tv CIA Dir. Nominee John Ratcliffe Testifies at Confirmation Hearing CSPAN January 15, 2025 11:04am-12:01pm EST
11:04 am
that's disturbing in itself. our republican congress will continue to stand with women throughout this congress and advocate for the protection of their rights. i yield back, mr. speaker. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back. pursuant to clause 12-a of rule 1, the chair declares the house in recess until >> you can watch live coverage of the house when members retur we stay on capitol hill to take you live to the senate intelligence committee's
11:05 am
confirmation hearing for president-elect trump's c.i.a. director nominee, john ratcliffe. already in progress. er. sen. king: would you ever ask, encourage or support an intelligence professional adjustorring his or her assessment to avoid criticism from the white house or political appointees? mr. ratcliffe: no. sen. king: and do you commit to exclusively consider professional qualifications and personnel decisions without consideration partisan or political factors? mr. ratcliffe: yes. sen. king: if you were to
11:06 am
receive credible evidence as director of the c.i.a. that an individual yas wund mining -- was undermining objectivity and furthering a political agenda in the intelligence community, would you remove or discipline that person? mr. ratcliffe: yes. sen. king: will you or any of your staff impose a political litmus test for c.i.a. employees? mr. ratcliffe: no. sen. king: finally, if confirmed, will you reassure your workforce that loyalty tests are not allowed and not encouraged in the c.i.a.? mr. ratcliffe: i will. sen. king: those are exactly the answers you gave. thank you. one other brief question. you are the author of an important statute on cybersecurity and i've done extensive work in that area myself. i believe that one of the great failings in national policy is the lack of a cyber deterrent strategy that our adversaries,
11:07 am
particularly china, feel that they can attack our telecommunications system, our electrical system or whatever, with impunity. do you believe that it would serve the national interest to develop and declare a cyber deterrent strategy similar to the strategy that underlies the rest of our national defense posture? mr. ratcliffe: i do, senator, and i know we share a similar view on the threat from cyber. there's so much focus on the integrity, sovereignty and integrity of our territorial borders but as you well know, it's invasion through our digital borders from half a world away in a few seconds and a few key strokes that cause -- king and it's happening -- king and it's happening every -- sen. king: and it's happening every day. mr. ratcliffe: that cause so much damage. the deterrent has to be that there's consequences for our adversaries when they do that. one of the things that i hope to do if confirmed as c.i.a. director is to work on the development of the types of tools that will be effective in allowing us to do those things,
11:08 am
the deployment of those capabilities of course would be a policy decision for others to make. but i would like to make sure that we have all of the tools necessary to go on offense against our adversaries in the cyber means. sen. king: thank you very much. i hope you'll advocate that in the councils of the national security apparatus of the administration. thank you. i appreciate your testimony. sen. lankford: thank you for being here. thanks for your leadership. thanks for your sacrifice and what you have already done to be able to serve the nation. we really appreciate that. it is a tremendous sacrifice to serve in the intelligence community. as my wife has said to me a couple of times, we share everything about everything and talk about life together, but there's now a portion of my life i can't talk about with her, serving in the intelligence committee. you've had even more of that, so thanks for y'all's sacrifice, to be able to serve. i've got several questions i want to be able to run through quickly on this. there are a group of folks in
11:09 am
oklahoma city, i can't name who they are because they're alive, but their lives were threatened on election day by an isis terrorist in oklahoma city that was discovered initially by a 702. that 702 authority is important. there are people in my neighborhood that are alive today because of that 702 authority. you've been outspoken on this. it has been. maligned in many ways on it. but it has been vital for intelligence collection around the world. what is your position on 702 authority? mr. ratcliffe: thank you, senator lankford, for the sentiment and for the question. fisa and particularly section 702 of the foreign intelligence surveillance act, is an indispensable national security tool. there's no other way to get around that. i say that not as a matter of opinion, but as an informed judgment as in my role as the director of national intelligence being the president's principal
11:10 am
intelligence advisor, advising the president in the oval office, and understanding that a significant percentage, sometimes more than half of the actionable foreign intelligence that we provide to the president as the policymaker to act as commander in chief comes from fisa-derived or 702-derived action. i will say i have supported fisa in that regard, but i've also, as i outlined earlier, understand that it is an important, indispensable tool, but one that can be abuse and that we must do everything we can to ensure it has the appropriate safeguards because it can't come at the sacrifice of americans' civil liberties. so i have supported those reforms and called out those abuses when they have taken place. sen. lankford: i think the best way to be able to do that is by actually enforcing those that have abused it, that they're called out and accountability is held for those individuals so everyone knows this is an indispensable tool, don't abuse it. i think that becomes very clear.
