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democracy. >> this is also a massive victory for democracy and for freedom. announcer: u.s. deputy defense secretary spoke on u.s. military policy and strategic competition with china during a discussion at johns hopkins university. she also urged the u.s. to remain focused while transitioning to a new administration and warned against underestimating the competitiveness of china and russia. she was joined by former deputy secretary who served in the george w. bush administration. o served under the george w. bush administration.

>> the honorable kathleen hicks serves as the nations at 36 deputy secretary of defense, a position she has held for nearly four years. she holds a phd in political science from the massachusetts institute of technology, an ma from the maryland school of public affairs. deputy secretary hicks and i have been following each of the professionally for many years. she launched her career as a civil servant in the office of the secretary of defense from 1993-2006 in a variety of positions, rising from presidential management intern to senior executive service. leaving public service from 2006-2009, she was a senior fellow at the center for strategic and international

studies. in 2009, she returned to the pentagon as deputy undersecretary of defense for strategy. leading the 2010 defense review crafting guidance for future force capabilities, overseas military posture and contingency and theater campaign plans. with all due respect to her subsequent achievements, i think that is the best job she ever held. despite that in 2012 she was confirmed by the senate as the principal deputy secretary of defense for policy responsible for advising the secretary of defense on global and regional defense policy and strategy. upon leaving the pentagon this time she returned to csis where she was senior vice president, henry kissinger chair and chair of the international security program. february 9, 2021, she left to

become the deputy secretary of defense. the second highest position in the department of defense. what a tumultuous and consequential four years it has been. today as she nears the end of her tenure, she has agreed to come give her final speech. we are honored to have her with us to speak about the threats we face as well as what the department has done to meet them. after her remarks she and i will continue the conversation with a discussion of the topic. join me in welcoming deputy secretary of defense kathleen hicks. sec. hicks: good morning. good evening to those in bologna and nanchang joining via livestream. thank you for professor mankin for hosting and dean steinberg for the invitation. it's always great to be here.

when the school of advanced international studies was cofounded some 25 years ago, he sought to create what he later described as a center in washington of independent thought. suffice was a vital intellectual engine throughout the cold war. i know that history imbues these institutions. there is even a piece of the berlin wall display downstairs. over the decades, shaping generations of national security scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. military, civilian, democrats and republicans alike. today as i prepare to depart the same pentagon office this seems

to be the perfect place to share how over the last four years we have been strengthening america's national defense for a modern era of strategic competition with the people's republic of china. today's prc is not the soviet bloc of the cold war. our approach to strategic competition cannot succeed if it is merely a warmed over tactic from 40 years ago. but there is no doubt we are in a strategic competition. the prc is the only nation with the well, and increasingly, the wherewithal to remake the international order by combining its economic, diplomatic, technological, and military capabilities to challenge the stable, open, international system that has done so much for so many for so long. that is why ensuring the united states provides our service members with everything they needed to defend the nation, and

our interests has been my highest priority since taking office nearly four years ago. i did so in direct support of secretary austin, who shared my concern over this most consequential competition. of course, competition does not mean conflict. no one should desire the global devastation such a war would bring. instead, we want prc leadership to wake up each day, consider the risks of aggression, and think to themselves, today is not the day. for them to think that today and every day between now and 2027, 2035, 2049, and beyond. deterrence is how we seek to prevent conflict by deterring prc aggression against us and

our allies. key to deterrence is being able and willing to win. deterrence is also translated to a mandarin word that implies coercion. i want to be clear. we are not trying to coerce or compel the prc. that is not our goal nor our approach. that is not the only example of words the doj uses that we have learned in the prc can misinterpret. perhaps a better way to describe our goal and approach is peace through strength. it's an ancient phrase first widely introduced into the american lexicon in the 1950's by bernard baroque, a close advisor to president franklin roosevelt. it has been a consistent, bipartisan theme of u.s. foreign policy for decades and one the

prc should understand. maintaining peace in a decades long competition means never being complacent. long term strategic competition means everywhere we currently lead either is or will be strongly contested. moves lead to counter moves, counter-counter moves, and so on. that is a fact of life in any competition. so, we strengthened our institutional abilities to regularly assess how we are doing and adjust accordingly. that in mind, here are four lessons i think are critical for prevailing in our current strategic competition. which i offer for those that will carry the work forward. first, stay focused on your highest priorities. the world will always try to distract you. whether you get distracted is entirely up to you. remember, dod has never had the

