[000:00:00;00] this is what gets them to the brigade level, even people who have passed these trainings, they go there periodically, they still face a different reality in battle, and eh, if, no matter how you prepare, the battle will still give its result, his conclusion, and unfortunately, someone will not survive it, and there is no other option, except to gain that combat experience there. that is, no training, no preparation for, it will not fully prepare, there will still be losses, and here the main problem is what, and we, well, the russians are very good that they bear such losses that they do not have this pool of professionals, trained on a sufficiently large scale, is being formed, but this also applies to us, that the hostilities are so continuous, there are losses, that here is the nucleus, which there are brigades,

battalions, it is constantly... either it is eroded or it does not even have time to form trained people, so that later some recruits would come, or they would take out this brigade for a rest, and it would be able to quickly replenish with recruits, quickly train them and everything, that is, this is still a problem, there is a nuance that the intensity of combat actions, the pace of hostilities is such that this core is personnel, it is constantly, a professional core, it constantly bears losses and it is very difficult for it to...' well, this is a bad historical example, but an example about the wehrmacht, the wehrmacht of the 41st year , who attacked the soviet union, he gained mega-experience in the campaigns of 39-40 with small losses, and he had a powerful pool of people who knew how to conduct a combined military battle, a general military operation, to synchronize different types of troops, to scale

operations as well consequence, but then, war. washed it all to a large extent, then they also had the same problem as cooking at the same time, and training, and, rather, conducting combat operations and training, so it is necessary, but again, we have already returned to this several times, we need more history , we need more context, and there is no other option, because otherwise we will perceive everything as something unique, or not take into account certain factors when understanding certain processes, including why there is a problem with training, retention and accumulation of skills, and then the claims that are put forward there, why yes and not otherwise, yes, but simply this situation that you describe, it still makes me ask the question, what is the way out in these conditions, ukraine sets itself the goal of exiting the borders of 1991 year, and parallel to all this there are the difficulties that you described, that is, obviously the question is what can give some kind of push,

break...' so high-quality that ukraine will be able to achieve this very, very ambitious difficult task, let me refrain from answers, simply because it is a task state policy, which is to be developed by many people, it is very difficult for me to answer this simply from the wheels, as it is called, for now we will limit ourselves to outlining the problem and certain nuances, which it seems to me that many leave out, about the offensive campaign... in the south, a few questions, for example, about zaporizhzhia, so the zaporizhia direction , in the summer there was a lot of news, reports, relatively recently, there were news about the release of work from a settlement, which is important for ukrainian forces, but in recent weeks we do not hear any very significant news from there that the offensive campaign in the zaporozhye direction is taking place, but not at the pace that anyone would like

to see. that is, but this is again a consequence of objective circumstances , the russians prepared, and the tactics we used, because we must understand that we changed our tactics, we first tried to break through the russian defense line with mechanized companies, realized that it doesn't work, we realized that if we throw mechanized companies as our partners wanted, by the way, because that our partners saw, they bet on a strike with mechanized columns, and they wanted even more on a larger scale. what do we do next, we will quickly lose our offensive potential, we switched to another tactic, we began to slowly knock out their artillery, as faithfully as possible, that is, we could knock it out faster, but not with the forces that we have, and at the same time, we began to act with the tactics of small groups, knock them out of their strongholds, and then clear the mini-nucleus and so

gradually advance, in fact, we somehow to a large extent still at the first stage of any offensive operation, when the so-called dominance in defeat is won, because our artillery is still not engaged exclusively in supporting our ground forces with fire, but it fights with the enemy's artillery, which creates huge problems for us. there, that is, to some extent we, we are still at the first stage , why, because we have exactly such forces and means at our disposal, technical ones, i mean first of all, and how it happens on the ground , we protect people as much as possible, we we take care of equipment, and as a result, the pace of advancement is not insignificant under those conditions, and therefore the enemy constantly reproduces the lines of defense , as a result, the fact that the line was quickly broken, the mobile forces were thrown in, the mobile forces quickly left, communications arrived, as a result, the line did not happen the enemy's defenses have collapsed, we are actually very glad that in the west there has finally been such a certain

