for the unity of our country. i thank you very much for the way that you have kept us engaged and informed as decisions have been made. as you pointed out, the biden administration was dealt a very difficult hand on the withdrawal from afghanistan. we all recognize we needed to withdraw, the options were extremely limited. the mistakes made by previous administrations, we've talked about it. i think we need to understand that many of us did not support the 2002 campaign to go into iraq. one of those reasons was we wanted to complete the mission in afghanistan when we had a chance to do it when the taliban was diminished after our military came in after the attack on our country. instead we went into iraq which was not engaged in the 9/11 activities and we never finished afghanistan. a mistake made by the bush administration. we've already talked about the trump administration and

setting a deadline and releasing prisoners and moving forward with the reduction of troops when there was really very little options the administration had. it doesn't negate the information that was made available to you about the strength of the afghan security forces and the ghani administration's will to stick with it in afghanistan. and i think many of us are interested in knowing how intelligence got that so wrong. and the contingency plans are ones that we really do want to review because it seems to us there had to be better ways to secure passage into the airport than what ultimately happened. but considering the hand that you were dealt and the crisis that developed evacuating 124,000 was a miraculous task. we congratulate all that were

involved in the evacuation of so many people under such a short period of time under such difficult circumstances. i want to get to where we are today. during this process, the state department was very open to all members of congress, democrats, republicans, as we filtered information into you about vulnerable people and in an effort to get them out of afghanistan. today our offices are still being delugeed by requests to help people that are in afghanistan, ngos are working very aggressively. can you share with us the process you are using in order to filter information aboufosiv and those afghans that are at risk, how do we transmit that information and what process is in place so we can try to get these people out of afghanistan? >> thank you, senator.

as i noted we've established a task force focused entirely on relocation to help those who wish to leave afghanistan whether they are any remaining american citizens, whether it's siv applicants or nationals of partner countries get out. and that involves a number of things. it involves for the american citizens case management teams. 500 individuals whose task is to be in constant contact with any remaining american citizens who wish to leave and that's what they're doing. it also includes with our legislative affairs office being in constant contact with you as well as with outside groups who have identified and are trying to help people who seek to leave. this here is the sum total of cases brought to us by members of this committee. just this committee that many of you have been working and we

are deeply grateful for those efforts, for this information. it insures that when you send us the information, we put it into our database if it's not already there, we make sure we are able to track it and make sure we are able to coordinate with you. i recognize that especially in the early going during the evacuation itself, some of the feedback was lacking. we were trying to do all of this in realtime making sure we took in the information that you were providing and acting on it. in some cases we didn't get back to people to say here is what we've done. and we've been working to make sure we get back to everyone. i think we had 26,000 inquiries from congress. we've responded to 21,000 or 22,000 of them. >> we still have the categories of reporters that worked for us that are still in afghanistan. we have women officials that

were officials in afghanistan that are at risk. we have ngos that worked with us in afghanistan, they are employees that are at risk. you are saying we still have an opportunity to work with you to get that information to the sources that you are using to try to arrange for their exit from afghanistan. >> absolutely. we very much invite that and want to make sure we have as best possible a unified, coordinated list so that we know what everyone is working on and we can track and we can help or we can take on depending on -- >> can i get your best guess on the numbers? at one point when we first started we thought there might be less than 100,000 u.s. citizens, sivs and afghans at risk that wanted to leave. obviously that number was low. we've already evacuated over 124,000. do we know how many u.s. citizens are in afghanistan that want to exit today, how

many or siv status that want to exit and how many afghans at risk we want to help? >> on the american citizens who wish to leave the number is about 100. it is very hard to give a realtime number at any given moment because it is very fluid. by which i mean this, some people -- we're in direct contact with this group. some for very understandable reasons are changing their mind from day-to-day about whether or not they want to leave. others continue even now to raise their hands and say i am an american citizen in afghanistan, someone who had not identified themselves before. i think as all of you know very well, we do not require as a country our citizens to register or identify themselves to our embassies in any country in the world if they travel or

reside there. >> do you have the numb berls for siv? >> that we're tabulating right now because we're trying to account for everyone who has come in. some people remain in transit countries, other people are now in the united states. we're putting all of those numbers together. the overwhelming majority of afghans are in one way or another at risk. some will be siv applicants, p1 or 2, or afghans at risk. we're breaking down the numbers and should have a breakdown in the next couple of weeks. senator rubio. >> mr. secretary, in your statement i think the most troubling thing is the following quote from you. even the most pessimistic assessment did not predict the government forces would collapse while u.s. forces remain and you cite general milley who said there was no

