and as a result, we have a situation where both states have resources, access to technologies, have defense-industrial complexes, and as a result, in fact, they constantly support these cycles, and neither side has yet demonstrated the ability to create a total technological advantage there, an advantage in application appropriate forces and means, as a result the defense dominates the offense, and as a result the challenge to conduct offensive operations is not only for us. for the russians, we see what is happening now, so there may be such a situation, based on those none of the parties, even after a year and a half, will not be able to create such an advantage in order to plan and conduct relevant operations, but this is the next stage, now our stage, i repeat, this is a strategic defense operation, active defense on the ground, pinpoint strikes on the military infrastructure of russia in the temporarily occupied crimea and actually in the russian territories, in order to bring the russians to at least... a minimal understanding and acceptance

of the fact that they cannot move the front line in a way that is beneficial to them, you actually mentioned about the fact that both russia and ukraine have access to technology, uh, but in fact, during these 2.5 years of full-scale invasion, ukraine has always or mostly outplayed russia precisely at the expense of technology innovation, or as of now do you see such a clear leadership of ukraine in in this area, because there is a feeling that... both russia and ukraine are moving hand in hand, and not so long ago the military talked about the fact that the russian army uses , for example, up to 1300 fp from drones per day, and this is a huge number. well, i would probably start with that our advantage, it was not absolute, that is, there were stories when somewhere we had an advantage, for example, the use of tactical drones for development, somewhere the russians had an advantage, for example, from the very beginning it was the lancet-type attack drones, for example, which... quite en masse already

went into the second half of the 22nd year and began to cause us quite serious problems, that is , this thesis that we had an absolute advantage there, it seems to me, well, at first it is already somewhat incorrect, and plus we had the effect of infusing many western models of weapons , respectively, who played for us, now we see that the russians have adapted to the use of certain types of western weapons, somewhere they reduced the effectiveness of western weapons to almost zero, somewhere they reduced it to certain... measures, in fact, this also creates for us appropriate problems, this is also a good example that any war that drags on actually leads to the loss of a certain technological and tactical advantage. and here, by the way, it is necessary to mention that the question is not only in technologies, but also in ways of their application, because we have always tried not only with technologies, but also with the tactics of their use, although the russians also do it, here are the latest examples of how they did not have any, for example, new drones, operational-tactical level,

which, unfortunately, now work on the appropriate depth, they simply changed the tactics of use a little, that is, they turn off gps navigation, work exclusively on inertial navigation, and then they already go to a certain point, then it turns on and already creates problems for us, that is, the question here is that from the very beginning it is not was an absolute advantage ours, the second is a question of tactics, and tactics can really compensate to a large extent for its limitations of certain technologies, and indeed. yes, this is an example of learning from each other, and since russia has access to technology, it significantly speeds up the path to adaptation, this is a good example, confirmation that the theses that in order to stand still, you need to move very quickly to run, and this is exactly this example, in fact, here we are ahead of the russians, for example, in naval drones, significantly ahead, but the russians are also conducting their own developments, and it seems to me that this it's only a matter of time when suitable, unmanned surface platforms will appear in the russians and... and already we will have to think about

some countermeasures, in fact, so this would be a constant race like this, and to say that if the russians did not have an advantage, i wouldn't say there were certain aspects, but this is what constantly forces us to innovate, and it is desirable that these are not only some technological innovations, but also tactical innovations, because the technologies themselves without an operator, they absolutely will not reveal themselves to. .. with love, in fact, and it is ours realities, when both sides have access to technology, this is the difference with the first world war, when one of the sides actually felt a certain hunger in terms of technology and resources for the third or fourth year there, and this made it much more difficult, here the situation is somewhat different, this is not a situation , which was there in the 20th year, the second karabakh war, when one side has both a quantitative and a qualitative advantage, and the other side does not, that is, here we are fighting a really... serious opponent, to whom

we must give credit, and conditions somewhat somewhat differ, and this also imposes restrictions on us, and also leads to the fact that we at least perform the task of high-quality defense. well, that is, it should be a constant shifting of efforts. you have already said that the main task now for ukraine is to make the defense line static, and overcoming positionality is the next step. your position is that ukraine should be on the defensive during this year, but there is no unity in the expert circle, within ukraine, do you think there is a possibility that the defense forces of ukraine in in one way or another , offensive operations will be carried out even now. rock, look, eh, of course, different opinions can and should be present, but strategy is an art , perhaps, we have no alternatives at the moment, that is, we are put in such conditions that we are forced to conduct active defense, defensive actions exactly, that is, do

