[000:00:00;00] it was also said in the training camps, here we need to understand and have more detailed information, which i hope our intelligence has, and it will be able to use it at the right time, and here it should also be noted that the transition to the defense thanks to, let's say so there, the russian propaganda machines will be able to explain to their own population for a certain time, i am not saying that i will say so for a long time, but i will explain the necessity of this step , if as a result of this transition they will be able to keep the territory, it may even be transformed in the information space by them into a victory, and by the way, are medvedev putin’s trips to a number of defense enterprises of the russian federation

, there are ammunition fields, there are air tanks , or these trips are actually intended to reproduce the idea of ​​the readiness of the russian defense industry to provide for the needs of the army. is this more of an image-e-e step on the part of the russian leadership? how do you assess the goals of the train of these trips, which were so active in the russian information i think that it is more like an information operation, let's say, and an imitation of violent activity, because if the whole system worked and worked effectively , then the appearance of such characters as medvedeva is absolutely not necessary. if the system works . if the system fulfills its tasks of ensuring military equipment to provide equipment, it is absolutely not

necessary for her to come there. well, there is a formal second person in the state, let's say so , defense state defense sphere in order to restore order there and demonstrate let's say some achievements, and here we still have to clearly understand that we see such laudatory e-e reports from russian military factories , how they produce everything well there , modernize well, and at the same time, we can e-e chronic video of the supply of weapons to the front there in the 40s in the 1940s and early 1950s, we see the same soldiers praising the b1 howitzers of the 1943 model year and praising the stalinist masters who made it. that is , we see a certain dissonance between the picture

that the russians are trying to present official the image of the media is the images presented by the citizens of russia or even their own soldiers, mr. vasyl, i don’t know if you delved into this report, which was literally there the day before yesterday, it was prepared by the royal united institute of defense electronic research of russia - this is the british interesting structure where they analyzed precisely the aspects related to hostilities with the role of the fsb village head of the foreign intelligence service in the preparation of operations, and there, on the one hand, they talked about the fact that despite the fact that there were thousands of arrested russian agents, you are traitors, all the same, the networks created provide russia with a constant flow of intelligence information, this remains a challenge, and the second thing they noted is that the russians continue active work in europe through their agents of influence, and this is the impression

. do you share this opinion that it is possible now to expect such a new wave of action by these conspiratorial agents in the russian federation in european countries in order to once again push this topic of the exhausting war and the topic of what actually needs to be freezing of the conflict, that is, in fact, now there is an attempt to form this information foul in european countries, are there such risks in view of the fact that now russia is extremely necessary to form, well, such information is on the agenda. i received this report today, well, i hope that i can get acquainted, but the conclusions did you do, i fully support them, uh, russia will try, well, how can you say now that europe is reeling for a very, very long time, because they uh, absolutely clearly already understand that they are not ready for

such a format of conducting hostilities that are now they are not ready to oppose the amount of military and technical assistance that is provided to ukraine, they cannot even officially announce any specific goals of their special military operation, and therefore it is very profitable for them to turn the conflict into a protracted form, to shape european society into european politics right here what you are saying is that from the war onwards, we are already trying to take a more or less long-term respite in order to, uh, reformat, maybe uh, update the weapons park, maybe something somewhere purchase and be ready to continue the war after a certain time, that is, everyone will now do all this in order to get a respite , it is desirable to get it on the conditions and

in the order that would be beneficial to them, first of all informationally, and then, let's say, they will try to correct the situation under the time of this well, then, in this context , putin’s actions in a heap with lukashenka regarding the brat of nuclear weapons look quite logical , because this argument, which we see, has the most effective effect on the unstable europeans and then we understand why then putin clearly talks about certain temporary dates for the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in belarus , he is conducting new nuclear training there , what do i think? of our european partners, this is absolutely at home, i agree here , the question is that, er, any statements

of the president of russia should be considered according to two vectors, one is aimed at internal consumption for its own citizens in order to to form, let's say, the image of a powerful political leader who makes uh-uh important decisions that uh-uh are beneficial to russia and which frighten the west . apprehensions about the use of nuclear weapons have an er inclination to this construct that you assigned to war fatigue and indeed it will be used maybe they will pull up some samples of this rattling there maybe there again they will conduct

