dwight eisenhower. the tape starts with ike, president eisenhower, asking what time kennedy will make a tv address later that night. [video clip]

host: that sounded like a phone call between eisenhower and kennedy, but it highlighted what you talked about earlier. eisenhower was among those military officials really trying to push kennedy to be aggressive

toward cuba. guest: i would say eisenhower certainly supported kennedy's diplomacy in this regard. what is particularly striking for me is the difference between eisenhower and kennedy in their thinking about why these missiles are there in the first place. for kennedy, this is really about berlin. this is another plate to try to put pressure on the western powers at a time when khrushchev , the soviet premier, was working with the east germans to essentially consolidate berlin as part of east germany and a check the western powers. western powers that had been there, by right, since the end of world war ii. kennedy kept coming back to berlin again and again. for eisenhower, that was not it at all. the soviets, as we heard them

say, will probe wherever the opportunity arises. throughout these conversations, we really hear kennedy thinking about cuba and berlin together. it is this crisis he fears, khrushchev is maintaining he is going to find a separate treaty and turn it all over to the east germans. that is a real problem for the western powers. host: quickly, what was the relationship between kennedy and eisenhower? where they buds, was a just professional? guest: i would not say they were buds. they had a long-standing -- maybe not so long-standing, but certainly for the previous few years, healthy -- contempt may be too strong.

but they were wary of each other. eisenhower did not think a whole lot initially of that young whippersnapper, and kennedy thought eisenhower was pretty christie and said in his ways. -- crusty and set in his ways. they did not get on all that well, though particularly after kennedy first met eisenhower during the transition period, he came away more impressed with ike and his command of the global situation. they had their challenges, they were from different political parties. that in and of itself created tension between the two. eisenhower is the outgoing president, he had served his two terms, so he could not come back. but he was clearly the most important figure in the republican party nationally. he was a force to contend with. here is john f. kennedy, a junior grade officer in world

war ii. eisenhower was the five-star general, planning operation overlord with the invasion of d-day, that is quite a disparity in rank. there are several eisenhower kennedy conversations, fortunately they come through really clearly. this was a telephone conversation, so unlike some of the others, which are room conversations where the microphones themselves pick up the sound. they developed a way to work together, and eisenhower is supportive of kennedy throughout the crisis. host: before we get back to a couple of phone calls, i want to play another recording. this one is a conversation between president kennedy and democratic senator richard russell. this is also on october 22, before jfk addresses the nation. [video clip]

host: it is 90 minutes before the speech president kennedy makes to the country on tv about his decision to blockade. tell us what is going on in the room between him and senator russell. guest: it is not just senator russell, it is the congressional leaders. seniormost figures in congress, 20 of them have gathered with kennedy. russell is a democrat from georgia, kennedy's own party. kennedy's briefing him on what is about to happen, congress is

out of session, so they came back to washington. here they are, kennedy is delivering the news of what the united states has found in cuba and with the administration proposed to do about it, which is to pose -- impose a blockade and try to force khrushchev to take the missiles off the island. it is not a belligerent response, though a blockade is technically an act of war. host: and it keeps supplies from getting to cuba, like kind devices them out? -- kind of ices the amount? guest: yes, particularly acknowledging that would help the missiles launched. it was not clear to the u.s. at the time the readiness state of the missiles. we know now that medium-range ballistic missiles would essentially be ready to go. the blockade that kennedy

announced, then would impose, starting at 10:00 a.m. on the 24th -- this is a conversation taking place at 5:30 p.m. on the 22nd, a day and a half or so. a blockade will be imposed to try to prevent more weapons or materials for weapons from coming in. essentially, what they do is freeze out the intermediate range ballistic missiles, it is longer-range missiles. there are still missiles already there, the blockade is supposed to, essentially, give them time to try to get those missiles off the island. we see again and again kennedy reaching for measures short of war, because once the bullets start flying end start flying, no one knows where things will stop. that is his great concern, that this will be some type of runaway conflict with new their weapons.

