every hour, i, a russian warship, offer to lay down my arms and surrender. and glory to him. fate will smile at bololyadina, our vows will change, all cross-country in the sun, satama.

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great britain where there is disorder, we will bring harmony. where there are errors, we will bring the truth. margaret thatcher, the iron lady. did everyone love her or support her reforms? i don't admire her intellectually method which consists in the inability to think that she can be wrong. but there is no doubt that it was thatcher's reforms that laid the foundations for the welfare of the state for many years to come. she was the prime minister who really eradicated socialism. from the system, the modern world is sorely lacking leaders of the caliber of margaret thatcher, all the more interesting to take another look at the extraordinary life and times of this formidable woman. come back if you want. the lady only goes forward. thatcher documentary. only forward. january 7 at 10:10 and 22:00 at espresso. the verdict with serhiy rudenko, from now on in the new two-hour format, even more.

analytics, even more important topics, even more top guests, foreign experts, inclusion from abroad, about ukraine, the world, the front, society, and also feedback, you can express your opinion on the bad day with the help of a telephone survey, turn on and turn on, the verdict with serhiy rudenko, every weekday from 20 to 22 at espresso.

with you is vitaliy portnikov and our interlocutor, a well-known ukrainian historian, professor at harvard university serhii plokhiy, i congratulate you, mr. serhiy, i congratulate you and the audience, you know, talking about the year 2023 with a historian is

probably quite a difficult task, because if we look closely at the disposition of what happened in 2023, it is not from the point of view. say, ours from the point of view of people who lived through the year 2023, and from the point of view, precisely historical, we can see that this year is simply capable of falling out of history, at least ukrainian, at least the history of the russian-ukrainian war, from the end of 2022, the line of defense the line of ukrainian troops has not changed the confrontation between russian and ukrainian troops in 2023 remained practically the same as it was in 2022. hopes for an offensive in 2023 turned out to be unrealized, and now many politicians and ordinary citizens have practically the same hopes for 2024 as for 2023, so our conversation is as if

it could be at an end in 2022, at the beginning of 2023, we expect an offensive, we expect some special changes between the russian-ukrainian... opposition, but a year has passed and nothing can be done about it. indeed, despite extremely great efforts, sacrifices, the front line did not move, that is, there were changes, of course, on the conventional front line in the black sea, which is extremely important, but not on land. the 23rd year began with... fears and hopes, the fears were about the russian winter russian offensive, which was already taking place in january of the 23rd year, and there were hopes for a ukrainian counteroffensive in the spring, from the positives

, the russian offensive was of no use did not lead, that is, at the end. he became the failure of this offensive, faced the condition of prihozhad's rebellion, but the negative, of course, consequences of the year are connected with the fact that the ukrainian counteroffensive did not achieve the goals that we all wanted it to achieve, and in this sense, our conversation today, it seems to me, is not so much an optimistic note as it would have been a year ago. in the 22nd year ended with several ukrainian miracles or miracles from, well, miracle, miracle, probably the right term, from the kharkiv operation, the battle for kyiv, and at the end of the liberation of kherson, today we are

in a completely different, different context, and most observers , and commentators, in fact, they do not have such optimistic, optimistic... prospects for the 24th. the 24th, it seems, is emerging as a year where it is necessary to maintain the line that was held during the 23rd year and prepare for a qualitatively new war. you know, you talk about 2022 as a year of miracles, but i honestly never hope for a miracle in politics, it seemed to me that in 2022 the ukrainian armed... forces used opportunities that, let's say, are given only once in war, and this also applies to the country's political leadership also. the first of these possibilities is the misunderstanding by the russian federation of the nature, i would say, of national statements between ukrainians and russians, this misunderstanding still

continues, we saw it in the speeches of the president of russia vladimir putin on a direct line at the collegium of the ministry of defense of russia, where he basically repeated the same thoughts about ukraine that he voiced. in their articles and speeches even before the start of the war, and also the effect of surprise, the unpreparedness of the russian federation for a massive attack on the entire ukrainian territory. using the a large number of troops allowed the ukrainian troops to defend the north and prevent them from capturing kyiv and other cities in the north of our country, and the effect of surprise allowed the ukrainian troops to liberate the kharkiv region in 2022, but then a real, i would say, war began with the use of the necessary mobilization and military-technical resources, and you need to have them for this, and you need to be aware of how the borog will... act, because in 2023 the ability of the russians to build effective