verification of the e-e of their e nuclear triad maybe there will be simultaneous attempts to launch missiles there from underwater missile carriers from on test sites with mine-based missiles there or with strategic bombing, that is, i think that this map will be played out, maybe from time to time they will be added to it there are some new fragments , some new actions on the part of russia, vasyl, when we try to evaluate the actions of our partners , in particular, let's start with the united states , we remember that there was such a thesis all last year what the americans kept repeating, we will help ukraine so that russia does not defeat ukraine, but this approach is already in itself this year, isn't it time for this paradigm to change to the format for ukraine to defeat the russian federation, or conventionally speaking, a collective measure, there is no idea yet

er, what exactly should the father’s victory for collective defense look like? because there are such important nuances here, but first, about the assessment of the us strategy. what do you think about this assessment of the strategy of the er, united states of america? beyond and competence, i will say. so we see from the statements of the top military leadership of the united states of america and the minister of defense and panama and the commander of nato forces in europe that there is already a clear understanding among the military that ukraine must win not only that russia must not win but ukraine must win, and here the second factor comes into play, which is what you say that the political community really does not have a vision of what a victory over russia is in

political terms, what the future of russia should be, how this victory should be secured or should these be peace treaties or should it be a system of external management, that is, as far as i know, such a vision does not exist now, maybe there are some, let's say, fintechs, no , they think they are developing some options, but i have not met them in the public space i think that as soon as we see a more or less adequate option for the post-war reconstruction of russia according to the military arrangement of russia, which will be voiced by a person who has trust in the mass media and in the political community and well let's say so in different ways representatives of various representatives, then we can talk about the fact that this plan has matured and is happening, let's say its probation and clarification

how will the american society there react to it , how will ukraine react to it, how will the other partners of the umbrella react to it, i hope that such a plan will indeed be will be absolutely adequate, will fully take into account the interests of ukraine, it will be clear and always for the fact that time is limited, i would like to thank you for participating in the live broadcast for your professional comments, and i will remind our viewers that the espresso channels are on the air was vasyl pavlov, a military historian, the head of a non-governmental organization, the center of military history, and now we have andriy kharuk, a professor at the hetman national academy of land forces named after hetman hetman pyotr sahaidachnyi, and andrii . i congratulate you. glory to ukraine glory to the heroes. your vision of what stage of the war with the russian federation we are at right now question question difficult question

well ambiguous what if where referring to the past referring to the experience of last year we can remember how on the eve of the same battle for donbas er-er of this campaign in the spring of the summer of 2022 we had such an awareness that this battle would determine whether ukraine would win or russia er-er i accordingly russia will be defeated we see that this did not happen the war continues we we are still far from the defeat of russia, we are closer to our victory than it was a year ago, but, well, we see that now the war is gradually moving into the stage of such a protracted stage of the war, i don’t want to use this word, but for exhaustion

accordingly, the question of resources arises, that is, how many resources are sufficient in russia to, accordingly , carry out these hostilities, here by resources, i mean not only the material factor , but also the moral and psychological factor, we are at your disposal the previous host, vasyl pavlov and i discussed the question of whether our enemy, relatively speaking , after spending two months on this incompetent offensive in five directions, can, after a certain time , switch to a blind defense, making it difficult for such how can our offensive actions be, are there such risks of the enemy going on the defensive? does this contradict the political ambitions of the top political leadership of the russian federation , and that will not happen. how do you assess such prospects from a strategic point of view ? the russians are now already on the defensive.

small movements there in one or the other direction, i.e. will they refuse offensive actions ideologically they could not refuse why because uh-uh they already have clearly set the goal of their vision which the territories of the donetsk and luhansk people's republics of the respective other regions of ukraine, which are recognized by russia as part of their territory, this is from an ideological point of view, on the other hand, we must not forget that russia is still a totalitarian country, according to the totalitarian country, the easier it is there , public opinion does not play a role, according to if , figuratively speaking, putin suddenly wakes up and decides to announce victory today, well , society will willingly throw up their hats

or whatever else they throw up and with this and that agree, yes, that is, theoretically, theoretically, any variant of the development of events is possible, taking into account, i emphasize once again that the russian society or the russian political system is totalitarian and it may not be reckoned with the public opinion, as it is accepted in democratic countries. and when we say then about our approaches, now we all expect a counteroffensive and hope that this counteroffensive is equal to victory and that is not why the minister of foreign affairs mr. kuleba said that such narratives are dangerous enough for ukraine, because there is an unambiguous perception of this one offensive as a key element of victory, it can undermine the trust of the society if something goes wrong. does this mean that we should somewhat adjust our perception of our contact offensive and be more restrained in the meaning of each operation