11:11 am
you have mentioned in your testimony, we cannot ignore c.i.a.'s critical counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions in support of border security efforts. i think few americans understand just south of our border is one of the most violent areas of the world. today there are murders, beheadings, aerial bombardments with one cartel fighting within itself for leadership happening right now. it is incredibly violent area just south of our border. not to mention the thousands of americans that die with narcotics that they pump into the united states and destabilize our economy. and our families. that's a critical role for us in our national security. how do you perceive that? mr. ratcliffe: it also ties in to your question about the importance of fisa. so much of what the c.i.a. has done and can do to support the u.s. government efforts to
11:12 am
interrupt the drug trafficking rings and the places from which the precursor chemicals for those drugs come from, our disruptions are often as a result of fisa-derived information. but you highlight an important point. we talk about the threats from china and russia and other adversaries overseas, but we i think all know and understand and acknowledge that the failures and the integrity of our border has turned my home state of texas as not only a border state, but every state into a border state. and that we have to make sure, and one of the things that if confirmed i want to talk about and pledge is the understanding that in addition to drug trafficking, i made a point about terrorists coming across our border, that we not lose
11:13 am
sight of counterterrorism as something that the c.i.a. needs to be focused on, as we talk so much about the threat from china and russia and the great power competition. sen. lankford: mr. chairman, i'll yield back 12 seconds. how about that? >> thank you. senator bennett. please follow senator lankford's example, everyone. sen. bennet: thank you. i'll take senator lankford's 12 seconds. just kidding. i want to thank you for your leadership on this committee. i hope we'll continue with the standard that you set for all of us in terms of politics. congressman ratcliffe, it's good to see you again. thank you for your visit to the office. i know you know you're a student of history and a student of this committee, you know that this committee came out of a series of reforms that congress put together because to deal with a
11:14 am
really dark chapter in american history, senator king from maine talked about bad intelligence during vietnam, there were instances of the c.i.a. engaging in the assassination plots abroad. it's hard to imagine today that that's even true. that provoked bipartisan outrage and the reason this committee exists in part is not just to make policy that you've been talking about and others this morning, but also to provide oversight on behalf of the american people and our colleagues who, as senator lankford was just saying, don't have access to the intelligence the people on this committee have. i would just ask you to talk a little bit about your views on what the purpose of that congressional oversight is and what -- if you are confirmed to this position, what your responsibility to this committee will be.
11:15 am
mr. ratcliffe: thank you, senator bennet. i enjoyed the chance to visit with you and talk about a number issues. as you know from my background, i came from congress. i was on an oversight committee. the house permanent select committee on intelligence. and so i think it gives me a unique perspective. i brought that over as d.n.i. and if confirmed as c.i.a. director. i have the perspective of both the executive branch and the legislative branch. and i will confess that one of the things i was disappointed in was the fact that despite being on a congressional oversight committee on intelligence communities, there was so much intelligence that i knew no member of congress was aware of from d.n.i. and i think that that sort of speaks to my approach and understanding that i take
11:16 am
seriously the obligation that i will have as -- if confirmed as c.i.a. director, to keep this committee fully and currently informed on intelligence issues. it's not that this committee or any intelligence committee or any oversight committee in congress needs to know everything. but you should at least know the topics exist. sen. bennet: let's talk about that a little bit. the president gets his presidential daily brief every day. there's a very high standard for veracity, for what's in that. because he has to obviously make the most significant decisions that any human has to make. about deploying our defense assets or the other things that a president does. we don't have anything like that in congress and a lot of the time it seems like we're often, as you said, finding ourselves fishing around in headlines and
11:17 am
in sort of less well organized intelligence materials, that we're providing with no assurance that it's a complete picture of anything. i wonder what your conclusion about that is and how -- what the obligation of the c.i.a. or any intelligence agency is with your leadership to be able to provide a fuller picture, the picture you're talking about, that a member of congress who is on these committees should tallly know, rather -- should actually know, rather than be guessing about. mr. ratcliffe: my perspective is, you've highlighted all of the things that sort of reveal that our national security posture is impacted in a negative way when we're not communicating well between the branches of government and particularly on sensitive national security matters. so i think a better informed congress will alower for better national security decisions and
11:18 am
keep the american people safe. so i'm open to a continuing dialogue about how -- i won't stand on traditions, this is traditionally what the c.i.a. does or shares. i am open to at the end of the day, we talk about the core mission of the c.i.a., it's to provide a decisive, strategic advantage to you and to the president as policymakers so i don't view it as just informing the president. i view it as big is ral that i be performing -- integral that i be performing you. sen. bennet: i appreciate very much the fullsomeness of your answer. i want to observe that it's real easy for politicses to -- politicians to accuse intelligence agencies of politicization and actually it's important that we do that when it's the appropriate thing to do. but this is the place where that oversight is supposed to be
11:19 am
provided. these are the people that are supposed to fix that problem and it can only be done if we have people with integrity that are working at the heads. these agencies that can help us fix the problems, not just explain about it. sen. rounds: thank you, mr. chairman. mr. ratcliffe, thank you for your service to our country already and to michelle, thank you for the sacrifice which you also offer in allowing him to do this particular job in the future. i want to go back to fisa section 702 just a little bit. we're in an open session and i think one of the opportunities that we have is to perhaps share with the american people with a little bit more clarity what 072 is really about and what actually happens. could you kind of describe in an approach that -- look, it's coming up for renewal again in april of next year.
