and democratic administrations, i assumed greater leadership positions within the department. the u.s. attorney's office in atlanta, i served as chief of the fraud and public corruption section and appointed united states attorneys and had the privilege of serving as deputy attorney general for a little over two years. finally, the current administration asked me to stay on as acting attorney general. throughout my time at the department, i was incredibly fortunate to work with the talented career men and women at the department of justice who followed the facts and applied the law with tremendous care and dedication. and who are in fact the backbone of the department of justice. in every step, in every position, from ausa to acting attorney general, i always tried to carry out my responsibility to seek justice in a way that would engender the trust and the

confidence of the people whom i served. i want to thank this subcommittee for conducting an impartial and thorough investigation. the attempt to undermine our attempted processes and our allies poses a serious threat. this hearing is an important bipartisan step in understanding the threat and the best ways to confront it going forward. as the intelligence community assessed in the january 2017 report, russia will continue to develop capabilities to use against the united states and we need to be ready to meet those threats. i sincerely appreciate the opportunity to take part in today's discussion. now, i want to note that in my answers today, i intend to be as fullsome and comprehensive as

possible while respecting my legal and ethical boundaries. as the subcommittee understands, many of the topics of interest today concern classified information that i cannot address in this public setting. my duty to protect classified information applied just as much as a former official as it did when i led the department. in addition, obviously i'm no longer with the department of justice and i'm not authorized to generally discuss the liberations within doj or more broadly in the executive branch, particularly on matters that may be the subject of ongoing investigations. i take those obligations very seriously. i appreciate the subcommittee's share interest in protecting classified information and preserving the integrity of any investigation that the department of justice may now be conducting. i look forward to answering your questions. thank you. >> senator grassley, would you

like to make a statement? [inaudible] >> all right. you'll get to ask them. senator feinstein. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i'll be very brief. we have prepared for the committee and i'd like to ask the staff to distribute it, a background and time line on lieutenant general michael flynn be of help the key dates to the subcommittee. i would just like to take this opportunity to thank the subcommittee. chairman graham and ranking member white house. i think you've done a good job and your whole subcommittee has. thanks very much. i just like to make a few comments if i might and put all of the remark in the record.

i think it is a foregone conclusion about russia's involvement. we see it replicated even in the french election. perhaps not to the extent or in the way, but certainly replicated. on february 9, 2017, the "washington post" reported that flynn had misled the vice president or that pence had misspoken. lieutenant general flynn resigned his post four days after the post broke this story. there's still many unanswered questions about general flynn, including who knew what and when. for example, the press is now

reporting that in addition to sally yates, concerns were raised by former president obama to then president trump, 95 days before flynn resigned. so the question, what role did flynn play in communications with the russians both after the first warning by president obama and then after the warning by sally yates. i hope to ask that today. what role did flynn play in high level national security decisions, again, both during the 95 days and the 18 days when the white house was on notice. so i look forward to hearing more about this from you, acting attorney general yates. you have stated that you warned the white house on january 26, nearly three weeks before flynn resigned that he was not

truthful and might be vulnerable to russian blackmail. finally, there's other troubling questions regarding russia's relationship with trump advisers and associates. there's questions about whether anyone was the target of russian intelligence either to be exploited or cultivated. so i will put my whole remarks in the regard, mr. chairman. i hope to ask some questions around these few comments. thank you very much for this opportunity. >> yes, ma'am. without objection. >> mr. chairman, may i also put in the record a letter dated november 18, 2016 from the ranking member on the house committee on oversight and government reform of elijah cummings giving vice president-elect pence notice about apparent conflicts of

interest regarding general flynn. >> without objection. general clapper, on march 5, 2017, you said the following to a question. here's the question. does intelligence exist that can answer the following question: were there any improper contacts between the trump campaign and russian officials. you said we did not include any evidence in our report, i say our, the fbi, the cia, with our office that had any reflection of collusion between members of the trump campaign and the russians. there was no evidence of that included in the report. chuck todd asked, i understand that, but does it exist. you say no, not to my knowledge. is that still accurate? >> it is. >> mrs. yates, do you have any idea or are you aware of any evidence that would suggest in

