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>> cox supports c-span as a public service along with these other television providers, giving you a front row seat to democracy. >> now to a discussion on the relationship between the united states and china from the center of international interest. among the topics, taiwan and the one china policy and how beijing views the u.s. policy in ukraine. this is about 50 minutes. >> our current speaker will be my long-standing friend, elbridge colby, author of a new book called "strategy of denial ." it contains a great deal of prominence for his contention that we should be looking more at asia -- i think he is calling for an asia-first policy rather than expending so much effort on

europe. our second speaker is paul, formerly affiliated with the center for national interest and now a senior fellow at the chicago council of foreign relations. he's is also the author of a book called "mr. x and asia." he is a gifted writer and lucid finger, and i am delighted to kick off our conversation with these two authors and foreign policy experts by asking them, in the wake of the balloon incident, which acquired so much prominence in recent weeks, are the united states and china inevitably headed toward some kind of clash, or can it be warded off? can we establish a more mutually beneficial relationship? elbridge: thank you, my friend.

great to be with you, jacob, and with paul as well. i will try to be brief. i think rivalry and to some degree confrontation is inevitable. as a matter of fact, it is already there, and i think that is driven by structure 10 incommensurate goals -- by structure and incommensurate goals the u.s. and china have. i do not believe that war is inevitable. i think eli roth put it well asking senator rubio the other day. the way to do so is from a position of strength. that is a cliche, but i think there's truth in it. my view, as we discussed before, is that we need to be hawkish, if you will, to get to a place where we can be more dovish. i think a country like china --

i was having a conversation with some chinese experts a while ago about the book, and they said you could describe the way you are talking about it us country c and you as country a, and i think it is right. it is human nature that as china grows, it's going to see what it can get away with. the u.s. is familiar with a country that is rising in power and will likely be tended to use it. it will negotiate the terms of its continued rise on terms that are reasonable, equitable to us, so in a sense, the goal for us is detente, but to get to did hunt, we have to be in a position where china has to respect our fundamental equities. i think if we try now that we are likely to get taken

advantage of. i was just reviewing paul's i thought thoughtful and insightful discussion pivoting off my books that involve some critiques, and i hope we can get into some of these more fundamental issues. i think international politics tends toward the darwinian at some level. animals practice it as well. i think that's the sort of model that we want. i think as we discussed before, jacob, my goal is not revolution -- for the chinese people's sake, i would wish a revolution away from the communist government, but i don't think we need dismemberment or regime change in china. what we need is a china that respects others' do claims in equities and china in that world will be one of the two superpowers that will command respect.

it will have weight within our sphere of influence even if we don't formally recognize it. my friend puts it, we have to sprint to qualify for the marathon, and i think that's the trouble where we are now. jacob: paul, sprint to qualify for the marathon -- is that what we need to do? paul: i would not disagree with that. i actually concur with much of what bridge just said. i agree that conflict is not inevitable. where i might diverge is i think that bridge said we need to be hawkish before we can be dovish. i think we need to be both at the same time. i fully agree that we need to bolster our defense capabilities. you come back to the taiwan issue and across-the-board, but i think that cannot be to the exclusion of diplomacy. i think that is one of the tragic consequences -- maybe

tragic is too strong a word -- of this balloon episode. i think there was at least an attempt to get into some momentum of restoring reciprocal engagement of the chinese, than i think the balloon episode really revealed the strategic mistrust and hostility on both sides or the inherent disinclination to be attentive to each other's speck of interest. in that regard, i agree that our goal should be to reach a point where china is able to accept peaceful coexistence with the united states, although he did not use the term. i think it does apply in which the chinese respect our fundamental interests, but i don't think we can escape an element to that inquiry -- to that equation that involves the u.s. paying more attention to what the chinese perceive as their fundamental interests. there's different elements of how you want to define core interests.

