candidate herself talked about it. if october of 2015 we confirmed it existed and said not another word. not a peep about it until we were finished. >> critical time possible, a couple weeks before the election, and i think there are other things involved in that election, i'll grant that. but there is no question that that had a great effect, historians can debate what kind of effect it was, but you did do it. the -- in october, the f.b.i. was investigating the trump campaign's connection to russia. you sent a letter informing the senate and house that you were reviewing additional emails that could be relevant to this. but both investigations were open but you still only >> i commented on october 28th and a letter that i sent to the

chair and rankings of the oversight committees that we were taking additional steps of the clinton administration because i testified under oath repeatedly that we were done, that we refinish there. with respect to the russian investigation, we treated it like the clinton investigation. we didn't say a word about it until a month into it. i would expect we are not going to say another peep about it until we're done and i don't know what will be sent when you're done, but that's how he handled the clinton investigation as well. >> let me ask you this. during our investigation into hillary clinton's emails, a number of surrogates claim to have a pipeline to the fbi. he boasted that numerous agencies talk to him all the time regarding the investigatio investigation. he even said that he had advanced warning about the emails described in your october letter. former fbi agent made similar

claims. either they are lying or there's a serious problem within the bureau. anybody in the fbi during the 2016 campaign have contact with rudy giuliani? about the clinton investigation? >> i don't know yet. if i find out that people were leaking information about our investigations whether to reporters or private parties, there will be severe consequences. >> did you know of anything from tim castro? >> same answer. i don't know yet. >> do you know of any former agents? >> i don't know yet, but it's a matter that i'm very, very interested in. >> you are looking into a question mark >> correct. >> would you find that answer, you'll provided to us? >> all provide it to the committee in some form. i will find a way to let you know.

>> there are reports that a number of senior officials are connected to the russian investigation. like the attorney general who is forced to recuse himself. members of this committee have urged the deputy attorney general and he has that authority to appoint a special counsel, to protect the independence of the investigation. i was here and december 2003, shortly after we were confirmed as deputy attorney general, then attorney general ashcroft recused himself into the valerie plane leak. you appointed patrick fitzgerald. will lead you to that decision? >> in that particular investigation, my judgment was that the appearance of fairness and independence require that it

be removed from the political chain of command within the department of justice because as you recall, it seems like a lifetime ago, that involved a conduct of people who were senior-level people in the white house and my judgment was that even i, as an independent minded person, was the political appointees so i ought to give it to a career person like pat fitzgerald. >> what about the situation now question what we have deputy attorney general, i voted for his confirmation, but shouldn't he be not investigated when his boss, the attorney general -- >> that's a judgment he will have to make. he is, as i hoped i was, a very independent minded career oriented person, but it would be premature for me to comment on that. >> this past week, president trump said the hacking was another attempt to influence the election. it could have been china, it

could have been a lot of different groups. it is that contrary to what the intelligence community has side? >> the intelligence community with high confidence claimed it was russia. and many circumstances it's hard to do attributions of a hack, but sometimes the intelligences there. we have type confidence -- we have high confidence that the russians did the hacking of the dnc and other organizations. >> i have lots of other questions, but i want to freeze their response to the fbi to vermont. they had anonymous emails coming in, threatening serious action against students in a high school. including detailed death threat threats. multiple lock downs. fbi worked closely with the

digital investigation which you visited a couple years ago. it was a textbook example collaboration. ed stayed local and federal authorities and i wanted to thank all of those -- it turned out to be a very disturbed young man who is doing it. i just wanted to think you're fbi for working with that. >> senator graham would be next. we will go to senator orrin. >> i'm disappointed to see that former secretary of state hillary clinton was in the news yesterday, saying she blames you and blaming everything other than herself for her loss on november 8th. i find it ironic because you are not the who made the decision to handle classified information on a private email server.