which is included in the general trench of the victory. perhaps i appeared less restrained than it should be, but still, from an objective point of view , this is not a contour, this is an offensive, just like the slobojan or kharkiv operation, which they call veresnev's counteroffensive, this is actually because in our country, since the russians did not have the initiative at the beginning, we did not have to seize the initiative, and now the situation is approximately the same. you see that the russians are actually not capable of conducting large-scale military operations on the on a broad front, they resort to local actions, even bakhmut, despite his er-er fierceness of my lips, this is still a local area on the russian-ukrainian er-er front yes, we have expectations we have

expectations generated by the successes of our defense forces i'm not talking about the armed forces, because it's a broader issue of strength and defense there and the national guard and other components . well, i don't feel like saying that, but these expectations are born again by the successes under kharkiv and kherson, because we saw that the russians can be defeated and well, what about us? and how else can we wage war? without faith in our defense forces. without faith in our victory . yes, we have to hope for that. preparation for our offensive of actions you can often hear that with the lack of aviation capabilities, it will be difficult to carry out effective offensive actions

. how do you assess the objections that it will be much more difficult from aviation and are there any alternative solutions so that the offensive is accompanied by a significant advance on the territory controlled by the enemy with minimal losses, of course, on the ukrainian side, it will be difficult, on the one hand, we have an example of the kharkiv or slobojan offensive operations themselves, where the role of aviation, and the role of aviation on both sides was minimal, this they can even estimate well, as i did it by conducting research based on indirect data on the losses of er aircraft helicopters, so it is clear that if aviation takes part in hostilities, there are losses, yes, there were practically no losses, they were minimal and even smaller, but in that period of the beginning of september than, for example, in the south of ukraine in the kherson region , respectively, one gets the impression that for a successful offensive, aviation is not so necessary, but here there is another very important

point and nuance that we must take into account when advancing, the troops are sure to come out from under the umbrella of their own air defense of those positions and stress complexes that are actually not too mobile and so on , which means that deployed means now in the threatening directions, accordingly, a quick strengthening and operational strengthening of air defense will be needed, and here it is it will be difficult to do without e-e fighter planes. if you imagine our hypothetical breakthrough to e-e melitopol-berdyansk yes here of course that the russians having air bases in crimea having air bases in the kuban, they will certainly try to use their

aviation to counter this very offensive, and the right fighters are actually needed here, and fighters whose quality would not be inferior to the russian su-30-135, and then they would even exceed them, plus before that, we must not forget that this aviation is a means of launching strikes at great distances, including depth, and in this sense, they are the same . well, for example, the f16 is the carrier of the e-e guided airbombs of the same ones. successful development of the offensive, i will once again emphasize another one the factor that the use of modern equipment will certainly reduce the losses of our armed forces, lost in manpower, lost in our soldiers and officers, and in this sense, we need aviation. can we advance without modern

fighter planes, judging by analogy, judging by experience, again can we launch such offensives near kharkiv and kherson , will this offensive be more effective and more effective in using the participants yes definitely mr. andrii if we take all the factors that affect the conduct of offensive children that is, on the personnel and its training, heavy armored vehicles, ammunition, long-range vehicles, impressions, e-e, aviation, what would these e -e, what things do you define as the most priority in order to start offensive actions, or just a combination of these factors? well, because it provides the most optimal approaches to conducting combat actions, definitely a combination , it should ideally provide maximum results. but if we talk in terms of hierarchy, then these are long-range means of impression that would allow to paralyze the logistics

of the enemy not for tens of kilometers, but for hundreds kilometers from the front line or dozens of kilometers already let them be covered by mars and here would be something to get there reliably to dzhankoy i to the crimean bridge and accordingly, training and motivation and also emphasizes the personnel, these are the factors that are of primary importance and further there are already leopards and other means, yes, andriy too, what does your experience as a historian say, because the question arises what should our victory look like, because it is possible to say that when we all talk about the fact that we should go to the working border in 1991 but at this time, even if this goal is achieved, russia as a threat does not disappear, and this constant trap of renewed aggression on the part of the russian federation. it can be repeated. are there