maybe that is the main point i think on where we diverge, if the hawkish approach is the only one we should pursue. i'm a big fan of engagement. i think that is a necessary element of this equation. i think we are in a bad place of the relationship right now because the balloon has exposed why there is desire on both sides to pursue that. there's not enough mutual trust. jacob: i want to tell the audience, all our viewers, that i am more than happy to pose your questions to our panelists. if you just submit them, i will ask them. let me cut to the nitty-gritty. right now, there's a lot of talk about china assisting russia. the biden administration has publicly warned china not to

send military equipment, not to raid the arsenal to aid russia in its war of conquest against ukraine. how does that fit with your thesis that we are expending too much effort on ukraine and not enough on china? are we in fact seeing an alliance between the two developing? elbridge: effectively it is an alliance in the pre-19 14 use of the term. they are allied in the way britain and france were in 1914. the fact that they are actually actively collaborating only accentuates the importance of focusing on asia because it means they can act to try to distract us which i think is highly possible. i don't know but it would not surprise me if the chinese are deliberately encouraging that

dynamic. i was saying this the last couple days. secretary blinken warning of serious consequences should they provide support -- and by the way, they have been propping up the russian economy and providing forms of military support. it stands to reason structurally russia is china's only major power ally and they are not going to let that ship go under. russia being weakened has some form of advantage for them in the sense it becomes a more pliant, junior partner. wes mitchell would say a sidecar. and at the same time, it is a useful distraction, especially if the war seems likely to become protracted and the united states seems to be doubling down. there are syria's consequent is, but one year -- they flew a

balloon over our country and that did not have serious consequences? to be fair, i think there are elements within the administration that are trying to focus on china, and i applaud their efforts. there have been semiconductor sanctions, but it is clear to me, i think the president himself, he said it's a fundamental contest between democracy and autocracy. this is the big problem, that we are saying that china is a priority but not actually following through. paul: let me follow-up, just to port in here a little bit -- just to pour in your little bit. if we were to fail to standby kyiv in its war to maintain sovereignty, you don't ink that that would send a signal to china that it is game on?

elbridge: i mean, i think we are realists here. i don't think normative kind of mimicry is how international politics works. i think the chinese -- and this gets to the fundamental issue paul and i were talking about before we got on -- how states make calculations. these are somewhat theoretical, but they are very practical. my view is china's ultimate decision on taiwan will be primarily driven by political achievements. how the united states behaves vis-a-vis ukraine is a data point, but i would say, like, a tertiary one, and that has to be weighed against the more significant issue, which is how does this deplete not only u.s. weapon source but political capital and willingness to expend money and other things just in a generic lyrical sense

vis-a-vis a potential contest in asia -- a general political sense vis-a-vis a potential contest in asia? the logic that you have to fight china in ukraine is the same logic defenders of the war in vietnam applied to the contest in europe, and i just don't think that's true. i'm not in favor of cutting off support for the ukrainians. i think we should support ukrainians consistent with the genuine prioritization of china, and the critical thing we have to bear in mind is that we are not yet on the right trajectory in a good place. there's a good article in "the washington post" saying we need more of a sense of urgency to deter war. we are sort of pocketing -- there is a broader dynamic here. we are pocketing gains as if we have solved problems just because we have recognized them. like the defense industrial base. everybody realizes we need to

spend more and fix our defense industrial base pay or that's like saying we have a smoking problem, but we have not kicked the smoking problem yet but we are acting like we have kicked the smoking problem. the dangerous thing is the war is likely to go on. david's anger was reporting today that the russians may indeed -- their offensives so far have thankfully been unimpressive, but they may do more mobilization -- david sanger was reporting today. putin is not giving up. anything is possible, but i don't think that is a prudent assessment, so we really are confronted by the problem of choice, and i think our stated strategy is correct, china and asia should be our priority. we should act like it. jacob: paul, i'm going to follow-up with you on this and your previous statement that you did not think that a hawkish posture toward china would be beneficial. do you in fact think it would boomerang on the u.s. in places

like ukraine, prompting china to take a tougher line against the u.s.? is that where you are headed? paul: we have at least three different sets of issues we are grappling with. i think i would say a couple of things. i'm not an expert on what is going on on the ground in ukraine, but in terms -- i mean, your question is framed in terms of how beijing is interpreting the u.s. posture and how it should respond to that. i think with regard to taiwan, i think the chinese -- i think their assessment on both of these issues is continuing to evolve. with regard to taiwan, i think the chinese certainly appreciate the extent to which we are preoccupied in europe. i agree on that. and i think they will probably appreciate the extent to which