11:20 am
and between now and then we're going to have to convince the american people and other members of congress that we've made significant improvements in the protections but also we've done our best to try to explain why this is such an important part of -- a tool in our collection of approach. can you talk more about the mechanics so that, as those listening to you today, may understand what fisa 702 actually is and how it fits in to the collection process? mr. ratcliffe: sure. senator, thank you. i've enjoyed the chance to visit with you and i know we are like-minded in terms of the importance of 702, as i talked with senator lankford and how i view it as an indispensable tool. it's one i used as a prosecutor, general ashcroft talked about national security and terrorism-related investigations. so i've used it as a practical matter there and then like you, as a legislator have seen it.
11:21 am
then in the unique perspective as d.n.i. and if confirmed here, you know, the importance of it in fulfilling the core mission. 702 allows for foreign -- collecting foreign intelligence on foreign persons. not on u.s. persons. the controversy, why some people think that fisa is, no pun intended, a four letter word, that in the course of doing technical collections on foreign persons for foreign intelligence to make good decisions to keep our country safe, that sometimes u.s. persons are ins p dentally collected -- incidentally collected. for example, they're having a conversation with a foreign person. sen. rounds: we eavesdrop, don't we? and we're not evening ofs dropping on -- eavesdropping on americans, we're eavesdropping on bheenl are not american citizens and we're doing it outside of our country. mr. ratcliffe: that's right.
11:22 am
sen. rounds: and in the middle of it we have americans who are caught up and having conversations with somebody outside the country and at that point there might have been something collected inadvertently, can we use that? mr. ratcliffe: so there is -- when, for instance, the c.i.a. collects intelligence, it is allowable to do a u.s. person query where you're looking for someone that might be communicating with some foreign person to do something bad to the united states. what you can't have is accessing that or making a query for political reasons or for some reason other than protecting our national security. and so we have to have the safeguards to make sure that those kinds of abuses can't take place and be miseyesed and my -- misused and my pledge to you if confirmed as c.i.a. director that that won't happen. i will point out that i haven't been briefed on everything, but i am impressed with the c.i.a.'s compliance rate with regard to u.s. person queries is 99.6%.
11:23 am
meaning they do are a really good job of making sure that americans who are swept up incidentally aren't having their civil liberties violated. is it perfect? no. but -- sen. rounds: there were reforms made based upon practices that were not appropriate several years ago, is that correct? mr. ratcliffe: that's correct. sen. rounds: but they've already been addressed now. mr. ratcliffe: that's correct. rounds round you would be supportive -- sen. rounds: you would be supportive of the renewal of 702. at this point it is critical we get it renewed? mr. ratcliffe: it's critical, it's indispensable and for critics of it, no one has offered a replacement. if, for instance, half of the actionable foreign intelligence comes from fisa 702, what are we going to replace that with? and the critics haven't provided any alternative to that. so -- sen. rounds: i agree. i just -- i just thought it was -- in this open setting, that
11:24 am
there be a better understanding or at least a better clarification -- how critical it is and what it really is. it's basically looking at things overseas, not in the united states. mr. ratcliffe: and i think it's going to be an ongoing discussion and needs to be as it comes up for re-authorization again. and it will be incumbent on me if confirmed to, both within the administration and outside, stress the things that you and i are talking about. and make sure that people understand and to dispel false narratives about how fisa's being misused or can be misused. sen. rounds: thank you, mr. chairman. mrs.gillibrand: thank you for your service and meeting with me. we had an excellent conversation about a number our priorities on the committee. but mine specifically. sen. gillibrand: i just want to
11:25 am
address those so you can talk about them publicly. as we discussed, we need to do a much better job in detecting and preventing and knowing the intelligence to prepare for the next pandemic. we didn't have the type of collaboration we needed to prepare for covid. we had disagreements about how covid began and we never really got resolution on that. which is a concern for me. but this idea of a one-health proposal is creating essentially a fusion center for the c.i.a., the n.s.a., the d.o.d., the department of agriculture and h.h.s. so that you are in real-time working collaboratively to detect this information. because agriculture and science, they often share data and information and we know with regard to the wuhan lab that they were publishing data and information about the tests they were doing. the scientific community had
11:26 am