nobody wants to see that -- nuclear weapons. nobody wants to see that. kennedy is probably foremost among the people with who he was deliberating was most sensitive to that. again and again and again, reached for solutions to take possible conflagration off the table. i would head a little bit -- hedge a little bit, there were others who were strongly supportive of negotiations area -- negotiations. the u.s. ambassador to the u.n., probably the most important one, kennedy's counselor. we see kennedy again and again trying to create an opportunity for the two sides to see their way through this conflict so the bombs do not start falling. that is the challenge. certainly beginning on october 22, when kennedy and his team went public with the fact the soviets had placed ballistic

missiles in cuba, 90 miles from american shores. as we hear it in the conversation, russell is of the mind, you have got to do something about this now. kennedy saying it takes a while to do something about this, as he goes on and on. they have to assemble a strike force, that will take about a week. so, get those people ready, there are several moves that have to be made. in the interim, kennedy is going to try to engage in a process of bargaining to get the missiles out. host: i want to show on the screen, it is helpful for me to see the blockade line of the ships. this is the website for the 14th day, which is a very well-known book about the cuban missile crisis. they have a map that shows where american ships were positioned to create -- it was called a

quarantine to avoid using the word blockade, which is considered an act of war. the u.s. positioned all of these ships to keep supplies from getting to cuba. let us go to calls. harry -- gary is in virginia. caller: thank you. i was a student in fifth grade elementary school when a captain, major and colonel showed up at the door. the girl on the front right screamed. i thought, why is she screaming? the teacher called her up to the front of the class, she told the class she was sorry she was not going to be able to be with us anymore. then found out later, her father was a pilot who got shot down over cuba. i remember ike.

well. his ship of state had a plank of common sense, up to the gunnels and logic. thank you very much for your time. host: as you did mention, there were some casualties. was it on both sides, or? guest: rudolph anderson was shot down on the 27th, conducting and overflight of cuba. he was shot down with a surface-to-air missile, between 70000 and 80,000 feet. that was a particularly dangerous moment in the crisis, because now there was a clear fatality as a result of hostile fire. they were getting to a point where kennedy was receiving increasing pressure to move on

cuba, a strike force was being assembled we had -- assembled. he recognized implications of that. if they move on cuba, it is possible to shooting might have been extensive. some of the weapons they suspected that were ready might have been fired off. there was a fear that with everybody focused on what was happening in the caribbean, the soviets and east germans were to move on berlin and take berlin, which is a concern throughout the entirety of the crisis. we heard more earlier about the concerns regarding berlin. this is a particularly dangerous moment, this 27th of october. perhaps the most dangerous moment of the cold war. it is people like david coleman, whose work on the 14th day's so important for understanding of what happened in the crisis to reveal how close the world came

to conflagration. host: the next caller is jeffrey in pennsylvania. go ahead. caller: yes. please talk about the two letters the kennedy administration received from khrushchev during the missile crisis and kennedy's decision to respond to the second letter and not the first. that seems to be one of the more brilliant decisions that was made as the crisis was unfolding. thank you. guest: it is a good question. the caller is referring to this moment the 26th of october, as well as the 27th of october, when the united states is moving toward a situation where there is a possibility for some kind of a deal.

there was always an interest in trying to make sure the soviets got the missiles off the island and the united states, in turn, would make sure essentially cuba sovereignty was protected and that the crisis could be resolved, essentially peacefully. by the time the united states receives this first notice from khrushchev on the night of the 26th of october, indicating there might be an opportunity to resolve the crisis, the soviets would withdraw the missiles by the time of the 27th the following day. khrushchev essentially has up his demands and is calling for

the removal of not just the blockade around cuba, but also calling for the removal of western missiles that had been placed around the soviet union. nato missiles that were in turkey, as well as in italy. so, that is a really dangerous moment for the kennedy administration. how are they going to get involved in this kind of missile for missile trade? it is something that occurred to the administration earlier in the crisis. the presence of the nato missiles reading the soviet union, how that could be a provocation to khrushchev. by the 27th, when a note comes in from khrushchev indicating missiles are to be withdrawn, that is upping the demands of