defensive fortifications on the lines that they occupy on ukrainian territory, and also an important political point, that is, the political leadership of ukraine, which in 2022 could count on, i would say , unconditional support from the western world, faced a situation when it is necessary to persistently to have a word for this support both in the political and diplomatic sense , to choose it, and before that i too... i can say that many people were completely unprepared, indeed, in fact, in the 22nd year , it was possible to win in what putin called , a special military operation, and in the 23rd year the situation changed, in fact , putin began to prepare for a long war back in the 22nd year, in the middle of the 22nd year, when... relevant tasks were given to the ministries, that is, the country's economy

was being rebuilt to the military, to military rails, and then i remember, i and probably many other people who received this information actually thought that this was planning for the future from the point of view of russia, which would not happen, that is, we all believed that a phenomenon will appear in one form or another prigogine, associated with great russian losses, associated with disappointment, and he appeared, but the regime survived him, and today we are really, we are really in a completely different situation, it is said that the methods by which we acted and inside the country, and outside its borders, in fact, today they have already exhausted themselves, and a change in perception is needed... horizons, a change in the way of thinking, the way of discourse as well, that is, in the west, and this is where

i understand the situation more, so to speak , an argument that was extremely important in 22 year, about the support of democracy, about the sacrifice of aggression and so on and so forth, begins to be less and less effective, when, therefore, the money that goes to the united states of america exceeds. 100, 100 billion dollars, that is, here, here a completely different argument and a completely different idea should appear, this is a question about the future of the event, in fact, it is that on monday a special issue of the wall street journal appeared about the past year and the next year, there was my article, precisely on this topic, what i was trying to convey to american readers and ... those who make decisions, and of course, a change is needed, a change of approach in ukraine, but

here i leave this topic rather to you, that is, i am in ukraine, but more, more i understand, of course, what is happening in the west, by the way , i would like to stop with you on this one, because really i met with... a time when i felt not only in the west, but also in ukraine the surprise that i always had when i met with assessments like so-called sovietologists, understanding of the political situation in russia, it was absolutely obvious to me that everything that happens to prihodzhan around prihodzhan is a deliberate action that strengthens the authority and power of the president of russia , vladimir putin, and that even the so-called rebellion of prihodzhan. no special operation was developed to strengthen the russian regime, no matter how it ended, because it must be remembered

that the entire pogozhin operation was directed not against putin, but against putin's closest entourage, putin was simply offered, so to speak, with the help of this march on moscow, which never happened, or maybe never should have happened, to choose a more understandable environment that will more effectively fight against ukraine, and it helped to destroy the very institution of private military companies, that is , finally... to bring russia to the rank of a totalitarian state in which there can be no alternative military groups, for by and large, this has always been the case in the history of russia, remember, even the history with peter the first and'. by and large, the russia we have, as a strong, cruel, empire ready to fight for foreign territories, was formed just after the shretchi rebellion, and from this the reason is historical works and pictures that we all saw in childhood, if not in museums, then in textbooks, and the exact same

situation will fly, mr. sergey, all historians are paralyzed, as if they did not read and did not know anything, this and... specialists and analysts, i was surprised, i 'll tell you honestly, eh, well, i, i apply history a little differently in relation to prigozhin's rebellion, for me it's a classic repetition of the situations of august 1991 year, when one of the serfs or serfs revolts in order to attract or to return the attention... the attention of the host, that is , the same kryuchkov and others came first to bow to gorbachev and actually tried to stop this signing of the treaty on the renewed union then, because the renewed union meant that they all had to resign, and

the coup ended with that these serfs returned again to gorbachev to ask him to forgive them, that is... the point was about the situation and maintaining their positions inside, inside the top, and that, this is the same thing that i saw in prigozhin, because the deprivation of the army beauty meant, also meant a physical threat to him and his life, and the fact that he was rebelling, he was not rebelling against the tsar, he was rebelling in the name of the tsar, as in russian history. quite often happened, what , what was revealed in 23 and what was not in 91, is what did not appear in, say, yeltsin, that is, conditional yeltsin, navalny or someone else, was completely outside, outside the political field, outside