access to that. the c.i.a. on the other hand was looking into other intelligence, they might have been able to get the details about illnesses quicker than anyone else. but none ever these groups were talking so the data wasn't shared in a timely basis. and so we didn't really have the information we could have had if the c.i.a. was talking to the medical community, the scientific community, and the agriculture community in terms of research. so i just want your commitment that you will work with me on this very important issue because the c.i.a. can play such a meaningful role in protecting our nation from such other threats such as a pandemic, or any use of a biological weapon or any use of that kind of harm to the united states. mr. ratcliffe: i really did enjoy the chance to visit and talk about these issues. i agree completely. i do pledge to work with you on that. you know, we go back to one of
11:27 am
the worst incidents in our nation's history, 9/11. it was a failure of communication. we had the intelligence, we just weren't sharing it with each other in a way that would prevent that. and you brought up covid as the more recent example where maybe as many as 25 million people died worldwide and at least a million americans as a result of that, and one of the things when i came in as d.n.i. to your point was, i was surprised at the lack of coordination between, for instance, the intelligence community and health agencies like the c.d.c. and the n.i.h. and the ability to -- the channels were not open to share information like you're talking about. so many of these things can be, if not prevented, mitigated quickly, if we're communicating and sharing intelligence better. so i completely agree with the sentiment that you've expressed and look forward to working with you to make sure that we're doing those things if i'm
11:28 am
confirmed at c.i.a. director. sen. gillibrand: thank you. i just want to associate myself with the comments of senator collins with regard to -- i think it is essential as i mentioned in our hearing that you collaborate with the department of defense, with their intelligence agencies, to understand what the nature of these effects are. what causes them. and what type of adversaries could be using technology in a way to actually harm our service members. so i just really appreciate that you will commit to delving deep into this issue and really try to limit the siloing of information between c.i.a. and d.o.d. on this very topic. mr. ratcliffe: i will. i look forward to it. the c.i.a. is the premier intelligence agency in the world and i'm not saying that it should always be able to make an assessment about a cause, but
11:29 am
over time that's typically something that we should expect and in some cases demand and, for instance covid, you brought up that, that's one issue. but a.h.i. is another one. i'm curious and look forward to work reading the classified -- look forward to reading the classified version of the assess ams that were made or the -- assessments that were made or the inability to make an assessment on causation and if i'm not satisfied, we'll continue to look at that. sen. gillibrand: thank you. my last question. obviously the scourge of sexual assault is problematic in every area of society. we want to make sure that the c.i.a. is a safe place to work and that people who are being harassed or assaulted can come forward and demand justice. i just ask your commitment that you'll work with this committee to make sure all of our members of this community can work in a safe environment. mr. ratcliffe: i will, senator. i appreciate your leadership on this issue. i know it's been something you've highlighted and as we
11:30 am
talked about in our meeting over the course of my career, i'm grateful for what my record reflects in leadership positions i've had and organizations i've had in terms of not tolerating sexual assault and sexual abuse when i was u.s. attorney, when i was d.n.i., when i was in congress, all of those. and so i make that pledge to you gratefully. mr. young: thank you, mr. chairman. it's great to serve with you and other members of this committee. mr. ratcliffe, had a nice visit with you in the office. you answered many of my questions. what i'll ask you here today will be familiar to you. imrung young thank you again for your -- sen. young: thank you again for your willing tons serve our country -- willingness to serve our country. you're qualified. i anticipate supporting your nomination so we'll begin with that. you spoke in your testimony to the growing role of emerging
11:31 am
technology and to advances being made by our adversaries. if confirmed, how will you direct the agency to analyze and respond to foreign threats that undermine, often overlook critical areas of our security and economic well-being such as the food and ag sectors? mr. ratcliffe: so thank you for the question. i did enjoy our visit, senator young, and enjoyed serving with you in the house of representatives. and if confirmed look forward to working with you from this perspective. you know, we were just talking -- i was talking with senator gillibrand about covid-19, the origins of that, and the things that the intelligence community needs to do to be better. part of that is to your point, embracing emerging tech nothings and -- technologies and making sure that one of the things that
11:32 am