indication there would be a rapid collapse of the afghan army and government. for much of last year i was the acting chairman of intelligence and now the vice chairman of intelligence and tracking it closely. going back to the beginning of this year i can't quote the titles of the pieces but let me say there are numerous pieces that would be categorized it will hit the fan. but let's just for a moment put that aside. i think any analysis those pieces to that conclusion. we had every reason to believe and to plan for the rapid collapse of the afghan military and the afghan government. at the beginning of 2020 by all admissions we had a bad status quo in afghanistan. we had a small footprint but a strong commitment to air support and that sustained the afghan security force efs' ability to resist the taliban. they were suffering the 10,000

casualties a year. the taliban was suffering casualties, too. but they enjoyed safe haven in pakistan. they were ariel -- able to rest, retrain and recruit. even before the withdrawal we had a terrible status quo. the security forces, small number of u.s. forces continued to die. we had u.s. losses as well. i want to mention that. the afghan government was corrupt and the taliban unchallenged safe haven in pakistan paraphrasing your own words, if after 20 years and hundreds of billion else of dollars in support, equipment and training there is not enough for the afghan government or the afghan security forces to become more resilient or self-sustaining what did we think was going to happen as that support began to be removed? what do we think was going to happen when the terrible status quo was changed? it doesn't take exquisite piece

of intelligence or brilliant analysis to conclude if you radically change an already bad status quo by removing u.s. and nato forces by ending air support the status quo would collapse in favor of the taliban. it is not an argument in favor of staying but i think that ship has sailed. i know a lot of time has been spent on justifying the withdrawal. we're not debating the withdrawal. we had a terrible status quo as is but e by your own admission the afghan government billion of dollars and was not sustain. we should have known as we drew down support we should have seen the collapse. it is concerning that no one saw all of this and concluded that there was no reason to believe that there could be a rapid collapse. more to that point, we began to see clearly signs weeks ago that this is where it was headed. without air strikes the taliban

maneuvered going from intimidating the small afghan outposts to getting them into quitting. we saw afghan outposts began to quit. the taliban went from surrounding the small provincial capitals to surrounding major cities with 5,000 to 8,000 taliban fighters weeks before at the same time i believe on july 8th president biden was still giving the naive optimistic prediction of the fighting abilities of the afghan forces. we could see them meticulously focused on the north and methodically and carefully splintering the remains of any sort of resistance weeks before the fall of kabul you could see the taliban was headed towards doing something they hadn't done before. isolate kabul from the north, cutting off all the supply routes. so we knew before -- we knew weeks before we were headed for taliban control of the north, all the traditional routes of

taliban encroachment on kabul nearly sealed. kabul faced the prospect of no fuel and afghan government unable to mount any viable opposition and sustained defense. what did we think was going to happen? all of those things were in place at the time. i have think the most concerning part of it if we didn't have analysis. this was a failure of policy and planning. we have the wrong people analyzing this. someone didn't see this. either someone didn't see it or didn't want to see it. we wanted to be out by september 11th so we could have some ceremony arguing we pulled out of afghanistan on the anniversary of 9/11. the fact of the matter is where it leads us now on top of the other things from a geopolitical perspective is not a good place. china, russia, iran look at this botched withdrawal and they see incompetence that they

could exploit. the europeans, allies, who had very say or control over the timing and execution of all this, they are now have to be wondering about our reliability, the credibility of our defense agreements with them but also have to be really upset at the prospects of a massive refugee crisis landing right on their borders here very soon. in india, i know announcement there will be a meeting of the quad fairly soon, a good development if you're india you look at this and saying if the united states allowed pakistan to unravel their standing, the pakistani rolle in all this and multiple administrations are guilting of ignore it. it is a taliban victory in the pakistani government. if the united states could have a third-rate power like pakistan unravel its aims, what chance do they have of confronting china? so i think this leads us in a

terrible situation. i go back to the initial point. i don't know how it is possible if in fact the people in charge of our foreign policy did not see all these factors and conclude there was a very real possibility of a very rapid collapse then we have the wrong people making military and diplomacy decisions in our government. >> senator, i'm happy to respond briefly in the time that we have. as you know from your own expertise and leadership on these matters, there are constant assessments being done and in this particular case assessments being done of the resilience of afghan security forces, afghan government, and different scenarios established from worst case to best case to everything in between. and ultimately the -- they land