the possibility of mobilizing the same muscovites or anyone else, for support, or a beauty. to protect putin and then get rid of putin, that is, this moment is different, and the fact that in russia they are not against the tsar, but for the benefit of the tsar, well, this, it means from, the history is quite, quite long and quite ancient. well, i think what you said is very important, because it means that the russian political leadership has made some good decisions since 1991 . it was not for nothing that he was a person who resisted the gkchcp, he represented an alternative center of power, he was the universally elected, popularly elected president of the russian federation, who, moreover, could rely on the people's elected representatives deputies of the russian federation. by the way, if we recall the rifle riot with you, then there was also an interesting story there, because peter i, who fought against the riflemen, somehow

knew that his opponents could rely on the authority of a more legitimate monarch, the eldest son. sophia, who was then the tsar, in the muscovite kingdom she could also appear as a representative of the interests of the legitimate monarch, because by and large, if we are honest, peter the first was a usurper of power, he took it from the hands of the legitimate monarch, who had the legal right of succession, and the russian political elite must give it due recognition that there are no alternative centers of power and even centers of opposition in the russia that putin is building, which, according to his opinion, should return to the borders of the soviet union in 1991, and can continue, should not be. this was not realized by alexei navalny, who returned to russia without realizing that he was signing a de facto death sentence for himself, and that his political influence in this future russia would be reduced to zero. but were we supposed to understand that? i think here

several, several topics you raised, one can. it seems to me that more important than others is the ability of the russian authorities to learn, both from experience and from mistakes as well, that is, in addition to the conclusions regarding yeltsin from 1991, other conclusions were related to the fact that now national autonomies do not have any special rights compared to other subjects of the russian federation, that is... a repetition of the collapse of the soviet union is constitutionally impossible within the same framework in the russian federation, and... and the russians have been learning this for the last few years, that is, about it we hear on the battlefield, we hear about this from our military, from commanders, and in this

sense, to underestimate the enemy, this is absolutely absolutely, so to speak, the biggest mistake that we can make today. it seems to me that it is important not only not to overestimate, but also to understand correctly. and i have a rather serious conclusion that it is in ukraine that russia is not understood more than even in those countries that have never been part of a single state body together with russia. this confuses me because the russians are not ready understand russia, because they consider ukraine, because they consider it a continuation of the russian civilizational organism, and every time they encounter a different development of the situation, i think... that these are some wrong ukrainians who simply need to be destroyed, everyone else is right, they do not do any conclusions , they simply believe that some people who are on the payroll of the department,

or even are supporters of some nazi ideology there, as vladimir putin says, and if ukraine is cleansed of all these people, then all the others will be like that by the russians themselves, like all russians who love the kremlin, ukrainians, too, believe that russians cannot be different, and every time... i meet with proof that everything is happening in russia completely differently than in ukraine, they simply fall down in a mortar yes, i, i will repeat myself a little bit in one of the interviews, but from the printed, not television, uh, i once, just thinking about it, said that, uh, uh, that ukraine is not russia, we we know, and we won it, but we are surprised to discover that russia is not ukraine, that is, we we are surprised by russia, because to a certain extent we also impose our way

of thinking, our mentality on them, we would never start this war, and we would never conduct it in the way that russia conducts it, well , this is what valeriy zaluzh says , but i was surprised that russia did not stop the war when such a large number of victims, yes, yes, yes, yes. and from this point of view, and here i will, so to speak, pull the blanket over myself already institutionally, in fact, what we need in ukraine is a rethinking of russia, we need actually decent russian studios, because we, we make the same mistakes that the russians do, who do not investigate us, do not study us, and we have... we have the same situation, this may be an unpopular opinion, when the main trend now in ukraine is that in fact, we need to cancel everything russian, but