the c.i.a. does is adapt to the technology curve. so, for instance, when we talk about utilizing artificial intelligence and machine learning, there's so much data that's out there in this, you know, great technological age that we live in, that sometimes the intelligence community spends so much time cysting through the data -- sif, iting through the data that they can't find the signal for the noise. one of the things that technology allows us to do is find the signal in all of that noise. in other words, so that we can find the intelligence, spend more time using the intelligence and less time looking for it. and so you brought up, you know, different issues where that can be valuable and where that can be helpful. one of the things that i know you're interested in and we've talked about was the biosecurity
11:33 am
and the bio intelligence issues and how the c.i.a. needs to expand its authorities in that regard. and its relationships with scientists and researchers to be on the leading edge of information as it's coming out. and develop early warnings to some of the problems that we're talking about in that space. sen. young: i'm ken couraged -- i'm encouraged that you are thinking critically about this topic and it's clear to me you are. you should know as you're likely aware, but all others who are watching this should know that there has been commissioned by congress a national security commission on emerging biotechnology. and that commission is charged with looking at the national security implications of our current biotech leadership
11:34 am
but also making recommendations that the united states can stay ahead of our adversaries, in particular, china. so we'll produce those recommendations in the spring time frame. i'm chairman of that commission currently and some of those will implicate very directly our intelligence community and so i would just ask that you and your staff review that report when it's published and work with this committee and others on some of its recommendations. so do you commit yourself without having seen the report, but to be attentive to its recommendations and findings? mr. ratcliffe: i absolutely do. and i appreciate your leadership on that issue and, as we talked about, and we'll talk about more, i look forward to supporting and collaborating your efforts in that regard.
11:35 am
sen. young: thank you. time is winding down. i'm the new guy but one other quick question here. would you like to volunteer any particular approaches that you might want to lead the agency in to delay or degrade the threats posed by foreign nations using emerging technologies like a.i. or biotech? mr. ratcliffe: i think we can talk about some of those things in the classified session, senator. i think that what i would say in this setting is that when it comes to technology, we have so much concern about china and russia and our adversaries and what they're doing and how we need to counter them. i have absolute confidence that we can and will. you know, there's only one country in the world that can parallel park a 200-foot rocket
11:36 am
booster. the chinese can't do it. the russians can't do it. we do it and we do it in part because of the great collaboration we have and can have and need to deepen between the private sector where there's so much innovation and ingenuity in the space of emerging technologies, and i'm committed as c.i.a. director, if allowed to expanding upon that. sen. young: thank you. sen. ossoff: thank you, mr. chairman. and mr. ratcliffe, congratulations on your nomination. thank you for your service to the country. congratulations also to your family. i enjoyed our engagement a few weeks ago as a useful opportunity for me to learn more about your views and your plans for c.i.a. i want to begin with a matter that impacts georgia. on election day 2024 there were a series of bomb threats issued against poling places in dekalb
11:37 am
county, georgia, principally. predominantly black and democratic-leaning precincts that disrupted the election operations and the ability of folks to vote in the afternoon on election day. our state election officials attributed those threats to russian actors. what assurance can you give my constituents in georgia that c.i.a. will sustain collection to identify threats to voting rights and election administration in the united states? mr. ratcliffe: so, thank you, senator, for the question. i enjoyed our visit as well. i can give every assurance. as you know, the c.i.a. doesn't have domestic authorities when we talk about election security issues, the f.b.i. and d.h.s. are the agencies that provide that protection, where the c.i.a. plays a role is if we have bad actors who want to
11:38 am
influence or impact our elections, as you've related in this case, i haven't seen that specific intelligence, but for instance russia, russian actors were behind those threats, those are the kinds of things that the c.i.a. not only should do, but must do and frankly do better in terms of collecting intelligence on how our adversaries intend, whether it's through physical means or through cyber means, of disrupting or influencing elections and, you know, the c.i.a.'s role should be to identify those threats over there before they come over here. sen. ossoff: thank you for that. i appreciate it. i want to give you an opportunity to provide clarifyings information about some events that attracted scrutiny in september of 2020 when you sent a letter to the chairman of the senate judiciary committee which declassified certain intelligence about russian analystic products that
11:39 am