we are depleting our resources and weaponry there. on the other hand, i think the chinese have to be somewhat kind of chastened by the fighting spirit of the ukrainians, which they can expect to see, i think, in the people of taiwan if they move in that direction. i think the chinese are also frustrated because of the comparisons that have been made, is increasing attention to the taiwan issue, if only for the wrong reasons because there's so many differences there. i think on balance, the chinese are marginally more cautious about that are planning -- about their planning with taiwan. but the chinese are not going to use what is happening in ukraine as an opportunity -- to seize an

opportunity to move against taiwan and we can come back to this, and are think it's because the chinese are not looking for an opportunity to use force against taiwan. that is a separate issue. on a broader issue, the great power confrontation, which is inherent in all the commentary we have seen over the last couple of days about the reports the chinese might be considering delivery of lethal aid to the russians -- i have not seen the intelligence there. i think it is interesting. the chinese have been trying to walk that line and not successfully for the past year, claiming neutrality and claiming that they are still committed to peaceful -- or to sovereignty and territorial integrity, even though the russians, their friends, are violating that in ukraine. while at the same time maintaining their relationship with russia. there have been limits to that support in spite of their no-limits commitment.

there's obviously an economic support base there. the chinese have tried to avoid explicitly violating sanctions, and today, they have not provided decisive military aid. my bottom line is if the chinese don't want to own this problem, they don't want world war iii, i don't think the chinese believe that they can provide lethal aid to the extent that it would make a difference. i cannot see them calculating that. you know, they don't want russia to lose, but i think it is not necessarily within their power to prevent that from happening. that is why what we are seeing this week is the simultaneous reporting on how they might increase support to russia. apparently what is about to come out now is xi jinping is about to make a speech with a proposal for a peace plan. i link those two things together, and it seems to me the chinese, whatever they are

considering in terms of increasing aid to the russians, i think is more likely aimed at bolstering that support for the purpose of trying to hasten an end to the conflict. i think there are some arguments that the chinese into the benefits of this war that they want it to drag on. i don't subscribe to that. i think they would like it to end, but they are grappling with how to -- because it would relieve them of a lot of dilemmas if this was over in some way, but i think they are still grappling with how to do that. i think they are focused more on this peace proposal than they are on providing substantial lethal aid. i mean, it might happen, but i would be surprised if it crossed that line. jacob: the portrait that paul has just drawn strikes me as more of a status quo then a revisionist power. elbridge: right.

jacob: isn't it the case that if we -- and you make violently disagree that china is not looking for an opportunity right now to roll over -- isn't it the case that russia is in fact the revisionist, the more volatile, more unpredictable power of the two, whereas china is perhaps if paul is correct, looking more for a rough personal -- more of a rapprochement? elbridge: i really resist attempts to kind of a centralized states' behavior, that they are revisionist or not revisionist. i think that has to do a lot with structure and contingent factors. 20 years ago, putin was their status quo actor. now he is a revisionist actor. under mao, china was the ultimate revisionist actor.

now it is a status quo actor. we cannot assume that is fixed. i have debates about this with my good friend at the university of virginia, who would be a real good person to sit in on one of these sessions. i think the problem here is that china is -- and i really want to hear more on what paul said because i think this is the nature -- i actually agree with paul that china is not looking for an opportunity to use military force against taiwan. my fear is -- my concern is that their goal -- their express goals but also what they are structurally, naturally looking into, which is great power hegemony over their region basically, is only attainable by military force, and they will work out that logic. taiwan is not going to fall into their lap. the only way to get there is military force, and they will come to that conclusion in my view is they probably already have. i don't think there's any reason to think we are smarter than they are. so i think that that -- and this