luxury of being able to focus on only one thing at a time. we are a global force with global responsibility. that was true throughout paul nick's decades of service through the post cold war era, the post 9/11 era and it remains true this era. the china challenge is not new for the pentagon or for me. when i worked on the dod 1997 defense review we were sure that even then in the period beyond 2015 there is a possibility that a regional great power or global competitor might emerge and we named russia and china as having the potential to be such competitors. since then, the prc worked with focus and determination to build a modern military, looking to long-standing u.s. operational advantages. beijing's behavior has been a

slow creep of incremental belligerency fueling unease across the region. it is no wonder, then, that the pla's growing capabilities and aggressive actions were increasingly a concern for defense policy makers across bush, obama, and the trump administration. with bipartisan support and continuity, our nation's started putting in place the building blocks for change. but, the actualization often so short of ambition. so we came into offices determined to build on the progress of our predecessors from both parties and unlock necessary changes. we did sod with a sober minded approach that neither overinflated nor -- we did so with a sober minded approach that neither overinflated snow or -- nor underestimates the power of the competition. we have proceeded with an equal measure of confidence and

urgency. with urgency to sustain deterrence and our military edge even as the pla modernizes. and with confidence, but never blind confidence that america has the capacity to do what is required to meet the moment today, tomorrow, and for the foreseeable future. even as a global power, trade-offs are inevitable. in europe, the middle east, and indo pacific, everybody wants more patriot boundaries. those don't grow on trees or get built overnight. you have to stick to your strategy and use that as your guide. competition for finite resources will always be fierce and should be. unlimited budgets don't help the taxpayer and do not automatically translate into military strength. senior decision-makers must rigorously align in ways and means to ensure that the strategy itself remains right

and the dot can deliver on it. and if it is not delivering, leaders must drive change from the top. this brings me to my second lesson. execution is paramount and the execution must occur across the entire delivery chain that turns vision into capabilities at scale. it is easy to talk a big game. but you have to be ready to deliver. take one of them are -- world's largest bureaucracies towards the strategic competition. that's not a fifth -- for the faint of heart. it requires personal investment, culture change, deliberate disruption and discomfort and rejecting usual practices constantly. from day one, we have focused relentlessly on driving changes needed to outpace the prc and ensure an enduring military advantage. the result has been a more

modernized, lethal, agile force across our capabilities, operational concepts, posture, and much more. we needed that focus because the modernization has been rapid, ambitious, and laser focused on us. even as their leadership has openly criticized the pla's fake combat capabilities, perhaps a reference to their challenges with rampant graft. we have been committed to delivering real u.s. military capabilities that are combat credible and open -- cutting edge from the oceans to outer space. today the united states maintains a significant over match in several areas compared to the prc and russia. undersea warfare is a key example. we will keep it that way, even as their navies keep modernizing. our partnership with the u.k. and australia will strengthen

our combined power beneath the waves and we aren't reinvigorating america's submarine industrial base to produce at the scale and pace we need. over four years, we have sought to invest about $10 billion in that anchors the lethality of america silent service. we have made bigger investments overseeing the largest dod state budget ever. in 2024, american space launches launched mort satellites then china has the its history. and that has happened every year since 2021. america's dynamic commercial space industry enables all this and it will continue to benefit the dod even more through our new commercial augmentation space reserve, almost like a

civil air fleet or airlift, but for space services delivered by satellite. not only will it leverage are many advantages in commercial space, it is critical to keeping space a domain of tranquility, not chaos and destruction. this is one of the multiple ways we are ensuring that the web of satellites that dod can draw upon is so great that attacking or disrupting them would be a wasted effort. we are outpacing china's military in the rapid, responsible use of data and ari, making our decision advantage even better than it already is. our approach reflects our ethics and democratic principles. we don't use data and ai to censor, repress, or disempower people. instead, building upon our predecessors, we draw upon our many u.s. advantages.