had been cluct clected by the tense -- collected by the tense community and which pertained to events four years past during the 2016 election and the controversy over alleged links between the trump campaign and the russian government. my purpose is not to interrogate -- to relitigate that ancient history from 2016, but to understand why you chose to send that letter to a judiciary committee, declassifying intelligence on that day, september 29. you will no doubt recall that that was the same day as the presidential debate, yes? mr. ratcliffe: i don't recall that it was that date. but it may be. sen. ossoff: you don't recall? your testimony is that you're not aware that that letter was sent to the judiciary committee by you on the same day as the te presidential debate? mr. ratcliffe: i don't recall that it was on that day. i'll take you at your word. the dates will reflect what they are. but to your question, -- sen. ossoff: i want to drill
11:40 am
down on that. my purpose here is not to suggest some kind of political intent. but you've made it very clear that avoiding the politicization of the intelligence community's activities is a high priority for you, is that correct? mr. ratcliffe: correct. sen. ossoff: it strikes me that releasing politically sensitive intelligence, that you'd think carefully about the timing of that. that you might consider that doing so on the day of a presidential debate, when this was intelligence collected four years in the past, might reasonably draw the question of whether or not there was some political impetus. was that reasonable? mr. ratcliffe: reasonable for you to ask that. and if i can -- you asked me to clarify. if i can do that. so, you're correct, it was my decision but it wasn't my process. so to your point, that effort was actually the request of this committee during my confirmation
11:41 am
hearing as d.n.i. was to go back and look at the intelligence from 2016 and the 2017 intelligence community assessment. i also received separately a request from the attorney general and from then-special counsel to declassify certain intelligence relating to that in support of what would be a public report from the special counsel. in addition to that i received what i would call requests or even demands from other senate committees to include the judiciary committee and the house homeland -- i mean, the senate homeland security and government accountability, whatever the title of that committee is, for information related to that. that took place over a course of several months and the process, just so you're clear, was anititive, collaborative process that included the attorney
11:42 am
general, the c.i.a. director, the director of the n.s.a., myself as d.n.i., and again, anitierive process that resulted in a highly redacted product to protect sources and methods. but yet to respond to these requests or demands, to put that information out. so i take that that's -- sen. ossoff: that's useful information. my time is running short. we can discuss further in the closed session if we need. to i appreciate you -- mr. ratcliffe: i very much look forward to that. sen. cornyn: mr. ratcliffe, i think i have the distinction of having known you longer than anybody else on this committee. i remember when you were -- mr. ratcliffe: they call that misfortune. sen. cornyn: when you were the mayor of heath, texas. mr. ratcliffe: don't date me. sen. cornyn: how many people live in heath, texas? mr. ratcliffe: around 7,000.
11:43 am
sen. cornyn: you still live there with your wife and family? mr. ratcliffe: i do. it's a great community. i say hi to all the heathans out there. sen. cornyn: i have every confidence that you'll do an outstanding job as the next director of the c.i.a. and i don't -- i say that advisedly because as i said, i've known you for a long time and watched your career from the private sector to u.s. attorney, acting u.s. attorney for a while, to member of congress, and i had the privilege of introducing you to the committee at your previous confirmation hearing as director of national intelligence. so i don't really have any doubt about your qualifications. i do want to talk about a couple of subjects and one is, i know people have heard the discussion of fisa and section 702 and i appreciate the clarity with which you've explained how essential this tool is and i
11:44 am
think part of the problem we've had with re-authorization is people don't trust the people actually implementing that tool. because they've seen the abuses by members of the i.c., including the f.b.i., particularly dating back during president trump's administration. so they figure, well, everybody must use -- misuse these tools. but i thought you had a great analogy when we discussed this on the phone. you said, well, you probably have a bunch of steak knives in your kitchen and they can be used for useful and beneficial purpose, but they can also be misused. and i think that was a pretty good analogy. but i want to ask you about one of the, quote, fixes that some people have suggested to the current state of the law. and that is to require a warrant to query lawfully collected fisa information.
11:45 am
you have properly identified the fact that these -- this is directed at people overseas, foreigners overseas, not americans. but you're a former u.s. attorney and a pretty good lawyer. and you understand what probable cause requires to be able to establish probable cause in front of a judge. you need to have evidence. and if all you have is a fisa query of a foreign target that happens to mention an american citizen or a u.s. person, is there any way for you to go to court and establish the requirements of a warrant or probable cause in order to query that data? mr. ratcliffe: senator, you know the answer to that better than i do because you're a better lawyer and were an attorney general. but the answer is no.