the crisis and making it a more dangerous situation. so, that will make the rest of the 27th of october a really challenging day. what do you do about the new demands? do you try to bargain the missiles out, or do you try to stick with an original plan and focus on the soviet missiles and preserve the sovereignty? it is a really challenging day, the 27th of october. host: i am on the website of the jfk library, where they translated and put up translations of these letters. this is a translation of that letter from khrushchev to president kennedy on october 27, 1962. i'm going to scroll down to what you referenced. khrushchev writes, i make this

proposal. we are willing to remove from cuba with the means which you regard as offensive. we are willing to carry this out and make the pledge in the united nations. your representatives will make a declaration to the effect the united states, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the soviet states, will remove its means from turkey. this letter is not public. how many people know about this letter in real time? host: the soviets made their -- guest: the soviets made a declaration publicly. that was the problem, the communication on the 26 was private. kennedy is thinking, maybe we can come to some resolution for the crisis. but by the time the soviets go public, kennedy recognizes the ground shifted and a lot of people will see it as fair

trade. the united states ranked the soviet union with intermediate range ballistic missiles, the soviets have placed medium and supposedly intermediate range ballistic missiles in cuba. those had not come, the presumption is the missiles would soon be there, if they were not there already. so, kind of looked like a tit-for-tat situation. kennedy recognize the compelling logic of some kind of a trade. he also understood the missiles that nato had placed in turkey and italy would soon be obsolete. more effective, from his perspective, would be submarine based missiles, which provide a better deterrent against the soviets, as opposed to missiles

in turkey and italy, which were above ground, fixed above ground. they took a long time to fuel and prepare, they were essentially sitting ducks. there had been all kinds of talk, for months and months, about what to do about these. the italians were interested in making a move, the turks not so much. kennedy, especially from 1961 to 1962, by the time of the crisis, he recognizes them as the provocation they were. now there is possibility of a quit probe quote. they will take missiles out of cuba if the west takes its missiles out of turkey and italy. host: russia proposes this -- i will not read, i will show the letter kennedy sends in return. if russia proposed publicly and it october 27 letter -- in its

october 27 letter, kennedy's response, is that public? i thought i read the turkey quid pro quo was not as publicly stated as some of the other things were to resolve the crisis. guest: the turkey quid pro quo is public, because it is made out in the open. that is something kennedy has to confront. the challenge is to try to get khrushchev to withdraw his missiles, the u.s. would not invade, there would be some kind of resolution to the crisis to get him back to where he was the previous day. that is what kennedy is trying to work out with his colleagues. can you essentially ignore the

communication from khrushchev and focus on the first communication? make sure he understands that and ultimately, by the night of the 27th, when things are getting dicey and maybe a couple days away from a shooting war, the communication goes out from the kennedy administration and the purpose of the attorney general to the soviet ambassador that there will not be a quid pro quo. it will not be a specific understanding. but those missiles that the soviets found to be offensive, those will be gone. they could not construe it as a quid pro quo. but yes, and four to five months, those were likely to be gone. ultimately, we know that is what transpired. even though that was not publicly part of the deal.

host: so much to learn. let us go back to the phone lines, norman in indiana, what do you remember? caller: i was a navy pilot in hawaii, we got an airplane loaded with all kinds of top-secret materials. as soon as the landing strip was secured, we were going to be bringing all of this stuff in there. we were all around the air force base, going to bermuda, all around. ended up in the military base tampa bay. i believe there was a strike force ready to go. that is what confuses me in this presentation. also, i would like to have the commentator explain what

actually determined the outcome of not invading cuba. host: we have heard from more than one member of the military who said we were scrambling, we were headed to cuba. one color earlier said we were almost there. -- caller earlier said we were almost there. was the military really trying to get 90,000 troops to cuba just in case? guest: it was not a slow walk, they were trying to move as expeditiously as they could. in other conversations we have, we do not have time to play, there are 43 hours of conversations about the missile crisis. extraordinary. there are a bunch in which kennedy is speaking with particularly maxwell taylor, chairman of the joint chiefs, about the time it would take to ready a full strike force on cuba, which would involve 90,000 troops initially and upwards of

