in the attack on the 26. >> in classified, i'd like to know that. i don't understand. i went to union public high school 1100. my math. 11,015,000 u.s. citizens. that leaves thousands, not hungry left -- not hundreds left. we have people calling us wanting to get out, u.s. citizens not allowed to get in the gate or kicked off the base are not allowed out. we have to get our folks home. i yield back. thank you. mr. chairman. >> general milley come i want to thank you for your 42 years of service, your principled commitment to civilian rule, for your commitment to military to military communication that kept this country safe for three decades during the cold war and for the sacrifice and patriotism that you and your family have shown. as the son of immigrants, i am

and your families debt and i want to thank the three of you for ending america's longest war and executing the longest airlifting history. secretary austin camille testified that troops stayed past the deadline. the military would likely have needed reinforcements. i want to make this clear. the choice for president biden wasn't zero troops or 2500 troops. it was zero troops or potentially many more troops. general milley briefly, would you agree that at some point more than 2500 folks would have been needed as the taliban engaged in offensive strikes? >> reasonable prospect we would've had to increase forces past 2500 given that the taliban were very likely going to start attacking us. there is a range of forces. we are talking about 2500 or

4500. >> i want to talk about the strike that killed civilians. i think our military cares more about the loss of civilian life than any military in the world, any superpower ever in history that's why i think we ought to talk about it. i brought pictures of the seven children who were killed along with three adults to remind us this is not one america wants. this is something that we need to prevent in the future. press secretary kirby who did a fine job during those ten days said you would support evacuating these family members as they have requested and resettling them in the u.s. is that correct, secretary austin? >> it is. >> can we get the families and the coworkers evacuated now and brought to safety? could that happen? can we get them into the u.s. or some safe place?

>> will continue to work through state department channels to engage the family and if they desire to leave and we will certainly do everything we can to facilitate getting them out. >> i hope we can expedite that and expedite the compensation. it is the moral thing to do, the right thing to do. it's how america conducts itself so i hope you will take that into consideration. general mckenzie, i admire and respect your leadership but i want to see how we can improve the intelligence to prevent these kind of strikes in the future. one aspect you said is that there was a white toyota corolla. i'm sure you're aware, is there any car more common than a toyota corolla? >> it's a very common car. of course there were many other factors that went into that decision. >> according to the stars & stripes, roughly 90% of cars registered in afghanistan have

been corollas. one of the of the things that me most on my reading and obviously you know more, the corolla was parked next to a u.s. registered calpurnia-based ngo that was delivering humanitarian assistance. i guess the question is, did the dod know about the ngo in advance of the strike? >> i would prefer, since it's under investigation, i would like to defer that question. >> i would hope that we can make sure going forward that our department will cross-check intelligence to make sure that aid organizations are on no strike lists. i assume that there is -- if there is an aid organization or hospital they are on no strike lists. >> as our mosques, often used as training sites as well. >> i believe our military goes through extra ordinary lengths to prevent this. it's not to be an indictment of anyone. i want to make sure we continue

to improve the processes and that we right by the families who suffered this unspeakable tragedy. thinking get into the three of you for your leadership and thank you to everyone who served. regardless of one's view in afghanistan, i find your integrity and patriotism -- a dishonor to this committee and a dishonor to your service. >> i have to ask the witnesses question. there is a complicated scheduling thing on. my plan would be if we could go to that. period, take a break then. but it's been a while. if you need a break earlier. we can take a 15 minute break at 12:30 and i wish there was an easier way to do this. it's totally up to you. would you like to break at 12:30 or just go?

>> i think we are good for right now, chairman. >> if you need a break. >> fire the star cluster. >> we all have overprotective aids. that they need a break, they need a break. mr. gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes. >> general mckenzie, "the washington post" reported on august 20th at the taliban offered to allow the u.s. military to take responsibility for security at kabul. did you meet to discuss such an offer? >> i met with him on doha and doha. we were attempting a withdrawal. >> having security over all of kabul. >> he said why don't you take security for all of kabul. that's not why was there. that was not my instruction. we did not have resources to undertake it.

>> did you convey the offer to the president? >> the offer was made to the president's special representative to afghanistan. >> do you know if it was conveyed to the president? >> i don't know. >> who made the decision to turn down the taliban offer to allow the u.s. military to secure kabul? >> i did not consider to be a formal offer and it was not the reason i was there so i do not pursue it. if someone made a decision, that would have been made. >> we don't know. >> i do know that it was conveyed to my chain of command. >> in military terms, what you call the retreat of military forces under security provided by and with the permission of enemy forces? >> i don't know. i've never done one of those operations. >> i think you just did. >> i disagree. >> you did not withdraw forces from afghanistan after a negotiation with the taliban? >> that's correct. we did not do that. >> this would not be a conditional surrender, your opinion?