someplace and there will always be voiced and important we listen to all of them talking about exclusively the worst case, some best case, some in between. here is what i can say in this setting, and we can take this up as well in other settings. back in february, the assessment of the overall assessment of the community was that after a complete u.s. military withdrawal that could potentially in the worst case scenario lead to the taliban capturing kabul within a year or two. so that's back in february. that was more or less where things stood in the winter and into the spring. by july and you are exactly right, that the situation was deteriorating as the taliban continued to make progress on the ground throughout the summer. in july, the i.c. indicated it was more likely than not the taliban would take over by the

end of the year, the end of this year. that said, we the intelligence community did not say that the country-wide collapse of all meaningful resistance would be likely to occur in a matter of days and you referenced chairman milley as i did earlier. nothing that he or i or we saw suggested this government and security force evers would collapse in a matter of 11 days. you are right that i think we need to look back at all of this because to your point, we collectively over 20 years invested extraordinary amounts in those security forces and in that government. equipment, training, advice, support. hundreds of millions of dollars. based on that as well as based on what we were looking at realtime again we did not see this collapse in a matter of 11

days. but it is important that we go back and look at all of this. >> senator shaheen. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you, secretary blinken for appearing before the committee today. i appreciate and share the frustration of my colleagues over the challenges with the evacuation over the situation of special immigrant visa and the taliban's treatment of women and other minorities. i agree with your assessment that where we were when we got to that evacuation was because of the failure of both democratic and republican administrations. and i want to know where that outrage was when year after year for 10 years starting with senator mccain i and others in the senate tried to get more special immigrant visa applicants through the process so that they could leave

afghanistan, leave the threat and come to the united states and there were a few republicans in the senate who blocked us year after year from getting more siv applicants to the united states. i want to know where that outrage was during the negotiations by the trump administration and former secretary pompeo when they were giving away the rights of women and girls and when secretary pompeo came before this committee and blue off questions about what they were doing to have the taliban have women at the negotiating table for that peace treaty. i think there is a lot of regret and recriminations to go around. the important thing for us to do now is to figure out how we can work together to address those people that still need to be evacuated from afghanistan and also to insure that we can do everything possible with the international community to help protect the human rights of the women and girls who remain in

the country and those minorities. so mr. secretary that's where i will put my effort. i do think we need an accounting. that's important for history and for us going forward. but let's stop with the hypocrisy about who is to blame. there are a lot of people to blame and we all share in it. now, mr. secretary, as you know i was one of those who was opposed to our withdrawing from afghanistan. a lot of my concerns were around the rights of women and girls if afghanistan fell into the hands of the taliban. i want to ask you now, and you have been very specific on briefing calls that you share the concern and i recognize that you believe it is a priority for this administration to do what you can to protect the rights of women and girls. can you talk specifically about what steps the department is taking to provide for the

safety of women and girls and how we are trying to rally the international community behind that effort? >> yes, thank you, senator. let me start by thanking you personally for your leadership for a long time now on these issues both on the sivs and the work that we've been able to do to try to improve the program but more work needs to be done. as well, of course, as on women and girls from advancing women peace and security and that agenda to insuring that there is an equal playing field for women and girls. you made a huge difference. i have to say over the last 20 years, we have made a difference. collectively in afghanistan and possibly the biggest difference we made was for women and girls, access to education, access to healthcare, access to work, and opportunity.

all of that was as a result of many of the efforts that we made and that this congress made and supported including with very, very significant assistance. this is hard. i was in kabul after the president announced his decision. i met with women leaders from the then parliament, ngos, lawyer, human rights defenders, listened and heard from them about their concerns about the future. just the past couple of weeks when i was in doha and ramstein i talked to young women and girls who we had evacuated and heard from them. both of their gratitude for having been evacuated but their deep concerns -- more than deep concerns about the future for the women and girls who remain in afghanistan.

so with that bearing in mind, we have done a few things and this is what we really want to work closely with you and every member. one, we've worked to rally the international community to set very clear expectations of the taliban going forward to include the expectation that it will uphold the basic rights of women and girls as well as minorities. and that's visible in the statement that more than 100 countries have signed of our initiative and also in a u.n. security council resolution that we initiated and got passed. i know people say it's a statement or security council resolution, it doesn't matter. in the case of the security council resolution to cite one example significant sanctions from the united nations on the taliban. there are travel restrictions on the taliban. and the idea that if the

taliban is in violation of the security council resolution that we established it will get any relief just on that alone, the u.n. sanctions or travel restrictions, i think that's pretty clear that won't happen. that is just one point of leverage. we've been working to make sure the international community speaks with one voice and acts together including on this. that's one. second, we want to make sure that assistance continues to flow. humanitarian including assistance directed at the special needs of women and girls. we are doing that consistent with our sanctions and we're able to do that by working through ngos and the u.n. agencies. now, i don't want to sugar coat this because we know that while the taliban seeks and will probably support and protect basic humanitarian assistance through these agencies like for food and medicine, it may be a different storey when it comes to things directed specifically at women and girls.