250,000 after that. it would take a while to get that force ready, since many troops were coming from the west coast. they were moving into position, there was some question about how soon would they be ready to do it. here they are on the 27th, maybe by the 29th or 30th, that strikeforce might be ready. the potential for mayhem, as a result, was extraordinary. the military was moving as quickly as they could. kennedy recognized the time for action was closing. if he was going to act before some type of conflict ration -- conflagration. by the 27th, he is moving quickly to try to make some type of deal with khrushchev to get the missiles out.

conveying that understanding that there is a whole lot of pressure on him to move and take the missiles out by force. if you did so, who knows what that have resulted in? host: i want to remind you, our phone lines are open. if you are on the east coast or central time zone, (202) 748-8000. mountain or pacific, (202) 748-8001. if you remember the cuban missile crisis, call us at (202) 748-8002. let us do another snippet of audio. this one is one of the dicier moments during the crisis, it is from october 27. a lot happened on october 27. this one is -- i am sorry, october 25. jfk and his advisers are discussing stopping a passenger

ship that is approaching the line, the blockade line. let us listen. [video clip]

host: we are talking about a cruise ship, do know more about the ship and what would be the dangers of enforcing the blockade by stopping the ship, possibly sinking? the ship? guest: there were some ships that the united states allowed to go through the blockade, some that it did not rooted some ended up turning back. the ships that were carrying the contraband did end up turning

around and went back to the soviet union. what remained on cuba where the medium-range ballistic missiles. the blockade to serve its purpose, but it did not stop, necessarily, the construction on medium-range ballistic missiles that were on the island, getting them ready to fire. much of the day of the 25th is focused on what to do about the ships that are approaching the blockade lines. some of which were soviet bloc ships, some were not. they were steaming into cuba. do you make a show of force and convey to your adversary you are willing to do this? do you let some ships go, because it is unclear whether or not there may be some type of provocation that results? if the bullets start a fire, where does that leave you? this is a particularly dangerous moment, the administration is

making the calculations in real time. we will let some ships go, not others. we will board some, check them out, not others. it is the process of signaling going on for much of the day of the 25th, this is the day after the quarantine has been put in place. there is not a whole lot of conversation, at least from kennedy's tapes, during the stay on the 25th about how to resolve the crisis. it is about what is happening at this line the united states imposed, which initially is 800 miles out from cuba. it gets brought back to 500 miles to provide both sides with a little bit more opportunity to think things through. where did they want to go with this? the further out the line is, perhaps the safed or it is -- safer it is for the united states.

closer to cuba, it gives both sides a chance to think. that is the process of bargaining that was going on throughout the crisis. host: let us take another call. from detroit, you lived through the cuban missile crisis. what do you want to share? caller: i was living in chicago during the crisis. they were flying those planes out of great lakes, we cannot go to work for a whole week. that was the most scary moment in the history of my life. straight out of miami, we watched it because we could not go to work. they had chicago locked down,

nothing was moving. all that stuff shut down. they were flying the planes out of great lakes, down across lake michigan. you could see them, you could hear the boom. he was watching it, we see them sometimes -- we was watching it outside, we see them sometimes. he thought kennedy was a young, weak president. he admitted it, he was trained to pull it over his head. that is what i know about it. host: thank you for your thoughts. two things, number one, how much of an impact on day-to-day life to this create for americans that were not connected to the military? the second thing is, did this

boost committees -- kennedy's stature coming out of the cuban missile crisis? guest: first question first, it gave people a lot of pause during the period from the 22nd until the crisis was resolved on the 28th, really. there were some reports of panic buying in stores, very concerning for people wondering where they might be when all of this is over. more so for members of the administration who recognized the dangers they were facing. but it was a rough time. we see the pictures today of people huddled around television sets watching kennedy's address at 7:00 the night of october 22. the crisis had become public, it was scary. both sides recognized. the rhetoric is belligerent, that is scary. especially when you are talking