we need an offensive, of course, we need it, and here we have just this paradox, that on the one hand there is a request for an offensive for many reasons, and maintaining the mood inside the country. and maintaining external aid, and if ukraine cannot demonstrate the ability to take offensive actions for a certain time, then the liberation of its citizens, its territories, it is clear that this will push us even more to sit down at the negotiating table and at least fix the front line, i.e. i understand this request, and this pressure that exists, i understand, but with the conditions we have, unfortunately, we have no other option for now, except to conduct an active defense, well, it is possible to conduct some separate counterattacks somewhere , counterattack, precisely counterattacks, that is, to improve our tactical position somewhere, yes, it is absolutely possible, but at the moment we have exactly these conditions, and our minimum in order to say that the campaign of the 24th year was successful is to lose a minimum of territory, save a maximum of people and to bring the russians to the point that they

cannot move the front line, but this contradiction, which we have actually touched upon with you, is at the heart of our dilemmas and problems facing ukraine, our strategy. that in the end , offensive actions are expected of us, which we cannot implement, if at a certain time we cannot implement them, it is clear that the situation will begin to play against us, that is , everyone understands this task, but on the other hand, if you try to do something that is more than your capabilities, then you are doomed to defeat, firstly, and secondly, you are undermining your long-term positions inside the country and outside, on the other hand, we can also talk with our partners about how to rethink what ukrainian victory is, what is the measure of success, because well, let's not accept as a given the fact that there is a third a year of such a war, such intensity, such a load, and ukraine remains a functioning state, ukraine controls more than 80% of its territories, again,

let's remember the first world war, uh, the end of 1916, for example, it's just two somewhere from half a year from the start of the war, roughly the same period. which we have already begun to crack at the seams certain empires, the russian empire, the austro-hungarian empire, problems have accumulated in the german empire, and ukraine continues to function, and with the right strategy, we have a chance to pass these all the tests, to survive as a state, therefore it is necessary to constantly convey this to partners, and it is necessary to conduct a discussion, if possible, about what is the measure of success, and at the same time, it is better to sell one or another point strikes that we inflict on the military infrastructure in crimea, in the black sea. actually on the russian territories, respectively, that is why this conflict between what is expected of us and what we can, i understand, this is the main task for us, i will tell you more, people who make decisions understand this, that is, i do not i can if i got this impression,

but people understand all these dilemmas, but for now we are in exactly these conditions, and at the same time we do not forget the context, the context of the first world war, where there were certain states after the corresponding intensity of the fighting, what happened to them there? in the corresponding time period, where ukraine is now, too, well, this automatically means that the russian troops are occupying, they will attack as long as they have the resources and capabilities, you have some expectations, maybe how long this crawling russian can last offensive, you know, two years ago, somewhere exactly in july , i had such a post on facebook that the lack of firepower that we felt then and feel now is, unfortunately, a kind of carte blanche for russia to try slowly to completely squeeze us out of the donetsk and luhansk regions, and indeed this situation, unfortunately, persists, but this does not mean that there is no limit in russia, well, first of all, what we see at the moment, for one reason or another, the russians do not create a group

of more than 5,000 people, that is, yes, they have it now support, but they do not create more groups, and this also does not impose certain restrictions on them there. the second point is that since the beginning of this year in... the western media, and then in ukraine, there have been analytical assessments that say that the soviet heritage of the russian federation will last for maybe a year, one and a half or two years of active hostilities, and really not... despite the fact that it is very difficult for us and we are taking losses, we are retreating point by point somewhere, the trend is really clear that with this intensity of fighting for it is a challenge for russia to restore what it is losing, that is, russia is losing more than it has time to restore, and this can be seen on the example of main battle tanks, now the main battle tanks used by the russian federation are restored soviet tanks and the trend towards , that if earlier it was t-72, t-80, now it is already t6. 52 and even t-55, 54, yes, the same applies to artillery barrels, created

artillery wears out, and russia did not have such, such potential, such technologies before the start of the war, in order to make artillery barrels en masse, and now the russians are also using howitzers, which were adopted there , were used there in the 50s and the beginning of the 60s, that is, it is really happening, it is another matter that we should these one and a half spend two years there too. but if we still manage to convince our partners, the key people who are responsible for decisions abroad, that the horizon is already visible when the soviet reserves are exhausted, then russia will accordingly have a problem, then in in principle, we have a chance if we could get to that point, the main thing is to get to that point again, while maintaining internal unity, this, for example, in my opinion, is now an even bigger challenge than holding... the front line, that is, the front line we we will keep it, if we are given appropriate help,