>> it would not be. i would describe it as a noncombatant evacuation operation that we conducted with our timing our forces and we warned the taliban that if they interfere with the operation we would strike them hard. they chose not to interfere with that operation. >> you are saying that the meeting and doha was to let the taliban know this is what we're doing. take it or leave it. but you are operating at that point under the agreement we had negotiated with the taliban for the surrender, right? the doha agreement. >> i was there to tell the taliban we were conducting the noncombatant evacuation operation. >> by dod definition, it does not include the evacuation of combatants. you are also evacuating combatants. >> you're wrong. when i met with the taliban on 15 august, we had completed the withdrawal operation. for the forces that women were forces that were -- the insertion and extraction of combat and forces. >> what do we call the

withdrawal of combatants? >> it can be called a retrograde period >> was it in your orders? or you're you tasked with doing? >> tasked with conducting noncombatant evacuation operation. >> what you just said -- what is the tasking to withdraw the forces? >> i would have to take a look. i believe it was "a withdrawal." >> i believe the definition is a repositioning of forces. i would call it a conditional surrender. something general milley said, has al qaeda sworn to the taliban? >> i believe there's a deep commitment. i couldn't answer that question. >> i believe general milley said before. has the taliban renounced the previous oath al qaeda had

sworn? >> the taliban and al qaeda have a very close relationship and i don't expect the taliban to seriously interfere with repositioning in afghanistan which i think is what you're asking. >> the new interior minister for the taliban government is a known al qaeda associate. is there any evidence that he or the haqqani network has broken with al qaeda? >> no. >> did the march attack breach the doha agreement in your opinion? >> no, it did not. >> it did not. general mckenzie, do you know which taliban forces were providing security in front of the airport? >> yes, we do. >> was it 313? >> there were other elements. they were part of it. a hodgepodge of units. among others. >> suicide bombing attacks. have the suicide bomber -- i think you suggested to the congressman that this person might've been imprisoned.

do we know? do we know whether he had been? >> we are working hard to find out where the suicide bomber came from. >> did we have an opportunity to take them out prior to the suicide bomber attack? >> we did not. >> does the over the horizon posture that we are adopted, will it require -- will be more or less difficult now that we are out of the country? >> eyes set on the record it would be difficult to do, not impossible. >> time is expired. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general mckenzie, you said reports about you engaging with the taliban, about a redline around kabul were false. does that mean there was no discussion or consideration and in the u.s. for a plan to defend kabul in early august before the fall? >> there was never a discussion about a plan to defend kabul before its fall. i will say that when i went to doha, i took with me a graphic, map of kabul with a 30-kilometer ring on the outside. the original proposal was we

would ask the taliban to staff that side -- stay outside that ring. on the data meeting, they were already in downtown kabul. the graphic was outdated. had to proceed from the new reality. >> secretary austin, i wanted to get your thoughts. when i spent some time in the situation room with you in 2014 when we were fearing the fall of baghdad, the u.s. commander was defending those position using air assets. the effort was to buy time for the iraqis. did it not cross your mind to consider something like that in early august before the fall of kabul? >> this is certainly something we considered. we took a look at what we would need to do to protect the embassy and if we had to do a neo, what could we do to buy time? >> chairman millie, yesterday you said you were asked on

august 25th to make a decision about the august 31st deadline. was there a formal request made to the taliban by the united states to stay passed august 31st? was it a request that we denied that you were taking into account and that decision? >> i don't make decisions. i provide -- >> in your recommendation. >> best military advice. i'm not aware of a formal request to the taliban one way or the other. staying past the 31st. i'm very familiar with the advice we provided on the 25th. >> before the fall of kabul, did we have formal taliban agreement upon an august 31st date? >> i'm not sure what you mean by formal. >> have there ever been a point where the united states went to the taliban saying that we are leaving august 31st. prior to the fall of kabul. >> from a policy perspective, we

could give you the detailed information. i believe the taliban new that we were departing on the 31st. >> you weren't aware -- >> a formal agreement per se. >> general mckenzie, you are saying that you talked to the taliban on august 15. did you use august 31st as the date to end operations? was there a date set at all? >> i did not use a specific date when i talk to them. >> no date was set on august 15. >> i didn't convey a specific date as part of my conversation. >> i wanted to switch gears one more time. secretary austin moved. when we are looking at the fundamental viability of the over the horizon effort, is the airspace over afghanistan currently considered sovereign airspace? i will frame it in a slightly different way. is it currently illegal for the united states to conduct isr's

