parts of the corps of the armed forces of ukraine and other power structures are more or less modern and sold it during the reformation of the so-called reduction. i myself was a participant in the struggle against these measures. he knows how it was done in those days . of the country, everything that was needed should be put on our arms now for demobilization from strong reserves as part of the army corps , now we do not have enough of it. we are waiting for help from our partners, sir. i will correct you a little there. what can be said, uh, not only in the expert’s opinion. it has to do with the fact that the left part of the weapons before the war was exported and it was directly the economic activity of the state. i think the main problem is that since the 14th year we have not ensured the restructuring of the defense industry, we have not provided a system exports from the point of view of satisfying the interests of ukrainians, primarily, they brought it

just for today, it is given as a sign of sportsmanship in those shortcomings that you are talking about. we are smart, we are ukrainians, we are not corners, you understand , if you did not create a military-industrial complex that started to work, why would you sell everything, well, that is what you and i understood. we start to launch only then we start to tear down this wall and throw it away and so on, we don't do it, it's like that, so that later we stand and i don't have any money, nothing to build it again, well , here i am with you, because now we really we remember my about the s-200 complexes with which they took off duty there we are talking about e-harrow equipment that we cut down now we sold we are right you say about helicopters and about tanks and about guns and

losing now we have a different reality where we have it better in these conditions, look for opportunities to defeat the enemy. now we are hoping directly for foreign aid, how do you assess the pace of foreign aid arrivals, do they ensure changes on the battlefield , that is, politicians and started this work in the first at the spring stage, it was quite effective, but unfortunately, to prepare the armed forces at the pace at which russia was advancing its offensive forces, we did not have time and lost these stages, first of all, because it means that our partners were not able to establish the pace necessary for the supply of weapons to us. resources for the supply of their warehouses, we need an expert of others who was engaged in this, we destroyed them, so we went into the summer period with the same forces that were well then, tell me then, in addition to uh special exports

, we even created a separate ministry strategic branches of industry, which was supposed to deal with the creation of the defense of the domestic defense industry in a new format, these measures were carried out, we see that the creation of the ministry is nothing to talk about. that the equipment is now of a high quality, it is very expensive, it is not so easy to manufacture it, it is necessary to conduct state tests and everything. it is easier than years and then set up mass production, so let's move on to the fact that we were left at the end of may without the necessary amount of equipment and could not form a reserve so that it would be on time

. active operations in the east could not be done, we had nothing to do with the same forces that were formed in our country on february 24, we moved to a deeper depth of permanent defense of the lines that we occupied, and russia was able to increase its reserves of equipment gigantic ammunition, fuel, and so on, they also had a problem with personnel and they felt it , that's why they couldn't actively conduct offensive actions against us, and you don't know, they advanced like a turtle, but gradually, very, very slowly, but they all after all, they decided to slowly solve their issues regarding staffing and personnel , i have already talked about this a and thus formed the necessary reserves , these troops support them in a combat-ready condition and are slowly advancing and

pressing on ours, they cannot defeat and strike with strong reserves of the corps there, for example , divisions, and they act as a battalion tactical group, squeezing us out, in what way we are talking about the fact that despite the presence of the personnel of the russian federation, we caused them significant losses , and the direct leadership of the country, in particular, mr. danylo, says that we we are talking about the exhaustion of the enemy and that he can conduct actions only there in one operational direction, how do we determine that the enemy is exhausted, which means that the enemy's exhaustion is determined by the fact that he has lost the pace of the offensive and is impatient to carry them on, this is the main exhaustion, what it consists of, it is definitely a loss in personnel, a loss of combat equipment, a loss or consumption of ammunition and consumption of

fuel . to the tactical e-e, our you have in the operational-tactical depth of your troops, which now, over the past week, our e-e means, the reactive means that we received from the e-e from our partners are very successfully destroying this is very good because, first of all, it destroys their possibilities for a further offensive, it would leave them with ammunition , fuel and other material resources, and it also does not allow them to create and, er, form, prepare for the battle in a timely manner, that is, a reserve, which they are now reformatting in order to enter into battle that is why they have now taken this pause, and this pause will be all the longer and more profitable for us. will be in charge of combat operations at the front there in

the donetsk region, they are very good men, they deserve the highest praise in all matters, but they also need human reserves, they need combat equipment. there was a video recently. i saw how our units in the north were defending the outskirts of slovyansk, where there is probably a sabotage group, i will infiltrate there and show the unit that was deployed and was doing the cleaning, so the air platoon of our assault troops was doing the cleaning, but this platoon was supported by only one btr-4 one armored personnel carrier, all behind him, the platoon arrived in the area of ​​the clearing on the 131st grass, you understand. a should have arrived with four armored personnel carriers on four instead of one, that is, really support, what does this