about nuclear weapons. this is a tough moment in the cold war. this is khrushchev, these were the soviets from that era. kennedy did not want to back down. publicly. behind the scenes, we know he is taking all kinds of steps to try to manage this crisis. so, it was very much a public crisis from the 22nd to the 28th. once it gets resolved, there are all kinds of things dispensed and draped over kennedy for doing it so successfully, with such skill, seemingly. people did not know what was going on behind the scenes. it sure looks like there was a tremendous diplomatic act he had pulled off to get the missiles

off of cuba. there was a non-invasion pledge, that is quite extraordinary. host: this is vera from washington, d.c. what do you want to share about your memories of the cuban missile crisis? caller: thank you for having this program. i am from chicago, originally. i came to washington straight out of college. being from illinois and living in an academic setting most of my life, stephenson was so revered. as i recall, during the democratic convention, stephenson still headed following and kennedy -- his relationship with kennedy was not so great. many of us were very

disappointed that stephenson was not selected as secretary of state. much later, i was also involved in the psychology of tyranny and negotiations. i knew people researching that. the story then was we have stephenson to thank for the final agreement -- what would you say, compromise that got us out. i hear he was not on the committee, i did not quite get what that was. he was not part of the inner circle. but also, some would stop at kennedy's inaugural address. never negotiate from fear, but we should never fear to negotiate. that was stephenson -- voting stephenson or not.

i would love to know -- the final decision, which was so complicated -- what kind of a role did he have? host: can you talk about that? i have seen in my research and things like that, there are different things that were written about stephenson's involvement. on october 25, i think he had a speech that got a lot of attention. this is on the jfk library website. this is one, here it is. it says during the debate in the security council, the un security council, the normal courteous u.s. ambassador stephenson aggressively confronted his soviet human counterpart zoren with photographic evidence of the

missiles in cuba. that is from october 25. it read he also might have been the one to suggest the exchange. what can you fill in? guest: he becomes a really important figure in all of this. he comes out pretty forcefully on the 25th and kennedy is pleased watching that, and says he did not know he had it in him. but he is one of the ones who is most concerned with trying to resolve the conflict peacefully. he is really the only one on the first day of the crisis, the 16th into the 17th of october, who will try to figure out a specific way to solve it. everyone else, including kennedy , thinks at some point they will go in and get the missiles out. ultimately, we know that kennedy himself gravitates toward the more peaceful solution. but adali is pushing diplomacy.

so, he becomes really something of a hero in the end, even though the administration ultimately kind of paints stevenson as more willing to cave to the soviets than the kennedys. that gets publicized in some of the literature post crisis, there is a famous piece that gets run in the seven-day -- saturday evening post in which -- because that is what the authors being kennedy cronies --were getting from the kennedys themselves. that adlai was weaker than the others, willing to cave. the kennedys stood tough. yet, it is the diplomatic

solution adlai is pushing that ultimately kennedy will reach for, making sure bullets do not fly first. host: just briefly, some say kennedy threw stephenson under the bus in the recaps. is that to avoid the criticism for the quid pro quo he ultimately went with? guest: absolutely. there is essentially a trade going on. as it becomes public, that is not going to be good for president kennedy's political standing. he keeps that under wraps. there is instruction that goes out from bobby kennedy on the night of the 27th that there is no quid pro quo. you are not to understand these two things are linked, these missiles in the soviet union, turkey and italy are going to be withdrawn for the withdrawal of the soviet missiles in cuba. to understand and fortified

months -- in 45 months, the missiles will be out -- four to five months, the missiles will be out. that is essentially how the crisis get resolved. but it cannot be spoken of out loud at the time. host: let us go to some more recordings. this is from october 27, a busy day. this is when moscow floats the idea of the trade of soviet missiles in cuba for nato missiles in turkey. we will hear president kennedy and his advisors talking about that. [video clip]

host: that is an excerpt of their discussion when moscow floats the idea of a trade. we are going to do one more, this is more debate between kennedy and his advisors over whether they should go forward with trading the soviet missiles

in cuba with nato missiles in turkey. [video clip]

host: they are saying this is the deal, i thought it was interesting when president kennedy said if we allow this to get the bloodshed, people are not going to be so resolute in standing up to cuba once people start dying.