you are not the one who decided to have a private meeting with secretary clinton's husband in the middle of the justice department's ongoing investigation into second clinton's server. i use the word investigation here because according to a recent piece in "the new york times," you are forbidden from using the word investigation and were instead told to refer to the investigation, as a matter. it was the former attorney general, loretto lynched that up until that meeting with president clinton, was the person responsible for making the decision whether to convene a grand jury involving the allegations against secretary clinton. it was former attorney general loretta lynch who forbade you from using the word investigation. indeed, "the new york times" story is true, a democratic operative expressed confidence that the former attorney general would keep that investigation from going very far. i think you were given an impossible choice to make and

you did the best you could in light of the situation that you are presented with. it strikes me as somewhat sad for people here and elsewhere to condemn you for notifying congress shortly before the election. secretary clinton had made the decision to use her private email server, and i think it's important to remind folks that you are not the one who decided to do business this way and keep the state department emails on a computer of someone suspected of child pornography. i believe you are placed in ancn and did the best you could. as you recall, i was one of those who felt like given the nature of the investigation and the concerns that a special counsel should have been appointed to conduct the investigation, but of course, attorney general lynch and the

obama administration opposed that effort. i just wanted to express to you my disappointment at this continued seeking of a reason, any reason, other than a flawed campaign and the candidate herself for second losing the presidential election. if i could turn to a couple of other items here. you mentioned 702, up for reauthorization. he referred to this as a crowned jewel of the fbi and counterterrorism investigations. could you explain why this provides such a unique tool and why you regard it as the crown jewel of the fbi? >> thank you, senator. every time i talk about this, i wince a little bit because i do want bad people of the world to focus on this too much. bad people around the world because of the genius of american innovation, use our

products and infrastructure for their emails, for their communications. what 702 allows us to do is quickly target terrorist weapons of mass destruction, proliferators, spies, cyber hackers, not americans, who are using our infrastructure to communicate, to target them quickly and collect information on them. it is vital to all parts of the intelligence community because of its agility, its speed, and its effectiveness. again, and an open setting, we can't explain what you already know from classified information about what a difference this makes, but again, because america is the mother of all this innovation, they use a lot of our equipment, a lot of our networks to communicate with each other. if we were ever required to establish the normal warrant process for these non-americans who aren't in our country, just because the photons are using the plan attacks across our country's land, we will be tying ourselves and knots for reasons that make no sense at all and

the courts that are unnecessary under the fourth amendment. this is a tool, we talked a lot last year about the database, i think that's a useful tool. it does not compare in importance to 702. >> i agree, it is a little bit difficult to talk about things that involve classified matters in public, but i think the public needs to know that there are multiple oversight layers, including the pfizer court, congressional oversight, internal oversight within the fbi intelligence community that protects americans under their privacy rights while targeting terrorists and people who are trying to kill us. i want to talk a minute about the electronic communication transactional records, something you and i have discussed before as well. the fbi can use national security letters, i believe to get financial information and

telephone numbers now in the conduct of a terrorist investigation, but because of a typo in the law, the fbi has not been allowed access to the data and national security cases to the extent that it is necessary. can you talk to us about the importance of that particular effects in the electronic communications transactional records fix? >> thank you so much, senator. this seems like a boring deal, this makes a big impact in our work and here's why. in our counterterrorism cases, we can issue all kinds of layers of approval in the fbi. a national security letter, to find out the subscriber to a particular telephone number and to find out what numbers that telephone number was in contact with pure or not the content of those communications, but just the connection. again, because of what i believe is a typo in the law, if i'm wrong, congress will tell me, they intended this. the companies that provide the

same services put on the internet resist and say we don't have the statutory authority to serve a national security letter to find a subscriber to a particular email handle or what addresses were in contact with what addresses. as the same at telephone medications. i don't think congress intended that distinction, but what it does do, if we want to find out the subscriber to a particular email handle, to go and get an order from a federal judge and washington as part of the pfizer court, it's incredibly long and difficult process. i'm worried about that slowing us down, but also worried about it becoming a disincentive for our investigators to do it at all, because if you are working a case in san antonio or seattle, were moving very, very quickly and if i have to go to get a subscriber information for heaven sakes on an email address to a federal court in washington, i'm probably going to try to find some other way around it. if that's what congress wants, sure, we'll fall the law.

on think that was intended, so i would hope that congress will fix what i believe is a typo. >> thank you, mr. director. i have a couple of questions. >> summer going over to vote no and i would also like to have democrats and republicans notify me if they would like a second round so i can get an inventory of that. senator called chart. >> thank you, welcome back director call me now more than ever, americans are looking to congress for leadership and we must be united and i would appreciate it if some of the members of this committee on the republican side who have spoken out about this, we must be united as we seek information from the

administration. last month, during a hearing, you confirmed that the fbi is investigating the russian government efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. including any links between the trump campaign and the russian government. i know that you cannot discuss that ongoing investigation, but just one question to clarify, we are commit to ensuring that the relevance congressional committees will receive a full and timely briefing on that investigation finding? >> in general, i can, senator. any department of justice approval to brief on particular people that we are investigatin investigating. on who we have cases open on and exactly what we are doing. i don't know whether the department will approve that, but i will lean as far forward as i can. >> because attorney general sessoms is recused from that,

