[000:00:00;00] maximum military aid from the united states, but this aid gives the impression that it comes in smaller portions than in the video, we would like it, i am repeating general things, but there is part of the truth here, because without it we cannot ensure qualitative changes on the battlefield, or indeed one of the components of the american of politicians is to ensure, in particular, that the destruction of russia is consistent with the change of leadership in the russian federation, but without the defragmentation of russia as a state, because in this case the united states faces a number of challenges and these challenges for them, they look much more serious than the course of the war in such a controlled, long-term version, the question of russia remains important, but i think that there is no need to think that the united states is too afraid of something. it seems to me that they are not afraid of anything, well, they

are afraid of something, but they are more likely to be afraid than to be afraid, they simply have well, the philosophical vision of the world is that there is no need to push countries to break up. well , you can literally say that in recent times , only one exception was kosovo. when they decided to recognize kosovo, it happened. after that, in general, they did not even recognize the disintegration of the former yugoslavia, only when germany said that we want these entities to disappear and take them to the european union in parts, but only then did the united states support the disintegration of a certain country, and then serbia. coconut through well the question is frankly about genocide what what what there well it was observed this is a very exceptional situation when the united states supports the disintegration of any country eh i think

well well it does not correspond to theirs and therefore i do not think that they will at any time push russia or plan something that will make the dispersal there fall apart, they will sooner. well, of course they will be interested in politics. but now i think that since they do not know for sure how it will be there and with whom it will be there, there are certain parameters that we would are considering well, in principle, two parameters. it seems to me that there are two strategies, or after all, putin is better than others because everything else is completely bad, or the option that what could be bad, if it is weaker than putin, then it is also either to ensure stability but russia will not be so aggressive, this is also acceptable, in the end, no one is going to build democracy in russia anymore, it is not, sir , i am building democracies , they will not build anymore, but it seems to me that such a situation as it is now, in general, is the policy of the united states until russia. well, roughly

the same as its arbitrary, they are thinking about what kind of situation in russia in a year will be considered not in a year. well, in a year it will be considered victorious by the american voters, so it will just be that russia would have troops or there she became weaker, but she either started negotiations on disarmament, based on those considerations, so that the image of russia would look victorious. and for the united states, this is not a policy aimed at this, but you have to understand that for american voters, i think it is important for them that they are not created additional risks, and the collapse of russia is a risk, there is a certain instability in russia, this is a risk, the refugees from russia are more likely to try to preserve the stability of russia

, but within the limits of what ukraine can achieve in fact, there are two such two such things that the united states seems to me not to understand, and for that reason, it does not go to blinky to understand what ukraine can achieve, and accordingly, from this , they can build that policy towards russia so that, well, it is preserved in some form . but no as aggressive as it was, then the question arises as to what ukraine can achieve, ukraine can achieve according to the forces and means at its disposal, if you have less means, we achieve less. the paradigm of the united states is collapsing, so that these events in ukraine are in the format of the ukrainian-russian war. they were somehow incorporated and, as you said at the beginning, into the election campaign of the united states so that it does not lead to crises, and then one can say that the cardinal successes of ukraine can also to cause such risks predicted by the americans as the russians say. now they will use tactical weapons there, this

is a call for a cascade effect, then let the ukrainians take their time, and this means that then , relatively speaking, our advance in the south is now one way or another, it is pressed into the political reality that does not depend on us. well, i still think it will be as we want, but with what you said, what we will receive from our partners is, well, it does not depend on us. it depends on the weapons we get, it is obvious that aviation will not be obvious soon that we will have to bite through a lot of blood, but when we bite through and reach melitopol and beyond and i think there is already, well, no one will be able to stop ukraine well, i mean that there melitopol would be there and giankoi would be there eventually there is no longer such a big difference, but there are things that the united states cannot influence, they can

influence the framework, and this is unfortunately so that they slow down the supply of weapons because they do not understand how it will be if ukraine quickly wins they simply do not understand or what it will be. and in the end such a risk will suddenly happen, just like with leopards , they came across these strengthened certifications and found that they are not so effective and in the end the commercial value of leopards falls, something must be changed there as well it may be that they were provided with airplanes, but they didn’t push the pilots a little or they didn’t add something and it turns out to be not so effective. there are always these risks, but they want to minimize these risks. they see that ukraine is already gnawing away. well, it is gnawing away well. yes , unfortunately, it is cynical but we don't have other partners and there is no partner more powerful than the united states. the united states can be many