worthies and air strikes in afghanistan? >> yes. >> under what authority? >> the same authorities we were using before. >> under the security and defense cooperation agreement of 2014? is that correct? >> no. what we are prosecuting now is, are the authorities that were referred to by general mckenzie earlier and he mentioned he would have to take that into a classified setting. >> okay. i will certainly follow with you. general mckenzie, something i wanted to follow-up with you on. yesterday in your hearing from the senate, he made a comment when asked about the war on terror. he said the war on terror is not over but then you also went on and said that the war in afghanistan is not over. i wanted to clarify. one of the clarification from you and your opinion. is the war in afghanistan over?

>> i believe the war in afghanistan is not over. we are no longer a party to that war but that doesn't mean isis and the taliban aren't going to engage in a furious fight this fall that may result in ice is being crushed or it may result -- >> i see. you are referring, you believe that there's a civil war in afghanistan but in terms of the united states war against afghanistan, you would say that that is over. >> we have no forces in afghanistan. our only interest in afghanistan is looking for isis-k in al qaeda targets. >> chairman gates is recognized. >> february 26, 2020. house armed services committee, general mark milley. "we know we're not going to defeat the taliban militarily and they are not going to defeat the government of afghanistan militarily." you really blew that call, didn't you, general? >> i believe it was an issue of strategic stalemate and then had we remained in afghanistan with

the advisory levels of effort within the government of afghanistan -- >> that's interesting but it's not what i asked. you spent more time with bob woodward on this book then you spent analyzing the very likely prospect that the afghanistan government was going to fall immediately to the taliban. >> not even close, congressman. >> oh, really? you said after kabul felt no one could have anticipated the immediate fall of the ghani government. when did you become aware joe biden trying to get ghani to lie about conditions in afghanistan. he did that in july. do you know that? >> i'm not aware of president biden -- >> you're not aware of the phone call that biden had with ghani where he said whether it's true or not, we want you to paint a rosy picture. you the chief military advisor to the president. you said that the taliban was not going to defeat the government of afghanistan militarily. the resident tries to get ghani to lie. >> the two things, if i may.

what i said was the situation was stalemate and if we kept advisors there, the government of afghanistan and the army would've still been there. that's what i said. whether that's right or wrong, i don't know. >> it seems wrong now. >> we withdrew. >> secretary austin, are you capable of assessing whether another has the will to fight? >> noel, we are not. that's the point that the chairman made earlier. >> it's and incredibly disappointing thing that the secretary of defense for simply to say i can't assess whether someone has the will to fight but it's consistent with your record. during the obama administration i think they gave you $48 million to train up some folks in syria to take on the assad government and i think your testimony was that only four or five survive first contact with the enemy. what confidence should this committee have in you or should the country avenue when you've now confessed to us and whether it's the swing and miss in

afghanistan that general milley talked about yesterday. total failure. or whether it was your failures in syria. you don't seem capable to look at a fighting force and determine whether or not they have the will. is that an embarrassment? >> if you'll recall, the end result was the sdf we stood up that was very, very instrumental in turning the tide of battle in syria. >> oh, yeah, turned it so much you got assad and power in syria and you've got the taliban and power in afghanistan. where have you been? >> the focus was isis, congressman. those forces had significant effect on the isis network. >> it seems like you are chronically bad at this and you have admitted that i guess, which is, to your credit. when people in the military like lieutenant colonel stuart schaller stand up and demand accountability, when they say that you screwed up, they point

out that general milley statement of the government afghanistan is not going to get defeated by the taliban. he ends up in the brig and you all end up in front of us and your former employer, raytheon, ends up with a lot of money. we have poured cash and blood and credibility into a ghani government that was a mirage. it fell immediately. while the guy sitting next to you was off talking to phil rucker and talking doing his thing with bob woodward, we were buying into the big lie. the big lie that this was ever going to be successful and we could ever rely on the afghanistan government for anything at all. general milley, you kind of gave up the game earlier when he said he wanted to address elements of your personal conduct that were in question. we are not questioning your personal conduct. we are questioning in your official capacity going and undermining the chain of command which is obviously what you did. you have created this whole -- >> did not undermine the chain of command.