is, i think, a fundamental -- and i mean, i think paul -- this is kind of the right debate to have. i don't want to put you in a box, but my approach is sort of deductive and structural, and i think the other approach, the emphasis is based more frankly on dealing with the chinese -- i mean, i have experience with the chinese over the years but nothing like paul does. where do you put that weight in terms of continuity based on the history that we know or what we expect the rationalistic costs and benefits or a sort of calculus? especially when we think about matters of war and peace. if we look historically, countries can radically change their orientation, their behavior, and this is important because china has immense incentives to generate as much surprise as possible -- surprise is not the term, but to act in ways that do not trigger or

accelerate countervailing actions, so i don't take any comfort in the fact that they are not advertising -- although, frankly, they kind of art. wang yi did not rule out force, and it would have been easy to do. at the munich secured a conference, he could have done a little flexible. i think the way paul is talking about it in terms of the weighing of costs and benefits, i have a somewhat different assessment of the nature of chinese decision-making right now. xi jinping strikes me as more aggressive. what they say publicly i tend to discount more than what they are probably doing privately then maybe he does, but i think the fundamental problem is that they are unlikely to achieve their goals peacefully, and they are going to essentially come to a decision about if they want to pursue those goals militarily or not, and if there is an advantageous way to do so, i think they are more likely to do so.

even if the taiwanese are splashing peace signs, it is still important to american interests, and that is the problem in what i fear, that we are teeing off the situation but focusing on ukraine where taiwan will receive an unfavorable comparison to ukraine, perhaps justified but missing the point, which is that taiwan is important anyway and if you are in the philippines, even our allies like south korea and japan, you are going to wonder to yourself, japan is not a very marginal culture either, these days. they are getting around to it, sort of, but this is not 1942. that logic takes you in a dangerous place from the position of maintaining and developing what i think is this hegemonic coalition. jacob: i would like to give you a chance for a brief response before i turn to questions from the audience. paul: sure, yes. actually, that does get to some

of the faultlines. i think i agree -- there's a whole basket of issues here as well. i agree that the chinese are trying to pursue what we would call reasonable hegemony within east asia. we could talk separately about their pursuit of global hegemony, which i think is an overstatement, but i think that depends, and i think bridge address this in his book, there's different ways to define hegemony. the other thought occurred to me listening to bridge just now that there is -- i'm a historian and he think he's more a political scientist. that's the way i kind of approach it. the point i would make about chinese pursuit of hegemony, i would make two points. i don't think that their vision for hegemony is necessarily hostile to or exclusive of the united states and its interests. i think secondly, and perhaps more importantly, i don't think the chinese calculate that military power is the primary

exclusive power for achieving it. in fact, i think the chinese believe that i hegemony, both regional and to whatever extent they are trying to influence globally, will be based on their economic power, and i think that is the way they are pursuing it in the region. i'll leave it at that for now. jacob: we have a question from someone who has been affiliated with the center for national interests for decades, and he says that australia and japan and south korea are fully capable of developing nuclear weapons. should the united states review its policy toward nonproliferation in light of the china threat? bridge, why don't you begin? elbridge: i wrote a piece on this almost 10 years ago, i

think geopolitics should trump nonproliferation. we have a strong interest in nonproliferation, but the fundamental foreign policy is to deny the world's key regions, especially asia now, any country development of that. if it is necessary or we get into a situation where it is important to our allies, that should be subordinated logically to the maintenance of our geopolitical interests. my daughter would say the alligator closest to the boat is the north korea situation where they are developing -- their development of icbm's basically outpacing our missile systems presented a limit that cannot be solved by reassurance. there is a reflexive reassurance, but the problem is what happens on the peninsula divorced from china is not important enough to risk american cities, so we either have to be able to deny their

ability to develop icbm's or there will be inexorable pressure towards proliferation, also toured japan and toward china as well. friendly proliferation is not a panacea. talk about this in my book. jim slashing her wrote something in the late 1960's about this -- jim slashing her -- jim slashing her -- jim schlessinger. china is not going to want to march into tokyo bay. this is my objective human rights argument. if australia gets nuclear weapons and use it against china, it is not clear they would get through because china might first strike them and have its own missile defenses, and then it would destroy australia. i have no doubt the chinese would have the result to do that. any kind of friendly full information would have to be integrated within the american

