far-right, thing that was the message from the carolinas 13th district. they want folks who are willing to work in the center for both parties. we need to see a lot more of it, people working together in that bipartisanly. >> and the other children, >> seven and 10. a boy and a girl. one of the things when you come here, you need it. you are here in washington a lot, so i am away from my kids more than i would like to be, but for me i have a ton of great family support which is absolutely crucial when you hav

i'm at the one near anniversary of the war in ukraine. from the institute for the study of war, author of several books about russian foreign policy. thanks for being with us. guest: thanks for having me. host: if this war is taking place into phases, what phase are we in right now? guest: there are several key phases and milestones. i want to start with a couple. russia has been trying to control ukraine for years, first, by trying to manipulate ukraine's political and domestic environment.

then russia launched a limited military invention in 2014. for the subsequent eight years, russia tried to use that to control ukraine politically. all of those efforts have failed. then russia resorted to full-scale military invasion of ukraine. we have several key phases. the first one was when russia had initiative on the ground from february of last year to july. and that phase, ukraine had defeated their objectives in the more to invade and conquer ukraine in a matter of a few days. ukraine won the battle of kyiv, pushed russia out. it won the battle ofkharkiv and forced russia to change their operational objectives to just focus on eastern ukraine. then there was a shift in the mid summer of last year.

ukraine launched several counteroffensive operations and successfully liberated thousands of square miles of territory and people. ukraine has been setting conditions for additional counteroffensive operations since, however some of the momentum slows, in part, because aid was a step behind. that allows russia to reform its lines and shore up its offensive of bahkmut and other regions. they launched an offensive that is happening very slowly and that is where we are right now. host: you talk about objectives. what divides winning and losing with russia right now? guest: their objectives have been consistent for years. they always expand, just taking territory, countering nato or forcing ukraine into neutrality but it is never about protecting

russian speakers given how many thousand russian forces have killed or expelled from ukraine. the objective for russia has always been to control ukraine and eradicate ukraine's statehood and identity. those objectives remain the same. we see no indication of vladimir putin changing them despite the battlefield setbacks he is facing. we accept those objectives will likely outlive him. host: what divides winning and losing four ukraine? if russia ends up controlling any territory that it has taken since a year ago, does that mean a loss for ukraine in this war? guest: four ukraine, essentially it is ukraine existence as a state. russia preserving some of its territory allows them to do several things.

territory matters tremendously. russia will use and it territory it keeps in nutrient to state future attacks. that has not changed. russia can advance much further if it starts from the lines it currently controls compared to what it had in february. there will be perpetual threats to ukraine's existence, survival as a state. host: you mention western aid. when it comes to usaid specifically, what has been the most important? a specific weapons system, dollars in general? diplomatic efforts to unite the west? what do you think has been the most important piece of aid? guest: i think military aid certainly but it is the full package. there are two centers of gravity. one is ukraine and the fight, and then there is western

support of ukraine's effort to fight. as long as those exist, russia cannot achieve their objectives. military aid, systems like the himars, were essential for ukraine to liberate its people. liberation of kherson city, vital, liberation would not have been possible without u.s. support and the himars system. but it is about the whole package. host: the next package to ask for is aircraft. what is the status of the air war over ukraine right now? guest: russia does not have air superiority in ukraine, one of the more important distinctions of the war compared to others where russia has been engaged. ukraine being able to preserve its ability to control its airspace and deny russia's

manned aircraft from really operating has been crucial. that is why russia has been relying so much on unmanned aircraft, drones, trying to get more from iran. i think about the next phase of the offensive and western aid, there are two things that matter. russia's offensive in ukraine right now is moving slowly. in fact, it will be short of achieving any significant gains. that means that ukraine will likely have another chance, almost certainly, to launch their own counteroffensive. it's important to make sure that when that time comes, ukraine is fully positioned to take that opportunity and exploit it to the fullest. it is in the u.s. interest, not just ukraine, that ukraine deliberate terrain. host: you assess that they will not meet their objectives. how do you see and watch this