11:46 am
because the danger there is that you really don't have the information to obtain the warrant and the process of obtaining the warrant, we're talking about national security issues where sometimes minutes matter in the ability to disrupt or interdict the bad actors. or to act upon the intelligence that you can gain from that. and so the process of even getting a warrant, the time that it takes, much less the fact that as you say, you won't have a probable cause basis to get there, -- sen. cornyn: i think there's a lot of misunderstanding and misinformation about how fisa works and admittedly i have to go back periodically and refresh my own memory. because it does get to be fairly convoluted sometimes. but the fact of the matter is it's illegal to use this tool to spy on american citizens. and there are protocols in place to lessen the likelihood that
11:47 am
that could ever possibly occur. but again, i think basically what's happened is there's been a lack of trust in the people who had access to those tools in the recent past and i hope you will help restore that trust. i also think you're going to need to share your experience and your wisdom with the nominees for f.b.i. and director of national security. because we've had these conversations as well and i think there's some confusion about whether a warrant should be required or not. i think you're absolutely right and that is, i think, -- is not the answer. thank you. sen. kelly: thank you, mr. chairman. and congratulations on your new job. look forward to working with you on this committee. and mr. ratcliffe, congratulations to your nomination for this position and
11:48 am
congratulations to your family as well. i want to follow up on what senator ossoff was referring to. the intelligence that was released prior to the 2020 election. that intelligence was rejected, first of all, it was before i was on the committee. but my understanding is it was rejected by democrats and republicans on this committee as having no factual basis and it put russian disinformation into the public sphere. i just want to understand. so just like in hindsight, knowing what you know now, this is four years removed from that and we've had another election and obviously we've got challenges we face with russian and chinese, iranian disinformation in our politics. so in hindsight, are there any changes that you would make to
11:49 am
the way you handled that information? mr. ratcliffe: well, senator, i appreciate the question. i certainly -- looking back, having the opportunity to change certain things, might do that. i don't know in this case, for instance, senator ossoff raised the point that the declassification occurred on the day of a presidential election. i don't recall that. obviously that's when it did. but -- sen. kelly: i think he said debate. mr. ratcliffe: debate, i'm sorry, yeah, debate. you know, i wasn't aware of that. i certainly don't think i did everything perfectly in terms of making decisions about every issue that relates to -- i'm talking generally. but i talked about my record in terms of how i approach these things and how in terms of
11:50 am
speaking truth to power, which sometimes included declassifying information, most of the things that i've done, senator, aged very well. and, you know, and i think others will continue to, for instance, on covid origins. you know, i think that ultimately i believe that there will be an assessment that is consistent with the position that i've taken. so -- sen. kelly: it's hard to get this stuff exactly right. i get that. this is complicated. in this case, you know, it did become rather political and i appreciate your willingness to look back. mr. ratcliffe: the other thing i want to say is i want to -- part of my answer to your question is classified. and i look forward in the classified session to talking about one of the things this committee asked me to do that did influence my decision was to
11:51 am
look at the 2017 intelligence community assessment and not only looking at that, what i did, to be clear, i requested a briefing from the c.i.a. from some members of the team that were involved in that, and i'm not sure that that information or that intelligence has been shared with this committee. so i look forward to -- sen. kelly: let's follow umon that. i have a few more things i want to cover here. i got about 90 seconds left here. in your written response to the committee, you indicated, this is a different topic, you agreed with the trump administration's 2018 assessment that the assad regime used chemical weapons. including in douma, killing hundreds, injuring hundreds more. the u.s. intelligence community had a similar assessment that these weapons were used. if you're serving or when you're serving as the director and the d.n.i. asks to you explore
11:52 am
evidence that the douma or other attacks were staged or that analysis indicating the use of chemical weapons is incorrect, or there's some kind of similar situation, what would you do? mr. ratcliffe: well, i'll look at the intelligence. so you're right. i did include that. that was based upon the intelligence that i was able to review during my time as d.n.i. and i think the intelligence was clear. i think the assessments were -- i forget if they were with high confidence, but i believe that they were. what i haven't seen is any intelligence in the last four years that i wouldn't have had access to. so i would look at that, but i'd be surprised if there is intelligence that would change my additional assessment, but i certainly go back and look at that. sen. kelly: can i just very briefly have a few more seconds here think? just want to get your commitment to work with me, focusing on
11:53 am
transnational criminal organizations on the other side of the border. it's a big problem. it effects my state. in a big way. mr. ratcliffe: and my state. i absolutely make that pledge and look forward to working with you. to address that threat. sen. kelly: thank you. sen. moran: chairman, thank you. mr. ratcliffe, i enjoyed and appreciated our conversation from the office. i particularly appreciated the indication of your transparency with this committee. your forth rightness, telling us the truth. it's been difficult from time to time to know what the true story is and there's certainly -- there are opinions about truth, but we ought to be trying to find the truth. i want to ask you about statements that you've made. i agree with you that china is the greatest threat facing our country. i rate russia as our second greatest threat. and believe it's the most acute threat today. will you describe the scope of the threat as you see it and the