the 2016 campaign anybody in the trump campaign colluded with the russian government or intelligence services in an improper fashion? >> senator, my answer to that question would require me to reveal classify information. i can't answer that. >> well, i don't get that. he just said he issued the report. he said he doesn't know of he any. what would you know that's not in the report? >> if i may -- are you asking me -- >> no. >> director clapper said he was unaware of the fbi counter intelligence investigation. >> would it be fair to say the counter intelligence investigation was not mature enough to get in the report, mr. clapper? >> that's a possibility. >> what i don't get is how the fbi can have a counter intelligence investigation suggesting collusion and you as director of national intelligence not know about it

and the fbi sign on to a report that basically said there was no collusion. >> i can only speculate why that is so. there wasn't -- the evidence, if there was any, didn't reach the level we were striving for in that assessment. >> okay. follow up. are you familiar with the dossier about mr. trump compiled by some guy in england? >> i am. >> did you find that to be a credible report? >> we didn't make a judgment on that. that's one reason why we did not include it in the body of our intelligence community assessment? >> you didn't find it -- >> we didn't corroborate the second or third sources. >> mrs. yates, are you familiar with the dossier? >> if i could clarify one answer

before. senator graham, you may have misunderstood me. you asked me if i was aware of any evidence of collusion. i declined to answer because answering would reveal classify information. i believe that's the same answer that director comey gave to the committee when he was asked the question as well. he made clear and i make clear that you shouldn't draw from that assumption that the answer is yes. >> okay. >> this illustrates what i was trying to get at in my statement about the unique position that the fbi straddles between intelligence and law enforcement. >> i want the country to know whatever they're doing on the counter intelligence side, mr. clapper didn't know about it, didn't make it in the report and we'll see what comes from it. mrs. yates, what did you tell the white house about mr. flynn? >> i had two in-personal

meetings and one phone call with the white house counsel about mr. flynn. the first meeting occurred on january 26. i called don mcgann first thing that morning. i said i had a sensitive matter and i couldn't talk about it on the phone and i needed to see him. he agreed to meet with me that afternoon. i took a senior member of the national security division who was overseeing this matter with me to meet with mr. mcgann. we met in his office at the white house, which was a skiff, so we could discuss classified information in his off. we began our meeting telling him that there had been press accounts of statements from the vice president and others that related conduct that mr. flynn had been involved in that we knew not to be the truth. as i tell you what happened here, i'm going to be very

careful not to reveal -- >> the reason it wasn't true is because you collected intelligence from an incidental collection system is. that fair to say? >> i can't answer that. that would call for me to reveal classified information. >> let me ask you this. did anybody make a request to unclassified the russian information and mr. flynn -- >> i can't answer that question -- >> there clapper, do you know if that is the case? >> i don't. >> is there a way to find that out? >> in another setting it can be discussed. >> but there's a record somewhere that would make a request to unmask the conversation with general flynn and the russian ambassador? if one was made there would be a record of it? >> i can't speak to this specific case. i can generally comment in the case of the 702 request, yes. they're all documented. >> i don't mean to interrupt you. but this is important to me. how did the conversation between

the russian ambassador and mr. flynn make to it "the washington post"? >> which one of us? >> mrs. yates. >> a great question. all of this -- >> i thought so. >> i don't know the answer to that. >> nor do i know the answer to that. >> is it fair to say if somebody did make an unmasking request, we would know who they were and we could find out from them who they shared the information with? is that fair to say? the system would allow us to do what i just described? >> unmasking requests -- >> no, to the agency that does the collection. >> that's my understanding. >> so there should be a record somewhere in our system whether or not an unmasking request was made for the conversation between mr. flynn and the russian ambassador which should be able to determine if it was made, who made it and then we can ask what did they do with the information? is that a fair statement mr. clapper? >> yes. >> okay.