more? -- this war? guest: the war has been extremely costly for russia. they have been repeating mistakes like growing in a lot of resources despite little gains. it is the same in bakhmut. it is russia's costly operation that depleted a lot of their capability. we see russian efforts to try to regenerate in the both and long-term, but they are facing a lot of systematic issues that cannot be fixed overnight. fixing some of those issues means not just 12 months of mistakes but 20 years of chemo to mistakes that vladimir putin and the way that he ruled russia lead to corruption and the erosion of russian capability. we see this on the ground, we

are ideally observing the information. various russian military movements, how the war is shaping on the bow to field. host: is that twitter accounts, instagram postings? how are you watching this? guest: we have research teams in russia and ukraine developing for a number of years. russia has been a global actor for a number of years. it is a comprehensive system including social media, news outlets in the ukrainian, russian language, telegram channels including russian military bloggers. it is very comprehensive. we constantly revise those sources, make sure they are primed for performance. host: about 35 minutes left in the program today. we want to get to your calls,

this being the one-year anniversary of the russian invasion of ukraine, escalating an invasion that began in 2014, full-scale invasion one year ago today. republicans, (202) 748-8001. democrats, (202) 748-8000. independent, (202) 748-8002. nataliya bugayova is with us from the institute for the study of war. guest: we are a nonprofit is an nonprofit research institution. our goal is to inform the public and national security community about military affairs and issues critical to national security. host: it is @thestudyofwar twitter. sergio is up first. good morning. caller: good morning, john. how are you? host: i'm fine. you are on with nataliya bugayova. caller: good morning, nataliya.

my question is, i respect the president of ukraine standing up against russia's tierney, trying to take over their country, and they are fighting back strongly. i respect that in this man. also, by the grace of god, that they are protected. how can president biden work with ukraine to overcome putin's invasion of ukraine? how can they defeat russia to stand back and leave them alone? caller: thank you for -- guest: thank you for the question. one, regarding russia's objectives of ukraine, those will not change. you have western policy that should try to stop using resources to change putin's mind

through cease-fires, peace talks, negotiations, especially those that are premature. the thing that truly matters is russia's capability to sustain the war. capability has four elements. one is momentum on the ground. two is russia's ability to keep terrain. three, as russia's convention on al military power. and then capabilities such as using information to limit their power. you asked, and ukraine and ukraine partners have a lot of agency in shipping those elements of russia's capability. the first is by denying russia's momentum on the ground. we talked about supplying ukraine with what it needs to be successful in the next counteroffensive. secondly, recognizing that

terrain is a core part of russian capability. whatever terrain they keep will use in future attacks. on the military-industrial complex of russia, a lot of necessary and good steps have been done to limit its access to? it's, western technology, but more needs to be done. finally, parsing through a lot of russian disinformation, including the key effort -- and i cannot emphasize this enough -- the key effort that is aimed to peel western support away from ukraine. countering those is essential. host: does targeting russian capabilities mean ukraine attacking russian depots, the ability to manufacture arms inside russia itself? guest: denying russia's ability to preserve their gains in ukraine. first and foremost, expelling

russia from the territory of ukraine, helping ukraine to regain momentum and go on the counteroffensive. host: which stops at the russian border. guest: correct. ukraine has made it clear that it has no intentions of taking land that does not belong to it. there is also russian capability globally, that many to target, by not amplifying russia and their military industrial complex with access to western technologies and markets. at the bare minimum, that is what we need to do. host: where do they have that access currently? guest: russia is using a lot of countries in the former soviet states, in some cases belarus, to circumvent sanctions. we are also watching their efforts in africa. russia has been using africa for sanctions, export controls were a number of years. there is a lot of knowledge