any ways out of this trap? we are currently waging a war for the restoration of the constitutional system in ukraine, where, among other things, the territorial integrity of our state is also written in the constitution . when it will be achieved, the constant question is how to ensure that, from what we see here, there are, in my opinion, two options it's good that both of these options coincided. but we may have to settle for one, that is, the collapse of russia as a single state , because a change of power in russia will do nothing, and the second way is ukraine's entry into nato , integration into its atlantic structures, but if this can be achieved, then we will be able to to look relatively calmly at the future of our

children and grandchildren, well, in other words, in fact, we should once again intensify our diplomatic efforts to obtain a security guarantee in a larger format . accession to nato should be raised now, because this, as well as this, should be a task for our diplomats right now, and not to postpone this work for later of the civilized world as much as ours, and this should be rewarded not because it is some kind of indulgence, or a concession to us because with ukraine, the euro-atlantic world , the euro-atlantic security system will be stronger

. well, in general, there is a paradox the situation there nato representatives told us to join nato after the end of the war with the russian federation, that is, in fact, ukraine will do all the work of nato, that is, it will destroy the threat for which nato was created. after that, we can already join the alliance, but we understand that here it is necessary after all, change approaches and still spread a security umbrella over ukraine before we complete the main work of the alliance, eh, and he would like to ask one more component related to the fact that somehow the economic plans related to the reconstruction of ukraine, do you remember the marshal's plan for ukraine and other such promising things that are extremely important for understanding the stability of our country in the future, do we need to renew these processes as well now? do our partners expect our offensive stabilization actions again the front line, so that we went to the ports, so that we recaptured our mines from the enemy on our lands, and then talk

about the marshal's plan, is there again no such delay in actions that were more important for us in the faster perspective and definitely definitely the point is that, as i already mentioned, when this war began, no one expected that it would happen. at least there are only so many politicians from those who make decisions. either we will be defeated in three days or russia will quickly collapse, or there is some palace there of its nature, or are there any other options, here we are also dealing with a protracted war, every day of which brings losses not only to our armed forces, but also to the economy, and accordingly, this is an issue that needs to be discussed and emphasized at various international forums, i am an idealist all the same, i believe that it is possible that our diplomats are discussing these issues not publicly, but it is possible that i have such a hope because, well

, objectively speaking, we will not be able to cope on our own, we would not be able to cope if it were not for the support that is currently being provided by our allies well, at least it would be extremely difficult to cope with such a powerful enemy, and we and our allies must understand that the war is not only fought for ukraine, it is fought for the ideals of european democracy and values, and ukraine is fighting not only for itself ukraine is fighting for everyone. for the entire western world. yes, we clearly understand this, but our partners do not always understand this, because even if we look at the approaches of european countries regarding the rates of supply of certain types of weapons and ammunition, the political nuances that exist against this background are not always present.

such categorical ones that are important to us. that is, it is now there, black and white, there are enemies , our victory and our interests are somewhat different for the europeans, and here then such a situation arises when we are now calculating what nato's security umbrella will really unfold after a certain time over ukraine , and if not, are there possible such more alarming options as , for example, a situation when there is no peace, not war, if we take into account the same experience of hostilities between north and south korea, this scenario is the same for us now they are throwing it there as a threat, how to get out of this trap . do you have a vision of what to do in the languages ​​when not everything will be as optimistic as we expect? events, but how to get out of this trap is another matter, but i am not ready to answer because sometimes i don’t even

want to think about such a development of events, but you are right , we need to think about these questions. i don't want to think about some conditional 38 parallel , so what would divide free ukraine and occupied ukraine, because in the end, any truce, uh, any peace with russia, in such a case, there will only be a truce, a truce i'm on some deadline until the next russian government decides not to postpone the decision of the ukrainian question for later , so accordingly i say that two aspects that can radically secure our future are the collapse of russia and the accession of ukraine to nato. if without the collapse of russia,

well, let's say that it was possible to get by, that is, it will be impossible to join nato . in my opinion, it is impossible to get by and guarantee the existence of ukraine as a democratic state. andriy, i absolutely share your approach and your optimism, and i remind you that the espresso channels are on the air was andriy kharuk, a professor at the national academy of land forces named after hetman pyotr sahaidachny , and the broadcast will be continued by olga leni and her chronicles of the information war, stay tuned to the espresso channel. of space now building such a system, you know when they have an internal