you go to him to get that approval? >> yes, i've already briefed him and his first day in office. i briefed him on where we are, so he would be the person to make that decision. >> thank you. and your testimony, you noticed that russian spies and criminal hackers were brought forward with that yahoo attack in february of 2014. in december of 2016, the fbi and a part of homeland security least a 13 page report providing technical details about how federal investigators linked russia to the hack against u.s. political organizations. does russia use the same military and civilian tools that used to hack our political organization in order to do things like hack into u.s. companies to steal identities and steal credit card information of americans on the black market? how is the fbi working to fight against hackers supported by foreign governments like russia?

>> the answer is yes. both are government organizations and on they have a relationship that's often difficult to define with criminals. the yahoo facts -- hack is an example. hackers are working together, so the answer is yes. what we're doing is trying to see if we can impose costs on that behavior in a lot of different ways including what i mentioned in my opening which is locking up people. if we can get the monsen of russia. russia's not too great about cooperating with us, but all of them like to travel. if they travel, putting handcuffs on them to send a message that that is not appropriate. >> and your testimony, you also expressed a threat that posed to our safety. i heard these concerns firsthand when senator graham and mccain and i were in georgia.

there are recent concerns that organized criminals including russia are using the luxury real estate market to launder money. the treasury department has noted a significant rise and the use of shell companies and real estate transactions because foreign buyers use them as a way to hide their identity and find safe havens for the money in the u.s. in fact, nearly half of all houses in the u.s. worth at least $5 million are purchased using shell companies. does the anonymity associated with the use of shell companies to buy real estate hurt the fbi's ability to trace the flow of illicit money and fight organized crime and do support efforts by the treasury department to use its existing authority to require more transparency in these transactions? >> yes and yes. >> okay, very good. i think this is a huge problem. when you hear that over half of them are purchased by shell companies, that is a major

problem. in march, this committee on crime and terrorism called its first hearing. i think senator graham and senator whitehouse for that. i've protected our infrastructure -- he agreed this is a very important issue. as the ranking member of the rules committee, i'm particularly concerned about assuring our elections are safe from foreign interference. i recently led a group of 26 senators and calling a full count of the election to address russian security threats in the 2016 election. i'm also working on legislation in this area. can you discuss how the fbi has correlated with the election assistance commission, the apartment of homeland security to protect our election process? >> in short we have done with dhs as a share the tools,

tactics, and techniques we see hackers, especially from the 2016 election season, using to attack voter registration databases and trying to engage in other hacks and we pushed that out to all other states so they can harden their networks. that's one of the most important things we can do is equip them with information to make their systems tighter. >> very good. as you know, have different equipment all over this country. there's some advantage to that, i think. it's good we have paper ballot backups, of course, but we have to be prepared for this. it certainly is in about one political party or one candidat candidate. the last time you came before the committee in december 2015, just one week after the san bernardino attacks. since then, we've seen other attacks in our country. we had a tragedy in a shopping mall in st. cloud, minnesota.

ten wounded at a shopping mall. thankfully, a brave off-duty cop was there and was able to stop further damage from being done. i would also like to thank you and the fbi for your investigation, having talked to the chief up there, senator franken and i were briefed by him as well as congressman amber, right after this attack. the local police department had to do a lot with working with the community. they have a significant somali community there that they are proud to have there, so they're working with them. they're working with our community, they're helping, but the fbi really stood and and led the investigation. i want to thank you for that and with one question, it's been reported that isis has encouraged attacks like what we saw in orlando. what challenges do the types of the hacks present for law enforcement and what is the fbi

doing to prevent these kinds of tragedies? >> the central challenge is not just finding needles in a nation my haid stat, but which pieces of hay might become a needle and which of the troubled young people or sometimes older people are consuming poisonous propaganda. and are moving towards acts of violence. a huge part of it is building relationships of the communities you mentioned because those folks do not want anyone committing violence, in the name of their faith. they have the same incentives we do and we need to make sure we see them that way and they see us that way. we won't see some troubled kid going sideways and thinking he should stab people anywhere near as easily as the people around that kid are going to see it. getting in a position where they feel comfort while telling us or telling local law enforcement is at the heart of our ability to

find those needles, and valuate those pieces of hay and stop this. >> i appreciate it, thank you. >> could you pass on to your agents and support personnel how much we appreciate their efforts. we are going to set a record for questions asked and answered and 6 minutes and 54 seconds if i can. do you agree with me that it would be devastating to the fbi? unless congress changes it. it >> i've been told that. >> do you agree with me that i so -- isis will become a terrorist agent and terrace to the homeland is going to get greater over time, not smaller? >> yes, it will diminish and that their power to put up the media to the troubled people within the country will decrease, but the hardened killers will be a big problem.