about what russia is doing. it is harder to fully stop it. this is the effort that these to be advanced. host: chris also in florida. independent line. you are on with nataliya bugayova. caller: i was wondering they might consider the first rule of war there at the institute, the institute of the study of war? i have another follow-up. host: what is the first rule of war? caller: if they have rules, but would they consider the first rule of war? there may not be an answer. host: what would be your answer? caller: i would like to know hers. guest: thank you for the question. a couple of points. at the institute, throughout the u.s., national security, we study issues through the open source data. we also have a program that is focused on the war studies that

educates americans in war, understanding the war. i don't think we have a written rule at the isw that can be quantified as a first rule of war, however, as we have seen in the past 12 months, there are some fundamental rules of war. one is understanding yourself, understanding your enemy, understanding your own capabilities, understanding the capabilities of your adversary. that is one of the key rules that vladimir putin has broken by both, overestimating russia's cabability, underestimating ukraine's capability, underestimating western support. that is one of the most essential rules of war. host: what is your first rule of war? caller: avoiding war. what i'm trying to say is what started this? i remember when there was georgia, something to do with

georgia and russia during the obama candidacy. i was wondering what her opinion was on that? and then your opinion on crimea. the reason he took crimea, the port there that he needs tremendously. the war is about the land bridge to crimea. what i'm asking is, why do we not avoid war? why did we not avoid war with these people? guest: thank you. this is an essential question about the kremlin's objective. first of all, the kremlin's efforts to begin control over ukraine and over other soviet states, including belarus, moldova, started early after the soviet union collapsed. there was a brief period that you have to think up as a

nonassertive russian policy in the 1990's, that was an anomaly, not the norm. as soon as vladimir putin came to power and stabilized the situation inside russia, he went on his efforts to begin control of ukraine, georgia, and let's not forget that russia also moved to the west and occupied illegal territory in moldova even before nato considered any conversations about enlargement. what i am saying is, the kremlin's objective to gain control over the territories of the former soviet states, first of all, were independent of any u.s. actions. u.s. policy may have accelerated some of those objectives, but he is intent on controlling ukraine, exceeding any contours of u.s. policy. we know that russia's goals in ukraine were not just territory. putin wanted to control portions

of the luhansk and donetsk regions for years and that was not enough. there were negotiations between the russia and the u.s., other western partners, but none of that mattered to putin. ukraine's territory and neutrality with the west was not the goal. full ukraine of ukraine was. i want to emphasize that. host: jane is on the line on the independent line. caller: i think she just answered my question partially. a simple question. why does russia need more territory? it is a big country. the other thing is, do they really need democracy because communism is a failure? is that really the motivation? guest: it's a great question,

why does russia need more territory? i think another reason for why what vladimir putin is doing in ukraine actually comes down to how he governs russia. ukraine opposed zero threat to russia, other than just existing, trying to build a society that was different and free, not authoritarian. one of the reasons vladimir putin is going on this endeavor is also to boost his domestic support. it worked in 2014 when he illegally occupied crimea. it worked a lot less this time. but he has also been consolidating russian society. russian power brokers around the agenda of continued war against ukraine. it is not putin's war, it is

russia's war. unfortunately, much of russian society supports the war, or at least not objecting to it. in terms of the second question about democracy, your question is about whether russia needs democracy? host: i think that is what she was asking. that communism did not work for them. guest: unfortunately, russian chose a path several decades ago when vladimir putin came to power, and he became increasingly authoritative over the past 20 years. year after year we see him imposing more societal control policies, controlling the information space, limiting freedom of speech, extending his suppression apparatus. creating the russian version of the national guard that directly supports putin. there were some efforts by the russian people early on to

resist some of these increases in authoritarianism. those efforts were crushed. russian society either got in line or left to russia, or became neutral or idle about the agenda. that is the path russia has been going down under putin's leadership, but this really exceeds putin. that is the choice they have made. host: before vladimir putin called up hundreds of thousands of additional troops, there were a lot of questions about how russian society would react to that, whether he was holding off doing that out of fear of a larger pushback from russian civilians. in your mind, how do you think that went? was there much pushback when it happened? guest: i think there were a lot of expectations that russian society would pushback on this invasion. however, in the 12 months, we