now, what did you finish, what did you tell the white house? >> i told them again there were a number of press accounts, of statements that had been made by the vice president and other white house officials about general flynn's conduct that we knew to be untrue. we told them how we knew that -- how we had this information. how we acquired it and how we knew it was untrue. we walked white house counsel who also had an associate with them, through general flynn's underlying conduct. the contents of which i obviously cannot go through with you today because it's classified. we took them through with a fair amount of detail the underlying conduct, what general flynn had done and walked through the press accounts and how it was falsely reported. we told the white house counsel that general flynn had been interviewed by the fbi on february 24. mr. mcgann asked me how we did and i declined to give him an

answer. we walked through with mr. mcagain why we were telling them about this. the first thing we did was to explain to mr. mcgann the underlying conduct that general flynn engaged in was problematic itself. secondly, we told them we felt like the vice president and others were entitled to november that the information that they were conveying to the american people wasn't true. we wanted to make it really clear right out of the gate that we were not accusing vice president pence of knowingly providing false information to the american people. in fact, mr. mcgann responded me back to let me know that anything general flynn would have side -- excuse me. anything vice president pence would have been said would have been based on what general flynn told him. we told him the third reason was is because we were concerned that the american people had been mislead about the underlying conduct and what general flynn had done.

additionally, that we weren't the only ones that knew all of this. that the russians also knew about what general flynn had done and the russians also knew that general flynn had mislead the vice president and others. in the media accounts, it was cheer from the vice president and others that they were repeated what general flynn had told them. this was a problem. because not only did we believe the russians knew this, but they likely had proof of this information. that created a compromise situation, a situation where the nation national security adviser could be blackmailed by the russians. finally, we told them that we were giving them all of this information so they could take action. the action that they deemed appropriate. i remember mr. mcgann asked me if general flynn should be fired. i told them that wasn't our call. that was up to them.

we were giving them this information so that they could take action. that was the first meeting. >> thank you. very quick question. either one of you aware of incidental collections by intelligence community of any presidential candidate, staff or campaign during the 2016 election cycle? >> say again. i'm sorry. >> was there any incidental collection where our intelligence community collects information involving a presidential candidate on either side of the aisle in 2016? >> not to my knowledge. >> i believe director comey was also asked this question and declined to answer it. so i need to follow the same lines the doj has drawn. again, you should not draw from that that my answer is yes but rather that the answer would

require me to reveal classified information. >> thank you. >> my response is always in the context of intelligence, not the domestic consideration. >> exactly. >> following the comey line, the director testified a few days ago in the full committee that the fbi had interviewed mr. flynn a day before or two days before your meeting at the white house. you just testified that you had told the white house counsel that the fbi had interviewed flynn and he asked -- mcgunn had asked how did he do. >> right. >> did you have the 302 with you in the white house? had you seen it at the time you went up to the white house? >> no. the fbi had conducted the interview on the 24th. we got a read-out from the fbi on the 25th, a detailed read-out

specifically from the agent that conducted the interview. we didn't want to wait for the 302. we thought it was important to get this information to the white house as quickly as possible. we had folks from the national security division that spent a lot of time with the agents finding out how the interview went but how this impacted their investigation. >> did you have any document with you that described the fbi interview of general flynn? >> at the time that i was there, i had notes that described that interview as well as the individual that was with me, the senior career official from the national security division was part of those discussions with the fbi. >> did you discuss criminal prosecution of mr. flynn? general flynn. >> my recollection is that did not come up much in the first meeting. it did come up in the second

meeting when mr. mcgann called me back and asked the morning after -- this is the morning of the 27th and asked if i could come back to his office. i went back with the nsd official. there were four topics that he wanted to discussion there. one of those was precisely that. he asked about the a applicability of certain statutes -- >> this was at the white house -- >> the white house. >> with the same two individuals on the following day? >> right. >> you went back pursuant to a phone call request or -- >> yes. the morning of the 27th after our meeting occurred on the afternoon of the 26th, the morning of the 27th mr. mcgann called me and asked if i could come back to the white house. we set up a time and i went over that afternoon bringing the same career official me from national security division who was overseeing this investigation.