we'll be very focused on that and trying to make sure that assistance can go through that it is monitored effectively including by the agencies doing it. i spent some time talking with the head of the united nations effort on this in terms of having a clear monitoring mechanism for that and carry it forward. next, we'll soon appoint at my direction a senior official responsible for focusing and marshalling all our efforts on support for women and girls and minor -- minorities. we need someone in the state department to carry forward the agenda and working with you in the weeks and months ahead. >> i'm out of time. can you share with us who that official is that as soon as they are appointed? >> yes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. secretary, if i were just to read your testimony, not

having watched any news, i would literally think this was a smashing success. but i do read the news, as most americans do, and we realize this was a complete debacle. and i think what concerns me the most among many things is that detachment from reality. the same unreality on the border. the self inflicted wound, a crisis created by president biden's policies that have completely thrown open our borders and yet the administration denies we have a problem at the border. so let me -- i have a number of questions. first of all, approximately what is the dollar value of the equipment that has been left behind that now the taliban controls. what is the dollar value of that? >> i believe the equipment provided over the last 15 years was about $80 billion. of that equipment that remains

as you know it was given -- the afghan security forces and of course some of that is now in the hands of the taliban. >> i was also struck by your comment that even the most pessimistic assessment didn't predict the government would collapse as quickly as it did. but you just in your testimony said that the realistic predictions before the complete withdrawal was that it would collapse by the end of this year. so the administration continued with their plans of withdrawal, of surrender, knowing the taliban would be in control of $80 billion worth of sophisticated equipment at the end of that, correct? did that discussion ever come up in terms of maybe that wouldn't be a good idea leaving all that equipment behind as we bug out of afghanistan? >> that assessment came in july. much of the equipment -- i will

defer to my colleagues at the pentagon who are more expert in this than i am -- much of that equipment was made inoperable. other pieces of equipment will become inoperable because there is no ability on the part of the taliban to maintain it. none of it to the best of my knowledge poses a strategic threat to us or any of afghanistan's neighbors. >> so we have an oversight letter we would like a response on that. let's just quick talk about the decision to close down bagram. the president says this was unanimously decided by the military. isn't it true that the president decided what the troop level would be, a very minimal troop level, the president decided we would keep the embassy open and forced the military's hands, right? in the end it was his decision, not the military's decision to close bagram. >> the president makes the

decisions when it comes to the drawdown. those were decisions made by his military commanders and sought their befs advice and it was what was carried out and the timing of the decision to leave bagram. >> you said when the president announced the withdrawal, nato immediately unanimously embraced it. joseph burrel, the foreign affairs chief of the european union, his statement on the surrender is that it is a catastrophe for the afghan people, for western values and credibility and for the developing of international relations. the "wall street journal" summarizes it nicely in their piece how biden broke nato. the chaotic afghan withdrawal has shocked and angered u.s. allies. again that's detachment from reality that our nato allies are on board with this thing. they're not.

that's not what we're hearing. >> i went to nato well before the president's decision along with secretary of defense austin and listened to our allies' views, subscription and ideas and i shared some of our initial thinking at that point. we factored in everything and we heard from our allies into our decision making process. >> just like you planned for every contingency. it is bureaucratic speech. the detachment from reality. as we surrendered and bugging out we are hearing all these soothing comments from the administration, almost like a well-oiled machine here. we have flights just leaving and 124,000 people being evacuated. we heard something completely different. tell me what is wrong about

what i heard. first of all, prior to the taliban providing perimeter security there was no security and tens of thousands of afghan people in the airport. we did not know who these people were. it wasn't only people we invited in. >> we controlled the airport. not the city. >> we had tens of thousands of people in kabul airport. the reports we were getting on the ground is many didn't -- had no form of i.d. whatsoever. when i went to fort mccoy i asked the commanding general again every contingency planned for. asked the commanding general when did you first find out your mission would be as an intake facility for the afghanistan refugees. he said 10 days ago. i asked the commanding general, the representative for the department of state as well as the department of homeland security do we know that every

refugee that you have received so far, only 1,000 at that point, do we know they have some form of i.d. we didn't. we're hearing all these assurances that we are getting biometricly screened. a 14-step plan. i asked the head of northern command at fort mccoy. describe the steps to me. what do we screen them against? our isis and al qaeda terrorists, have we biometricly screened them in the past that we can compare them to a database? what is the 14-step process and detail. not just 14 steps. tell me, describe to us in detail how are we keeping this nation safe from such a chaotic situation? >> so senator the 14-step process refers to specifically to the special immigrant visa applicants. >> how about for the other

