a significant number of approximately 15-17 million people, but to collect such an amount of e-e resource in order to form new military units, in my opinion, it is now impossible in russian realities in recent years, out of 10, i can not recall a single successful experience of conducting mobilization exercises, they have never turned around a unit the size of a brigade , for example, one more nuance: russia lost a significant number of tactical officers in this war , that is, today they have a situation where, er , what platoon commander is a huge problem to take from the reserve an officer who graduated from the military department in the 80s well, agree, it is unlikely that this

person is ready for the introduction of hostilities in modern conditions, to be a leader for his unit and in the future to replace the same company commander , that is, this imbalance will also have a significant impact for holding events, etc. we see today, first of all, we see that the most high- quality resource is attracted by private military companies, three of them have already been noticed in ukraine, it is known to everyone, wagner is somewhat less known, judging by the league that, well, from the following information, the league is a unit that has accumulated the best resources that wagner had and performs the most responsible tasks, and the third is a private military campaign redoubt that has its roots in the airborne forces of the russian federation,

well, it is very close in terms of subject matter and, accordingly, its resources are mainly used to serve in airborne troops, as for private military companies, they note that they are worse equipped than regular forces, but much more effective on the battlefield. they have experience urban battles and, accordingly, we saw their widespread use in the battles in popasnaya blyschansk, severodonetsk, lyman, that is, the armed forces are left with, firstly, the best, secondly, the worst trained, and thirdly, the resource is not motivated by the russians, and it is mostly unclear what they are fighting for that complex only and if we still evaluate this opportunity to the dobrobatts

to ensure the reinforcement of the russian army with personnel , can we say that within a month or a half they will be able to collect somewhere around 35,000 personnel of this type and plus 15,000 of these the third army corps, whose estimations i am somewhat mistaken in the estimates of the recruitment of the russian ground forces in the russian federation, how am i not mistaken, 86 subjects if each one collects a battalion, which is not unrealistic it will turn out, how can they have an impact , these are people who are hastily gathered in something, quickly trained among themselves, they are not coordinated, they are conventionally called a battalion, they are real. these are groups of people. they are suitable for filling some gap in the

defense or creating a numerical advantage on the direction of the attack, er, some local tactical point, these people will be knocked out quite quickly due to poor training, most of them are now proactive, so they will not be able to exert any decisive influence on the hostilities, but 30,000 is a lot, let's put it this way a certain resource that we should pay attention to, and this third corps, which is being formed in mulino with 15,000 personnel , will it form dobrobats with this, or will it be, shall we say, a separate unit that does not depend on these initiatives in er-e regional er-e directions ah, the administration of the gorky region of the nizhny novgorod region announced the formation of

as many as four tanks, it is not entirely clear where they are going to take tanks for all this, but judging by the fact that a tank brigade can be formed, what corps formations can be introduced, also when we talk about the fact that the russian army suffered significant losses in military equipment. what measures will the russian federation take now to restore its aviation resources? the federation of solutions to this problem is not many . so we see, first of all, in the zaporizhzhia kherson region, the deployment of field maintenance systems for the restoration of weapons and military equipment, that is, they are trying to do something directly closer to the operational zone

, their ability to repair is limited due to the lack of large repair bodies, such as, for example, a repair field newly formed divisions, for example, the 150th e-e, which here e-e inherited the flag of victory in the russian fetish. it has a dvd repair company and the evacuation work of the division that is, even the repair of a non-restorative battalion in the division does not exist. all these problems have a very serious effect on the situation in order to evacuate huge quantities of damaged weapons to the places of repair, which have given a lot or do something by attracting repair bodies here. we saw at one of the exercises before the war when the russians formed a

repair and recovery train in the area of ​​the same mulina that you mentioned, which was moving to the area of ​​belarus, it is on training, it seems to have carried out some measures from the repair and restoration of equipment have a huge impact on the problems with the restoration of equipment, because the russians are cut off from the supply of electronics, that is, if the equipment in the tank burns out, there is a football calculator, a team device or a commander's remote control, it is more and more difficult to restore it because the elemental base is not available today, the last visit of mr. putin has tried to somehow fill this niche, but as far as western sources report, nothing has been agreed upon, so we can expect the restoration of a more or less simple