he had the same associate from the white house counsel's office. we talked through four to five more issues. >> you could have waited to see the agents 302 of general flynn. why go ahead of that? why not wait? >> this was a matter of urgency. >> describe. >> in making the determination of notification, we had to balance the interests. it was critical that we got this information to the white house. in part because the vice president was unknowingly making false statements to the public and we believe thatflynn was co respect to the russians. we were balancing this about the fbi's investigation, as you would always do, and take into account the investigating agency's desires and concerns on how a notification might impact

that ongoing investigation. once general flynn was interviewed, there was no concern about that investigation. >> do you know where the interview took place? >> i believe at the white house. >> the flynn interview? >> yes. >> do you know if flynn was represented by counsel? >> i don't believe he was. >> okay. the scenario you were concerned about, you saw all of these statements from the white house that were inconsistent with what you knew. you presumed the white house was being truthful, which means that flynn was misleading them, which means he was vulnerable to manipulation by the russians, could call up the national security adviser and say you have to do this or your career is done. >> that's right. one of the questions that mr. mcgann asked me the second day, why does it matter to doj

if one white house official lies to another white house official? so we explained to them, it was a whole lot more than that. we went back over the same concerns that we raised with them the prior day. that the concern first about the underlying conduct itself that he lied to the president and others, the american public had been misled and importantly every time this lie was repeated and the misrepresentation for getting more and more specific as they were coming out, every time that happened, it increased the compromise. to state the obvious, you don't want your national security adviser compromised with the russians. >> were there any take-aways from the first meeting or action items that you left with? >> there was an action item in the second meeting. we talked about several issues -- >> to get the order right, you said earlier there were two meetings and a phone call. >> right. >> was the phone call to phone

call to set up the second meeting -- >> there was a third phone call. >> go ahead with the second. >> sorry about that. one of the issues that mr. mcgann raised with me on the 27th, the day after the first meeting, was his concern. we told him before that we were giving him this information so that they could take action. he said they were concerned that taking action would interfere with the fbi investigation. we told him, the senior career and i, that he should not be concerned with it. that general flynn had been interviewed and their action would not interfere with any investigation. in fact, i remember specifically saying it would be fair of us to tell you this and expect you to sit on your hands. >> was the interview of general flynn accelerated once you became aware of this information and felt you needed his statement quickly? >> we had wanted to tell the

white house as quickly as possible and working with the fbi in the course of the investigation. >> the first thing you know is that you have information that one thing was said and the white house is saying something different. you know that that information irrespective of who was involved needs to get to the white house quickly. so at that point the decision was made to do the interview that that would lock down before you went to white house counsel? >> right. so that wouldn't have a negative impact on the fbi investigation at that point. there was a request made by mr. mcgann in the second meeting so they could look at the underlying evidence that we described of general flynn's conduct. we told them that they were inclined to look at the underlying evidence and be able to make the logistical

arrangements for that. this second meeting occurred late in the afternoon, friday the 27th. we told them that we would work with the fbi. get back with them monday morning. i called them first thing monday morning to let them know that we would allow them to come over and to review the underlying evidence. >> was that the phone call or is there a separate phone call? >> there was the phone call initially to let them know i needed to come see him. two meetings and a phone call at the end to let them know that the material was available. he had to call me back. he was not available then. i didn't hear back until that afternoon of monday the 30th. >> and that was the end of this episode. nobody came over -- >> that was my last day with doj. >> okay. got it. >> senator grassley. >> mr. clapper, you said that you never exposed classified information in an inappropriate

manner. i director comey these questions last week. both of you, yes or no. as far as you know, has any classified information related to mr. clapper and his associates been declassified and shared with the media? >> not to my knowledge. >> mrs. yates? >> not to my knowledge. >> next question. have you ever been an anonymous source in a newspaper in associated with russia's attempt to med le in election? >> no. >> absolutely not. >> third question. did either of you ever authorize someone else at your respective organizations to be an anonymous source in a news report about mr. trump on his associates?

>> no. >> no. >> as far as either of you know, have any government agencies referred to any of the leaks over the past several months to the justice department for potential criminal investigation? >> i don't know. as you know, senator, there's a process for doing that. i don't know if that has happened. >> mrs. yates? >> i'm not at doj anymore. i don't know what has been referred. >> so then i get kind of sum up, neither one of you know whether the department authorized a criminal investigation of the leaks? >> i do not, sir. >> no, sir. >> have any of you been questioned by the fbi about any leaks? >> i have not been. >> no.

>> i want to discuss unmasking. mr. clapper, mrs. yates, did either of you ever request the unmasking of mr. trump, his associates or any member of congress? >> yes, in one case i did. i can specifically recall but i can't discuss it any further than that. >> so if i ask you for details, you said you can't discuss that? >> not here. >> mrs. yates, can you answer that question? did you ever request unmasking of mr. trump, his associates or any members of congress? >> no. >> question 2. did either of you ever review classified documents in which mr. trump, his associates or members of congress had been unmasked? >> oh, yes.