objective assessment of why the ukrainians are fighting in this way and not in another way, why as a result they are advancing at exactly this pace, and not at other paces, after dozens of articles on the subject of the volume why ukraine's counteroffensive failed, yes, it is generally such a complex topic that instead of praising our, as it were, adjustment in tactics, change of tactics, we for some reason began to be criticized when we abandoned attacks by large mechanized columns in the second half of june, and switched to the tactics of small groups and to the tactics of such counter-battery fire, weakening the defense system on the other hand, because relatively speaking , everyone, everyone emphasized mines, but mines by themselves, they are not self-sufficient, mines only work when the fire is still working, in fact, it is supplemented with fire , and that is why we changed our tactics so that we can clear the mines and advance, we are fighting the russian artillery as effectively as possible, and instead of saying, oh, well done ukrainians, we started to be criticized

, this is the first moment, and the second moment, which is true , many people, since people, again, well, you have to understand that people in the west have pictures of storms in the desert, the war of 2003 and so on, and we do not have these conditions, and only in the month of september, well it began to change the situation, in my estimation, somewhere in the middle of august, already in september of this year there were indeed articles, including from american officers, that in the conditions in which the ukrainians found themselves, do not demand more from them, taking into account the - firstly, how did the russians prepare, and secondly, what, if any, technical means were at the disposal of the ukrainians, so we got a certain breakdown, certainly if a more objective assessment of the situation, and including, that is, if, and, if , not a verdict, but our partners made a very big bet on a maneuverable war, that is they made a very big bet that right now we will prepare several

maneuver brigades there, and they will do everything, it turned out that in conditions when the enemy has artillery, and minefields, and attack helicopters, and special forces with atgm groups, it won't work like that, so the question here is that we all have to draw conclusions and our partners too, because a very big bet was made precisely on a maneuverable war, they simply have two approaches there, a maneuverable war and a war of attrition , that is, attrition attrition warfare, they made a very big bet on a maneuverable war, but it does not fit the conditions in which we found ourselves, that's another matter , well, no one wants to admit mistakes, it's easier to say, it's all the ukrainians' fault, they don't know how to fight, they are there incorrectly apply our technique, instead of admitting that the approach and philosophy they have is not at all suitable for the conditions in which we find ourselves and with the means we have, which is what the ukrainian side needs in order

to in the south, in the zaporozhye direction to achieve this goal, to reach the sea of ​​azov and cut off the land corridor of the russians to the crimea, one more line of defense must be passed, but again, here we are, as in our imagination there is this support zone that we have overcome, there is the first fika fortified line of discontinuous, which we are now, if we were at war, and there is a second line, the problem is that the russians create these lines of defense, constantly, new ones, and along with the main two, in fact, new and new ones arise, so the problem here is that with the means we have, it will be just like that gnawing, such a slow advance, such a slow clearing, such a slow knocking out of the russian artillery, and some others , well, of course we can imagine, but again , some people imagine that we will have aviation there, for example, in number our minimal the request for 48 units, let's even imagine the situation, we have these 48 f16s, which can also carry out ground strikes there, well , they will not change the situation, they will complement the ukrainian fire system, but the americans are

an exception, they can raise them there 1000, 2,000, 3,000 aircraft and gain dominance in the air and then completely clear everything with the help of fire from the corresponding aircraft platforms, we will not have this ... and therefore it is a matter of correctly managing expectations, understanding what we cannot, what we can , it's another matter that, okay, questions arise here, i'll answer it myself if we...' we understand that it's very difficult, why we, as an example, for example, don't go, no, no, decided not to go, relatively speaking, if we understand that it is very difficult, we cannot but go for two reasons, the first reason is political, i already said it, i say once again that if we do not move forward, everything, we will just be blamed, that the conflict must be frozen, the front line that exists must be recognized, and that is why the president, literally, the other day in

the appeal said we must advance there 100 m, 500 m, we must advance, because politically we are under pressure, but there are also expectations of our partners, they are also expecting, this is what we have given you, so let's please give us some result , they also made a very big bet on this offensive, and imagine the situation that in june volodymyr zelenskyi or valery zaluzhnyi came out there and said, you know, we calculated here, the chances of success are insignificant, the russians have prepared well, so we will not conduct an offensive operation, well, it is also very difficult to detect, so something radical the other thing is to quickly return to maneuverability, i don’t see any options that are realistic, but it’s also very difficult for us not to go forward here, but on the other hand, we need to talk to our partners about the company next year and talk to them about giving everything - still we understand yours request and our this request will also free our

