anything else with their careers but have chosen to work for the f.b.i. because they believe in serving others. the feedback i get from our state and local law enforcement partners, from our foreign partners, from the folks we work with in the private sector and the community, office after office after office has been very, very gratifying and reassuring to me. and i'm a big believer in the idea that the f.b.i. speaks through its work, through its cases, through the victims it protects. and i encourage our folks not to get too hung up on what i consider to be the noise on tv and in social media. >> you haven't seen any evidence of some sort of inherent political bias in the agency. >> no. >> how do statements like that impact the rank and file of agents or are they able to shake it off? >> we have 37,000 individuals. they are all individuals and think in their own way.

i would say our people are very mission focused and accustomed to the fact we do some of the hardest things there are to do for a living and i like to think that our folks are pretty sturdy. i think of a woman i met the other day, an agent in the miami office who had a bad accident, 12 stitches in her face. the next day boom, right back at work. i think about the folks in the san juan office i visited recently. you want to talk about people going through a real storm. they do it and they're out in the community and i can tell you the community values what they do on the island. >> thank you. an op-ed by a number of former intelligence analysts called the nunes memo and its release one of the worst cases of poll itization of intelligence in modern american history. you had concerns about the memo. i know you can't get into the gritty details of that but can

you say in your view whether or not one of those concerns is that it may have selectively cherry picked information without presenting the entire fact pattern that led up to that fisa warrant application? >> well, senator, i would repeat what we said at the time, which is that we had then and continue to have now grave concerns about the accuracy of the memorandum because of omissions. we provided thousands of documents that were very sensitive and lots and lots of briefings and it is very hard for anybody to distill all that down to 3 1/2 pages. >> director pompeo, have you seen russian activity in the lead-up to the 2018 election cycle? >> yes. i paused only trying to make sure i stay on the unclassified side. we have seen russian activity and intentions to have an

impact on the next election cycle here. >> director coats. >> yes, we have. >> anyone else? admiral rogers? >> yes. i think it would be a good topic to get into greater detail this afternoon. >> all right. according to news reports, there are dozens of white house staff with only interim security clearances still to include jerad kushner until last week and white house staff secretary rob porter who i would assume would have regularly reviewed classified documents as part of his job. director coats, if someone is flagged by the f.b.i. with areas of concern in their background investigations into white house staff with interim clearances, should those staff continue to have access to classified materials? >> let me first just speak in

general relative to temporary classifications. clearly with the new administration in particular we're trying to fill a lot of new slots and the classification process and security clearance process has been mentioned. >> i'm only speaking with regard to folks who may have had issues raised as opposed to being in the matter of course of going through the long process. >> well, i'm not in a position -- we can talk about this in the classified session, but i'm not in a position to discuss what individual situations are for specified individuals. i might just say that i think sometimes it is necessary to have some type of preliminary clearance in order to fill a slot but i have publicly stated if that is the case, the access has to be limited in terms of the kind of information they can be in a position to receive or not receive.

i think that's something we have to do as a part of our security clearance review. the process is broken. it needs to be reformed. as senator warner has previously said, it is not evolution, it is revolution. we have 700,000 back-ups. so we have situations where we need people in places but they don't yet have that. your specific question i think i would like to take up in the classified session. >> i'm over my time. thank you, director coats. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director coats, director pompeo, admiral rogers, i think you all talked about evidence that the russians would intend to do things to be active in our elections. it seems to me two divisions of that activity. one is information that is put on the record that misleading,

false, trying to develop that level. the other even more sinister might be the level of dealing with the election system itself. the voting day system. the registration system and the voting day system, the one we need to have the most concerns about that critical infrastructure. this committee has been working toward both of those goals of trying to shore up critical infrastructure on election day as well as alert people to and decide what might be done about misinformation on the other side of the ledger. voting begins in march. that's next month. if we going to have any impact on securing the voting system itself we need to act quickly. i think a great part of the strength of the system is the diversity of the system. different not only from state to state but from election

jurisdictions within those states. that's a strength, not a weakness in my view. what are some of the things we can do to be more helpful to local election officials and encouraging them to share information when they think their systems are being attacked, getting more information to them than we have. there was a lot of criticism in the last cycle that we knew that some election systems were being attacked and didn't tell them they were being attacked. and so the three of you in any order let's just do the order i started with, director coats, director pompeo, admiral rogers, any thoughts you have on what we can do to protect the critical infrastructure of the election system and how quickly we need to act if we intend to do that this year? >> the intelligence community are aware and want to provide collect and provide as much information as we can to give those warnings and alerts so that we can share information

back and forth with local and state and election processes with the federal government. department of homeland security, department of the f.b.i., obviously were involved given they're domestic issues but we do look to every piece of intelligence we can gather so that we can provide these warnings. it is an effort that i think the government needs to put together at the state and local level and work with those individuals who are engaged in the election process in terms of the security of their machines, cyber plays a major role here. so i think it is clearly an area where federal government, foreign collection on potential threats of interference, warnings and then processes in terms of how to put in place security and secure that to ensure the american people their vote is sanctioned and well and not manipulated in any way whatsoever