different mobilization measures will be carried out, here is the main thing - it will not be digested inside and preserve this unity in fact, but already if this trend is visible, this trend is clear that russia, as well as ukraine, as and others states, you see, we, we live now in such a paradoxical situation, when it would seem that the technology we possess is much better, er... than it was there in the first half of the 20th century, where there were two world wars, but the industrial society of that time could to produce much more weapons and military equipment than now, and that is why the soviet stocks, they are really exhaustive, and here is a plus , we also see how the russians have problems with mobilization, that is, they also attract various mercenaries, they are trying to limit mobilization in the largest cities, that is, we also see that they cannot create such a total advantage. in the forces and means that would allow them to quickly complete the assigned tasks, so if we have a certain horizon,

it is another matter to hold out until the end of that horizon and provide the appropriate support when such serious problems with arming with military equipment really begin in russia. against the background of the situation on sukhodol, a slightly different situation at sea, we have recently been observing the pre-dislocation of the russian black sea fleet. can this be considered a success for the defense forces of ukraine? i will explain the meaning of the question, because on the one hand, these ships are redeployed, they remain out of range of unmanned boats, and on the other hand, there are the same ones, at least some of the caliber carriers, they were relocated either to the caspian sea or further to the black sea, where again, it is impossible to get them, but is this a success for the defense forces of ukraine? it is definitely a success of many. reasons, starting with the fact that a country that does not have a navy in the classical sense, because most people have a navy

associated with large surface ships, if you have large surface ships, you have a navy, then here is a country that does not have a classic navy in the classic sense, it was able to perform certain very important tasks, the first task is to remove almost completely the threat of landing , he is now from the realm of science fiction, and the second is the guarantee of freedom of navigation in the west. part, at least of the black sea, this is a very important task from the point of view of the further existence of ukraine, the functioning of ukraine, here we now see that even more than half, it seems , of the export revenue that we receive, it is received precisely through exports that go by sea, that is, without it, it would be much more difficult for us. from the point of view of the fact that the russians are now either in the eastern part of the black sea, or in the caspian in general, of course, this somewhat limits our capabilities and does not allow us to fully solve all the tasks, for example, to eliminate for... the threat there of cruise missiles-caliber, which in the last strikes there were even more of them than kha-101 missiles, in fact, this is how it creates

problems for us and imposes on us the corresponding limitations, but the previous success story is a phenomenal success story that, let's be honest, helped us a lot in '23 in the second half, because against the background of the lack of other successes, it was the story that was constantly mentioned, quoted, and that what helped us to some extent ee... to repel another wave of pressure on us to agree on terms that will be more beneficial to our enemy than to us, is precisely the story of success at sea, although from the point of view of... war, of course, the result this war, it will be determined on one side combat operations on land and in the air, because the front line, and we can see how the russians are adapting in the air, adjusted aviation ammunition, but at the same time, again, it is very important, i will repeat again, this is an internal front, it is not a front, so internal if the dimension ,

unity, understanding of common goals and cohesion, because... russia is betting on exactly this, here is my current feeling that the russians are not counting on some kind of breakthrough in our defense and there the defeat of our group, the capture of a significant amount of territory, as they count in order to to undermine this unity, to use certain contradictions, and therefore, again, victory at sea, successes at sea are important, but from the point of view of achieving key tasks - it is successful. defense in the air and on land and , of course, parallel support of internal unity, internal cohesion. regarding actions in the air, ukraine has not yet demonstrated, at least publicly, we do not see, we have not seen any signs that there are already f-16s in ukraine. nevertheless, in recent weeks and months we have seen concentrated work by long-range weapons on pppo systems in

annexed crimea, do you think this is a harbinger? the air company is particularly successful, since the restoration of air defense systems is a long time, and it is possible that this will open a window again, as it was in the 23rd with the destruction of the black sea fleet at sea. well, the air defense systems themselves are an important goal, regardless of whether or not the f-16 will be operational after that, that is, weakening the air defense system, which is one of the integral parts of the russian defense system, is an important goal in itself, because we do not forget , that... ongoing intelligence work is ongoing, which relies on drones, work is also underway, missile systems of various strike systems, in fact, that is why creating holes in the air defense system is not only about the use of the f16, it is generally about weakening the russian defense system, which creates a lot of problems for us, because we have our own reconnaissance-strike fire complexes