people, our territories, but let's make it possible. next year we will knock out the enemy point by point, slowly change this ratio of forces and means, especially means in our favor, and then in 20, maybe by the end of the 24th year, maybe even in the 25th year we will try something, that is, there is still the question is dialogue with our partners , using the 23rd campaign as proof that it is difficult to overcome the positional walls, not only is it difficult for the enemy to advance into the kupyansk district, but also avdiyivka, but also for us very it is difficult to advance, so... let's think about the correct campaign plan of the 24th year and the correct ukrainian military strategy of the 24th year. regarding the offensive campaign in the kherson region, in recent weeks there have been reports primarily from the russians, their russian bloggers there in telegram channels, that on the left bank of the kherson region, certain movements on the part of the ukrainian forces are visible, are we talking here about the potential for some... major operation by the ukrainian side on

the left bank, or are these rather movements of the lot single throughout the summer, we have seen some ukrainian activity already on the left bank , it can be very difficult to say what the scale is now and what it is, but again, you have to be a great military genius to understand that a hypothetical large-scale strike, precisely with the forcing of the dnieper, it allowed to overcome that position. the value that exists, which is very difficult to overcome with frontal attacks and with the defense system that the enemy has built, it is another matter whether it will succeed under these conditions, well, here too it is quite risky, in general in a land war, forcing large water obstacles, so-called, especially, in the conditions that the enemy 's artillery is not completely suppressed, then there is a significant risk, because you see , in order to carry out such an operation, it is necessary to simultaneously...' perform a number of tasks, it is necessary

to create several bridgeheads, it is necessary suppress the russian artillery faster than it will cause us problems, it is necessary to constantly strengthen efforts on these platforms, it must be done simultaneously, well, imagine juggling a large number of balls, this is about the same, so i lead to the fact that it is very a complex operation, a very complex operation , whether our leadership will decide on it or not, i do not know, and i cannot condemn it, especially in the conditions of pressure from partners, there are expectations, there is again this component that in in the 23rd year, we need to move forward, it is no longer enough for success to simply defend, that is why it is very risky and we must have exactly such expectations based on this, if we are even discussing some hypothetical large-scale operation, you mentioned kupiansky several times, i want to clarify about this one direction, we saw how the situation... twisted in the summer, when the russians, as

i understand it, tried to divert attention from the offensive campaign in the south, now recently, we recently saw, for example, a video of the ukrainian special forces kraken, in which number, the ukrainian side destroys the russians in the kupinsky direction. can we say that the russians are getting exhausted there and that at least there their active actions will decrease, perceptibly, this is also a direction that is quite promising from the point of view

of the russians, because if they succeed, then they can develop it, especially, that is, the question is not only there, for example , to overcome... the results of the balakali-kupyan offensive operation and go to the oskil river, and if they even have the resources to move further, then this is the most promising direction, because there is a threat to the ukrainian front as a whole, to communication, and therefore, for example , well, a little bit about another sector, but general muzhenko also spoke closely when he communicated with the towns at the beginning of this year, that we must constantly watch for the junction there sumy and kharkiv region. because this direction is promising, another question is whether the russians have the strength, and here, it seems to me, they do not have these forces yet, and secondly, again, here the circumstances work in our favor, because in defense in this war we hold perfectly, we find, inflict damage, exhaust

, so we will keep the positions plus or minus the same, it will be very difficult for the enemy to advance, another thing is that i do not guarantee that he will not lose. will try again, most likely, will try again, will try to try again, because this direction is also quite promising, many promising for them, it is another matter that the existing resources will not be enough to really change the situation for everyone, on the entire front, with actions on this sector of our front, it is already the end of october, and in principle all people in my environment in such a standby mode. that russia will resume attacks on ukrainian critical infrastructure , primarily energy, is it clear to you whether critical infrastructure is still a target for the russians, roughly speaking, whether there could be a repeat of all that we have seen since november last year? we always have to