, but interests do not always coincide . the slow advancement of ukraine or there, the slow retelling of the russian potential continued over time actually suits the partners, because at the current stage their concept of deterrence, their capabilities to conduct combat operations , they are inadequate to the challenges that now actually exist on the battlefield and now they have a certain temporary such carbon in a certain time reserve to ensure internal transformation to reach a different level of combat readiness and as long as we fight and actually act as the main outpost for the protection of european interests during this time nato can prepare for, er, real hostilities, and the longer we are at war, the easier it is for them to prepare, well, to some extent , it seems to me that there are two main elements, er, of such considerations, which are very difficult to

enumerate . that there are clear terms, well, it's generally one parameter - it's not very fast to have time to have time to do, well, to launch a certain process , to spin up certain processes, and secondly, after all, everything must end by the time this war does not turn into such an endless one the afghan war. that is to say, this is also an undesirable scenario. that is why it is necessary to end one day, preferably with the victory of ukraine, but it is necessary to understand that ukraine will be able to do it within the framework of what is given to it, not without exerting too much effort and without putting everything on the map, so i think that the united states has such a limitation of the election of some, the main thing must be resolved or in europe there are other processes. i think they are more economical. i think i would say so that now

for the combined for europe, the main thing is how quickly poland will take over the functions of germany during the lessons of the cold war, as in the lessons of the cold war, the cold war period, there was such a situation when germany was an outpost of west germany, there were the main groups there, the concentration of forces there should have been the main battles, if what happened now , poland is taking on such a mission, it is this huge 4% of the shaft of the domestic product of these huge purchases, in general, it can be seen that poland and even the conversation about nuclear weapons in poland. i would say that we should give poland time

to become a new. even the center of gravity of the defense of europe, nato and the eu, well, i don’t think that we have to wait until poland deploys all its programs, but i also think that if we give poland another year to develop, well, they will be grateful to us, but at what price is the boarding house, well, i just asked half of the questions that he always prepared, more questions well, we don't have time, unfortunately, thank you very much for your comments, for your vision , a situation that is very interesting to our viewers and our e-e, why should i remind you that the press class was actually on the air, oleksiy ezhyk, an expert of the national institute of strategic of research and further. we continue this topic with other experts. but after an informational pause , we continued our program. literally in a few minutes, i, oleksandr sklyar, was born

and grew up in kharkiv, in a city that suffers daily from russian weapons. i know that poltava has become a home for tens of thousands of displaced people, and for me my second hometown, where the best years of my career were spent. thank you to the armed forces of ukraine for the opportunity to play football. there are discounts on pectolvan 10% in pharmacies podorozhnyk to you and savings there are discounts on painkilling trio forte 10% in pharmacies traveler bam and save with you vitaliy portnikov and we will discuss the main events of this week vitaliy portnikov and top experts about the brightest events of the last seven days our guest will be the generator of companion forces former

national security adviser to the president of the united states donald trump herbert mat - master, we are aligning current topics, pressing questions , authoritative comments and forecasts in the project informational marathon with vitaly portnikov every sunday at 8:10 p.m. on espresso hello, this is freedom, morning informational project

radio svoboda has guests here every day, this is the ship district of kherson . we are live. we are somewhere in the vicinity of bakhmut. our broadcast joins the war in serhiy zgoretska's military summaries of the day and what is the world ? about the economy during the war and new sports yevhen pastukhov is ready to talk about sports for two hours in the company of his favorite presenters about culture during the war lina is ready to talk about other presenters who have become familiar to many , maybe the weather will give us some optimism mrs. natalka didenko is ready to tell us a we will also have a respectable studio hotel today volodymyr hryshko, if all goes well, events of the day in two hours, a big broadcast of vasyl zimi, a project for smart and

caring people, an espresso evening, war in ukraine the main topic for ukrainians is victory and losses, analysis and forecasts, politics and geopolitics , serhiy rudenko and the guests of his program will talk about all this, people who have information and shape public opinion, people who defend ukraine and create the future right now, the main and interesting thing in the program is the verdict of serhiy rudenko from monday on fridays at 8:00 p.m. repeat at 12:10 p.m. we continue our program and now we are joined by oleksiy melnyk, director of foreign policy and international security programs , razumkova center, everyone. congratulations, glad to see you and listen. i congratulate you on the situation of our conversation, but i would like not to continue. i literally finished the conversation with oleksiy ezhyak, an expert of the research center and institute, and there we talked about the situation at the front