redlined structure. where i think this will reach a real head with china is i think what china is pursuing is a combination of conventional dominance and a nuclear force that is able to fight under the nuclear shadow under the strategic shadow, the stability/instability paradox. their main goal, it seems to me, is conventional dominance. if we lose conventional dominance, i don't believe the u.s.'s first use is going to be credible or, frankly, rational. a demonstration shot is not going to deter the time -- deter the chinese in the event of a war. it's not going to stop them. you would have to use nuclear weapons at scale. i just don't think -- unlike in

the cold war, initially we had a nuclear monopoly, and that degraded into a kind of -- without going into it, a different posture over the later part of the war. i don't think we can go back there, so either we retain conventional dominance or we will very likely have to face non-friendly proliferation. jacob: paul? paul: bridge knows a lot more about nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrine that i do, but as a historian, my comment would be more nuclear power is probably not a good thing. there's been speculation or contemplation of this over many years. that one of our sources of leverage with the chinese is the possibility that we would allow the japanese or the koreans or australians to become nuclear powers. i'm not sure that that is a persuasive lever against the chinese when they recognize the reasons we ourselves have historically not wanted that to happen.

jacob: we have a question for bridge from ethan kessler at the chicago council on global affairs. he asks -- woodbridge argued that there would be fewer trade-offs between back in ukraine and preparing taiwan if the u.s. limited the number of gml rs it sends to kyiv? he does not think that weaponry is necessarily critical for a taiwan contingency. what is your take? elbridge: the most manifested element of the trade-off is the particular weapons. what i would say is weapons that are being sent to ukraine are usable by the taiwanese. one of the myths about a conflict over taiwan is that it would not be a ground war. it would definitely be a ground war.

number one finding was the taiwanese ground forces. we can talk capabilities, range, etc., but -- and, by the way, the taiwanese are getting pushed back years. there was a report today that said they are years behind on delivery. the deeper problem, and this gets at, like, the smoking habit issue. defense capabilities are in sorry shape. that is where it is. the situation is actually continuing to deteriorate, so just because we recognize the problem does not mean it is better. another report by seth jones pointed out that we have one actor that produces turbo bands for cruise missiles. these are assembled in hundreds or maybe sometimes thousands of

different places, so this is a real problem, and i think it is becoming clear there is a real trade-off in terms of capabilities, and again, the bottom line is we and taiwan are not where it needs to be. we are massively overweight and about to have a heart attack, and then we are saying we are going to do this other thing and we are going to walk and chew gum at the same time. doesn't work. jacob: good question from stanley chau for both of you. he says the u.s. needs to be stoking or provoking china's acts on taiwan. we have nance's -- nancy pelosi's visit. he asks if the united states is starting to back off on its one-china policy and what is the end result of all these actions? paul: it's a very good question. my answer is do we need to

confront the inconsistencies of your one-china policy? that is what i would add to the military deterrent part of the equation on the taiwan issue. i agree with bridge, and he has written extensively on this, what we have to do to help bolster taiwan's self-defense capability, but i think there has to be a reassurance element to the equation. the chinese are not looking for an excuse to attack taiwan. they are looking for reasons not to, and they are quite insistent and clear on what they are looking for. they are looking for credible assurances of our one china policy. there was a report in "the washington post" overnight which addressed this. i think there needs to be more persuasive reassurances that u.s. policy is not aimed at permanent separation because i think the idea we do not support independence is not sufficient, frankly.

taiwan's polity already claims to enjoy independence. i think stanley's question is appropriate to ask because i think we focus inordinately on the reasons that the chinese are eager to use force against taiwan without paying attention to the reactive component of that approach. there are actions that are being taken and statements that have been made in the u.s.-taiwan relationship which raise, i think, valid questions on the chinese side about what the nature of our one-china policy is. i think in addition to this focus on the military equation, we need to confront that part of the equation as well. elbridge: i think actually something we agree on is a lot of the arrangements not only on