>> from a funding point of view, terrorism will get better, it will get worse. >> i think that's fair to say. >> did you ever talk to sally yates about her concerned about general flynn being compromised? >> i did, i don't know whether i can talk about it in this forum, but the answer is yes. >> it she did express those concerns to your? >> correct. we will talk about that later. >> do you stand by your testimony that there was no surveillance of the trump campaign that you are aware of? >> correct. >> you would know about it if there were, is that correct? >> i think so, yes. >> is there a pfizer warrant -- go >> i can't answer that here. >> did you consider carter page and agent of the campaign? >> same answer, i can't answer that here. >> do you stand by your testimony that there is an active investigation,

counterintelligence investigation, regarding trump campaigning individuals on the russian government? you said that in march. >> to see if there is any correlation between the russian effort -- yes. >> nothing is changed, you stand by those statements? but you won't tell me about carter page? >> not here, i won't. >> okay. the chairman mentioned that fusion, are you familiar with fusion? >> i know the name. >> are they part of the russian intelligence apparatus? >> i can't say. >> do agree that if fusion was involved in preparing a dossier against donald trump, that would be interfering in our election by the russians? >> i don't want to say. >> okay, do you agree with me that anthony weiner of 2016 should not have access to classified information? >> yes, that's a fair statement. >> would you agree with me that that's on a legal we have really bad laws?

>> it would be illegal if if yu don't have appropriate clearance. >> do you agree with me that he did have appropriate clearance? if he did, that would be worse. >> at the time, we didn't find that he had any clearance. >> i agree, so for him to get it should be a crime. somebody should be prosecuted for letting anthony weiner having access to classified information. does that make general sense? it >> it could be a crime. >> when you agree with me that it should be that anybody who allows anthony weiner to have classified information probably should be prosecuted? if our laws don't cover that, they probably should. it >> there's anthony weiner statute -- >> maybe we need one. i just wonder how you can get classified information and not be a crime. unmasking, are you familiar with that? >> yes. >> has the bureau ever and

investigated the unmasking of american civilian and accidental collection? >> yes, i did it this week in connection with an intelligence report. >> i'm a pretty hawkish guy. i want to know how unmasking works. are you aware of any requests by the white house, anybody and the obama administration, to unmask american citizens that were caught up in incidental surveillances in 2015 or 2016? >> i'm not aware of any requests to the fbi. >> who would make the requests to? >> they can make it to anyone in the fbi -- >> would they make it to the nsa? >> chair, if it was an nsa report. i heard about nsa reports. >> would you ask a question mark go to the nsa western mark -- >> i got a report this week that said u.s. company number one. if removed, i need to know the

name of that company. i asked my intelligence prefer who works and say i would like to know that and then she goes and asks the owner of the information -- and this case, it was ti information. >> does the owner investigation -- information record the unmasking? >> the nsa definitely does. >> there should be a record somewhere in our government for a request to unmask, regardless of who made the request. >> it that's right. >> is it fair to say that very few people can make requests for unmasking? i can't go and make the request. >> sure, it's a fairly small group of consumers, which i am am -- >> , security council? >> i think the national security advisor certainly can. >> when it comes to russia, is it fair to say that the government of russia actively provides safe havens to cyber

criminals? >> yes. >> is it fair to say that the russian government is still involved in american politics? >> yes. >> is it fair to say when he to stop them from doing it? >> yes, it's fair to say. >> do agree with me the only way they will stop is for them to pay a price for interfering in our political process? >> i think that's a fair statement. >> what we're doing today is not working, they're still doing it. they're doing it all over the world, aren't they? >> yes. >> what kind of threat deeply russia presents to our democratic process? given what you know about russia's behavior? >> certainly, in my view, the greatest threat of any nation on earth, given their intention and their capability. >> do agree they did not change vote tallies, but one day they might? it >> i very much -- we found no indication of any change in vote tallies. there were efforts aimed at voter registration systems, in