>> i was referring to the first part of your question, not truly to the latter. the things we've seen russia doing to date are mostly focused on information types of warfare. the things that senator warner was speaking of earlier. with respect to the c.i.a.'s role and admiral rogers will say his, too. two missions one to identify the source of this information, make those here domestically aware of it to do the things they need to do. whether f.b.i. or dhs. we're working diligently to did that. the second thing we do have some capabilities offensively to raise the cost for those who would dare challenge the united states elections. >> after admiral rogers, director wray i may want to come to you and see on that same sharing information, any impediments to sharing that information with local officials or any reason we wouldn't want to do that. >> the only other thing i would

add. this is also shaped by my experience at cyber command where i defend networks. one of the things we find in that role, many network and system operators do not truly understand their own structures and systems. one of the things that's part of this is how do we help those local, federal, state entities understand their network structure and what its vulnerabilities and harness the information that the intelligence structure are providing them. how do we work our way through this process? >> i think that's one of the areas that there has been a lot of discussion whether we're doing better. this is one of the areas i think we are doing better. we together at the f.b.i. together with dhs, recently for example scheduled meetings with various state election officials. normally the barrier would be classification concerns whether somebody had clearances. we were able to put together briefings appropriately

tailored and with non-disclosure agreements with those officials. there are ways if people are creative and forward leaning to educate the state election officials which is where elections are run in this country. >> hopefully we'll be creative and forward leaning and keep track of what we're doing there. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator king. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first statement i want to make is more in sorrow than in anger. i will get to the anger part in a minute. the sorrow part is that director coats, in response to a question from senator collins, you gave an eloquent factual statement of the activities of the russians and the fact that they are continuing around the world and they are a continuing threat to this country. all of you have agreed to that. if only the president would say that. i understand the president's sensitivity about whether his campaign was in connection with

the russians and that's a separate question but there is no question we've -- for us the entire intelligence community that the russians interfered in the election in 2016, they are continuing to do it and they are a real imminent threat to our elections in a matter of eight or nine months. my problem is i talk to people in maine who say the whole thing is a witch hunt and a hoax because the president told me. i just wish you all could persuade the president as a matter of national security to separate these two issues, the collusion issue is over here, unresolved. we get to the bottom of that. but there is no doubt, as you all have testified today, and we cannot confront this threat which is a serious one, with a whole of government response when the leader of the government continues to deny that it exists. now let me get to the anger part. the anger part involves

cyberattacks. you have all testified that we are subject to repeated cyberattacks. recurring right now in our infrastructural over this country. i am sick and tired of going to these hearings which i've been going to for five years and everybody talks about cyberattacks and our country still doesn't have a policy or a doctrine or a strategy for dealing with them. and this is not a criticism of the current administration, i'm an equal opportunity critic here. the prior administration didn't do it, either. admiral rogers, until we have some deterrent capacity, we are going to continue to be attacked. isn't that true? >> yes, sir, we have to change this current dynamic. we're on the wrong end of the cost equation. >> we're trying to fight a global battle with our hands tied behind our back. director coats, you have a stunning statement in your report. they will work to use cyber

operations to achieve strategic objectives unless they face clear repercussions for their cyber operations, right now there are none. is that not the case? there are no repercussions. we have no doctrine of deterrents. how are we ever going to get them to stop doing this if all we do is patch our software and try to defend ourselves? >> those are very relevant questions and i think everyone not only at this table but in every agency of government understands the threat that we have here and the impact already being made through these cyber threats. our role as the intelligence community is to provide all information we possibly can as to what is happening. our policymakers can take that, including the congress, and shape policy as to how we are going to respond to this and deal with this in a whole of

government way. >> it just never seems to happen. director pompeo, you understand this issue, do you not? we won't be able to defend ourselves from being defensive. we have to have a doctrine of deterrents. if they struck us in cyber they'll be struck back in some way, may not be cyber. >> i agree and i can't argue. i can't say much in this setting i would argue that your statement that we have done nothing does not reflect the responses that frankly some of us at this table have engaged in and the united states has engaged in both before and after -- during and before this administration. >> deterrents doesn't work unless the other side knows it. the doomsday machine in dr. strange love didn't work because the russians hadn't told us about it. >> it's true. it's important the adversary know it but not a requirement that the whole world know it. >> does the adversary know it? >> i save it for another forum.