say about the fact that we are very lacking now lost during today's hostilities, we lost combat equipment, we are also losing people, we are replenishing people, the platoon was full, in my opinion, but there is no equipment, and this will affect our capabilities, er, effective defense, not to mention the contract or counterattacks. well, when do we have are you talking about the personnel now in the defense security forces, almost 700,000 personnel are directly called up or engaged, is this much or little? given the needs of the tasks facing the state today, this is almost enough, almost enough . because you, you, they are not, we said about 750,000. that’s right, but danilov and other political figures say that about a million we have them at gunpoint. this is very good,

but where are they located? where is this million located on the territory of ukraine in the combat zone, no, not so . there are not a million of them there, or 700,000, you understand correctly, on the one hand, because these people need territorial defense units and other problems, they need combat equipment, and they will not go to fight with tanks and armored vehicles on lawns and in cars the enemy not yet having the appropriate settlements of artillery means, there is not enough artillery for them to form them to put them on armor and thus advance them to a combat position in the area of ​​hostilities with the active army the challenges have been understood, you understand that we have a huge, er, a very long-standing army today, which is mobilized but not equipped with combat equipment. well, we understand

this because we repeatedly hear the statements of the political leadership of the state, the leadership of the armed forces, that we need a military equipment that we receive under lend-lease, we expect an increase in scale, and actually this is one of the restraining factors so far so that we carry out effective counter-offensive actions there. as i understand it, we still we are waiting for the arrival of this equipment in your opinion. when we talk about foreign equipment or any priorities in your opinion, which, first of all, need to be met there, air defense, defense equipment, aviation, communication systems, intelligence. is there any priority in the things that we should receive first of all? things to the fact that in the summer period of the military operations of our defense operation, we still suffered losses and this must be recognized. declares and i think that this is correct, but we must understand that we cannot our equipment tanks and armored personnel carriers

cannot be eternal yantal systems but they also fail they also break down they are also considered enemy fire different scales with auto losses but they are and that is why we this technique is needed and during this period the summer company is definitely reflecting such a massive uh, let's say a heavy, albeit gradual, slow such a turtle offensive of the russian federation in the donetsk region , but we still gave all our must give severodonetsk and lysychansk did all our military correctly, but they, uh, our enemies forced us to do it, why or what do we need appropriate equipment for the troops, we need its equipment , we need armored personnel carriers, we need tanks, artillery systems , we need air defense systems.

artillery was and is now becoming the main factor . artillery and rocket launcher systems are very important for us, especially the latter, but we already have a growing need for armored personnel carriers and tanks. is needed therefore, we need not dozens, but hundreds of tanks and tanks in order to update carts and ours at the front, as well as to create reserves for them so that all reserves do not come on cars or trucks, but come on tanks and armored vehicles, you understand. therefore, now the pace of our supply to us weapons should be 10 times more than they were before, otherwise the enemy will still gather, pull up their resources and again start to act in the same way as us, pushing us out of our territory and the center is already under threat ukraine is, well, let's say raisin, dnipro,

zaporizhzhia, this is bakhmut, this is the center of ukraine, now this territory is the center of ukraine, it is already very important for us, it is under the fence, i want to say more. we won't be able to arm ourselves, our partners will help me, we have a threat of losing this territory. what makes it dangerous for us is that after this territory is captured, this territory can join the war in belarus and transnistria. well, it's even worse for us that i would like in fact , they accepted the reality rather calmly, because according to my estimates, the line of the slavyanska and the kramatorsk lines is sufficiently well protected in terms of engineering, we are talking about the fact that it is

difficult enough to break through this line. do you think i agree with you except for one thing, everyone must remember that the lines of defense, regardless of whether they were broken or taken, do not exist in nature, the line of defense was broken, the line of this very same french other lines of defense were breached, you know were all broken, there is no such defense that could not be destroyed, of course the enemy will determine where our defense is the strongest and there will be no offensive, he does not go in the second direction and in that direction he will go to us here he will redeploy and so on, you understand, the russian federation can and advance to break through concrete walls with crowbars, they can do it, as they did under e-e, it was in north donetsk and lysichansk that we saw, we understand

that the strategy of the russian federation was built on the superiority of artillery when at the expense of artillery was carried out by redrawing the territory that we were defending. now we are talking. assessment of this operational pause, how long can it last ? well, if we continue to successfully deliver such and such strikes of the missile rocket systems of salvo fire that we received, and if they still provide it is more important for us, on objects located in the operational and operational-tactical depth of the enemy , to prevent them from concentrating material resources for the offensive, then even having appropriate reserves of material resources both in the troops and directly on the line of defense, they effectively they will not be able to advance, firstly, secondly, it is necessary to