start from the worst scenarios, namely the energy infrastructure - this is the goal that allows us to put pressure on the whole of ukraine. society, so it is more likely than not, eh, we have to wait, another matter is that, as i understand it, the russians will modify their tactics, but we see that there are no such large-scale strikes, especially due to the caliber missiles and the x-101, and that means that they are stockpiling missiles, that means that they are most likely preparing for a large-scale combined strike that will include various cruise missiles and shahed drones, 136-131. in order to eventually break through our defenses somewhere, find a weak spot and achieve an effect, and here there is a nuance in that in air defense, if the initiative was completely with the enemy, you can predict his actions, you can calculate, perhaps his actions , but you will never be 100% certain. and therefore

certain, if, tro, a little, the russians will have a greater advantage, because they always can. uh, kind of thinking differently than we might expect, so that's the nuance of this struggle, a very difficult struggle, as we are ready, well, only time will tell, that is, we have held quite a large set of events , we have received serious pro-systems this year , including us, we are preparing to meet chess 136 as much as possible, and unlike last year, this is no longer a surprise for us and we can in principle say that plus or minus we have found solutions that allow us to fight these systems not just effectively, but also economically, because the main, main problem, the main challenge was not to knock them down, but to do it economically, without wasting conventional anti-aircraft guided missiles,

now it’s all there, with us we see these various mobile fire groups , which are equipped with night optics and means of situational awareness, these corresponding turn tables, and come back alive invests in the corresponding project, which will also allow, in fact, what we are talking about is various different levels of management systems, from such command posts, where , as i understand, brigades and divisions will gather there, to just some mobile fire groups, a small backpack-type one that will allow better exchange of information and it is better to use this limited, it is always limited, available resource, which is to allocate targets and quickly inflict damage , that is, according to estonian intelligence, as recently as it was announced that if last year the russians produced up to 40 missiles of various types per month. now there are as many as 100 missiles, that is, they have adjusted, adapted, it was also expected, by the way , that they would bypass all these sanctions and

restrictions, and this is also such a dynamic game, because it seems to me that many believed that accepted sanctions and that was the end, and russia bypasses them, through third countries, through gasket companies, obtains components, increases production to a certain level and prepares such a combined strike... we can even see how they are quite, but in the last strikes, even with shaheds, they, they constantly maneuvering, changing direction to make it difficult to intercept them, to find that gap and inflict damage, so the enemy is preparing, we are preparing, but in fact we will only be able to say next year, the only thing i have no doubt is that it will be the target because the energy system is such an opportunity to put pressure on everyone at once, because in others, which... such means of pressure, which would be large-scale, touched the whole country, well, even somehow, you can actually imagine, so

it is more likely than not, i will clarify whether i understood correctly about this large-scale combined strike, which is probably being prepared by the russians, are we talking about a strike on civilian infrastructure or a military one? well, if the russians will not betray their traditions, i see no reason why they will betray their traditions, they ... fight, we see we are fighting according to the philosophy left to us by clausewitz, that by destroying the enemy's army , we can reach a suitable solution, while the russians conduct more combat operations in the type of total wars, that if we influence society, if we influence the internal counterfront, then and the external counterfront, it will collapse, we act in such a classic military logic, they act more in such a logic, oppressive... on the whole society, and i see no reason why it should change, and we

constantly see, unfortunately, confirmation, as they are trying to put pressure on society in the broadest sense, this is the latest tragedy in kharkiv oblast, where this point, the logistics point of the new post office, was hit, what a threat it is, but we understand very well that this creates a threat there, raises risks for all logistics, which associated with a large-scale center. urban kharkov, in fact, that is why they continue to fight with society, believing that if you put pressure on society, then the front may eventually start to roll back. when we speak about strikes like the one we observed recently in kharkiv , in the novaya poshta branch, when we can recall the strike in chernihiv in august of this year, these border towns, uh, is there any air defense system for them, uh, that can

protect? unfortunately, no, because even if we imagine a situation where a patriot-type air defense system is placed there, unfortunately, due to the closeness of the distance and short flight time, uh, then these complexes themselves become targets, and relatively speaking, for example, if if we put something near kharkiv, then the sum tornado may come there, so...' there is a problem here, because the closer to the border, these sams themselves become a target, but we actually saw how difficult it is, even when the patriots were intercepting the daggers, one of the daggers did get a little bit of a trigger installation, that is, there are only a few seconds, and if the flight time is even shorter, then unfortunately there is a probability that the air defense system crew will not have enough time, so what is the future of these regions? you know, if we really imagine the prospect of russia as an aggressor for a long