124,000 people? >> to come to your point. we ranged transit countries so that any afghan coming out of a of after would initially go to a transit country where we could initiate the screening, the vetting, background checks. we surged customs and border protection officials to those transit points as well, of course, as other security law enforcement agencies to do these checks with biometric, and other information that we had. then as people are cleared in these transit points they then come to the united states. but they aren't being resettled immediately. they are going once they land at dulles or in philadelphia they are being sent to military bases where the checks continue and are completed. >> but again what checks? we need specifically what the checks are going to be. >> the time of the senator has expired. i'm sure you can follow up with the rest of your questions.

>> thank you for this hearing and thank you, secretary blinken for your service and cess -- testimony today. we have lots of opportunities to look backwards at the 20 years of our engagement in afghanistan and the decisions but i had hoped this committee would rise above the temptations of partisan politics and use this hearing to consider the urgent question still before us. i hope we'll get a few minutes to focus on this, mr. secretary. how do we get the remaining american citizens, legal permanent residents and those afghans who served alongside us or worked with and for us and who are most at risk out of afghanistan? how do we make sure afghanistan doesn't become a safe haven for terrorists again and deal with the taliban, what leverage do we have in doing so? and also make sure humanitarian aid gets into afghanistan and how do we support and resettle those afghan refugees whom we have evacuated to third countries and that much smaller

population that has reached the united states? let me just start with my thanks to the state department, to the employees in kabul and qatar and the d.c. based task force that worked with the evacuation and & many americans i heard from. former military and folks who served in afghanistan. former diplomats eager to help. i look forward to continuing to coordinate with you and with agencies of our government, advocacy groups and other partners on resettlement efforts. i'm glad jack martell has been asked to step forward and welcome u.s. launch a broad multi-faith bipartisan national organization co-chaired by three former presidents bush, and obama and clinton, and dozens and dozens of faith groups and nonprofits to

welcome afghans to the united states. let me just start with a question about visa status. senator sullivan and i wrote a bipartisan letter in mid-august urging expanded eligibility for the siv program. i'm interested if how you are working to expand eligibility under the existing visa programs to include family members and support those the u.s. government supported and worked alongside but who were not direct employees? i want to start if i could, mr. secretary by asking you yes or no questions about three groups that other senators have mentioned. there are about 550 employees and family members from voice of america, radio free europe and radio liberty who were not evacuated. is the department prioritizing their evacuation? >> yes. >> they committed to getting our other partners and are they being prioritized

>> and partners from the american university as well? >> yes. >> how do we insure safe passage on land borders and safe and regular flights out of afghanistan and how do we get documents into the hands of those who don't have identity documents either because they were destroyed in our embassy or they destroyed them themselves out of fear of the taliban? and how do we make sure we're providing the financial support needed for the whole group of refugees who, after thorough vetting, ument matly reach the united states? >> thank you very much. those are very important questions and let me try to respond briefly to them and we can take on the details after the session if need be. first, we needed and we have established a clear expectation from the taliban about allowing people to continue to leave the

country to include american citizens, green card holders, afghans who are properly documented with a visa, including specifically those who worked in some capacity for the united states. and not only do we have that understanding in public statements by the taliban, of course, it is built into everything we've done with a large coalition of countries in terms of setting an expectation and making very clear that failure to fulfill that expectation will have significant consequences which we can get into. second, very important to make sure there are ways to travel freely from the country. we made an intensive effort before we left to understand and share with qatar and turkey, the countries that stepped up to do this, what was necessary to make sure that the airport in kabul could continue

to function. and ultimately to have charter flights and commercial flights understand ards. we brought the american contractors back who had been running the airport and handed off a very detailed plan which is now being implemented. third, the land crossings. we worked with pakistan, uzbekistan and other countries that they would facilitate crossing into their country and have consular officials surged to the necessary places to handle people coming out in that fashion. and now to your very important point about documentation. this is something that maybe we can take offline. we're working on a mechanism and means by which -- multiple ways of doing this -- to make sure people who don't have the necessary document, for example a physical visa, to get that to