>> you have? can you give us details here? >> no, i can't. >> mrs. yates, have you? >> yes, i have. no, i can't give you details. >> okay. did either of you ever share information about unmasked trump associated or members of congress with anyone else? >> well, i'm thinking back 6 1/2 years. i could have discussed it with either my deputy or my general counsel. >> mrs. yates? >> in the course of the flynn matter, i had discussions of the intel community. i'm not sure if that is responsive. >> in both cases, you can't give details here? >> no. >> no.

the fbi notified the democratic national committee of the russian's intrusion into their systems in august of 2015. the dnc turned down the fbi's offer to get the russians out and refuse the fbi access to their servers. instead, evidently eventually hired a private firm in the spring of 2016. wikileaks began releasing the hacked dnc e-mails last july. it took roughly 27,000 of the 27,500 dnc e-mails it released, or e-mailed sent after the fbi notified the dnc of the breach. mr. clapper, would you agree that one of the lessons of this episode is that people should cooperate with the fbi when notified of foreign hacks instead of stone walling?

>> yes, sir, i generally think that's a good idea. >> mr. clapper, you sent the russians -- you said the russians did not release any negative information on republican candidates. i believe that that's not quite right on june 15, 2016. goosifer 2.0 released to gawker and the smoking gun more than 200 pages of the dnc's opposition research on mr. trump, hundreds of pages of what i would call dirt. this happened just two days after the "wall street journal" published a plan for republican convention delegates to revolt to prevent mr. trump from securing the nomination. why wasn't the russian release of harmful information about mr. trump address in the russia report and was this even

evaluated during the review? >> i would have to consult with the analysts that were involved in the report to definitively answer that. i don't know whether they considered that or not. >> can you submit that as an answer in writing? >> i'm a private citizen. i don't know what the rules are of obtaining classified information. i'll look into it. >> mr. clapper, you testified that the intelligence community conducted an exhaustive review of russian interference. do you have any reason to believe that any agency withheld any relevant information?

>> i don't believe so with one potential caveat. that there is the possibility, again, acknowledging this role that if fbi plays in straddling investigato investigatory information. i'm suggesting it as a possibility. >> my time is up, mr. chairman. thank you. >> thank you. senator feinstein. >> thanks very much, mr. chairman. mr. yates, i'm not going to ask you anything that deserves a confidential or security answer. but a after your second in-person meeting with mr. mcgann, you said there were four topics he wanted to discuss. would you list the four topics? >> the first top in the second meeting, why does it matter to doj if one white house official lies to another. the second topic related to the

applicability of statutes and the department of justice would pursue a criminal case. the third topic is his concern that they're taking action might interfere with an investigation of mr. flynn. the four topic is his request to see the underlying evidence. >> were all of those topics satisfied with respect to your impression after the second meeting? >> yes. the only thing that was really left open there was the logistics, for us to make arrangements for them to look at the underlying evidence. >> and you did make those arrangements? >> we did make those arrangements, again, i don't know whether that ever happened, whether they ever looked at that evidence or not. >> fair enough. apparently lieutenant general flynn remain national security

adviser for 18 days after you raised the justice department's concern. in your view during those 18 days, did the risk that flynn had been or could be compromised diminished at all? >> you know, i don't know that i'm in a position to really have an answer to that. i know that we were really concerned and the compromise here. that's why we were encouraging them to act. i don't know what steps they may have taken if any during that 18 days to minimize risk. >> did you discuss this with other doj career professionals? >> certainly leading up to our notification on the 26th, there was a topic of a lot of discussions with doj and other members of the intel community. we discussed it at great length. so after the 30th, i wasn't doj anymore. i didn't have discussions about what was being discussed. >> did you consult with other

career prosecutors? >> absolutely. we had really the experts within the national security division as we were navigating this situation, they were working with the fbi on the investigation. we were trying to make a determination about how best to make this notification so that we could get the information to the white house that they needed to be able to act. >> so what is the point that you were trying to make -- yes or no will be fine -- that general flynn had seriously compromised the security of the united states as possibly the government by what he had done? whatever that was. >> well, our point was that logic would tell you that you don't want the national security adviser to in a position where russians have leverage over him. in terms of impact that may have had or could have had, i