post proliferation but also on the one-taiwan issue in an era defined by a dramatically unequal power balance are no longer satisfactory. i don't think we can keep just sticking to the -- well, i mean, we make formally stick with it. i think we should keep strategic and begin ready formally, but i don't favor -- [indiscernible] i would not go as far as paul. other than ambiguity where there has clearly been a different understanding on beijing's side and washington' aside for many decades, and that was fine when the chinese side could not do anything about it. now they potentially can, so having some sort of clear understanding about how to deal with that i think is important, and i agree that they need -- there needs to be something for them and something for their

dignity. the very factors that i'm describing, a rising power feeling its oats, they demand recognition, so, like, we have to have that. if that is consistent with our interest is going to be a difficult problem, but i agree it is something we need to confront. jacob: we have a very complex response from paul, senior vp for china at albright stonebridge group, who writes, having just spent time in taiwan, i'm struck by the extent to which there is little support on the island for mobilizing for conflict with china. there is a clear desire not to move in this direction, in part

due to people deciding to leave taiwan and maintain a vibrant business climate, particularly in the tech sector where maintaining confidence is critical. i don't see any chance that arming taiwan is an effective approach to deterrence. given this, shouldn't there be a much more robust effort to rethink the trilateral relationship, ramp-up diplomacy, and tone down the rhetoric around mobilizing both taiwan and its allies to prepare for conflict? the stakes are high here. elbridge: no. i mean, the fact that the taiwanese are not adequately motivated is a huge problem, perhaps the biggest problem, but it does not change anything -- i'm sorry, bear with me. i have this metaphor that i think works. last spring break, i was in the water with my wife, and the lifeguard called and said i shark was right by you. you did not see it.

you are lucky. to me, the lifeguards hire a nc. the united states is like a person in a boat. it's in patronizing, but it's not. we have the world's best intelligence-gathering architecture. you're not always right, but it's unparalleled. we can see farther than anyone else. the taiwanese are like a man in the water. americans are shouting at them that there is a shark in the water. they are closer to the shark, so they have a certain kind of finger feel for it like the chinese do with china, but they don't see how big this shark is and how daunting. the problem is the taiwanese in the way -- the person in the boat is saying, swim to the boat, i'll help you out. you are kind of paralyzed with fear. the real problem is that the

taiwanese, it is critical for their defense, both morally and also in a military defense, if the united states has to carry too much of the weight, they will fall. the taiwanese have no interest in becoming part of china, so there is an incompatible problem. meantime, they are militarily weak and irresolute. that is a great opportunity for military aggression because you could make it work, unlike in the case of ukraine. that is the real danger. what i tell the taiwanese directly -- i mean, the chinese are talking about reeducation camps. i'm sorry, ultimately talking about reeducation camps. look at how they shut down the protest. forget it, they are going to crush an insurgency on taiwan in, like, weeks. the taiwanese are in real danger, and i don't think the american people are fully bought

in to defending taiwan. that is the danger. i think it is important they do for our own interests, but they are not going to do it. this is why i'm not sanguine, to paul's point. i think about if i were sitting in regime, thinking about it from the kind of perspective i take for the u.s., i would say that looks pretty good, and by the way, if we wait around, the americans are going to have the-one one's in a few years and might start pumping out submarines, and i might lose the window, and that is a really bad situation. jacob: paul, could you give us a brief response as well? paul: i think that applies to the extent china is looking for an opportunity to use force, and as i said, i don't think they are. i'm still trying to figure out how i would interpret your metaphor. i have heard it from you before,

and i'm still grappling with it. i think this all makes sense as far as the military portion is concerned, but my bottom line is taiwan is fundamentally not a military problem that lends itself to a military solution. as i said before, i agree with the determine elements of our policy and with regard to bolstering taiwan's self-defense capabilities, but i think the problem is a diplomatic and political one that needs to be confronted, and that is the way to avert escalation to military conflict, and to reiterate something i said earlier, i think part of the problem, to the extent that we approach this as a military problem, and i take ridge's point, that he is not an advocate for what has been announced as strategic clarity -- i take bridge's point, but i think in your book and some of the things you have written, you essentially create the logic to support -- well, the logic for u.s. support for