theory, part of the united states, the beauty of our system is is a bit of a hairball and all different kinds of systems -- >> have they done this and other countries? >> my understanding is they have attempted in other countries. >> there is no reason they wouldn't attempt it here? >> i think that's fair. >> thank you. >> thank you, welcome back director comey. what is the policy and the department or bureau for release of derogatory information on a uncharged subject? >> the general practices -- is we don't talk about completed investigations that don't result in charges. as a general manner. >> what is policy for derogatory information uncharged subjects beyond the derogatory investigative information disclosed either in the charging document or in further court

proceedings? >> i think you summarized it. the gist of the policy as you don't want to do anything outside the charging documents of the public records that might prejudice the proceeding. >> one of the reasons you do that is if you have a police chief say we have investigated contracts between the mayor and we decided there were no misleads, but he found the mayor was sleeping with a driver, just want to let you know that. that would be a blow to the integrity of the prosecutor function. it would probably tend to diminish the court. >> that's fair. that's why the policy exists. >> with respect to oversight questions, let's hypothesize that an investigation exists in the public knows about it, which have happened for a great number of reasons. what questions are appropriate for senators to ask about that investigation and their oversight capacity? >> they can ask anything they

want. >> what questions are appropriate? >> a very few a matter is pending. >> while we know it's pending, is it appropriate for you to tell us whether it's resourced -- for instance, other agents assigned to this or has been put in some at his bottom drawer? >> who's working on it, that sort of thing. >> other benchmarks in cases where the department approvals are required or the involvement of certain officials are required to see if those are taken? >> am not sure i follow the question. >> hypothetically, it's a rico investigation. if none of those have ever been invoked or implicated, that would send a signal that may be not much effort has been dedicated to it, would that be a legitimate question to ask? again, you have to know that it's a rico investigation, but assuming we know that's the cas

case, what those standing elements be appropriate to ask about? >> that's a harder question, i'm not sure it would be appropriate to answer because it would give away what we're looking at potentially. >> would to be appropriate to ask whether an investigation -- any witnesses have been interviewed or documents had been -- >> it's a slippery slope to giving away information about exactly what you're doing. >> if were concerned that an investigation gets put on the shelf and not taken seriously, the fact that no witnesses have been called and no documents have been sought would be pretty relevant and wouldn't reveal anything other than a lack of attention by the bureau, correct? >> a code, but we are very careful about revealing how we might use a grand jury for example. >> this is a separate thing.

>> that's a harder call. >> will pursue it. what is the bureau's policy regarding witnesses to our cooperating in an investigation who have some form of ongoing compliance problem? let's say they haven't paid their taxes for the last year, as of the policy of the department of bureau they should get those witnesses to clean up their act so their noncompliance does not become an issue later on in the case? >> yes, i don't know whether it's a written -- i should know this. it's a long-standing practice. >> exactly. when her tax returns useful in investigating a criminal offense? >> there useful in showing unreported income, motive if someone hides something that should otherwise been a tax return indicating they know it was criminal activity --

>> is not uncommon to seek and use tax returns in a criminal investigation? >> is not uncommon, it's a very difficult process as it should be, but certainly in complex financial cases, it's relatively common as a tool. >> the hearing that senator graham and i held with respect to russia's infiltration and influence in the last election raised the issue of russia intervening with business leaders in a country engaging them in bribery or other highly favorable business deals with a view to either recruiting them as a somebody who has been bribed or being able to threaten them by disclosing the illicit relationship, they're perfectly happy to blow up their own cut out, but it also blows up the individual. have you seen any indication that those are russian strategies and their election

influence toolbox? >> in general, my understanding is those are tools that the russians have used over many decades. >> lastly, the european union is moving towards requiring transparency of incorporations so that shell corporations are harder to create. that risks leaving the united states as the last big haven for shell corporations. is it true that shell corporations are often used as a device for criminal money laundering? >> s. >> is it true that shell corporations are often used as a device for the concealment of criminally guarded funds >> yes. >> and to avoid legitimate taxation? >> yes. >> what do you think the hazards are for the united states with respect to election interference

of continuing to maintain a system in which shell corporations, that you never know who is really behind them, or a commonplace? >> i suppose one risk as it makes it easier for illicit money to make its way into a political environment. >> that's on a good thing. >> i don't think it is. >> yeah, me neither. thank you very much. >> director, thank you for being here. given the fbi's extensive responsibilities and expertise and cyber investigations, how likely do you think it is that i.t. systems have been targeted by foreign intelligence services? >> is a certainty. >> inside the ic, who who would talk about that problem? >> i don't want to talk about particular matters, but it often is the fbi alerting a u.s. government institution or private sector, dhs might come across it, or other parts of the