, about the pace of progress, about the pace of aid, and he said two theses that i wanted i would like to take with you there as a seed for further discussion, first of all, the pace of aid provision, the conditions of aid provision from the united states, one way or another, depends on the political realities that are in the united states and from the point of view of actions by european countries, one way or another, this slow advancement of ukraine or slow aid to ukraine, one way or another, depends on when the alliance itself will gain strength to be able to engage in real hostilities with the russian federation and, relatively speaking, poland will not gain strength and will not become a country like germany during the cold war. what do you think actually depends on the pace and volume of aid? to what extent do these political factors in

europe and political factors in the united states affect how we receive help, how we now shape our combat operations , how we depend on our partners is such a broad question, but let's try to answer it as succinctly as possible. in my opinion, it is precisely the lack of a vision of the ukrainian victory as we see it, plus what caveats that have been repeatedly expressed is to prevent a direct conflict between russia and the north atlantic

alliance. a powerful restraining role in the adoption of political decisions well, accordingly, this already affects the speed of the supply of which weapons, where there are its own factors, technical technological factors , bureaucratic factors. that is, it is a whole complex, but if this first restriction were to be removed, that is, if the united states ceased to be guided by the so-called management policy escalation, if they somehow, let's say, reviewed the very red lines on the drawing, let's say so, and the limitations they impose on themselves , whether putin is using nuclear weapons will attack one of the nato countries, then, probably, the whole process

would move faster . this is the second kind. they pointed out that nato seems to want you now in order to better prepare . for all that, well, people sitting in the kremlin are detached from reality . well, this is exactly what they or what they clearly understand, if their teeth were broken, figuratively speaking , ukraine. well, then entering into a war with the north atlantic alliance, well, this is really a matter of three days, and in russia , the russian army will simply be defeated there they understand it there. i think that the alliance is definitely not going to fight. well, they are not simply not considered with this. at the same time, are there possible, so to speak, any options for a black swan of such a large scale that one way or another

will force nato countries to engage in hostilities because i prefer the events there with the missiles in poland, then with the shaheds in romania, on the one hand, we see that uh, nato is trying to find such an answer that is not irritating for the russian federation, as it seems to us, and on the other hand, we see that uh, there can be various hybrid actions on the part of the russian federation, which one way or another requires a military challenge and a military response on the part of the alliance , are you not considering such options, and the minimum number of such black swans, well, the black swan is quite insignificant , and it is black by definition because it cannot be predicted, so that's why of course, since they appear from time to time, no one can rule it out. but again, based on this term itself

, it cannot be predicted, but we can, in principle, predict a scenario that can to lead to such a phenomenon as the black swan are also synonyms, let's say which are used . the terms are, for example, strategic. corporal here. i think in this case it is a more appropriate term. or a senior officer can make a mistake or an initiative decision that then has strategic consequences examples of this we have seen, for example, this is how uh, one of them is when russian planes attacked an american drone here and there er, in principle, they were literally there, maybe a mm away from a serious incident, because the actions

of the russian pilot were extremely unprofessional . and the fact that he did not kill himself by attacking this drone is just that, well, he was born in a shirt, so to speak. there was a plane crash with the death of the crew - this could be a step towards escalation but again , even if we recall when turkey shot down a russian plane, there will also be a justification for how far it entered the airspace of turkey, it was so-so they could shoot down, they could not shoot down, but then literally everyone there already expected that russian tanks would meet with turkish tanks, but this did not happen because there are certain mechanisms when the leaders of the allies can prevent the worst-case scenario in any

what is the moment under one important condition if each of the parties is not interested in such a conflict. and to date, neither nato nor russia are interested in direct military action, so black swans are possible. yes, but for now, we must do everything possible, and we we can already see this in order to lower this any incident let's say so on the brakes and prevent it, well then if we are talking about such effects of a corporal or a black swan eh against the background of this, the tactical redeployment of nuclear weapons to belarus, the placement of a tact of good warheads is the same in principle, an increase in risk rates on the part of the russian federation. then what is the purpose of these actions from the point of view of the expectations of the russian federation itself ? i have several versions of why putin did this