>> i believe this country needs a clear doctrine. what is a cyberattack, what is an act of war, what will be the response and the consequences. right now i haven't seen it. >> i agree. it is a complicated problem given the nature. as i sat as a member of the house of representatives i take responsibility for part of not solving it. we do need a u.s. government strategy and clear authorities to go achieve that strategy. >> i appreciate it. i don't want to go home to maine when is a serious cyberattack, we knew it was a problem. we had four different committees of jurisdiction and couldn't work it out. that isn't going to fly. >> i might just add that we don't want to learn this lesson the hard way. 9/11 took place because we were not coordinating our efforts. we are now coordinating our

efforts. but we didn't have the right defenses in place because the right information was not there. our job is to get that right information to the policymakers and get on with it. because it is just common sense. if someone is attacking you and there is no retribution or respond it will incentivize more contacts. there are a lot of blank checks and a lot of things we need to do. >> thank you, i appreciate that. >> director coats, you and i talked last year about this same issue that senator king was bringing up as well about cyber doctrine and a point person on who that would be and a defined person that would give options to the president and congress to say if a response is needed and warranted. this is the person, this is the entity that would make those recommendations and allow the president to make the response. is there a point person to give recommendations on an

appropriate response to a cyberattack to the president? >> that has not yet been completed. of course, your understanding of the stand-up of cyber command and the new director that will be replacing admiral rogers, the decision relative to whether there would be a separation between the functions that are currently now nsa and cyber has yet to be made. general mattis is contemplating what the next best step is and there is -- they've involved the intelligence community in terms of making decisions in that role. but at this particular point we cannot point to one sort of cyber czar. various agencies throughout the federal government are taking this very, very seriously and there are individuals that we continue to meet on a regular basis. the odni has a coordination effort for all the cyber that comes in so we don't stove pipe

like what we did before 9/11. so things are underway. but in terms of putting a finalized this is how we are going to do it together is still in process. >> with respect to responses to that. these are title 10, dod activities unless they are granted to some other authority, a title 50 authority. there is a person responsible. secretary mattis has the responsibility to advise the president on the appropriateness in all theaters of conflict with our add ver source. >> i want to bring up the issue of the rising threat in next company. homicide rate went up 27% last year. we had 64,000 americans that died from overdose of drugs, the preponderance of those came through or from mexico. we have a very rapidly rising threat it appears to me. what i would be interested on a national security level what is

changing right now in mexico versus 10 years ago and our relationship and the threats coming from there? >> i would defer to director wray relative to what his agency is doing. clearly, we have a continuing problem in the mexican government has a continuing problem relative to the gangs and organizations. there have been some high profile arrests lately. we've taken down some labs. mexico is cooperating. but in -- they themselves will admit that it's almost overwhelming. their army has been participating and almost overwhelming for them to control the situation south of the border. we have our own issues on the border protection as well as consumption here in the united states. >> in many ways what we're seeing a more of the same but one of the things that has changed because i think it was at the heart of your question, i think we're seeing one of the things we're watching in

particular is more black-market fentanyl being shipped to trans national criminal organizations in mexico and then they are taking advantage of the pricing advantages and that's being then delivered in large quantities to our streets. certainly the mexico relationship from a law enforcement perspective and domestic security perspective one of our most important -- the f.b.i. office in mexico is our largest in the world i'm pretty sure about that. or close to it if not. that's a reflection of how much activity there is. >> let me ask you a specific oklahoma question and a national question. there was an individual picked up in oklahoma just a couple of weeks ago by the f.b.i. his fingerprints were identified from a terror training camp in afghanistan. he had been in the country for multiple years. and what i'm trying to be able

to determine is the coordination of information to local law enforcement and from data that is gathered from some of the work that's happening overseas in afghanistan and such how are those two being married together that we can identify individuals that are a threat to our nation based on their participation in a terror training camp overseas coming to the american shores? >> well, certainly we've become better at looking at biometric information from overseas and marrying it up with potential threat subjects here in the u.s. as well as in some of our allies. the individual in question, of course, turned out to have his fingerprints on information from a camp and it is a reminder to us a lot of people went through those camps. while the civilized world, the intelligence community, law enforcement, military, our