intelligence community, especially nsa. >> when we talk about things like cyber investigations, it becomes the shirts and skins exercise. without commenting about anything that's retrospective about 2016, do you think it's likely that in 2018 and beyond, there will be more targeting of u.s. public discourse and elections? >> i do. i think one of the lessons that the russians may have drawn from this is that this works. as i said a month or so ago, expect to see them back in 2018, especially in 2020. >> you regularly testify, correct me if i've misheard, but you've regularly testify that you don't think the bureau is a short of resources. you don't come before us and make increased appropriations requests and yet, those of us who are very concerned about cyber look at the u.s. government and think we are not at all prepared for the future. can you tell us what the fbi is doing to prepare for that 2018

and 2020 circumstance that you envision? >> without giving too much detail, we have an enormous part of the fbi and our cyber division that focuses on just that threat and making sure that we do everything we can to understand how the bad guys might come out us. as i talked about earlier, to equip the civilian agencies that are responsible for hardening our infrastructure with all the information we have about how they're going to come at us. >> in your national security domain, if you have increased resources, how would you spend another marginal beyond what you expect to receive now? >> it would have a tie between investing more and upgrading our systems to make sure we are keeping pace with the bar of excellence and probably to hire an additional cyber agent analysis. >> what kind of increase funding request would you make? >> i wouldn't make any sitting here. >> i would like to talk about

wikileaks. in january, the fbi contributed to an assessment that concluded that wikileaks is a known outlet of foreign propaganda. you stand by that assessment? >> yes. do you believe wikileaks has released classified information? >> s. >> have the wikileaks exposure endangered american lives? >> i believe yes. >> why has julian assange not been charged with a crime? >> i don't want to comment on the particular case because i want to confirm whether or not there are charges pending, he has been apprehended because he didn't -- resigns at the embassy in london. >> i asked about the status of the investigation and it seems pretty clear, individuals were polite and kind and responsive to our requests, it seemed that across the ic, there wasn't much deliberation about wikileaks and about julian assange. does the fbi participate in any

other dialogue about whether or not he committed crimes? >> i don't know where you got that impression, but wikileaks is an important focus of our attention. >> i intentionally left almost half of my time for you to relax broadly for a minute. there is room for regional people to disagree about at what point and allegedly journalistic and -- organization becomes a tool for foreign intelligence. there are well-meaning thoughtful people who think wikileaks might be a journalistic outfit. can you explain why that is not your view? >> again, i want to be careful that i don't prejudice any future proceedings. it's an important question because all of us care deeply about the first amendment and the ability of free press to get information about our work and publish it. to my mind, crosses a line when it moves from being about trying to educate a public and instead

just becomes about intelligence. just pushing out information about sources and methods without regard to interest, without regard to the first amendment values that normally underlie press reporting and typically becomes a conduit for the russian intelligence to cause damage to the united states. i realize people struggle to draw a line, but certainly there's conduct that is so far to the side of that line that we agree is nothing that even smells journalist about this conduct. >> if you could map that continuum, there are clearly members of the ic who at different points in the past have leaked classified information. that is an illegal act, correct? >> correct. >> when american journalists court and solicit that information, how they violated any law by asking people in the ic to potentially leak information that is potentially

classified? >> that conduct is not treated by the u.s. government as criminal conduct. i've been asked another context, isn't it true that the sp nonce statute has no -- in my lifetime, the department of view has been newsgathering is not going to be investigated or prosecuted as a criminal act. >> an investigative reporter taking advantage of and celebrate in the liberties that we have under the first amendment at "the washington post" ," "the new york times," trying to talk to people in the ic can get the maximum amount of information that they possibly can out of them to inform the public. it is not the burden of an american journalist to discern whether or not the member of the ic is leaking information that might be classified. the journalist can legitimately seek information and is not their job to police said. the number of the u.s. i see is that leaked classified information has broken the law. >> right. the leak clearly rests on those

who are in the government possession of intelligence and class event information. it is not the journalist's burden. our focus is and should be on the leakers, not those that are obtaining it as part of legitimate newsgathering. >> i want to hear this one more time i know the chairman has indulged me. the american journalist who is seeking this information differs from julian assange and wikileaks how? >> and that there is at least a portion. people can argue that this conduct of wikileaks, and my view, a huge portion of wikileaks activities have nothing to do with legitimate newsgathering and informing the public, commenting on important public controversies, it's simply about releasing classified information to damage the united states of america. people sometimes gets an 11 -- cynical about journalists. they don't do that. they will almost always call us and say is there anything up out