>> you absolutely did. >> did not. >> you said yesterday that you weren't going to resign when senators asked you this question. i believe that you probably won't resign. you seem to be very happy sailing up over there. if we didn't have a president was so adult, you all would be fired. that you deserve. you've let down people who wear the uniform in my district and all around the country and you are far more interested in what your perception is and how people think about you an insider washington books and you care about winning. >> time has expired. >> thank you, mr. chair. gentlemen, i apologize for the behavior of my colleagues. i am deeply, deeply appreciative of your service and of the decades of experience that you will bring to this conversation. thank you so much for the opportunity to ask important questions of you, questions that ought to be asked of you in the spirit of our responsibility of

oversight rather than provocation. i just have a couple questions of clarification from testimony that has happened so far the first one is for you, general mckenzie. you mention something in the opening remarks about you having looked at different branches to account for the complete collapse of the government and the afghan military. that's the first time i have heard that scenario being articulated out loud. most of the testimony that i have heard prior to this has been we could have never foreseen that. a somebody -- as a branching engineer type person, that's what i do. it's intrigued. >> as we drew up the neo plan, one of the assumptions of the neo plan was that the afghan military would be able to continue to secure the airfield. the turks were there but they only actually secured a small fraction of the airfield.

the rest of the long perimeter around the runway was secured by afghan military forces. our assumption was that they would continue to perform that function. but since we stated that as an assumption by the way we planned, we have to say if that assumption is wrong because an assumption is a future hypothetical condition we believe is going to occur, we felt that was always something we should challenge. we developed a plan if that assumption failed, if they melted away. we had a branch plan developed as part of the overall plan where we would introduce adequate combat forces to physically take over securing the perimeter of the airfield in case it did melt away. the first week of august it looked increasingly likely that they would melt away so i began, talk to the secretary and the chairman and we agreed to bring forces and for that contingency. >> thank you. my question for all three of you and perhaps with you, general,

how long have you believed that the afghan military might not be up to the task of taking over and maintaining security against the taliban? we discussed a lot of different timelines over the last few months. has it been inevitable for five or ten years? how long have you been relaying that information or concern to senior leaders, senior administration? >> ma'am, i'll start. from the relatively short term perspective i think that the doha agreement on the signing of the doha agreement had a really pernicious effect on the government afghanistan and on its military. psychological more than anything else that we set a date certain for when we were going to leave and when they could expect it to end. for the first time there was something out there in front of them. it's an important thing. the other point and it's been my position in my judgment that if we went below an advisory level of 2500, i believe that the government of afghanistan would likely collapse in the military would follow and one might go before the alibi believed that was going to be the inevitable

result of drawing down to zero and i have express that opinion in writing for quite a while. take a look, that's my best judgment on that. going below 2500 i think was the other nail in the coffin that allowed the afghan government, it led to conditions where we could no longer see what was happening because our advisors were no longer down there with the units. let me give you an example. we shipped a box of mortar rounds into afghanistan. we would sign it on the ramp at hkia and the afghans would truck it away. there would be nobody below that level to help them disperse it, see if it went to the bazaar or it went to the unit that needed more rounds. >> thank you. appreciate that. secretary austin. >> i certainly agree with the comments general mckenzie has made. i would add to that that is part of that agreement, we agreed to cease conducting air operations against the taliban so the taliban got stronger.

they increased their offensive operations against the afghan security forces. the afghans were losing a lot of people on a weekly basis. in addition to that we caused them to release 5,000 prisoners. many of those prisoners went back to fill the ranks of the taliban. they got a lot stronger. they continue their attacks. we got smaller. i agree with general mckenzie. that's when you can begin to see things really begin -- >> with the last four seconds, i appreciate your time. very intriguing that it seems like the doha agreement might've been a pivotal point. thank you. with that, i yield back. >> general milley, you said today you saw this as strategic failure. as a 30-year veteran who's been deployed four times myself. i haven't served as long as three of you.

it breaks our heart. i think most veterans are heartbroken at the blood on the treasure spilled. the strategic failure. i think we are enraged by it. then we have the president come out and say that this was a success and he had no regrets. that does not break our heart. that makes us mad as hell. to say that up front. secondly president biden on abc said that no one that he can recall advised him to keep a force of 2500 troops in afghanistan. that's not true. we heard yesterday and we are today that the chairman of the joint chiefs and the commander advised fridley. i have no other view to see this as a lie, falsehood from our president.