. well, besides scaring western leaders once again, with the fact that he can use tactical nuclear weapons, there may be such a version. we cannot rule it out, even though it sounds like, let's say, such an incredible version or an incredible scenario. that at some point , putin seems to use lukashenka so that he, as it were, with his own hands a blow to the nose, a nuclear strike, either in one of the nato countries or on ukraine, that is, creating a certain provocation, and then lukashenka was this bomb, his pilot or his missile, this bomb, uh, that bomb was hit on the territory of ukraine, smaller

a risk for russia itself, for belarus or on the territory of nato. but this cannot be ruled out because after all that russia is doing after or in the background. what is lukashenko carrying when he contradicts himself in the following sentences that is, even such absolutely incredible scenarios cannot be ruled out, but most likely, at a certain point , putin was given a fairly clear signal . well, maybe they even described to him that his plans have already been revealed, so i don't think that there will be any in the near future some continuation of this story of tactical weapons on the territory of belarus, but when we talk about the potential of russia, you are really talking about the fact that russia is not ready to fight with nato countries because the gdp of nato countries there seems to be 50-60% of the world's there, russia's potential

there is up to 2% at most, that is, economically they are not matched, but not only by their gdp potential, but also by this presence of nuclear weapons, this factor of influence through nuclear weapons and us rests on the states and on european countries, even if it is less there of one percent, we see that it acts effectively enough on our partners , which is precisely what limits such drastic decisions regarding aid to ukraine. the question arises as to how it is possible to weaken the potential of the russian federation or the weakening of the military potential of the economic potential, or can it lead to a certain limit when our partners will well, should we act more decisively or does a similar situation suit our partners in principle and everything will depend on how we will act on the field or this will shape the presentation of the picture of interaction in europe in america

as for us, as far as the comparison of potentials is concerned, here you absolutely correctly noted that the size or percentage of world gdp will be measured in percentages or billions of dollars, this is important, but it is unlikely to stop the aggressor . somewhere from the autumn of last year, it took a clear course for a war of attrition, so the economy is really important here, and in this case, if it were not for the external support of ukraine, then russia would have won this war, guaranteed, guaranteed. i am not saying that we have finished, but that that

ukraine could not withstand a long war of attrition without external aid is an established fact. the third thesis, which i think is also important to understand, is to remember that nuclear blackmail or nuclear weapons work as a means of deterrence , because somewhere at the end of the years after the caribbean crisis, let's say consensus regarding the fact that there can be no winner in a nuclear war, since the potentials have reached the level of guaranteed mutual destruction. that is, despite the fact that now the system that was then developed in the late 70s and 80s is the international system of deterrence international treaties are practically destroyed, all the same, this is the understanding that nuclear weapons can be threatened, but to a certain extent, because there cannot be a winner there, but there is also, i

have already spoken about it, there is probably a clear understanding of the games of the russian e-e military, including , apparently, himself putin that by conventional means the united states can inflict damage on russia no less than fire volleys with hundreds of tomahawks and russia, realizing that they cannot give advice, for example, to ukrainian drones there, single attacks with the help of rocket targets on the territory of the russian federation, that is, they themselves, i think, perfectly imagine what the end of this conflict will be, that it will be

short-lived, what targets will be hit randomly, it is possible also to mention that i don't know how true this is, but the program had such information from the time when the americans were there, when the russians actively threatened today with dented weapons, they showed them somewhere e-e draft plan as how the entire black sea fleet can be destroyed e literally within e -e a very short e-e very short time as a response to such actions of russia i.e. russia do you understand and i would like to ask then about such a thing as security guarantees for ukraine because this topic was raised before the vilna site, then it gradually receded into the background, there were publications in foreign publications. what is there in the format of numerous countries ? now this topic is being discussed, but countries

see differently how these guarantees can be provided in ukraine. and whether at all it is about security guarantees or about the obligations of the g7 countries to ukraine and what is happening now with these security guarantees. what is your vision, what changes are possible there , well , in the medium-term perspective around this topic. at least prescribes these guarantees, you can talk about how reliable they are, because if you read the text of this short paragraph, we will see that uh, the obligation is not so sorry for