strike not only at the warehouses, but also at the reserves , at the troops that have gone into the bodies that we are now receiving from our partners, tanks and other military equipment and equipment, they must be destroyed there for we need to suppress their beer so that our aviation can fly there and destroy them. some of the actions of our aviation have already been carried out. last week, they were carried out, but so far they are not enough, very not enough, so in order to restrain the possible potential of the russian army, you need to do these actions, and in addition , you must it is absolutely necessary on the flanks of the donetsk region, you can still call it kharkiv region, which means kherson region, to carry out active offensive actions with the aim that the enemy was still forced to abandon their reserves and remove them from donetsk region direction because the donetsk direction is now becoming the main one and it will continue to be the main one until the end of the summer period of our military companies, if you can say so in this war, how do you

assess the training of the personnel of the armed forces today because we said that 700,000 this is a significant amount, not all of it is at the front, we have to prepare trained reserves because this is precisely the basis of our stable defense, how should we properly prepare these reserves, should we consider helping britain there or adopt some other techniques where soldiers and commanders fight right away. to be honest, after completing the training, what are the optimal solutions in this direction? well, the solutions can be adopted. unfortunately, they were not adopted last year. they started on january 1, 2022, and not, i'm sorry, in

march 2021, when the russian federation began to concentrate troops on the borders of our state, that was the time to start forming of territorial defense during this time, these troops would have been formed, prepared, it was more or less clear with their equipment, what what, how, and they would have some kind of potential, a potential force greater than today, we have a number that we say is 700 thousand, which is ready, ready, i count yes, there are about 120 of the 150,000 armed forces of ukraine, ground troops who are on the front line and are conducting combat operations, they are effectively prepared and very well, they only lack the armed forces we talked about, but territorial defense is definitely on these four places should have already been carried out with coordination and combat training, of course, all the rest, but

there are quite a few units that are not yet ready to conduct combat operations with which they have not yet conducted the appropriate ones, because uh, combat training is conducted, it is conducted, it is constantly conducted, it is conducted in an amateur way , it is often conducted and by the forces of the armed forces and the forces, i mean our partners who are preparing people for us abroad, including, and in this matter, i want to provide the great britain with the training of 10,000 of our troops to understand what it will be mainly instructors or people who will determine the combat capability of the unit, that is, gunners, mechanics, commanders of battle tanks, it is a little bit of a struggle with our partners, guns and other weapons that we are given, we will be given 10,000, very good, such a number from which you can

form an instant a thirty-year-old corps and throw weapons at him and they will be able to fight quite effectively , but those who are playing, we now have training and are preparing territorial defense troops or territorial defense forces , they have a low level combat readiness and that is why now they act in this way, they prepared a company, more or less, it is ready for battle , they send it to the area of ​​hostilities, and the second company prepares to fight, they withdraw the company that suffered, you suffered losses, to rest and change the next one, but it is not of a mass nature. unfortunately, and therefore, to say that we can use several hundreds of thousands of territorial defense in a defensive operation. now we cannot say that we have to lose not only about the territorial defense of mine about the fact that today the ravens continue brigades of the armed forces of ukraine, which bear the

brunt of the hostilities, these brigades of ours also have losses, but conditionally speaking, from the point of view of strengthening the personnel potential, should we not directly create separate battalions in such combat brigades, training battalions that will already directly gain experience near the line combat operations because not everyone can learn to fight quickly, not everyone can precisely this is the challenge before which we need to find a model to strengthen our main combat brigades, which can be models yes, the model you are talking about once existed. such a model existed in the soviet army during the second world war, but today the situation has changed a little, not a little, because the means of armed struggle have become very strong now, if we were mainly tactical then, that is it’s a matter of 5-10 km depth, well, sometimes 15, no, not counting the aviation. well

, now the means have changed dramatically, the depth of which stretches to 460 km, that is, to operationally tactical depth and to keep the company’s training battalions there, that’s now it is impractical to create them in the deep operational rear, and they exist, there is a system of training the armed forces, er, between the war period, let’s say from the 14th year to the 22nd, it has changed. it is quite strong, it should only be used in full and effectively to train the forces of the means that we attract today to defense to the main thing, first of all, and secondly, the training of our specialists abroad is of great importance and there it should have a mass application, not by tens there, but by hundreds or even thousands. we must train people there, because it is also, first of all, security calm conditions of training. and secondly, it will be faster than it will be here in the