we need knowledge about russia, without this, without knowledge and awareness, not only our biggest neighbor, the most aggressive and deadly neighbor, well, our future looks very doubtful, i want to support you, mr. serhiy, because i think that... the idea of ​​canceling, so to speak, russia, this is a trend of resentment and deep contempt, which is connected with russian victims on the territory of ukraine. however, if ukraine at all wants to survive as a sovereign state, and even more so, if ukrainians want to survive in their territories as a people, because this is also an open question in history, now that we see all the determination , and a long struggle, we should know russia better, than the russians themselves, but we read the history of russia, er... in the interpretation of the conditional karamzin there, in the interpretation of the conditional solovyov, now in the interpretation of the language, you

wrote ukrainian history, hrytsak wrote a history, his interpretation of the history of ukraine, we know that ukrainian civilization itself began there with how hrushevsky saw the history of ukraine, then there was the famous suptelny textbook, you can list it. to list the ukrainian historians who wrote the history of ukraine, which is different from its russian version, question number one, which of the ukrainian historians wrote the history of russia, where is it, i think that this is absolutely urgent, urgent task, i also thought about the example of the poles, from whom there is a lot to learn, but they have such a world recognition... the history of russia was created by richard pipes, an emigrant, a jewish emigrant from poland, interwar poland, the origin of the father of his origin.

from lviv, from galicia, which has become not only one, but one of the most powerful and defined, and we have this task ahead of us. i am reminded of the words of the then minister, or excuse me, people's commissar of foreign affairs litvinov, in the mid-1930s, who wrote in a letter to a colleague that the west, when talking about the soviet union, does not understand anything. poles understand, but they understand too well. here we have to find ourselves in the situation of the poles, who understand russia too well, so well that it would be uncomfortable for them. well, here is an important point, if you mentioned richard pipes, i suddenly remembered one of his theses about russia, theses, which, by the way, he was able to write after he had been to the soviet

union many times. he said that, in his opinion, russians very often lie simply out of love for art itself, they lie for the sake of lying, because lying itself is a part of life and a part of survival, and it seems to me that the russians do not really understand ukrainians here either, because if a ukrainian lies, he lies for some purpose, in his there is a goal, and thanks to which he wants to hide or slander or distort information, and the russians can lie just like that. a person who has never lived in russia, i lived in russia, for many decades, i can confirm this thesis of pipes, he will never understand this, always when will be deceived, deceived, they will look for the purpose of why she was deceived, and she was deceived just like that, and this is the same mental difference that is important, but it is very important for me to understand how much ukrainians will be aware of the extent to which these two civilizations, which have been together for so long , actually different, er... yes, that

is, the question, the question, i think, here is also related to the empire and - a certain form of the empire, in which, well, let's say, they talk about byzantium , sometimes they talk about the east, where actually the truth is surrounded by many, many untruths, that is, uh, and it, it became, it became a cultural code. pipes also very interestingly turned out to be surkov's favorite historian, because pipes, even in the 90s, when everyone admired the fact that today, tomorrow russia will become fully democratic, pipes said, as a historian, that this is simply impossible, that historically, historically, so to speak, cultural dna and genotype are connected precisely with

authoritarian power, and... surkov, who welcomed pipes in moscow and showed russian translations of his books, said that he understood russia, because for surkov and for the people around putin, it was also a legitimization of their authoritarian rule, but no matter how pipes was used, it was clear that he understood many things that his colleagues did not, and this understanding was related, i would say, primarily with the experience of e... polish history, because poles and eastern europeans were looked at as outsiders in the 90s, when they were knocking on the door of nato and asking to let us in, which means, well, they looked like some kind of urban dwellers, but today , today we know pretty, pretty well that they were right and those who were wrong did, were, well, very, very wrong, i remember the words of zbigniew brzezinski at...

one of the conferences devoted to nato and nato expansion, which was a controversial topic in the united states of america, he said then, it was about 10 years ago, he said that if this had not happened, today we would have discussions in the united states of america not about ukraine, but about poland, so this is this experience, we are still gaining it, we are gaining it very hard. price, but it cannot be released, and it must be on it to build self-awareness, understanding of the enemy and the way to the future. well, this is an important question, because if you talk to the average ukrainian about the future course of events, at least this year, you will surely hear from many that russia will collapse on...