allies around the world made a dent on those people but we're kidding ourselves if we don't think there are a lot out there and we need to stay on the balls of our feet. >> if i could one additional point you asked what has changed in mexico. what has also transpired the last couple of years is you had five principal cartels. a number of captures, the five cartels have devolved into 20 and part of the outgrowth you see an increase in the level of violence. >> thank you. first let me tell you of the people of west virginia thank you for keeping us safe. the professional list many and we have the utmost confidence in what you're doing and support even further. people appreciate and we appreciate the service you are giving. director coats, i think you and i both were in the senate at the same time when mike mullin

said the greatest threat we face trying to find out what the greatest threat the united states faces. i was thinking of another country whether it be russia, china, whatever. he didn't hesitate when he said the threat of our nation, the greatest threat is the debt of our nation. i think you just reiterated that in your opening remarks. i was a little bit amiss about the report the worldwide threat assessment. you didn't mention the debt in here. it wasn't in the report as a threat to the nation. i didn't know if there was a thought process behind that because you made a tremendous effort to put that in your opening statement. i appreciate that. tell me what your thought process here was. >> my thought process was i'm getting a little out of my lane in terms of what i am supposed to do but i felt that -- >> you do think it's a threat. not in the assessment. >> it is something that congress needs to deal with. i didn't want to come back and preach at you but i thought at

the very end the fact just yesterday look, i think i have a responsibility to raise this issue because it does affect the military significantly. it affects the intelligence community tied to the military in terms of intelligence. it is going to have a serious effect on us. >> you sat on both sides of the aisle. the only thing about bipartisan is spending money. both sides agree to that without any accountability. i'm glad to hear your remarks on that. if i could -- i share what senator langford has said about concerns about what is killing more americans than any of the threats discussed that we have today it's with drugs. my state of west virginia has been hit harder than any state. more deaths per capita than any state. ravaging my communities, homes, schools, the families, it's unbelievable what we're going through. i think in a nutshell what i would be asking all of you all are responsible to do everything you can to keep us

safe and you've done a tremendous job as far as from the foreign attack and things of that sort and director wray i appreciate what the f.b.i. does and they have a strong presence in west virginia and we're very, very appreciative of that. what type of efforts from each one of your agencies have you spent as far as drugs and fighting the drug infestation, highest on your priority list, one of the greatest dangers or just part of the overall scheme of things? >> speaking for the intelligence community, it is a high priority for us. we mentioned it in our threat assessment here. and so we are the collectors of foreign sources at trans national organizations, etc. whether it's coming from over seas, afghanistan, columbia. what it is, how it's going and then of course it is a whole of government because once it penetrates the united states,

we then use our domestic agencies -- >> as far as the f.b.i., you are on the front line on the homeland. what did we do to help? >> on a good side this is one issue as far as i can tell where everybody agrees about what a major, major threat it is it. covers communities from north to south, red to blue, rich to poor, urban to rural. and i think it has -- that's the good news. the bad news is it's grown to a point there is no one agency or one approach that is going to solve the problem. so we are doing our part. some of the things that we're able to do focusing on gate keepers, a lot of this is coming through medical professionals and pharmacies. and so we are using intelligence-driven operations there, various initiatives. we have a prescription drug initiative focused on that part

of it. we are partnering with our foreign counterparts and working with dea, state and local law enforcement, and also trying to do things to raise awareness. we did a video with dea called chasing the dragon which is kind of been shown in schools around the country. this is a multidisciplinary problem. >> if i can ask this question whoever wants to answer this one. based on what we know and the way we distribute money to our -- for foreign aid to different countries, knowing that a lot of the countries we distribute aid to is basically allowing, permitting this type of scourge coming to our country as far as in the form of drugs, have you all thought and considered and make recommendations we hold them hostage if you will or liable basically to the money they're receiving from the united states for the best of intentions but that best of intentions is their fight against drugs coming to our country when we know it's coming whether it be china,

afghanistan, iraq, wherever it's coming from and mexico and the south american countries. we should hold that. i've never seen it. we'll lose a whole generation in west virginia. i have 10,000 jobs i can't fill. united states has 3 million jobs we can't fill. most of it is around drugs. so this is what we're asking for. this has to be all hands on deck. i don't know if anybody wants -- do you all have that as a high priority. should we withhold foreign aid to countries that have illicit drugs coming to our country? >> i'll answer this. i think the united states should use every tool. foreign aid or other tools. >> seems like money talks. >> that's exactly right. to get the nations this is coming from to put a priority to their country. it's a problem that's bigger than their nation but we should be unafraid to use the leverage that comes with our generosity from the american taxpayer to

ensure these countries are doing everything they can to prevent drugs from coming from their country to ours. >> thank you, appreciate it. >> as you know we do provide efforts within countries to help them eradicate. it hasn't been totally successful. it's one way that we use some of that aid, if it's directly contributed to the eradicating of drugs. >> thanks to all the men and women and the work you do for your country. mr. wray, are you aware of a gentleman by the name of oleg daraposkin. true to connect him to a putin-linked oligarch.