have learned, the thing that really shapes the russian domestic information space, causes russian society to react, is unfortunately not even russian casualties, not russian atrocities in ukraine, it is russian setbacks on the battlefield. we have seen them react when russia was forced out of the kiev access. host: what is that? guest: when russia lost the battle of kyiv, forced out of western and northern regions of ukraine. second, when russia suffered some very embarrassing defeats in eastern ukraine, expelled from the kharkiv region. we have seen the russian public react, in part because many of them do by the idea of russia being a great power. the idea that putin has been

cultivating for 20 years. that is what russia probably reacted to factually. unfortunately, we have not seen those kinds of reactions to their own casualties even. host: paul is on the phone, independent. you are on with nataliya bugayova. caller: good morning. but before the war started, on c-span, you had putin on tv. i checked that out. basically, putin said what this is all about is, on the eastern part of poland, there are nato missile silos and the eastern part of romania, missile silos. the thing is, they are afraid of ukrainians, if they join nato, missile silos there. weapons could be used against russia. they are about five minutes

flight time to moscow, so it is checkmate. that is why he is doing this. host: is that why he's doing this? guest: that is not why he is doing this. he has proved it over and over again. territory, neutrality is not the goal. you cannot have it both ways. claim that ukraine somehow presented a conventional military threat to russia, but also that russia was planning to invade and conquer ukraine in three days. based on russia's own assessment of how limited the ukraine and military was. you also cannot have it both ways, claiming that russia is generally concerned about the conventional nato threat, and also observe now, when russia is removing and pulling back some of its military given abilities the nato border and the peninsula.

also, putin openly claiming that sweden and finland joining nato is not a fundamental national security threat to russia. it is very important to parse the disinformation operation russia is using to justify its illegal invasion of not just ukraine, but also georgia, earlier moldova, its occupation of belarus also has transpired in the last three years. let's not forget about that. and so on. host: south carolina, this is hank on the democrat line. caller: i don't know if this young lady has answered the question, but i've been thinking about, we have given ukraine these tanks, but we are going to make them before we send them over. it will not be about 10 or 20.

ukraine does not have air superiority. those tanks will be destroyed the first day they go there. can you answer that? host: abrams tanks. guest: actually, russia does not have air superiority in ukraine, and this is why russia continues to rely on unmanned aircraft. tanks are incredibly important in the counteroffensive operation that are underway, are being planned right now in ukraine. i think it is actually quite the opposite. if anything, tanks did not arrive when ukraine had the opportunity to exploit the russian setback after ukraine first push them back out of the kharkiv region and liberated kherson. tanks are important and russia does not have air superiority. host: we talked about the air war. is there a naval war in the black sea?

guest: a couple points. russia's ability to control crimea in the beginning of the war, illegally occupying for eight years, was one of the key reasons why russia has been able to control the black seacoast, essentially use it as a staging ground for attacks on ukraine. as we look ahead, we should remember, helping ukraine liberate the south and also deny russia an opportunity to some of the southern regions freely, is vital. russia had been kicked out, if you will recall, from snake island, which is a controlled. so, russia has had some setbacks in the naval war, as well. it's been an important element from the broader global implications of the war. in the beginning of the war, russia blocking access to ukraine ports, essentially

starting their ability to export grain. that has been partially resolved. but it also matters for russia's ability to deprive some economic activity in ukraine, diminish that. it is also part of economic warfare. host: you mentioned the planned ukrainian offensive. what makes the most sense for ukrainians to target in their upcoming offensive? guest: we did not watch the specific ukrainian counteroffensive, we watch russia and the adversary. however, the key question here is what ukraine needs to liberate to create a circumstance in which it can understand its sovereignty sustainably. the whole territory is the answer but there are some more immediate priorities.