combat zone, it will be faster and cost-free, and therefore i think that our political leaders made the right decision to prepare in the rear and abroad, this is very correct and only these issues need to be increased, increased, to go from dozens to hundreds and thousands well, when we talk about what to prepare in the rear, let's consider the reality , let's say the same way that the front edge is under threat of missile strikes also under the threat of missile strikes and there is a training center there, let’s mention desna, zhytomyr, yavoriv, ​​that is, the enemy can strike in operational depth, this means that when preparing reserves, we must look for some optimal models , that is, prepare in particular there in poland, in particular prepare in great britain these units, and especially well, there are commanders and they should be returned to ukraine but all the same, this model should be well, more effective, because it will really

be difficult to win a war without reserves. you are right, but striking with missile troops is punishable by rocket on the territory, including on the educational institutions of the armed forces of ukraine and the state as a whole. they are of a point nature, you understand, they do not have a mass nature of communication with the fact that the losses among these training centers are insignificant, very insignificant, and this allows us to effectively train people and if these e-e connection units are more precisely located in the training zone in the operational-tactical zone, where the enemy's artillery and jet systems and aircraft can reach, they can be completely destroyed there, you will understand later, but this option e is to keep them in the combat zone, the training unit is not necessary here, it’s just necessary to

do it in a different way. or from this unit to put him on the defensive as it is correct or enter him during other types of combat with them they must come to the front with them and they must put them on the defensive or competently and so on effective interaction with the brigade commanders who directly lead the defense in certain areas. but you have repeatedly said that the situation in the rear is to enter the battle and instructors from the front should move to hold a short lesson with them there for a few days, prepare them for their specifics and help them enter the battle, you are enough i critically and alarmingly assess the situation in donbas that we need reserves of weapons to hold back the enemy, i think that we will have it in time and in sufficient quantity, but

i would like to evaluate your vision of the situation directly in the south, that is, are there any opportunities for the ukrainian army to provide a counteroffensive on this part of the front, well, apparently there is no such activity, i understand that there is probably no well, something is being done in the direction of kherson from the direction of kryvyi rih, something is being done, but now they have pulled it there they are reserves and our actions will probably slow down there, i want to tell you that there is no continuous front line in that direction, by the way, it does not exist everywhere, but on some it is already a continuous front line in donetsk region, but in the kherson region, it does not exist in a continuous direction, that is why i made such a proposal a month ago, some time ago, so that our military commanders could hear it, maybe they are delighted or in those heated battles. well, there is no time for them to look at

history look at history back there is such a tactic as the tactic of infiltrating small units of a platoon into the rear of the enemy, even in the operative political forces of retreating to a specifically specified area, where they gather in companies into battalions and begin to operate there, and this tactics are possible precisely in those directions where there is no solid front line, where there is a large gap between the territory between the guarded points occupied by the enemy and then if we study, for example , the kherson directions by such battalion groups to a depth of 50-30 km 30 20 km they become effective even without the presence of such heavy weapons, armored personnel carriers, tanks and artillery . why, because now our infantry is very effective

. so the same swedish ones and so on are very good , that is, they can effectively fight with them in the tanks and battleships of the enemy without having such , but their advantage will be that they will be spread in depth and the enemy will not have enough strength to advance in all directions he there will be one from the same direction, well, the tactical group of the battalion can advance in one direction, and then the largest group in our battalion, which has closed in on it in the rear, then another group that has not been attacked by the enemy, there is no countermeasures, it can hit it in the rear and so in the way we park them, we talk about the fact that this strategy can be used for action in kherson, but when we approach the city directly to the city of kherson, which must be liberated, how should we do it? we cannot destroy its artillery. what

is the optimal tactic for the liberation of such cities? - there are those we need, but we will finish it. thus, in those spaces and those where there are not your entire summer of the front, the tactics of infiltrating small units and then climbing into the depth of the enemy's defenses in tactical or operational-tactical can be very successful in these situations, now as for kherson, yes, kherson is a very big city because of our regional center, and to do with it what was done with lysichansk or mariupol, we have one minute of airtime left, let's put this answer into one minute it is necessary not to take it by storm under any circumstances the army must be drawn up and beat them up to kherson, but it may not be possible not to touch this one, do not come close, it is necessary to force the dnieper and advance on the crimean pereveshek or advance from the zaporozhye direction on the crimean

then this group that is in kherson will be decided, she will run away because she will be surrounded. and this is death for her and she will run away by herself and liberate kherson without a fight, i really hope this is one of the options that can be used. their interlocutor was ivan yakovets, a reserve colonel, ex-commander of the airborne forces of ukraine. my name is serhiy zhorets. i am the director of the defense express company, which, together with the espresso channel, tries to promptly cover the most relevant events in the life of the armed forces. we are looking for the girl, 17-year-old anastasia akopova, lived in the city of izyum, kharkiv region. the connection with her was not interrupted at the beginning of april, and all this time nastya persistently , without losing hope, is looking for