that rely on reconnaissance means, drones and various missile and artillery systems, then we have... the problem lately is not so much the lack of ammunition, but the fact that russia can kinetically and non-kinetically violate these reconnaissance and shock fire complexes precisely in the intelligence segment, so the destruction of these air defense systems is important in itself, plus it opens up other opportunities for strike drones, for strike missile weapons of another, and from the point of view of the expectation of the f16, well, first of all, they will arrive exactly then, when they were supposed to arrive, and i don't understand this, if, for example, when there was a statement at the nato summit that they were supposed to arrive soon, and again, they were supposed to be earlier, no, they were supposed to be just in time, this is somewhere in the third quarter of this year, based on how the training started, they started in october last year in arizona and in parallel in europe, so everything is clear, based on the fact that the training program

is minimal for nine months, then what tasks can the f16 perform, well, first of all, this is the strengthening of anti-aircraft anti-missile defense, because for... the russians are bypassing our ground air defense zones, and even one f-16 squadron, having there a radar of the level of the 90s, and having aim-120, aim9 missiles, could multiply the air defense in the segment of combating cruise missiles. plus, of course, this is a better use of the ammunition that we have already received, and the harm missiles and jaydam ammunition, respectively, further, well, again, we will see, because in order to use the f16 in the depth of the russian combat orders of magnitude in tlu, it should still be almost complete suppression of anti-aircraft defense, there is no question of this yet, but at least this is a very important task in itself, and this is exactly what was expected, including from rocket atacoms, of course, on may 10 this year russian troops opened a new section of the line

front in the kharkiv region, at the moment when russian troops invaded, ukraine had to redeploy some units. in particular from the eastern front, and ukraine was restricted from striking with western weapons, but this ban was lifted, ukraine was at least partially able to launch strikes against russian rears on the territory of russia, and this permission is preserved, does this mean in your the opinion that russia strategically miscalculated this way, although it temporarily gained an advantage due to redeployment of ukrainian troops, well... russia tragically miscalculated, if it recognized that the war against ukraine was pointless, it was more of such operational calculations, miscalculations, well, on the one hand, it should probably be emphasized that the... fact that russia was able to open a new direction of attack, although it did not achieve certain results, this is a consequence of miscalculations and problems primarily on the part of our partners, that is, the fact that we did not

receive the required amount of weapons for more than six months, we will allow the russians to increase the corresponding group from 420 to 510 thousand and to open a new direction, but really the calculations that the russians had, they did not come true, that is, calculations of a local nature that they really planned to leave at least. on such approaches to kharkov, in order to carry out systematic missile and artillery strikes, they may also have set themselves the task of redeploying significant forces of ukraine and opening an opportunity for themselves in the east, we see that the front is holding, despite certain problems and nuances, and yes, in finally got permission to use ammunition for the first time gmlrs against military facilities on the territory of russia, and another discussion arose about the actual use of atakoms missiles. and here the question is that this situation, which took place in the kharkiv region, north-northeast of kharkiv, it visualized the problem that

only experts talked about before, this asymmetry, when russia has the opportunity to strike where it considers is needed on the territory of ukraine, where its missiles and drones actually pass, and ukraine, unfortunately, is very limited when it comes to western weapons, and therefore, yes, a serious a discussion that could have even more negative consequences for the russians. therefore, the calculations they had actually did not come true, we once again showed that if the defense is sufficiently supported, it will dominate the offense, and it will be difficult to carry out offensive actions, and on the contrary, a discussion has begun that can open up new opportunities for us , i hope that the moment will come when healthy military calculations will prevail over unhealthy political calculations, and the logic of lifting restrictions on the use of atacoms on russian airfields. which are in the border, she, she basically is, and i think it's only a matter of time, because in another way, to solve the problem with adjusted aviation ammunition,

it will be very difficult for us, that is, the patriot by itself will not remove this problem, in fact , so yes, the russian calculations turned out to be not as they thought it should be, but again one thing must be understood, this is only my hypothesis, but russia is not setting herself a task now. advance is already so deep, well, that is, they will be able to advance, ok, they will not be able to, the main thing to support the intensity of hostilities, and the fact that they were still able to open a new direction and make some tactical wedges there, it is as if it is still being used by russia, and russia is selling this image to the west, especially, look at something, we have been there for a long time, if they were buried, they were written off in the 23rd year of the american'. told that we inflicted a strategic defeat on russia, russia suffered a strategic failure, and russia at this time is opening new lines of attack, yes, perhaps without significant success, but the main thing for them is to keep