better chips, better tests, better talent and better values that guide how we use data and ai. our investment in sustained leadership turned all domain command and control from a pipe dream to a real capability now being used at multiple combatant commands. our speed it shows the beauty of what software can do for hard power, delivering for the war fighter in days and weeks instead of waiting for years. the quality data powering our applications comes from decades of real-world modern military application and years are in active war zones leveraging connectivity across domains strengthened by real-time data sharing with allies and partners. the pma not only lacks such data, there -- pla not only

lacks such data, their approach to ai is different with autonomy superseding human control over an expanding array of missions. we do the opposite because it is more effective and safe. we are mindful of ai's potential risks. when we can see ourselves and any adversaries clearly, when we make the battle space more transparent than ever for us, we can sense, make sense, and act faster, while still maintaining human judgment and responsibility over the use of force, the best of both worlds -- world spirit are to sit -- world's. out of the same time, we know how to counter adversary kill chains. through our investments in key weapons, platforms, and enablers across domains, air, land, sea and beyond, we have continually improved how we sense, see, and

shoot in contested environments. we have gotten better at how we compensate -- complicate our adversary's abilities to do so. look at missile defense. with examples from 2024 including a successful demonstration of ballistic missile defense and successful tests by multiple services using hyper velocity gun weapons systems projectiles to intercept missiles and drones at much lower cost per shot ratios. for munitions, we embraced a diverse portfolio of long-range fire including subsonic, supersonic, hypersonic and newer, lower cost long-range munitions. we do not treat munitions as a voltaire. when you compare the last four defense budgets at aggregate munitions investments grew by

over 30%. with bipartisan support for multiyear procurement of munitions we expand limits maximizing procurement of munitions most relevant for the indo pacific, tomahawk's come long-range antiship and joint air to surface missiles and much more. additionally, we continued our long-term investments in modernizing america's nuclear triad. that is important. strategic deterrence is a no field mission. we have also focused on complementing our exquisite, world-class system with the things that are small, smart, cheap and can be acquired and felt fast and in mass. that is what our replicator initiative is doing. first by fielding all domain autonomous systems by this august. it is a pathfinder.

it's on track to meet our stated goals and it is seeing a broader scaling of responsible autonomy. we knew that execution was key with replicator. that was part of our thinking from the beginning. it is where other innovative visions have stumbled in the past. by driving both technology change and culture change, replicator is showing dod can move fast to shape the battle space and equip war fighters with what they need to win. in all, when we look across four annual defense budgets and multiple supplemental funding bills, adding up all of our capability investments, r&d plus procurement, the real dollar total is over $1.2 trillion. even after adjusting for inflation, that is more than dod invested in those areas, r&d plus procurement, across any four year period throughout the entirety of the cold war.

in addition to the capabilities themselves, we have also focused on developing and fielding innovative operational concepts for how we use our capability. showing we can continually shape and master the changing character of warfare. beijing cares about that. you see from the 1990's on the prc carefully crafted its elaborate military modernization to counter two long-standing u.s. approaches to power projection. one was aircraft carriers, as deployed during the 1996 taiwan strait crisis. the other it was the multi-month time phase forest deployments that moved america's military might from the constitutional u.s. into the theater before an operation. like desert shield before desert storm and subsequent regional buildups proceeding war in iraq and afghanistan.

since then we have seen beijing work hard to focus military concepts and capabilities toward an approach that would keep us out of the western pacific in a crisis. so, we are changing the game. it includes changing our software necessary. we are considering, for example, what it takes to be in place earlier, with more distributed, mobile, lethal, and resistant force posture in the island chain to maneuver, communicate, strike, and resupply into and around a battle space that is highly contested across many, if not all, war fighting domains and the electromagnetic spectrum. to be able to hold operational centers of gravity, not just on demand, but on unexpected timelines from unforeseen places and with unanticipated methods and capabilities. all deny the territory

conquering goals of the military that some day whites to exceed our own. while there is more work to do but it is already manifesting in aspects quite different from the military the pla bills itself to be. we are seeing in classified wargames, that these approaches are paying off. make no mistake. our novel concepts are imposing the limits. to sow doubt in our competitors, sometimes with new capabilities like autonomous systems and sometimes by using existing capabilities in new ways that are more flexible, mobile, and rapidly deployable. for example, this summer, the navy showed our personal fm six missile has a long-range capability operationally deployed today. the marine corps is accelerating its design initiative fielding

nimble regiments that can operate throughout the first island chain showing they can fire naval strike missiles from a joint light tactical vehicles. meanwhile, the army is standing up multi-domain taskforces and showing how missile batteries can be shipped 8000 miles away in only 15 hours. the air force is hardening pacific bases and villa -- developing collaborative combat aircraft and the space force is showing how we can rapidly launch space systems with barely a day's notice. i will stop the examples there. the prc's strength in intellectual property theft and sheer industrial capacity make them talented, fast followers. so we must be careful with what we say and what we show because a long-term investment can be shown once. the third lesson for strategic

competition is that the united states has a strong, enduring, competitive advantages that it must leverage, from our vibrant network of allies and partners to our unparalleled ability to generate innovation through and with our private sector to the finest fighters in the world. strategic competition is a team sport, and more is more at home and abroad. internationally, our allies and partners are a force multiplier that makes us stronger. where we have partners of choice, our competitors only have bedfellows of last resort. since 2021, we have made historic transformational improvements and upgrades to u.s. posture across the indo-pacific, fortifying opposition from northeast asia down to australia and the pacific islands. that has been a major personal priority for secretary austin and an enduring legacy he will leave behind.