>> chuck grassley sent a letter to a london-based lawyer who represents that man and asked if christopher steele was employed directly or indirectly by him at the time he was writing the steele dossier. do you know if christopher steele worked for him? >> that's not something i can answer. >> could we discuss it in a classified setting? >> there might be more we could say there. >> thank you. maybe we'll hear back from the lawyer in london as well to give us a straight answer. jim comey testified before this committee in an open setting last summer and referred to the steele dossier as salacious and inverified. is that still the f.b.i.'s position? >> i think maybe there is more we can talk about this afternoon on that. >> okay. thank you. i would like to turn my attention to the threat posed by china and specifically chinese telecom companies. senator rubio spoke earlier and

i agree with what he said about the threat of a rising china and confucius center and telecom companies pose to our country and why i've introduced legislation with senator cornyn and rubio that the u.s. government can't use companies that use them and i'm glad some companies like verizon, at&t among others have taken the threat seriously. could you explain what the risk is that we face from zte and wawa being used in the united states here in the public setting, the risk that companies, state and local governments might face if they use either of those products and services >> probably the most simple way to put it in this setting would be we're deeply concerned about the risks of allowing any company or entity that is beholding to foreign governments that don't share our values to gain positions of

power inside our telecommunications networks. that provides the capacity to exert pressure or control over our telecommunications infrastructure and it provides the capacity to maliciously modify or steal information. and it provides the capacity to conduct undetected espionage. we've been gratified to date by the response of the large u.s. telecommunications providers who are trying to raise awareness on this issue. but i also recognize that the competitive pressures are building. and so it's something that i think we have to be very vigilant about and continue as you all are doing to raise awareness about. >> admiral rogers, would you care to that? >> i would agree with director

wray's characterization here. this is a challenge that will only increase, not lessen over time for us. >> so you would suggest to mayors, county judges, university presidents, state legislatures to look warely at them? >> you need to look long and hard at companies like this. >> all the witnesses i would like to address this question to. raise your hand if you would use products or services from wawa or zte? you lead intelligence services, that's something of a biased question. raise your hand if you would recommend that americans use those services? none of you are raising your hand. thank you for that. i would like to turn to question director pompeo that has been in the news in the last few hours. there were reports that over 200 russian mercenaries were killed in eastern syria. can you confirm or deny those reports? >> i'll leave to the department

of defense to talk about what transpired there. i can say this. from an intelligence perspective we have seen foreign forces using mercenaries in battles that will begin to approach the united states. >> general ashley since you represent the department of defense would you like to confirm or deny? >> if we could take that to a closed session i think we can lay out a rather interesting fabric of what is syria and what transpired over the last. >> we can address that in the afternoon. as a general matter can i ask is massing and maneuvering forces against a location or u.s. personnel or present in syria a good way to get yourself killed? >> i think i'll defer that to the department of defense as well. >> general ashley, would you like to answer that question? >> it makes you more susceptible and leave it to the operational commander. you are at greater risk when you amass in that situation. >> not a good idea if you want

a lock and fruitful life. >> i want to echo the comments of my colleagues in thanking the men and women who serve in your agency. i am concerned the political attacks against the men and women of your agencies may have had an effect on your ability to recruit, retain and also the moral of your agencies. i would like to emphasize the point that we all i think share in making which is we thank the men and women of your agencies for their selfless work. they do it on behalf of the american people without any expectation of award or reward and we cannot thank them enough for keeping us safe. director wray, chairman nunes memo included sensitive fisa information regarding a person who worked on the president's campaign. according to the white house statement, the president was the one who authorized the memos declassification. do you believe there is an actual or at least the

appearance of a conflict of interest when the president is put in charge of declassifying information that could complicate an ongoing investigation into his own campaign? >> well, senator, as we've been very clear what our view was about the disclosure and accuracy of the memo in question, but i do think it's the president's role as commander-in-chief under the rule that was invoked to object or not to the declassification. i think that is the president's responsibility. >> regardless of whether there is an appearance or actual conflict of interests. >> i leave it to others to say if there was an actual or conflict of interest but the president was fulfilling his responsibility. >> if the president asked you tomorrow to hand over to him additional sensitive f.b.i. information on the investigations into his campaign would you give it to him? >> i am not going to discuss