i already mentioned the south of ukraine is critically vital. also denying russia the ability to easily use portions of ukraine as a staging ground for resupplying russian military operations. there are several critical lines of communication that russia will also likely target. host: ronald in jericho, new york. independent. good morning. caller: good morning. nothing has been said on the media, c-span, or elsewhere, about the expansion of nato in the past, right up to russia's border, and how far russia this is analogous of when russia sent missiles to cuba, right off the coast of the usa in 1962. this has been a provocation, existential threat to russia. for this reason, russia feels it

must win. host: is this akin to the cuban missile crisis? guest: it is not. once again, there is years of evidence to suggest that russia did not take nato conventional threats seriously. we see that from their military posture, many other actions. the only thing that they took series was the rhetoric, which they used two wage war against ukraine, other states in its orbit. the second point, the conversation about nato expansion somehow threatening russia, and therefore being a justification for russia to launch an unprovoked invasion of several of its states, killing, torturing, deporting a lot of those people is actually not a good justification. in fact, it dismisses any agency that any other state that russia

invades has. many of those states wanted to join nato. many of those states want to join nato now after russia launched a full-scale invasion, precisely because it is their people, it is their sovereign choice. russia has no say over that. we shouldn't forget what is at stake in this war. it is not just ukraine sovereignty. you also have national security interests, and it stabilization of values. we will either emerge in a world where states can redraw, or we can emerge with ukraine sovereign. there is no middle ground here. host: in 10 minutes, we are taking our viewers to the u.n. council meeting happening in new york, happening today on the one-year anniversary of the war. what are you expecting from that meeting? guest: i think there will be a couple of points to watch for.

one is the continuing resolution for the support of ukraine. there are two things that truly matter in the war. continuation of ukraine's willingness to fight. you cannot break the will to fight of people who are facing an existential war. second is global support for ukraine's effort to defend itself. looking at the u.n. security meeting from that lens. the second question being brought up is, the way of war by russia and its atrocities. we should not forget, in the past 12 months, we have seen russian atrocities all throughout ukraine. there were not isolated incidents. this was actually a microcosm of their way of war. bucha was a suburb of kyiv where

russian troops -- the troops were occupying. when it was liberated, we saw horrific scenes of the atrocities that russia committed including killings, rapes, torture, so on and so forth. that is happening in every city that russia occupies in ukraine. that is why also people who are suggesting -- that implies giving some of ukraine's land in exchange for whatever they see, to be explicit, that they understand this condemns those people on those territories to perpetual russian atrocities. back to the u.n., there have been some great sessions this week talking about the issue of russia deporting children from ukraine, from the occupied territories. perhaps you are aware of a great yale university study that says

about 6000 ukrainian children were forcibly deported to russia against their will, being forcefully reeducated. we cannot agree on some issues of the war, but we can all agree that deporting children against their will is not some thing that should exist in the world. we should not try to create a world in which a country that does it, but also praises about it, is rewarded. that will be the theme at the u.n. host: a caller asked earlier why russia is still a member of the security council. why can't that be changed? guest: great question. many people agree that it shouldn't. it is the structure of the u.n. they are a legacy framework, but it brings up a larger question. it comes down to the question of what kind of world we will have it russia wins and keeps its

gains. it has everything to do with the global security structure, as well. this is where i want to bring in a point of u.s. national security interest in all of this. american supporting ukraine in this for values, but on the security side, if russia keeps its gains in ukraine, it will have a chance to rebuild, launch future attacks, connect its military gains in ukraine to belarus. that would imply different requirements on nato, the eu, and united states. the u.s. is risking being dragged into this, have the same problems, with the same escalation risks. those risks will always be there, but under much worse conditions, if it doesn't help ukraine right now. host: randall is in michigan. independent line. caller: thank you both for