we are also deepening our interoperability with key allies and partners and increasing cooperation on both cutting-edge edge concepts and capabilities. we are expanding codevelopment, coproduction, and co-sustainment, and strengthening our industries and supply chains through a 15-nation partnership for indo-pacific industrial resilience. and around the world, america's friends and allies have been substantially contributing to the common defense. they are investing more on their own and in our collective defense, operating more deeply with each other and with us, and fielding more advanced capabilities. when beijing sees us training and exercising with capable allies like australia, japan, and korea, whose 14 total aegis destroyers have 1400 vls cells, it shows how much combined power of this can bring to bear

alongside our own if we must ever fight against territorial aggression. and when beijing sees, as they did last year, navy ships from canada, germany, and others peacefully sailing through the taiwan strait, they are reminded that america is hardly the only democracy that wants to see stability and prosperity prevail over chaos and conflict. since that vital waterway is practically the jugular vein of the global economy. domestically, more is also more when we work across government, industry, academia, and nonprofits. the same goal is for dod partnering with other government agencies and congress. strategic competition is rarely confined to the military sphere and is powerful as military tools are, they have limits. when competitors like china use

brazen tactics, the most effective counters, navy, intelligence sharing, diplomatic actions, other activities. sometimes dod should contribute, but not always. you must u -- we must use all levers of national power and more that is why this administration has taken steps to ensure that u.s. wealth and innovation aren't exploited for pla military monetization. a private sector is a key advantage and we must collectively collaborate to achieve our competition aims. that is why we have made significant, sustained investments every year to strengthen the health, productivity, workforce, facilities, and supply chains of our defense industrial base, traditional and nontraditional, from critical minerals to microelectronics and much, much more. our ability to innovate is something that beijing can never

blunt, steal, or copy, because it is embedded of our system of free minds, free markets, and free people. we don't seek to control innovation or make it toe the party line. instead, we aim to foster and unleash innovation. that is why over the last four years we took chainsaws to the thicket of innovation obstacles that inhibit dod from adopting america's best commercial technologies. we built more bridges and express lanes over the valleys of death between more fighter needs, research in developing, production, and fielding at scale. we opened more doors to newcomers from defense tech startups and scale ups to commercial companies. from fiscal year 2021 through 2024, at least 375 billion dod dollars went to nontraditional

defense companies. perhaps the most intangible advantage we have over the pla is the people who comprise america's all-volunteer force. they are our greatest strength. retention is strong, and with sustained post-covid focus, last year we also met our recruit contracting goals across the breadth of the joint force. that all reflects our attention on taking care of our people. now, p.r.c. leaders have in recent years bemoaned those so-called fighting capables -- that is how some pla officers and commanders can't judge situations, understand higher authorities' intentions, make operational decisions, deploy forces, or manage unexpected situations. the u.s. military doesn't have these issues. our officers and senior enlisted leaders not only are capable of all that, they are exceptional.

and because we use principles of mission command, we don't need to centralize decision-making or micromanage operations like the pla does. we can trust that even if our forces get cut off from higher headquarters, they will use their knowledge of commanders' intent, rules of engagement, and the law of armed conflict, and they will innovate on the fly to achieve their mission objectives. it's not blind trust. we know they can because they've proven they can for decades in the heat of battle. last but not least is my fourth insight, attend to your actions and your words. they matter more than you think. many of you here at sais no the concept of a security dilemma where the security actions of two states compel each other to do more, raising the possibility of misunderstandings,

miscalculations, or inadvertent escalation that could lead to conflict. some think this may already be a factor in today's strategic competition between america and the p.r.c. whether or not you agree, the possibility of a security dilemma should inform p.r.c. and u.s. policy. after all, we want our operations, activities, investments, and messages to maintain deterrence, not needlessly provoke beijing into starting a war. even if deterrence is what we intend, it behooves us to consider how our actions might be perceived behind closed doors on the others, and it behooves china to do the same. for instance, it's been publicly reported that some in beijing may genuinely think we are trying to bait or trick them into war. we are not, and consider what we are not doing as part of our evidence. we are not rationing, not