permanent separation, and i think that flows from the determination that you and others have made about the strategic importance from -- strategic importance of taiwan. my concern is that u.s. support for permanent separation defector or otherwise is inconsistent with our one-china commitments because they would both constitute a restoration of a defense pact with taiwan, which was the primary requirement for the normalization process. again, i agree that there's at lot of, you know, things that are wrong with that scaffolding 40 years later, but i think we need to confront those faultlines rather than continue to approach this as primarily a military challenge and a problem for military deterrence. elbridge: let me just address this. there's the logic of things and then there's diplomatic and political fictions that can be useful. i agree we need to confront and

think clearly. i'm in favor of strategic ambiguity, if you will, but i'm in favor of small letter strategic clarity. that's speaking out of both sides of of your mouth, but, you know, that's life in the big city. on permanent separation, i don't think we need to take -- i mean, that's the kind of thing where i think we need to have a clear policy. you know this better than i do, but i don't think in our one-china policy -- i mean, our position is we don't take a position on the territorial position of taiwan. [indiscernible] and we may have to reassess. we have to reassess very carefully, not because it is immoral but because the chinese are going to get very angry with us, and that is something we need to be realistic about, but i think it would be a big

disaster for us if taiwan were to fall, but i really don't think this will be solved by future generations of we can get to that and maybe there is some commonwealth model that we can explore to kind of kick the can down the road. we don't need to come to a clean political solution in the near term. i think we need to have it clear in our heads the chinese cannot be allowed to seize taiwan, but we also should not put the dragon in the eye, just for prudence if nothing else. jacob: i think we will end with a question from ravi, columnist at "the straight times," and he asks if u.s. resolve appears to have stiffened in recent years and if it is time to aggregate u.s. power with that of japan, australia, and india when it comes to the indo pacific and

then asks a question which intrigues me as well -- has china's power in fact peaked? paul? paul: those are two very different questions. the first is how we can operationalize the quad essentially, i think? jacob: correct. and if we do, does that signify that china's power has peaked? bet they are not going to be the colossal threat in the future? paul: let me try to address the first question first. i think there are some problems with the operational potential of the quad, and i think it gets to in part there are a range of views both within the quad and across our broader alliance network in east asia as to how

confrontational we should be towards china. i think there are actually a range of views as to what the extent of the nature of the china threat is, if it's more economic or military, so i would not put all my eggs in the quad basket because i think there's some flaws about how collectively we can operate against the chinese and in fact, i think there's concern about -- there's apprehension across the quad and as it an alliance is the way to go. i support the idea that we should be contemplating a policy in the region which is not entirely exclusive of and targeted at china. i think there is a big hole in the middle of that approach. china needs to be part of what i let listen in the region. as to if china has peaked or not, that strikes me as an academic question. i don't know that they have pete

-- peaked. my guess is that the answer is no, but even if it were -- even if the chinese had peaked, they are still going to be a consequential challenge for us that is going to beg attention and this requirement that we come up with some way of pursuing a relationship with them through our alliances as well. an inadequate answer, but i think he will give you a more articulate one. elbridge: i think it is an anti-hegemonic coalition, so i think it is anti-china. i think that is coming together and that is encouraging. i go over this a lot in my book if you are interested, but we cannot neatly aggregate all of our u.s. partners and allies and say that matches against china. what matters in a sense is

really military power, and military power is defined by distance in a lot of ways. india's military power is irrelevant to the taiwan military balance. my argument is china would pursue a focus and sequential strategy and not go after everybody at the same time, more like divide and conquer. we should -- and this is the fundamental fallacy with the arguments the administration and others often make, we have this unparalleled alliance system. true. much of that is latent. countries like germany and until recently japan have not been spending very much, so such an unwieldy, massive alliance can be seated in the tail, basically, so i think that's the way we need to think about things. also, military victory in ukraine, success or failure can have ramifications for countries allied with germany when they see what way the wind is blowing.

to your second question, has china peaked? i'm not an economist. i don't think anybody knows. from a strategic point of view, we don't know the future so we should prepare for the downside. the worst outcome would be if we under prepare and

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