the appropriate intensity of hostilities, this is for us, for our already theory of victory, if this is a challenge, that is, not only if we stabilize the front line exclusively, but if we break this image that russia... can indefinitely maintain the appropriate intensity of the battle, therefore, despite the lack of success, all the same, these actions on the kharkiv region fall into the general russian, if russian approach, concept of how they will try to impose their will on us. in ukraine, they always talk about the need to bring war to the territory of russia, this has been going on since the 22nd year, or the efforts that are being made now, they are sufficient for this direction of defense development, well... first, they are much more than there were in the 22nd or 23rd year, that is, now the attacks are large-scale, there were several waves of them, in fact, this is already the next one that will be, it is already probably

the fourth wave will be such a powerful wave, first of all, they include a much larger number of drones, so some of them are complete hoaxes, in fact, which force the russians to focus on them, respectively, that is, we can already talk about the fact that they have increased significantly scale, i hope we will reach the moment when the russians will face roughly the same dilemma that we face in the 22nd year, how to distribute our air defense systems, because now the russians have concentrated the bulk of their air defense systems over the front line, we will try to disperse them and create dilemmas for the russians, and the dilemma, the meaning of the dilemma is that no matter what choice you make, you will still suffer losses, that is, if you cover objects in the rear, then you will be weakened. this defense, if you focus on defense at the front, then the facilities in the rear will suffer, so we go to that, of course there are restrictions, restrictions on the weight

of the combat unit, that is... now the average weight of the combat unit carried by the main mass of ukrainian drones, long-range strike aircraft is 450 kg. and here we also have a paradox, when in the second world war, planes, if bomber aircraft, had the opportunity to deliver much larger strikes, in fact, we are now limited in this regard, but in combination with other measures, these point strikes, they play their role role, and i think they will only increase. this is exactly the direction that will grow, and our task not to destroy everything, but to unbalance, again , the russian defense system in a very important segment where the russians have a huge advantage, which is ground-based air defense. uh, about the event on the ground, uh, these constant russian advances. recently, at least according to the videos that we see on social networks, we see a lot of tactical innovations, if you can call it that,

the use of shed tanks. plastered there with various reservations, if you can call it that, the use in assaults of golf carts or the same motorcycles, we understand that this does not happen from a good life, from a lack of means of mechanization, but nevertheless, this does not cause a lot of trouble for the military, who admit that even motorcycles, which in principle pose a huge threat to the stormtroopers themselves, when successfully used, they create problems when it is possible to penetrate into ... in the rear, do you see changes in russian tactics, or is this, in principle, everything happening in the general canvas that existed in the actions of russian troops before that, that is, do you see adaptation on the part of russian russian forces, adaptations are ongoing constantly, but it is not tactical adaptation that counts, but the sum of tactical adaptations, we have not seen a single classic offensive operation by the russians, most likely we will not see it if

ukraine is properly helped. way, that is, yes, they try to overcome the gray zone without losses, or with minimal losses, but this does not turn into a quick breakthrough of our defenses. i would say more, we currently have such a situation that we need to solve the problem of how to carry out rotations so that the russians do not use it, in my opinion, this the bigger problem is when there's a rotation on our side, the enemy understands that and the enemy then exploits that rather than using one action or another, so that's how the russians adjust, but it doesn't give them... any huge advantage until the russians can fully to suppress our weapon development system , the air defense system, they will not have the critical quality of forces that will allow them to conduct classic offensive actions, regardless of any tactical innovations, so far the russians have not solved this task, it is the suppression of these three segments in order to to create conditions for classic offensive actions, and those innovations that you mentioned, they do not

solve the relevant tasks, just about... absolutely measures countermeasures and fight with each other two two systems of reconnaissance-strike reconnaissance-fire complexes in fact and in this case and the coordinate system works for us, because we need to conduct defense, the russians need to advance and at least capture, try to capture the donetsk luhansk region, so that they can say that at least something was achieved there and sell it within. outside, so we can exploit it as much as possible and will continue to exploit it and prevent the russians from building up groups and creating new directions there, strengthening existing directions, and therefore it will continue to be such a positional confrontation, and here we really recall the western front of the first world war, as it was during the years 1915-1917, at the beginning of this answer you said that if they were going to help, they would probably

stay with the political turbulence as well. the political process in the states continues, in your opinion, or not will ukraine find itself again in the conditions that existed at the beginning of this year, at the end of the previous one, when there was a delay with funding, according to the means to conduct defense, and whether ukraine's other partners have drawn conclusions, relatively speaking, whether europe will be ready in which case to provide ukraine with what is necessary for conducting a defense operation. for is actually a constant challenge, and this is what russia is counting on, because its positional wars of attrition are a very difficult thing in terms of attracting further attention and resources, people lose interest, people are losing focus, and this is what russia is also counting on, that is, to weaken one of the two consensuses that ukraine should be helped, this is how we see those discussions that...