time to come? after this tragedy that happened, i wrote a post on facebook about the fact that most likely the state will be divided into zones, eh, because this is exactly how the state works, zones where it will be possible to reliably cover air defense and the flight time there will be longer, which means a longer reaction time, and it will most likely, the right bank transnives region, halychyna, bukovyna, southern volyn and podillia. and that is where, according to the logic of things , there should be both heavy industry and defense industry, then there will be a region where, in principle, we can engage in agriculture, and we must engage in agriculture, and border regions are regions where the state will most likely say that you can be there at your own risk, but we do not guarantee your safety. security, because well, our state does not have enough resources to guarantee all those who will relocate a place of work and

a place of residence, so it cannot tell everyone to evict in a forced order, so the fate is very, very difficult , and so we can try, for example, to symmetrically create risks for the border territory of russia, and then talk to the kremlin that let's not strike at each other somehow, but the problem is that putin does not care about belhorshchyna, chironivsk region or kursk region, he is absolutely ready to take any risks of flying there and in parallel to make the border regions of ukraine a nightmare, that is, to imagine a situation where we can demilitarize the border regions region, and the russians cannot strike, unfortunately, on our border areas, i cannot, so the state will most likely act like this, it will divide the country into zones, it

will try to develop nominally more a safe region, although we do not have such, strikes can be made everywhere, but still ... it is easier to cover a certain part of ukraine with a longer flight time than the whole of ukraine, but there will be agriculture somewhere, because we need it, in zone 20 - 25 km from the border, where the main barrel jet artillery can fly, this is a zone where the word safety will be very relative, eh, about a month ago, we heard quite a lot of news about the hitting of unmanned aerial vehicles on the territory of russia itself, ukraine , does not confirm that she is related to these blows, meanwhile, now we don't hear such news in principle, why? to hear later, because it's very difficult to somehow imagine this happening all the time, an operational pause, as it used to be said, remember, in

the first, in the first periods, the first weeks of the great war. oh, but it will continue, and it should continue, because this idea that it is possible to set up some borders, that military operations are conducted only on the territory of ukraine, and not transferred to the territory of the russian federation, it actually contradicts the logic of war, war, it's like a fire, unfortunately, and it spreads everywhere it can reach and put artificial limits, it 's absolutely wrong, so it will continue to happen, and it must ... happen, because it's about zaluzhnyi and his deputy zabrodskyi, then still a people's deputy, and now already his deputy in september 22, clearly spoke about the fact that if the hostilities are not transferred to the territory of the enemy, the enemy, well, a terrible asymmetry turns out, because the war is on our territory, the enemy

inflicts damage to the entire depth of the military structure and the country, that is, economic life is under threat, regrouping is under threat , certainly not as it could have been, but nevertheless, on the other hand, the enemy leads an economic life, calmly regroups, creates new "unity, it is clear that if it continues like this, then the chances of a primordial will decrease, we must not allow this to happen, so it will continue, and anthony blinken, after he visited kyiv and talked with her american journalist, and she also asked him about that there is cross-border activity, let's make money from it, so he agreed that this is a system of self-defense of ukraine, that is, it is the implementation of the 51st article of the un charter, that is, can we say that what are the artificial restrictions that you mentioned and about which ukraine's western partners, who provide weapons to ukraine, say that these artificial restrictions no longer exist, the american position is clear that we do not encourage, we do not provide the appropriate capabilities, but we

cannot prohibit and will not prohibit, because to them it is this too, i think revenues is an understanding that if we leave the situation as it is now, when 850 km of active front runs through the territory of ukraine, when our civilian objects are being struck, when the front-line zone is actively being struck, and on the other hand, russia is free to he can do anything, well, the chances of victory will be lower then, so they admitted it, another thing is that their position remains clear and we can see it. that the weapons we provide should not be used against the sovereign territory of russia. another thing is that in the temporary occupied crimea has a lot of military facilities that need to be destroyed; if they are damaged, it will be more difficult for the russians to hold the front line in the zaporizhzhia and kherson regions. is it possible that this winter the russians will experience what the ukrainians experienced in the winter, namely, blows to critical