those that will put lives in danger? and then work with us to try and accomplish their first amendment goals by safeguarding those. wikileaks involves no such considerations whatsoever. it just pushes it out in order to damage. >> thank you. >> senator franken. >> thank you. good to see you, mr. director. i'm going to kind of pick up where sheldon whitehouse, senator whitehouse was going. are you familiar with a report called the kremlin playbook? >> no. >> this is an expert report that exhaustively documents russia's past efforts to undermine european democracies according to the report, russia is known to cultivate close ties with business and political leaders and target countries.

this is stuff you acknowledge that you knew happened. the report explains that russia has cultivated an opaque network of patronage across the region that uses influenced to direct decision-making. in other words, russia has a strategy of creating the conditions that give rise to corruption. then exploiting the corruption to benefit. in the intelligence community's unclassified assessment of the russian campaign to influence the american election, our nation's intelligence agency right hooton has had many positive experiences working with western political leaders whose business interests made them more disposed to deal with russia. that seems to jive with your understanding of what russia has done. in that same assessment, the

fbi, cia, and nsa, all concluded that russia did in fact interfere in the 2016 election in order to help president-elect trumps election chances, when possible, by discrediting secretary clinton. the agencies concluded that russia had a clear preference for president trump. what is your assessment of why the russian government had a clear preference for president trump? >> the intelligence community assessment had a couple of parts. one was he wasn't hillary clinton, putin hated and wanted to harm in any possible way. the second notion that the intelligence community assessed at the putin believed he would be more able to make deals, reach agreements with someone with a business background then with someone who had grown up and more of a government environment. >> okay.

i'm curious about just how closely russia followed the kremlin playbook when it meddled in our democracy, specifically whether the russians had a preference for president trump because he had already been ensnared in their web of patronage, that is a quote from a report. is it possible that in the russian views -- view, trumps business interests would make him more amenable to cooperating with them more disposed to deal with russia as the ic report says? a >> that was on the basis for the assessment. >> okay, well, i just said is it possible? >> possible questions are hard for me to answer. >> an order for us to know for certain whether president trump would be vulnerable to that type

of exploitation, we would have to understand his financial situation. we have to know whether or not he has money tied up in russia or obligations to russian entities. do you agree? >> that you need to understand that to evaluate that question? i don't know. >> it seems to me that there is reason to believe that such connections exist. for example, the president's son donald trump, jr., told real estate developers in 2008 that russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our assets. he said we see a lot of money pouring in from russia. this is a report on the family business. in 2013, president trump held a miss universe pageant in moscow in the pageant was financed by russian billionaire who is close to putin. president trump sold a

palm beach manson to a russian aligarh for $95 million in 2008. that's $54 million more than he paid for it just four years prior. those are three financial ties that we know of and they are big ones. director comey, the russians have a history of using financial investments to gain leverage over influential people and then later calling in favors. we know that. we know that the russians interfered in our election. they did it to benefit president trump. the intelligence agency has confirmed that. what i want to know is why they favored president trump. it seems to me that an order to answer that question, any investigation into whether or not the trump campaign or trump operation colluded with russian operatives would require a full appreciation of the presidents of financial dealings.

director comey, would president trump's tax returns the material to such an investigation? >> that's not something i'm going to answer. >> does the investigation have access to president trump's tax returns? >> i'll have to give her the same answer. i hope people don't over interpret my answers, i don't want to start talking about what we are looking at and how. >> director comey, we continue to learn about ties between russia and former members of the president's campaign and current senior members of this administration, jeff sessions, attorney general, former campaign advisor, carter page, former campaign advisor, paul manna fort, former campaign manager, paul manna for it. secretary of state, political mentor and former campaign advisor, michael flynn, former national security advisor, jerry

kushner, white house senior advisor and son-in-law. we don't know if this list is exhaustive, but i think might see where i'm going. these connections appear against a backdrop of proven russian interference in the election and interference of the intelligence community has concluded design favored president trump. i'm hitting my time, but let me ask this one question. thank you, mr. chairman. from an investigative standpoint, is the sheer number of connections unusual or significant? what about each individual's proximity to the president? is it unusual for a president in these roles to have so many unexpected and often undisclosed ties to a foreign power? >> not to give you the same answer, that's not something i

can comment on. >> okay. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you. with regard to 702 reauthorization, in 2014, the oversight board recommended the agency's development mechanisms to limit the potential scope of incidental collection. under your leadership, what is video done to comply with these augmentations? >> what we've done is make sure we tighten up our training and making sure that nobody gets to see the contents of a speech collection. that's a good way of summarizing it. there's a lot more beneath that, but that's the just of it. just to make sure we are collected under 702, just make sure that nobody gets access to it and doesn't have a need to know that hasn't been trained on how to handle information.