the investigation in question with the president much less provide information from that investigation to him. >> and if he wanted -- if he received that information and wanted to declassify it would he have the ability to do that from your perspective? >> information from -- >> however he received it. perhaps from members of the united states congress. >> i think legally he would have that ability. >> and do you believe the president should recuse himself from reviewing and declassifying sensitive f.b.i. material related to this investigation? >> i think recusal questions are something i would encourage the president to talk to the white house counsel about. >> has the f.b.i. done any kind of legal analysis on these questions? >> happily i'm no longer in the business of doing legal analysis. i now get to be a client. and blame lawyers for things instead of being the lawyer who

gets blamed >> have you blamed any lawyers for their analysis of this issue? >> i have not yet, no. >> is the f.b.i. getting the cooperation it needs from social media companies to counter foreign adversary influence on our elections? >> i think the cooperation has been improving. i think we're continuing to work with the social media companies to try to see how we can raise their awareness so that they can share with us and vice versa. so i think that things are moving in the right direction. but i think there is a lot of progress to be made. >> what more do you need from social media companies to improve the partnership that you would like to have with them to counter these attacks? >> well, i mean i think we always like to have more information shared more quickly from their end. i think from their perspective it's a dialogue. they are looking to get information from us about what

it is we see so that they can give responsive information. so i think we're working through those issues. >> do you believe the social media companies have enough employees that have the appropriate security clear ns to make these partnerships real? >> that's not an issue i've evaluated but i would be happy to take a look at it. >> please do and follow up with the committees. mr. coats, threats on social media is so complex is that the threat originates overseas and within the jurisdiction of the c.i.a. and nsa and it comes to our shores and passes on to the f.b.i. and also the social media companies themselves. i'm not aware of any written ic strategy on how we would confront the threat to the social media. does such a strategy exist? writing? >> i would have to get back to you on that. i would be happy to look into it. from my perspective right now a

written strategy specific strategy is not in place but i want to check on that. >> please do follow up. also last year congress passed a bipartisan russia sanctions bill. however, the administration has not impolesed those sanctions. from an intelligence perspective what is your assessment of how russia interprets the administration's inaction? >> i don't have information relative to what the russian thinking is in terms of that particular specific reaction. there are other sanctions, as you know, that are being imposed on russian oligarchs and others through the united states and other things that have been done. in reference to the -- but specifically on your question i don't have an answer for that. >> i think it's -- we ought to look at that in a broader context. how the russians view all the actions of this administration,

not just a particular set of sanctions or the absence there of. so as we've watched the russians respond to this administration's decision to provide defensive weapons in ukraine, to push back against russian efforts in syria, sanctions placed on venezuela were directly in conflict with russian interests. the list of places that the russians are feeling the pain from this administration's actions are long. >> but director pompeo i'm sure you would agree in order to understand the full scope of effect it is also important that we analyze each discrete component including what is the interpretation of this administration's failure to enact the sanctions as has been passed and directed by the united states congress in a bipartisan manner. have you done that assessment? >> in closed session i'll tell you what we know and don't know about what discrete issue. i agree with you it is important to look at each one in its own place.

what we most often see in terms of russian response is to the cumulative activities in response to russian activities that and how the united states responds to those in a cumulative way. >> director coats, you alluded to the activities of trans national criminal organizations and i'm thinking particularly as regards our neighbors down south of our border. recently i heard somebody refer to the cartels, these trans national criminal organizations as commodity agnostic. in other words, they will traffic in people, they'll traffic in drugs and other contraband all in pursuit of money. >> whatever brings them the most dollars. >> bill: senator manchin and others have alluded to their concern and certainly we all share the concern about the

deaths and overdoses caused by drugs in america. much of which comes across our southern borders through our ports of entry. this week we are going to be considering border security measures as part of a larger package that the president has proposed while addressing the so-called daca recipients. but do you believe that modernizing our ports and enhanced technology and other means to surveil and follow and identify illegal drugs coming across our ports you are entry would be a good thing for us to do >> i do think. i think a layered approach is necessary. it is clear just one specific fence put in place is not going to solve the problem. it needs to be a layered interest of not only physical facilities but also border patrol, also how those who