stockpiling -- not stockpiling hard currency reserves -- not restarting conscription. we aren't condoning or encouraging separatism or aggression. rather, the united states strongly discourages both. at the same time, we do see the p.r.c.'s exercises can we hear its leader's words about her willingness to use force against taiwan, and we take that seriously. we don't believe conflict is inevitable, but it is our job to prevent war by always being ready for war if it comes. so where beijing might see dod anticipating a potential conflict, that is because we are concerned beijing will instigate one. both sides must try harder to avoid misunderstandings in this dynamic. to be clear, we are not and we have no cause to be in an ideological struggle for global dominance with the p.r.c.

they don't have to succumb to the fate that befell the ussr in 1991 in order for us to thrive and win the competition for the 21st century. the p.r.c. isn't going anywhere, and that's ok. neither are we. as we define the terms of what victory we seek in the long-term strategic competition with china, we should be crystal clear with everyone that victory means assuring the continued safety, security, prosperity of our nation. victory means ensuring the international system is not adversely tilted against us, and victory should also mean averting the global economic and human devastation that would be wrought by a full-blown war between the nuclear-capable nations of the united states and china. winston churchill once rallied

britons by saying it would be foolish to disguise the gravity of the our, it would be still more foolish lose heart and courage. churchill's sentiment has resonated with me through my time as deputy secretary of defense for some we must treat the daunting challenge that the p.r.c. poses to american interests with urgency, but we also must be confident. we must be forthright about how advanced the p.r.c.'s military has become, then do our utmost to outthink, outmaneuver, and out strategy i them, to prevent war if we can and be able to prevail in war if we must. remember whose side we are on. we are the united states of america, and together with our allies and partners, we have so many asymmetric advantages that the p.r.c. lacks, all of which are represented here today. we have an open society, a

vibrant innovation ecosystem that is second to none, and i dynamic free market economy that beijing cannot replicate. we have dependable and increasingly capable friends and allies throughout the region and the world who stand with us because they share our values. and we have the most proven, proficient, professional military in the world, enabled by the world's best intelligence agencies. because of them, we know the gravity of the our, and because of them and you, i have no cause to lose heart or courage. whether you are a student or servicemember, entrepreneur, educator, and engineer, whether you already do or someday will contribute to the cause of america's national security, each of you will shape the future and our nations fate in

this multi-decade era strategic competition. you are the problem solvers, and it is all hands on deck. i'm deeply proud of all the defense department has done to advance that because over the last four years. of course work remains. the needs always evolve. it is the cause of at least a generation and likely more generations to come. the last several years are but the dawn. as i leave this, my third tour in government, like paul nitze and my predecessors before me, i will be watching my successors to build on my progress with their own, i will be rooting for those who stand watch for a nation, or fighters, civilians, military families, and all who support them, and they will remain in my prayers as they help defend us all. thank you. [applause]

>> what a wonderful speech. i have questions, but i know we don't have a lot of time. let me jump to something that you didn't talk about, nuclear deterrence and nuclear modernization. modernizing all three legs of the triad, nuclear command-and-control systems, here, as in the areas you discussed in depth, the situation now looks very different from four years ago. how should the united states be thinking of nuclear deterrence with our peers? deputy sec. hicks: and i did mention in passing -- you are right that a lot has changed the last several years, the invasion by russia and the p.r.c.'s

expansion, rapid expansion of nuclear capability, the independent commission on strategic posture in the united states out in 2023 that really captures a strong bipartisan consensus, and there is a broad commission, so that is saying something, that we have a lot of work to do to be capable of operating in a world of multiple nuclear challengers. i think that is the right way to think of it, multiple nuclear challengers. any net administration will be doing in nuclear posturing view. our view has been to undertake actions to to

strengthen america's hand.

going forward, how should we think about that? where should we be staying the course, where should we double down, and dare i say, where might we pullback were or divest a little bit? i will leave it to the next administration to think about the last piece. ways to think about the environment having been around like you -- we've been around it for a while, both of us come and there is always a reason to buy us -- recency bias on risk. i think it is a very dangerous world and hopefully my comments here underscore that. but even as a practitioner of yoga, i don't think i coul [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2025] >> we're going to leave this here but you can continue watching it if you go to our website, c-span.org. live now to the u.s. house of representatives where today members will be workinn