i thought that was pretty accurate. what were the back channels kennedy had to khrushchev, and how did that shape the decision-making during this time? guest: there were a couple of back channels. formal and informal, information that got to kennedy. with a variety of soviet officials who were in washington. these were back channels the administration had used, really from the early months of the kennedy presidency. they were used to working with these officials, some folks were involved with thetru and somewhere and a busy -- the tru and some were embassy officials. it is an attempt to work out a resolution to the conflict before the bullets started flying and the bombs started to drop. so, it is part of the dance the

two sides were doing. how do you resolve this without people dying? part of kennedy's strategy here was to play for time, have these conversations, make it clear to the other side what your bottom line is. try to get the other side to reason with you, and come back away from the abyss. which is what they were both staring into. so that the knot did not get untied. with each day the crisis lasted, they came closer to the conflagration. the strike force being assembled in florida would be closer to being ready, all of the missiles would be closer to being ready. then, if the strike force was launched, it is conceivable there might have been some type of soviet reprisal. that is really dangerous. kennedy is trying to get to that point, where they can make some kind of a deal to resolve the crisis.

these moments on the 27th are the climax of the whole thing, really. host: we've been talking all morning about the cuban missile crisis, but you have a new book about jfk in vietnam that is going to be released in about a month, november 15. tell us about that book and what you reveal about kennedy. guest: it is something i've been interested in a long time. kennedys plans for vietnam, because he is saddled with vietnam from the earliest part of his administration. the challenge is to try to figure out what to do about it. a crisis that was growing more intractable by the day. particularly as the united states had more challenges with its own ally. what kennedy is essentially

looking to do -- it is declared publicly in october of 1963 -- the u.s. is planning to get out of vietnam by 1965, after having committed itself to sending and 16,000 military advisers during the course of kennedy's presidency. that is an extraordinary excavation -- escalation, given little over 700 and been there previously. the question for historians for a long time has been, what was kennedy's plans for vietnam? with a fully committed to getting the troops out, come what may? or was he trying to bargain somehow in vietnam to make sure the north vietnamese, who were threatening at the time were not able to undermine the regime and kennedy had all kinds of troubles with the resume himself.

it is hard to know exactly where things would have gone, but ultimately that deal to get the united states out that kennedy is moving towards gets reversed by lyndon johnson in 1964. the question ultimately becomes how many more troops are going to get in, ultimately leading to the bullets flying in a big war in 1965. host: thank you so much. we have been talking to the chair of the miller center on presidential recordings. i want to make sure all of our listeners and viewers know there is a special bonus of the recordings podcast now available with more audio clips from those fateful 13 days in october during the cuban missile crisis. find and follow the presidential recordings wherever you listen to podcasts. that will do it for us for

"washington journal" today. we will be be back -- we will be back tomorrow morning at 7:00 a.m.. ♪ [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> c-span's washington journal, everyday we are taking calls live on the air, on the news of the day, and discussing policy issues that impact you. monday morning, the president of the democratic legislative campaign committee discusses efforts to elect more democrats at state legislative doubles this november, and the senior research strategist at george mason university center on

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>> we are not arguing it was exclusively a southern phenomenon but focusing on the south because that is where the violence was concentrated and that is where folks were disenfranchised. so now they have a real ability to affect the political reality because they had no jurors, judges, police officers. they were exposed, not only at the violence of a law enforcement but also bus drivers and others in positions of authority who felt their role was to enforce the jim crow era. >> tonight at eight :00 eastern on c-span's q and a. you can listen to all of our podcasts on our free c-span now app.