arrive and perhaps dissipate in waiting for their court appearance, tracking them. there is a whole range of things that i think will be needed to stop that flow from coming in. >> i know it has been alluded to but let me emphasize my concerns that with the demand side. maybe we've given up. i hope not, in addressing the demand side which, of course, provides the money and incentive for these cartels to operate and something i think deserves the full attention and focus of the united states government. i've heard general kelly in his previous job at dhs and -- talk about that and i hope we will return to that focus as part of this layered approach. the demand side because it is something i think that is maybe the hardest thing to deal with but perhaps might have the greatest impact. >> the supply depends on the demand. the demand drives the supply

and provides the capital in which to take extraordinarily methods that by pass our defenses in order to get those drugs into the united states and on the demand side, this is a whole of the american people process. it is ptas, it is -- growing up we got these videos of driving in driver's training and the horrendous look of crashes and so forth. we need to let every student know, we need to let what the consequences of these drugs are to their lives and to their future. we need to get parents involved. parent/teacher associations involved. so whether they pick up their values from church or from the neighborhood or whatever, this is a national crisis and all of us represented or from states which are staggering through

the process here of watching young people and others die from drugs that are more potent than they've ever been. >> let me lay down a couple of markers in my comments and end on cfius, the committee on foreign investment in the united states. i will join senator rubio and senator king, senator langford and others concerned about the failure of the u.s. government again to have an all of government strategy to deal with the cyber threat. i have no doubt in my mind that we have superior capabilities and -- but they are stove piped and i don't think we are -- the policymakers are doing a good enough job and i think it's incumbent upon us to try to provide policy guidance so you and others in the intelligence community and national security apparatus can address this threat in a way that needs to be addressed. our adversaries don't suffer from our lack of an all-government policy.

they are all over that. and china, i agree with senator rubio, about their strategy and some of you have responded to that. but one of the strategies that china and other countries have adopted is to avoid some of the review measures in the committee on foreign investment in the united states when it comes to direct investment, buying those dual-use technologies, startup companies and the like and using that to gain strategic advantage against the united states. i wonder if maybe director wray, could you address that and anybody else in the time permitted? i would be glad the hear what you had to say about that. >> i think you're exactly right that cfius reform is particularly relevant to the china threat but not exclusively and there is a degree to which cfius as it currently stands is susceptible to the kind of round pegs only

go in round holes. it is not hard to come up with other pegs to get around the process. joint ventures but other ways as well. that is one of the significant problems. another problem is the amount of time that is built into the process to do a thorough review, which is too short. another problem is the inability to share information since other countries, our all aisles are going through the same thing, to share information when they go through their own versions of the cfius process they have the benefit of knowing what went on in our country and vice versa. and we need a more specific effort on china to use business ventures as opposed to just a tactical looking only within the four corners of one particular transaction. >> if i could, the director laid out the bigger issue at

the strategic level. we're taking on the tactical. we are the ones ready to penetrate the lines. supply chain risk management we run the threat analysis center hooked into cfius. we bring the services together and look at supply chain risk manager for issues with whoever may get a compact and ties back to china and other nations. every case for cfius or us comes back and take a look at it. get three days with it. we could use more time to make a more thorough scrub. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i apologize for being late. we had another committee. all morning we've heard the story of russia influencing our campaigns and indeed in the current campaigns for the mid-terms. so let me begin with mr. wray. has the president directed you and your agency to take

specific actions to confront and blunt russian influence activities that are ongoing? >> we're taking a lot of specific efforts to blunt. >> directed by the president? >> not as specifically directed by the president. >> director pompeo have you received a specific presidential direction to take steps to disrupt these activities? >> i'm not sure how specific. the president has made very clear we have an obligation from our perspective from the foreign intelligence perspective to do everything we can the make sure there is a deep and thorough under being of every threat including threats from russia. >> has he singled out the russian threat, which appears to be critical to this election coming up? i know there are threats from many different directors. have you received a specific threat very important to him to get this done correctly? >> yeah. i think the president has been

very clear to ask our agency to do everything we can to ensure that we thoroughly understand this potential threat. >> director coats have you received a directtive to take specific steps to disrupt russian activities directed at our elections in 2018. >> i would echo what director pompeo just say. we work together on this throughout the agency. has full understanding that we are to provide whatever intelligence is relevant and make sure that is passed on to our policymakers including the president. >> passing on relevant intelligence is not actively disrupting the opponent, do you agree? >> we pass it on and they make the decisions how to implement it. >> as director of intelligence are you leading an intergovernmental working group that is tasked with countering

russian activities not only reporting on it but tasked with countering those activities? are you aware of any type of interagency group, any intergovernmental groups and state elections are critical? >> well, we essentially relying on the investigations that are underway. both for this committee f, as well as the special counsel. >> you are not taking any specific steps sto disrupt russian activities that are occurring >> we take all kinds of steps to disrupt russian activities in terms of what they are trying to do. i'll turn it over to director pompeo. >> is that -- are you finished, mr. coats? >> yes. >> thank you, sir. >> we have a significant effort. i'm happy to talk to you about in closed session today. it is all of ic effort.