weapons with mechanical damage , but the repair of such complex systems as anti- aircraft defense equipment, radar stations, aviation technology is complicated by many indicators, it is clear that the use of such equipment by our troops is yes, the javelin is absolutely correct tactics, in the end the enemy will be forced to attack us in a larger formation or on horseback if they someone, somewhere, you mentioned that russians currently lack tactical commanders at the level of company commander, platoon commander, but on the other hand on the part of the e-e, there is such an impression that the number of generals who direct the e-e offensive actions is increasing and increasing. how do you directly assess the role of the dvorkin e-e janitors zhitky lapiny syrovykiny from the point of view of influence

on the organization of the process of managing the russian troops? russian generals are quite interesting the characters commanded the vast majority of battalions and regiments during the second chechen campaign . directions to ukraine, the operation did not have a single leadership headquarters, tasks were assigned to the army commanders directly, who was in charge of the operation, it is not known, uh, well , this state of affairs and such a system of management can be explained by the fact that, uh, the president of the russian federation probably wanted to have a personal laurel of the winner for himself, but when instead of a laurel in the winner was offered

responsibility for the rights, the head of the operation was appointed general dvornikov, who is the commander of the troops of the southern military district in rostov-on-don and, as it were, after the escape of the russians from near kyiv, from the chernihiv sumy region, he took over the command, and it was logical, but during his not-long stay at the post of the head of the operation, he was unable to achieve any such significant results, except how to demolish brüupol to its foundations, his little machine was moved to the side , and the character of the colonel-general appeared. the character is the deputy minister of defense, the head of the main department of military and political work, somehow his position is called on the one hand since may, the appointment is because

the commissar manages the operation, on the other hand, he is for by education, the tankist passed the appropriate combat path to the command in russia by the district troops, respectively, he has the necessary theoretical and practical training. but it seems to me that this appointment is due to the fact that the military needed a strong political voice that will be heard in the russian political community, and therefore this official is somewhere in the territory of the kharkiv region, from where he carries out the leadership of the troops flickered the character of general survykin, this is the commander of the military space forces, then it is a strange decision in general, the impression is that only the ends ended, he leads the troops of the southern direction when i began to understand where our half operates, more precisely the russians. the southern direction

turned out to be a struggle against the armed forces of ukraine around north donets lysychansk , the russians carried out four groups, northern, central and southern, that is, by capturing, for example, mountain villages, and if i do not i am wrong, gold, led by the commanders of spain of the central military district of the russian federation. why did he become a hero in russia, his merits were highly appreciated there, here are all these strange facts. this tells me personally that the russian military's top leadership does not trust the commanders of the tactical branch , it does not consider them sufficiently proactive and qualitatively

prepared for management or between actions, respectively, in their in the areas of responsibility, therefore , russian generals move closer to the front line, where they periodically die, we have five confirmed facts of such actions, although eight politicians were actually mentioned, it seems that they died russian generals in the war in ukraine, so i can say the following about the single decision-making center that managed the operation from kharkov to kherson. there are no russians for certain areas of the front. army commanders are responsible for directing from their control points, but the lower the tactical link, the topic of management problems more and more, we will

observe and hear about the fact that some generals advanced to the front where he was the lower the level , the worse the control of the russian armed forces that actually plays into our hands, but on the other hand, yes, but on the other hand, the russian army has adopted the traditions of the soviet army where it is strong and is starting to use the only successful tactics at the current stage, this is exactly the advantage of artillery, the implementation of, let's say, pushing through the defense with the use of an excessive number of means of impacting the barrel and rocket artillery. please tell me what is the peculiarity of such tactics and how it can be countered. artillery makes sense when it is well managed and comprehensively provided for. munitions when there is no control or the logistics of ammunition is broken, respectively. this is just a set of such expensive iron, which