taking this call. first of all, obviously, president kennedy must've been concerned to agree to remove nuclear missiles from turkey as a part of that deal. the second -- i want to preface this. both the vatican, his holiness pope francis, chinese president xi, have made numerous statements suggesting that nato played a role in undermining the minsk agreement. i want to specifically focus your attention on the issue of self-determination. it is my understanding that the previous president before zelenskyy, poroshenko, had, in fact, recognize those two republics in the donbass region had inherent, as a collective --

and i'm crossing over to the u.n. charter the issue of self-determination -- that they had met the criteria to where ukraine recognized that. there was an accord, understanding between ukraine and russia on that specific point. then zelenskyy became elected, and he has acknowledged that he actually repudiated that agreement that had been earlier agreed upon in russia. that, in my mind, if true -- which is not a part of the western narrative. that has been excluded from the western narrative. if you look to the other side of the world, many people see that as a provocation. host: let's talk about that.

poroshenko, minsk agreement, self-determination. guest: first of all, the narrative that so-called separatism exists in ukraine is anything other than russia created situation is flawed. i can tell you, as someone who has spent many years in eastern ukraine, speaking not just as a military analyst but from first-hand experience. russia is not in ukraine to protect russian speakers. in fact, russian forces killed, deported, tortured russian speakers all throughout ukraine. russian forces leveled to the ground many russian-speaking cities in ukraine. mariupol was a predominantly russian-speaking city. now is a mass grave. let's get over that narrative.

number two, ukraine and every other former soviet state became an independent state in 1991. full stop. that is the border of independent ukraine, russia. russia's efforts to set up so-called separatist structures in eastern ukraine actually started as early as 2005. they have been going at it deliberately for years, trying to create a foundation that they would then used to have a military intervention. the minsk agreement, how putin broke them -- this is nothing more than putin to use his limited military gains to control the whole of ukraine. any discussion about peace agreements now need to account for that. we have seen that in ukraine, syria.

russia uses and then corrupts the notion of peace with one sole purpose. rebuild, reconstitute, and then attack again. host: you mentioned, you spent years in eastern ukraine. what were you doing there? guest: my family is originally from donbass. i can speak to on the ground experiences. host: how long have you been in the u.s., how long have you been studying these issues? guest: i'm a proud american. i've been with the institute since about 2015, have lived and studied in the u.s. in high school, also did my masters degree in the united states. so, for many years. host: how we got here with russia, the kremlin worldview. when was it published? guest: 2019. it was a recognition that we needed to look deeper at russia's objectives over time. it was an effort to counter the

russian misinformation, that everything that russia does is because they are being provoked. it is to document putin's speeches, actions of the kremlin, to show a lot of the efforts to once again control the countries in former soviet states has nothing to do with the u.s.. it is intrinsic to russian policy and continued to be. host: a couple minute before we go over to the un security council. matthew in new york align for democrats. can you make it quick? caller: absolutely. one of the myriad reasons that russia supposedly went into the ukraine was because they did not want a nato country abutting theirs. putin must be losing his mind because finland now wants to be part of nato. what do you think about that? guest: i think a lot of what

putin has done actually went against his original objective. his invasion significantly depleted russian literary capabilities, expanded the unity within nato, expanded the unity between ukraine and the west. a lot of his actions were based on flawed assessments, intelligence, actually led to him creating a problem that he thought he was solving in the first place. host: for much more on this topic, and for nataliya bugayova 's work on this topic, go to understandingwar.org. nataliya bugayova >> washington journal every day we are taking your calls live on the air on the news of the day. we discussed the policy issues that impact you. coming up saturday morning, the

march 1 and of emergency food benefits. and an author discusses a 1993 siege of the branch davidian compound near waco, the aftermath and legacy of that event. watch live saturday morning on c-span or c-span now, our free mobile app. c-span has unfiltered coverage of the u.s. response to the russian invasion of ukraine. we also have international perspectives from the united nations and statements from foreign leaders all of the c-span n