them. i prefer to go into more detail on that in another setting. >> understood. if i might just as a closing question you were asked at the outset what are the factors we weigh as we decide the future of our relationship with the taliban? we're in this difficult situation. many of us recognize the taliban is a terrorist organization that has done horrific things within afghanistan in the past, yet we need to have some working relationship with them to secure the safe passage out of thousands of people who we still care deeply about, a number of american citizens with delaware ties who i have been in contact with didn't leave because their families were still in afghanistan. and there are clear measures that they should be expected to meet that you laid out in your opening statement. what do you think will be the most important aspects of our leverage to insure the taliban perform in ways that we would accept, and what do you think will be the turning point at which we'll make decisions with

our allies to take sharper and harsher measures against the taliban? >> simply put, the nature of the relationship that the taliban would have with us or most other countries around the world will depend entirely on its conduct and actions. specifically with regard to freedom of travel as well as making good on its counter terrorism commitments, upholding basic rights of the afghan people not engaging in reprisals. these are things not only we and country around the world are looking at. there is significant leverage and we and other countries hold when it comes to things the taliban says it wants but won't get if it does not act in a way that meets these expectations. for example, we talked a little bit before about the existing u.n. sanctions on the taliban. these are significant as well as travel restrictions. there is now a new security

council resolution we initiated setting out the expectations what the taliban has to do. if it's in violation of that resolution it's hard to see any of the sanctions being lifted. travel restrictions being lifted and indeed additional sanctions could well be imposed. similarly the foreign reserves of afghanistan are almost exclusively in banks here in the united states including the federal reserve, other banks about $9 billion. all of that has been frozen. there are significant resources as well in the international financial institutions that afghanistan normally would have access to. those, too, have been frozen. over the last 20 years or so the international community has provided 75% of the afghan government's annual operating budget. that, too, has been frozen. so among many things that the taliban says it seeks, both basic legitimacy and basic support, the united states, international community has a

hand on a lot of that, much of that, most of that. and so we'll have to see going forward what conclusions the taliban draws from that and what its conduct will be matching these basic expectations that we set. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you, mr. secretary for taking time to answer our questions today. i would like to associate myself with the comments that senator rubio made about planning for a potential immediate collapse of the afghan government and security forces. it seemed that as the taliban was running the table throughout afghanistan, that the prospect of them continuing to run the table by coming into kabul was a significant probability that should have been planned for. in your view, mr. secretary, has the taliban abandoned their sympathy and collaboration with groups like al qaeda and the

haqqani network? do they continue to have the same aim, and are they of like spirit? or has that relationship be severed? >> the relationship has not been severed and it is a very open question as to whether their views and the relationship has changed in any kind of definitive way. it is fair to say two things. one, whatever the taliban's views on al qaeda, they do know the last time they harbored al qaeda and it engaged in an attack on our homeland, certain things followed which i believe they would have an interest in not see being repeated. whatever their views on al qaeda there is a strong disincentive to allow it to engage in outwardly attacks. they aren't currently capable

of that. isis-k is a different thing as you know. the taliban and isis-k are sworn enemies. since the emergence of isis-k the fight has been between the taliban and isis-k with the taliban taking most of the territory isis-k sought to hold in afghanistan. less whether they have the will to deal with isis-k and more weather they have the capacity. >> given that response i know that previously the position of the administration and the state department was that the 2001 aumf no longer played a role of significance. given the developments in afghanistan and the taliban's ongoing collaboration with and sympathy with al qaeda and the haqqani network and like-minded groups, is it not appropriate for the state department to revisit your recommendation that we abandon the 2001 aumf? >> i think we need to look to

make sure we have all the authorities that we would need for any potential contingency including the reemergence as a threat of al qaeda or the further emergence of isis-k as an outwardly directed threat. if we don't have those authorities we should get them. whether it means relooking at those authorizations or writing new ones which would be the most appropriate thing to do if necessary. we need to look at that. >> i appreciate your willingness to change your point of view because of the conditions that developed in the most recent weeks. nothing wrong with conditions leading to a change in perspective. i for one thought some years ago we should withdraw from afghanistan. the conditions i saw in the ensuing years convinced me i was wrong and i like senator shaheen was one of those that felt that president trump was wrong to enter into an agreement to withdraw and i thought president biden was wrong to continue with that