makes no sense to use at all. the tactic chosen by the armed forces of ukraine to destroy warehouses in the zone is, in my opinion, a very correct step, because it and the strikes, the russians are forced to withdraw operational stocks of ammunition for the zone of defeat of our heimers they are forced to concentrate warehouses and keep the military reserve of regiments brigades small them hide them this all complicates logistics this complicates everything delivery of ammunition to the front line, they tried to do it according to the justin time method, supplying the ammunition directly to the units by railway echelons at the unloading station, but two successful strikes on the railway tracks in yeshinuvatia in donetsk, the actions of ukrainian partisans in the melitopol region, well, at this stage,

only if they did not put christ fat, they made it extremely difficult and such a variant supplied ammunition, the russians did not invent anything new here, they will try er and will try in the future well, of course not er, there was some fire shaft here applied by the soviet troops during the liberation of kyiv, when the artillery will reach the highest in history, but in certain areas there up to 2-5 km, they are able to create a serious advantage and a serious force density from purely striking means, but without combat apiaries. i will repeat this in principle again nothing, parts of the experts are now starting to discuss the fact that we are now entering the stage of contradiction and opposition between two

strategies, one strategy of putin, relatively speaking , is the winter campaign to delay hostilities in the next a year through winter and winter to be used as a way, they say, of freezing the line of resistance and weakening the unity of the west there at the expense of gas, economic, and actually political problems, and on the other hand, this is the strategy of ukraine, in particular, the strategy of the summer blitzkrieg, that is, to start preparing a series of offensive operations after waiting weapons by preparing reserves and starting hostilities in a wide format. as soon as, immediately , yes. how do you feel about the fact that there are two strategies , relatively speaking, winter putin and summer ukraine? i can't hear you well. please send something with the equipment if i can hear you now, now i can hear you

normally , now i can hear you now, the commission is very strong. next year and achieve the separation of the unity of the west due to energy problems and from the ukrainian side - this is a summer strategy to conduct a quick counter-offensive relying on the receipt of foreign military help, is this assessment of the current situation correct? war is always a competition between two strategies. there is nothing new in this. the nature of war is the russian military-political leadership . a powerful player in

the field of hybrid conflicts, russia will use other levers of pressure on the world community, they understand that western aid multiplies ukrainian efforts and with greater ukrainian capabilities in this war, and they will do everything to deprive ukraine of these opportunities by provoking government crises, influencing individual politicians, disrupting contracts, making life difficult for western businessmen who are one way or another involved in the supply of weapons, material means in the interests of the armed forces, blackmail will be used with the grain of the united nations, they will influence through the organization of the red the cross on which russia has a huge will drag out the war under the guise of some negotiations, some operational pauses

, slowing down hostilities in order to enter the cold season in order to use the most powerful energy weapons as effectively as possible, as far as the ukrainian side is concerned, i don't see any attempts to conduct any blitzkript, uh, rush to carry out a counter-offensive, well, it's dangerous, you can put a lot on the map, and it's a lot to lose , our problems are not can be solved by one contour stupa. in my opinion , five or six fewer such operations will be carried out and it cannot be finished until the end of this year, it is somewhere around a year, it will take a year. which side is which? will impose his will, well, this is a struggle, who

will succeed better today, i see a small but ukrainian advantage, the number of the army of the russian federation on the territory of ukraine, if i am not mistaken, is somewhere around 180,000, our resource in the security and defense sector is about 700,000, that is, the actual number we have much more, but on the other hand, there is a difference between the number of personnel and the trained resource. how do you currently assess the quality of reserve training and the training of the main combat units of the ukrainian army, which involved in hostilities, i think i almost don't hear from you, if i didn't guess everything from what you have just voiced, i ask to repeat, it means that as regards the ratio of the power of means, well, these are good times

when two heroes come out on the field and measure their personal professional skills, now a boy weighs 65 kg with pulmintes in a gaiter is a much more powerful player on the field of a fighter of 10 knights of armor e-e it is absolutely correct about security, training and tactics of the use of units with the armed forces of ukraine since 2014 foreign instructors are working who have already trained our instructors for a long time, we have good skills and eight years of war experience in the east, so we can see what the armed forces of ukraine are now able to show and are showing. i think that the training of ukrainian reserves takes place according to the same