>> can you briefly describe the process for incidental collection? >> incidental collection is the name given to -- if you are targeting a terrorist who is in yemen and he happens to be using an american email provider to communicate. under 702, the u.s. intelligence community can collect that terrorist communication. he is outside the united states and he's not an american. if an american contacts that terrorist, sentiment email at his email, that is collected. he's not a target, but because he or she communicated with a terrorist, that is collected as part of that level collection. that's what incidental collection means. if the fbi is doing that's be 21 collection, those two medications from a terrorist and to the terrorist's and are databased. if we open an investigation on that person who happened to be the communicant and research our

systems, we will hit on that speed 21 collection and then must getting agent will know there is an american who was in touch with that terrorist and yemen. that agent has been trained and has access to that information, they'll be able to know it. that's how our systems are designed. >> i should say, the same review was conducted in 2014 does point out the value of the program. i certainly think and most of us do here, see the incredible value of seven oh two and need for reauthorization there. with regard to a different topic completely, it's worth noting that cpb experiences significantly higher failure rates, 65%, than any other federal law enforcement agency.

has the bureau conducted any benchmarking with other federal agencies as to the process whereas you require a polygraph for employment? it seems that given fbi success with this instrument that you can inform some of the other agencies who are having difficulties. >> i don't know whether we have, but i'll find out. i think we have with other members. >> would be helpful, we appreciate it. given the amount of data for the fbi, what have you put forth to protect your own systems? >> it is a constant worry of all of us. since i have been director, i have put a senior fbi executive

in charge of it because i want someone waking up every morning worrying about how might we lose data, who might be penetrating us either our systems or as a human, a ton of work has gone into protecting our systems, but the weakest link is always the people. you can have the greatest firewalls and greatest intrusion detection system, but if people are engaging and negligent or intentional misconduct, all that is defeated. we're making sure we have a rich picture of our people it is constant and doesn't depend on pawn five-year investigations. that's hard to do and build. technically, it's a matter of law and policy, but we're working very hard on it. >> and your opinion, is congress doing enough to protect our systems from outside threats? >> i don't mean this is a wise guy answer, surely not, because none of us can be doing enough frankly.

it's not about the perimeter we build, it's about the security culture inside our organization organizations. i'm part of the fbi and i don't think ours is good enough. i'm sure congress is not good enough. >> do you know the freedom of information act, citizens have access to information from the federal government. clean title but how the bureau promptly responds to requests? at the same time, maintaining some level of security. >> we have none an enormous operation that's 24 hours a day outside of washington, d.c. great people who know the regulations, they know the security sensitivities and work as hard as we can to comply with the foia deadlines. it's a huge pain, but it's an essential part of being a public institution. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you chairman grassley,

thank you director comey for your return. i want to start by asking about a letter. mr. chairman, also meant this to the record. we sent a letter to our colleague, senator cruz who served as the oversight committee chairman, expressing our grave concern about the potential for foreign interference and our upcoming presidential election. we ask for an oversight hearing to consider whether existing statutes were sufficient to address and contact. we didn't have that hearing, but i would like to ask you that same question now. our existing federal statute sufficient to prosecute and conduct related to foreign entities that undermine our elections? >> i think saul is my answer, but someone smarter than i. we have the statutory tools,

it's a matter of gathering the evidence and then applying it under those statutory tools. >> you stated that you fully expect russia to continue to be engaged in efforts to influence our elections, do you expect them to be back in 2018 and 2020. what more should we be doing both to defend our election infrastructure and our future elections against continuing russian interference and what more are you doing with the agency to help our allies in countries like france and germany that have upcoming elections where there is every reason to believe the russians are actively interfering there as well? >> two things we can do and that we are doing in the united states and with our allies is telling the people responsible for protecting the election infrastructure in the united states everything we know about how the russians and others try to attack those systems, how they might come at it, what ip addresses they might use, what fishing techniques