agreement to withdraw. i was appalled by the disastrous withdrawal process myself. for us today i would like to focus on the moral stain of leaving people behind and understand what we can do to make sure we aren't leaving people behind. i understand we're down to a small number of americans, hard to know how many are left behind. in terms of legal permanent residents is your priority just as high to get them out as it is to get out citizens or is there a different level of commitment for illegal permanent residents return to the united states? >> our number one priority is american citizens. that has long been the case. in this situation in afghanistan in this emergency evacuation in afghanistan, we did everything we could as well to make sure that legal permanent residents, green card holders would also identify

themselves to us. we don't know at any given time how many american citizens in any given country around the world and make available resources to help them. our number one priority is any american citizens who wish to leave. >> there is a secondary level for a legal permanent resident. how many of them, how many legal permanent residents are we convinced are still in afghanistan? >> we don't have an exact number but in the thousands. >> in the thousands. likewise in terms of siv holders or applicants, or people who worked with us that have been our partners through the years, how many of them approximately are still in afghanistan that want to come to the united states? >> this is what we're doing an accounting of right now based on two things. based on the pipeline of applicants as it existed before the evacuation. and then looking at those who we were able to evacuate.

we don't have those numbers yet. as we moved to evacuate people a number of them are at transit points around the world. >> tens of thousands? >> realistically two things. one, we talked about this a little bit earlier but of the applicants in the program, and as i said we inherited about 18,000. about half of those. this remains the case now, are at a point where it is before the chief of mission has given his or her approval they are in fact eligible for the program. we focused on the -- >> i was looking for a number given the fact the siv process was so slow and not undertaken during the trump years in is significant way you sped it up. that's great. you knew no way you would get all these people out in time. given the rapid collapse of the afghan security forces and you

said yesterday that you inherited a date but in fact you didn't inherit the date. the date was made first and you pushed it to august 31st. why didn't you push it much later so we would have been able to process the siv applicants as well as those who had worked for us and not yet applied? i don't understand why a date was actually not inheristed and a date was not selected that would be sufficient to actually remove people from the nation in a way that would be in keeping with our moral commitment to honor our citizens and green card holders as well as those who worked with us over the years? >> two things if i may. first we took some risk in terms of what the taliban would do or not do after may 1st in pushing beyond may 1st. we of course worked this very hard because its -- >> it's a risk with other people. the risk was on people we care for. >> to be clear if i could.

the military told us that in order to do its retrograde, it's draw down from afghanistan in a safe and orderly way it needed three to four months and why we pushed to get to the end of august, early september. second to your point, an important one and good one, our expectation was that beyond august 31st, beyond the military drawdown, the government, security forces would remain in control of kabul, of the major cities, our embassy was fully planned to remain up and running. we were leaving 600 military behind to make sure we could secure the embassy so that it could continue to operate. we had robust programming planned to include continuing to bring out anyone who wished to leave, notably sivs so that was very much the plan. and the expectation. what we did not anticipate was

that 11-day collapse of the government and security forces. that's what changed everything. >> thank you, senator murphy. >> thank you, mr. chairman and mr. secretary for spending so much time with us. i think what links our failures in iraq and afghanistan is that they are both fundamentally failures of hubris, believing that we can control things and influence events on the other side of the world that are beyond our control or influence. america can be a force for good in the world but there is a limit to what we can achieve and so there has been decades-long magical thinking with respect to what is in our control and what is outside of our control. as it turns out it wasn't within our control to stand up an american-style democracy and american-looking military in afghanistan that would be able to protect the country from the taliban and we spent 20 years trying to achieve it.

mr. secretary you covered some of this in your opening remarks but i wanted to ask you a series of questions to level set for the committee. the situation you inherited. what was inside your control an outof your control and to look at the events of the last 30 to 40 days with that same lens, what was in your control and what was outside of your control. i think these are yes or no answers. some of it you have covered in your testimony but it is important to get it on the record. mr. secretary, if president biden had chosen to breach the agreement that president trump signed with the taliban, would the taliban have restarted attacks against u.s. troops and bases? >> yes. >> as you said in your opening testimony, by the time the administration took office the taliban was on the outskirts of several provincial capitols. if president biden chose to breach the agreement between president trump and the taliban would the taliban have begun