11:54 am
importance of countering the kremlin? mr. ratcliffe: the question -- the threat from russia? sen. moran: the threat from russia. you indicate china is the greatest threat. mr. ratcliffe: absolutely. so russia is very clearlyan adversary of the united states. the threat of course is a country with a very large nuclear stockpile. the thing that separates the threat from russia from china in my mind and why i put them, even though we include them in the great power competition, is that the united states is the largest economy in the world. china's the second largest. russia has an economy that's roughly the same size as my home state of texas. so what that means is that the russians have to decide where they're going to compete with the united states and so they've chosen areas like hypersonics
11:55 am
and other areas. but that comes at a cost. and i think we saw some of the cost in terms of their troop readiness as they engaged in their aggression against ukraine. so a dangerous lethal adversary who in many respects is -- because of the limitations that i've talked about, has focused on areas where there are great equalizers and one of those is cyber security. so -- cybersecurity. so countries that can't compete with the united states in terms of kinetic fire power across the board, which can do so through cyber means, in other words, and we see that with iran and north korea and other countries who can't compete with us kinetically, focus on cyber means to cause us harm. russia certainly falls into that category as well. in terms of where a lot of their
11:56 am
focus is in my assessment of them in terms of the malign activities that they take across -- against the u.s. sen. moran: certainly invasion of another country has complicated the security of our allies and perhaps the united states. i point out that you're the first texan i have ever met that belittled the state of texas. in your answers to the committee's question, you state regarding russia that you believe, i'm quoting, you believe that we cannot let our adversarial relationship boil over into unintended wars. you go on to say, i will advise the president when there are opportunities to work toward mutually beneficial outcomes with russia. you did not make a similar commitment for china, iran or north korea. what's the difference? mr. ratcliffe: i don't recall the context of the question, why there would be a difference. for instance, i think what i was referring to there was, for all
11:57 am
of the things that i talk about in terms of russia as a threat and the things that they -- where they challenge us with malign activity, there are areas where we, for instance, countering terrorism, some of the same threats that we face from terrorist groups are threats that they face. so there are occasions where information or intelligence can be shared or things can be done in our mutual -- to the mutual benefit of our countries and those types of things. that would be true with china as well. i think president trump's approach from a policy standpoint is to not look for conflict with anyone, including our adversaries, but to provide a strong deterrent effect to their malign activities through america's strength. through peace through strength. i think iran may be different in the sense of it is a terrorist
11:58 am
state, a terrorist regime, had been designated by the trump administration. and so i would put that in a different category. sen. moran: in addressing the importance of analytical objectivity and speaking truth to power, you state that as the d.n.i. you represented the i.c.'s analysis policymakers faithically, -- faithfully, including dissenting views, even when the picture was unpopular. can you give me an example? mr. ratcliffe: sure in. connection with the 2020 presidential election, assessment was made as to whether china was trying to undermine president trump's re-election efforts and there was a split between the community, a majority opinion was that china was not doing that, wouldn't do that for a number of reasons. the minority opinion was that they were. i agreed with the minority
11:59 am
opinion. but what i did was not try to substitute my judgment for the community, i wrote a dissent that would be public and people could see the reasons for that. and in the process supported a whistleblower, one of our leading cyber officers in support of that, of that position. i will say that 15 months later, f.b.i. director wray held a press conference talking about the exact things that i was saying china had engaged in, that they were doing. and so the opinion that china would never engage in those kind of activities proved to be false and i think that my dissent aged well. sen. moran: not only did you speak out against the majority, but you turned out to be right. thank you. senator hinrich:thank you, mr.
12:00 pm
chairman. on july 21 of 2020, you sent a letter to this committee stating that while you agreed to appear at the committee's open worldwide threat hearing as d.n.i.'s director of national intelligence, that you would not take any questions in open session. you wrote that letter despite committing twice in your confirmation hearing that you would appear and answer questions. so obviously this position is one that requires congressional oversight. i don't think any of us up here would ever ask you to answer questions in a way that revealed anything that was classified or was more appropriate for closed session. so i want to ask you why you thought that was appropriate and then today can you commit that if confirmed, you will appear at this committee's annual open hearing on worldwide threats and take questions from the committee itself? mr. ratcliffe:
0 Views
IN COLLECTIONS
CSPAN Television Archive Television Archive News Search ServiceUploaded by TV Archive on