couldn't speak to that. that's why we wanted the white house to know about it. >> "the guardian" has recorded that britain's intelligence service became advised of suspicious action between trump advisers and russian intelligen intelligence. this happened over the spring of 2016 and multiple allies passed on information about contacts between the trump campaign and russians. is this accurate? >> i can't answer that. >> general clapper, is that accurate? >> yes, it is. it's also quite sensitive. >> okay. >> the specifics are quite sensitive. >> when did components of the

intelligence community open investigations into the interactions between trump advisers and russians? >> what was the question again? >> when did components of the intelligence community open investigations into the interactions between trump advisers and russians? >> i can -- i referred to director comey's statement before the house intelligence committee of when he advised that they open the investigation in july of 16. >> and what was the reaction when you advised that the investigation be open as early as july >> i'm sorry?

>> i thought you said that you advised on july -- >> no, director comey did before the house intelligence committee announced that the fbi didn't initiate an investigation in july of 2016. >> well, what did the intelligence agencies do with the findings that i just spoke about that "the guardian" wrote about? >> i'm not sure about the accuracy of that article. so clearly over actually going back to 2015, there was evidence of soviet or russian activity mainly in information gathering mode where they were investigating voter registration roles and the like. that activity started early. so we were monitoring this as it

progressed and certainly as it picked up accelerated in the spring and summer and fall of 2016. >> okay. so let me go back to you, mrs. yates. i take it you were very concerned. what was your prime worry during all of this? you were worried that general flynn would be compromised. what did you think would happen if he were and how do you believe he would have been compromised? >> well, we had two concerns. compromise was the number 1 concern. now, the russians can use compromise material, information in a variety of ways. sometimes overtly and sometimes subtly. our concern was that you have a very sensitive position like the national security adviser and you don't want that person to be

in a position where again the russians have leverage over him. but i will also say that another motivating factor is that we felt like the vice president was entitled to know that the information he had been given and that he was relaying to the american public wasn't true. >> so what you're saying is that general flynn lied to the vice president? >> that certainly how it appeared, yes. the vice president went out and made statements about general flynn's conduct that he said were based on what general flynn told him. we knew that that flat wasn't true. >> well, as the days went on, what was your view of this situation? there were i guess two weeks before -- was it 18 days before director flynn was dismissed. >> a n -- again, i was no

longer with the doj after that day. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> chairman cornyn. >> thank you. thank you for today's hearing. this is important. the american people have every right to know as much as possible as russian interference and our elections. as the director told us many times before, this is not anything new, although perhaps the level and intensity and the sophistication of russian overt and covert operations is really unprecedented. i think the intelligence community for their assessment. i do regret while these two witnesses are welcome and we're glad to have them here that former national security adviser susan rice has refused to testify in front of the committee. seems there's a lot of questions that she needs to answer. i would point out though that

mr. chairman, mrs. senator feinstein and i are fortunate enough to be on the senate intelligence committee, which is also conducting a bipartisan investigation under the leadership of chairman burr and vice chairman warner. one of the benefits of that additional investigation is we have been given access to the raw intelligence collected be i the intelligence community, which completed what understandably is an inflict picture when you can only talk in a public setting about part of the evidence. but it is important for the american people to understand what is halls. i think this subcommittee hearing is playing an important role in that i want to ask director clapper because i think unfortunately some of the discussion about unmasking is casting suspicion on the intelligence community in a way

that i think is frankly concerning, particularly when we're looking at reauthorizing section 702 of the patriot act by the end of next year. as many have said -- i can't recall your specific words. i know director comey has called that the crown jewels of the intelligence community. i'm very concerned that some of the information that has been discussed about unmasking, for example, might cause some people to worry about their legitimate privacy concerns. so when it comes to incidental collection on an american person and that is unmasked at the request of some appropriate authority, can you describe briefly the paper trail and the approval process that is required in order to allow that to happen? that is not a trivial matter, is it? >> the process is that first of