methods under the leadership of the same specialists at the same the material base itself and, of course, over a certain period of time, all those people who do not have combat experience in their majority acquire not bad military skills that they will be able to demonstrate on the battlefield as for the russians, we hear on radio intercepts that prisoners of the periodic security service of ukraine say that they studied from two days to two weeks after that, they received some weapons there and came to fight in donbas. this is not the same level. on the other side, in russia, we can see two more processes. the first process is restoration of the combat capability of military units that initially did not participate in operations, for example, in the belgorod region, since the restoration of the combat capability of the 144th and rifle divisions from

smolensk has been completed, this is a serious force that can significantly complicate the situation for us both in the kharkiv region and directly under the kramatorsk slavonians, they conducted a full-fledged full cycle of measures to manning to equipping with weapons, repairing what is available , bringing in the necessary supplies, conducting this cycle of preparation, the second process is the formation of a reserve with reserves, the picture looks like as follows, it seems that there is a lot of weaponry on the bases, but it has not been there for a decade, it needs an average, and in some cases, major repairs, which it is not possible to fully implement it due to sanctions , and accordingly this is not entirely new. not quite combat-ready weapons will be handed over to the same volunteer battalions that are being formed in the

subjects of the russian federation today, that is, formally, many of their military units are already formed, but what is their combat potential, what are their capabilities well, they have enough doubts, well, briefly , probably yes, mr. viktor. and what are the current approaches to our rearmament? important long-range means impressions of non-technical air defense means of intelligence which priority series is extremely important for us in order to stabilize the front line and achieve a turning point in the course of hostilities i apologize for absolutely nothing, i did not understand what priorities are needed in the rearmament of the ukrainian army now given the fact

that it is just ending the meeting of the ministers of defense in rammstein dispatches please communicate now the meeting of the ministers of defense in rammstein is actually determined by the priorities which extremely important in order for the ukrainian army to be able to effectively conduct combat operations, these changes relate directly to air defense means, to automobile means, to impression means of reconnaissance, to armored vehicles. and this is exactly what should ensure a breakthrough for the ukrainian army on the front line, which priorities do you think are the most important for that, right now, and the ministry of defense is counting on the fact that help from the west will be precisely concentrated on the most urgent

areas, of course, we all expect and talk about heimers, but in addition to heimers, other important components are, in particular, armored vehicles to carry out offensive operations and means of communication to ensure the reliability of the control system, this is directly unmanned aerial vehicles, that is, of course, i want to see your vision, viktor, what priorities are extremely important for the ukrainian army today, so that really ensure rearmament in those directions that can change the format of actions on the battlefield, in order to talk about priorities, you need to know what you are going to do the armed forces of ukraine and the further development of our operation, i can tell you about my priorities, which do not necessarily coincide with what the armed forces really need, mr. reznikov, some time

ago, e-e reported that the ministry of defense of ukraine has chosen the path to transfer entire units to the western samples, for example, partners provide 18 self-propelled activists to institutions , personnel are trained accordingly, and the next step is the withdrawal of a russian-armed unit and the inclusion in its place of a unit armed with equipment the button adopted by the armies of the member countries is correct, but it is a long time because it is extremely necessary . in my opinion, we need to strengthen air defense in the middle and far zones in the russian federation. the missile terror does not stop , trying first to break the will to resist and

provoke some civilians riots that would exert pressure on the ukrainian government, secondly, to destroy as many objects as possible , e.e., ensuring the livelihood of the population in the grip of winter, which is called in nikolaev, we saw two destroyed universities therefore, before the start of the academic year, i think such strikes will be eh by the way, the idea of ​​\u200b\u200blearning offline i absolutely do not share the wrong times now respectively after air defense we need means eh what i mean if we have systems 270 and m142 himers with a firing range of up to 83 km for today, well, it would be

good if we received ammunition for firing at 160-300 km. this is a very serious complication of the life of our enemy, of course, our air force has suffered losses in aviation and to strengthen fighter aircraft with modern, relatively modern aircraft in the 16th century would also be an effective step in order to effectively use modern weapons, it is necessary to ensure fast and reliably protected exchange of large volumes, respectively, a communication system with appropriate cryptography and other means