offensives on the urban centers? >> yes. >> so if the taliban had begun its siege on these cities and resumed attacks on u.s. troops would 2500 troops have been enough to keep the country from falling to the taliban? >> no. >> would double that number have been enough? do we know how big our force would have had to have gotten >> it was the assessment of our military leaders not to put a number on it but significant additional u.s. forces would have been required to both protect ourselves and to prevent the onslaught from the taliban against the provincial capitals and kabul. >> it wasn't a decision between leaving and status quo. it was a decision between a significant commitment of new u.s. resources to the fight or the continuation of a withdrawal plan. the last month. once the afghan and military

disintegrate it is understandable there would be panic among the afghan people. could it be expected a few thousand u.s. troops and diplomats would have been able to prevent the panic? >> no. >> much has been made by the dramatic scenes at the airport. 2500 or 5,000 troops enough to stop the afghan people from rushing to the airport to created the security nightmare for you? was there any way for the limited number of personnel that were there to prevent individuals from rushing to the airport? >> no, they could control the airport as we did. they could establish a basic immediate perimeter around the airport as we did but couldn't control what happened beyond that perimeter. >> let's talk about the perimeter. others said we should have controlled a bigger perimeter. we should have taken back over parts of kabul to secure the passage of americans and afghans to the airport. let's say you would quadruple

the number of troops and 10,000 troops. without the afghan military or a functioning government would that have been enough to retake kabul to be able to secure the passage of everyone to the airport? >> i don't want to profess to be a military expert. i would defer to my colleagues at the pentagon on that. i can say i safely say it would have taken a substantial number of forces to try to retake the city or establish a much broader perimeter. and of course if that was ultimately opposed by the taliban, in a sense it would have defeated the purpose because anyone outside that perimeter would not have been allowed to get through it to come to the airport, among other things. >> once the afghan military collapses, disintegrates, we don't have enough troops to retake kabul and we are in the position of having to rely on the taliban or at least communicate with the taliban to

make sure we get individuals to the airport. i think it is important to put on the record in a clear and concise way because we have to have a reckoning in this country what we can accomplish and what we can't accomplish. it is extraordinary this administration got 130,000 people out of afghanistan given the circumstances and given the situation they inheristed, that you inherited in january of this year. may worry is the malady we suffered for the last 20 years, this idea that it was just a bad plan but it was the failure of execution as to why we couldn't succeed in iraq or afghanistan is plaguing us again today. that right now we are having a conversation as if we had a better plan and executed better we could have avoided these scenes at the airport and guaranteed the easy and safe passage of everyone into that facility. it is heartbreaking what

happened. it was impossible for americans to watch. but if we just simply leave today believing that if we had planned better, if we had better execution, we could have avoided this panic and confusion, i think we're just inviting another iraq, another afghanistan in the future. finally, mr. secretary, just quickly expand on your point about the messages it sends to china, this idea the chinese would love it if we stayed another 10 or 20 years and why this isn't a sign of weakness. in fact, it is an ability for you and the national security infrastructure to reorient resources to fights we can win. >> you put it very well. in my assessment and others there is nothing that strategic competitors like china, like russia or adversaries like iran

and north korea would like better than for us to reupped the war, doubled down on it and remained bogged down in afghanistan for another 5, 10, 20 years with all that dedication of resources, all of that energy and focus on that as opposed to the challenges that we have to face today. i might add this committee has done i think a very good job on trying to focus on. i think that would have been doubling down on this war, after 20 years, after nearly $2 trillion. after 2,461 american lives lost. 20,000 injuries. and not to preserve the status quo that existed before may 1st. that would have been one thing. but to be in the situation where

the war with us was restarted. the taliban attacking our forces, attacking our partners and allies, going on an offensive across the country to retake the cities. that would have required a doubling down on the war. and the bottom line is this. we were right to end the war. we were right not to send a third generation of americans to afghanistan to fight and die there. and i believe we were right in the extraordinary efforts that were made to make sure that we can bring out as many people as possible. and now we have an obligation to make sure that we continue to do that and, of course, to guard against the re-emergence of any threats coming from afghanistan. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i appreciate the fact that we are having this critical hearing today. i must say i'm going to talk about based on the last

interaction. thank you for being here. i wish general austin were here. secretary austin could answer many of the questions that were proposed. but this was not a choice between either a dangerous escalation of the war, which has just been laid out, or a precipitous chaotic withdrawal that embarrassed us around the globe. to say that it was not a sign of weakness the way we left. i mean, i don't know who you're talking to. but if you're talking to our allies in nato, they would say it was a sign of weakness. if you're talking honestly to our adversaries, they will certainly say it is a sign of weakness, as will terrorist groups around the world. so i hope the lesson we learned here isn't that this was the right way to leave. hopefully,