all, the judgment as to whether or not the unmask or reveal the identity is rentered be i the original collection agency. normally that is -- in the case of 702, going to be nsa. i know from my part as i indicated my statement over my 6 1/2 years as dni, i occasionally ask for identifies to be unmasked to understand the context. what i was concerned about and those of us in the intelligence community are concerned about is the behavior of the validated foreign intelligence target. is that target trying to bribe, recruit or what. it's difficult to understand that context by the labels u.s. person 1, u.s. person 2. and as well, i should point out, doing that on an anecdotal basis

one report at a time and what you need to look at, is there a pattern here. so i tried on my part to be very judicious about that. i wanted to understand the context and who this person was because that had a huge bearing on how important or critical it was and what threat might be posed by virtue of, again, the behavior of the validated foreign intelligence target. so our focus was on the target, not as much as the u.s. person. only to understand the context. >> the fact that some appropriate authority might request and receive the unmasking of the name of the u.s. person does not then authorize the release of that information that classified information into the public

domain. that remains a crime, does it not? >> yes. again, that's why i attempted to make -- to clarify in my statement the evidence -- that's why in my statement i attempted to make that distinction between unmasking with the approval by the appropriate authorities and leaking, which is an unauthorized process on any circumstance. >> mr. chairman, it's important that in order to determine who actually requested the unmasking and in order to establish whether appropriate procedures were undertaken under both legislative oversight and judicial over sight, that we determine what that paper trail is -- >> if i may, i have to be very careful here about how i phrase this. but i would just repeat to you the definition of what 702 is used for.

collection against a non-u.s. person overseas. >> i don't think you can say that enough, director clapper. it's important. >> happy to say it again. we want to keep the american people safe and respecting their private rights and constitutional rights of american citizens. >> absolutely. >> mrs. yates, this is the first time that you appeared before congress since you left the department of justice. i just wanted to ask you a question about the -- your decision to refuse to defend the president's executive order. in the letter that you sent to congress, you point out that the executive order itself was drafted in consultation with the office of legal counsel. you point out that the office of legal counsel reviewed it to determine whether in its view the proposed executive order was

lawful on its face and properly drafted. is it true to office of legal counsel did conclude that it was lawful on its face and properly drafted? >> yes, they did. >> you overruled them. >> i did. >> what is your authority to overrule the office of legal counsel when it comes to a legal determination? >> the office of legal counsel has a narrow function that is to look at the face of an executive order and to determine purely on its face whether there is some set of circumstances under which at least some part of the executive order may be lawful. importantly, they don't look beyond the face of the executive order. for example, statements that were made that may bear on its intent and purpose. that office does not look at those factors. in determining the constituti constitutionality of this order,

it was an important thought to engage in and one that i did. >> i thought the department of justice had a longstanding decision of defending a presidential action in court whether or not they were ultimately persuasive, which is up to the courts to decide and not you, correct? >> it is correct oftentimes, but not only the civil division of the department of justice will defend an action of the president or an action of congress if there is a reasonable argument to be made. in this instance, all arguments have to be based on truth. we're the department of justice. wire not just a law form. >> you talked about lawful. >> it was derived on facts outside the face of the order.

that is part of what led to our conclusion that it was not lawful. >> mrs. yates, you had a distinguished career for 27 years at the department of justice. i voted for your confirmation because i believe that you had a distinguished career. but i have to tell you that i find it enormously disappointing that you somehow vetoed the decision of the office of legal counsel with regard to the lawfulness of the president's order and decided that you wouldn't counterman the executive order of the president of the united states because you disagreed with that as a policy matter. i have to say that. >> i appreciate that, senator. it was not clearly a policy matter. i remember my confirmation hearing. in an exchange that i had with you and other of your colleagues where you specifically asked me in that hearing that if the president asked me to to something that was up lawful or

unconstitutional and one of your colleagues said would reflect poorly on the department of justice would i say no. i looked at this and i made a determination that i believed it was unlawful and i thought it was inconsistent of principles of the department of justice and i said no. that's what i promised you i would do and i did. >> i don't know how you can say it was unlawful and left it for the courts to decide. >> i did not say it was lawful. i said it was unlawful. >> i have one quick question about how 702 works. you said something, general clapper, that i don't quite understand. is it unlawful to surveil with a fisa warrant with an agent in the united states? >> no, it's not. that's another provision. i was saying with 702 -- >> i want to make sure there's a