there may be others participating as well to do our best to push back against this threat and not just the russian threat. it's iranians, chinese, a big, broad effort. >> i understand. we have mutual threats. one threat that has been central to our -- you've testified to this publicly. the last election there was russian influence. this election they seem to be more prepared. they've learned their lessons. the simple question i pose has the president directed the intelligence community not merely to report but to actively stop this activity and the answer seems to be i'm hearing is the reporting is going on as the reporting about every threat coming into the united states. that's -- let me get back to quickly do any of the other panelists have anything to add on this point? >> for us i can't say that i've

been explicitly directed to quote blunt or active stop. on the other hand it is very clear generate knowledge and insight, help us understand this so we can generate better policy. that direction has been very explicit in fairness. >> but again you -- collecting intelligence and acting on it are two different things. >> i would also argue what is our role as intelligent professionals? >> i have very few moments remaining. we've talked a lot about china, cfius, their involvement in trying to buy companies in the united states. what i think has to be pointed out, too, is they are undertaking a significant national investment in artificial intelligence and quantum computing that is dwarfing anything the administration is proposing or suggesting. if artificial intelligence has

even half of the benefits that its promoters claim it will be very disruptive. quantum computing has a capacity to undercut criptology as we know it and the experts can correct me if i'm wrong. some of the mechanisms that quantum computing can generate could, based on infinite measurements of gravity, defect devices underground and under the water which for anybody who is a submariner you have to be wondering. so where is our national manhattan program for ai and quantum computing that will match the chinese? >> i think there are some things we'll talk about in classified setting here. we are treading very narrow

line here relative to discussing this in an open meeting. >> i don't want to tread that line. we do have to recognize that again the chinese activity to appropriate our intellectual property is obvious. they're generating their own intellectual property at a rate that could be disruptive and we are not matching them. again, this manhattan analogy might be a little bit out of date but when we saw the potential effects of a scientific development back in the 40s, we spared no expense so that we would get it first before our opponents. the chinese seem to be making that type of commitment very publicly. billions of dollars that they've said publicly they have a plan and working the plan. >> we provide that information to the extent that we can collect that information. but just like the manhattan

project, we don't openly share what steps we're taking to address it. >> i respect that. thank you, sir. >> i do hope you'll come back to the closed session if you can this afternoon. i think you'll get some fidelity in that closed session. i want to turn to -- we're about to wrap up. everybody can look up. there are no more questions. so you don't have to lose eye contact with us hoping you aren't the guy they'll ask to answer. you can tell who the new ones are. they've stayed focused at the members. the ones who have been here before are like this. i want to turn to the vice chairman. >> we look forward to seeing you all this afternoon. robert, we hope to get some overhead questions to you this afternoon. echoing what we've all said. appreciate your service. but i think we're hearing again a lot of commonality as we

think about cyber information and disinformation. one of the things that has struck me is that you do a rough calculation and add up the costs to russia in terms of their intervention in america. >> one of the biggest hearings of the year is coming to a close, at least in its open format. there will be a meeting of this same senate intelligence committee later this afternoon behind closed doors where the members -- the leaders of our nation's intelligence services will be better able to speak to the senators about some of their concerns. i'm jon scott along with melissa francis. we've been listening to the bet -- for the better part of an hour now of this hearing and some interesting and sometimes scary stuff coming out. >> a lot. probably there was a back and forth from director wray about rob porter where director wray said the f.b.i. submitted a partial report in march and

received a request to follow up and submitted in november. earlier this month they received additional finish owe and passed along. probably one of the bigger news items out of there. >> "outnumbered" starts right now. >> you've been watching a critical hearing on capitol hill. top intelligence officials including f.b.i. director christopher wray fielding tough questions on a variety of national security topics including alleged agency bias, house fisa members. this is "outnumbered". republican strategist lisa boothe is here. former deputy spokesperson for the state department and fox news analyst marie har *f. joining us on the couch press secretary ari fleischer is here and happy to have him. you are out numbered, sir. back to the couch for you. all right, always good to