procedure to do that. >> there is. >> senator durbin. >> to your point, you said the word "overseas." ambassador kisliac was not overseas. >> that's correct. >> thanks. at the outset in response to senator cornyn. in your conclusion about the nature of the muslim travel ban was a position that was supported by three different federal courts that stopped the enforcement of that ban and ultimately led to the president withdrawing that particular travel ban. is that not true? >> that's correct. >> thank you. i want to mention at the outset here, this is a critically important hearing. i want to thank senator graham and senator white house nor the bipartisan nature in this hearing. i think the testimony we received from these witnesses and the presence of so many of my colleagues is an indication of how we view the severity and gravity of the information before us. i'm troubled that this great

committee with its great chairman and all of its members does not have professional staff assigned to this investigation. it's in orderly the staff of the subcommittee that work it. what we have seen with this situation calls for appointment of an independent commission, congressional or presidential, one that is independent, transparent and can get to the bottom of the russian involvement in our last election process and the threat we face in the future because of that. short of that, we'll continue to do our best with meager resources in the intelligence community and here. i'd also say that i'm starting to hear from the republican side of the table some real concern about section 702, which senator lee and myself, have been calling for reform on for several years. unfortunately we didn't have the support from the other side of the table when we did.

i hope we can get it now when we talk about real reform of the 702 and protecting the individuals of individuals in american. mrs. yates, let me ask you about this meeting january 26 with white house counsel. you shared the justice department's concern about communications with russia, the apparent dishonesty about the communications and vulnerability to blackmail, is that correct? >> that's right. >> is the there anything else about the relationship with flynn and the russians that you warned don mcgann about? >> it was strikely on that question? >> yes. >> and then you had a second meeting the next day. >> that's right. >> correct? >> uh-huh. >> january 27. >> at his request, yes. >> at mr. mcgann's request. at that second meeting, did mr. mcgann say anything about

the information you had given him? >> no. >> are you aware of the fact that mr. spicer, the white house press secretary on february 14 said in that quote, immediately after the department of justice notified counsel, the white house counsel briefed the president and a small group of senior advisers? >> i've seen media reports to that effect. that's all i know. >> there was no statement by mr. mcgann that he had spoken to the president about your concerns with his national security adviser or with any other members of the white house? >> no, he didn't advise us or anything we he made have talked with. >> i'm going to be questioned -- that mr. mcgann asked of you. is there anything wrong with one white house official lying to another white house official? >> to be fair to mr. mcgann here, i wouldn't say he said is there anything wrong. his question is what is it to the justice department if one white house official is lying to

another? in other words, why is this something that doj would be concerned about. that's why we went back through the list of issues and reasons why this was troubling to us. >> did you think there was a legal to be concerned if oneite another white house official? >> we didn't go into that. to the extend that you may be talking about a 1001 violation, that is not something that we alluded to or discussed with mr. mcgann. his paint when he made that point to me, he wasn't sure why the department of justice would care about one lying to another. not to be discussing who that was in fact a crime. >> and the reason you told him was what? >> was that, again, it was a whole lot more than one white house official lying to another. first of all, it was the vice president of the united states and the vice president had been going out and providing that information to the american people who had been misled and the russians knew all of this making mike flynn compromised

now. >> you said earlier that mr. mcgann asked you if you thought they should fire general flynn with that point. >> right. >> what was your respond? >> i told them it's not our call if general flynn was fired. we were giving them this information so that they could take action, the action they believed was appropriate. >> on february 14 after general flynn redescribed, sean spacer said there's nothing in which general flintdisconducting himself. >> if he didn't reach that conversation with us, i can't speak to how he arrived at that. >> there was a period of time, 18 days during the course of this. during that period of 18 days, a number of things occurred. general flynn continued to serve as the national security adviser for 18 days after you briefed

the white house about the counter intelligence risk that he posed. in those 18 days, general flynn continued to hire key senior staff on the national security council, announce new sanctions on iran's ballistic missile program, met with president abe from japan and talks act responding to a north korean missile launch and spoke to the press about his communications with russian ambassador kysliac. >> i was no longer with doj after january 30th. i was no longer aware of the actions that he took. i couldn't opine on that. >> general clapper, could you comment? if you had the warning from department of justice about