that makes us mad as hell too. thirdly, i think it's important to point out that this committee for well over a year caution both presidents against premature withdrawal from afghanistan. members of the house and senate were so concerned about a calendar based withdrawal that we passed a law to prevent it. the chairman of the committee voted for it when it restricted president trump. preventing any present regardless of political party from drawing down below 2500 troops. until there was a detailed plan extending how the u.s. would continue to conduct counterterror operations in afghanistan following u.s. withdrawal. how would the u.s. conduct an orderly transition of security functions to the afghan military? how would the u.s. protect americans remaining in country and how with the u.s., any such withdrawal with our nato allies.

everything will failure we are witnessing congress warned against in writing a law over a year ago. after taking office, president biden i am referring to, we wrote to the biden administration reminding them it was not permitted to go below 2500 until vital interests could be secured. despite clear congressional intent backed by statute, this did not happen for the day after taking office, the newly confirmed undersecretary of defense of policy wrote to the members of the committee essentially stating that president biden was smarter than congress, confident he had all the angles covered. believed it was not in the national interest to provide congress with the assurance is required. mr. chairman, i ask unanimous consent to enter this letter into the record. >> without objections, so ordered. >> my first question, general mckenzie, one of the reasons the afghan forces crumbled much quicker than we ever assessed was that we pulled most of our air cover.

we took the mechanics away from the afghan forces, and we pulled out a lot of our logistics capabilities. do you see this underlying reasons why the afghan forces collapsed? >> i think all those reasons contributed to why they collapsed. >> only take away most of our air power that they were used to having that that would pull the rug out from underneath them. >> my position all along has been if you go to a state where you're not going to be able to maintain forces on the ground, collapse is inevitable. after further say i did not see it coming as fast as it did. i thought it would be a matter of into the fall or winter. i didn't see it happening in 11 days in august. >> thank you. general milley, appreciate your candor about this being a strategic failure. how does it embolden isis and what does it do to russia, china, iran? >> i think the taliban sitting in kabul significantly emboldens the radical jihadi movement

globally. the analogy i've used with many others is that it will likely put a shot of adrenaline into their arm. their grandfathers defeated the soviet union in the war in afghanistan many, many years ago. they are taking this on their own networks right now. declaring it a major victory. i think it's a big morale boost. i think it remains to be seen. i think the russians are quite scared, not scared, i guess concerned. of terrorists coming across the borders into their -- china is very complicated. they have a significant issue in the western part of their country. i think iran now has to deal with a very complicated issue on their border. >> the gentleman's time has expired. >> i yield. >> i want to make a comment because i watched the george stephanopoulos interview before this hearing. joe biden did not say that no one suggested that we should

keep 2500 troops. >> i read the quote. >> i have the time. what he said was you cannot have 2500 troops stay there in a stable situation. so we should at least be accurate about what information was provided. i would urge everyone to go back and actually look at the words and not take what is being said here as accurate. >> chairman, i read the quote. >> i read it too and i read it with a clear, open vision of what he was saying, not with a bent to try to make sure we could successfully have a partisan attack on him. he was asked, could they stay there in a stable environment. that's the option he said wasn't on the table. not because it wasn't offered because it didn't exist. while we are ripping apart these three gentlemen here, i want to remind everybody that the decision the president made was to stop fighting a war that after 20 years it was proven we could not win.

there was no easy way to do that. >> mr. chairman, i believe general bacon was clear. >> i will be happy to yield mister rogers' time when i am done. when he made clear was we needed to stop fighting a war that for 20 years we've had these conversations over and over again. democrats bash on the republican president more than they bash on the democratic president. republicans bash on the democratic presidents more than they bash on the republican presidents. but the end result was the same. 20 years of an endless series of decisions five very intelligent, very capable, very committed people. any implication that the three gentlemen in front of us are not very capable, very intelligent, very committed to this country is simply partisan political opportunism. we can look at 20 years. pick your favorite general. pick your favorite president. pick your favorite leader.

none of them could successfully do what so many members of this committee are sitting here telling these gentlemen that they are basically idiots for not being able to do. we should pause for just a moment and think about the fact that maybe that's the wrong argument. may be the mission itself was really hard to achieve. what president biden said is we are done. we are not going to have this anymore. we are not going to have it. not going to lose the service members fighting a war that it is clear we cannot be successful. this decision, that decision, why did you say this or do that? 20 years a whole lot of different people leaving has led us to this point. we said we are going to stop. >> mr. chairman. they are bringing the ward -- bringing the war here. it's coming to america.

we count on you and your leadership and your generals journal of the war war is not over. >> clear point of order. >> we are not done with this war. >> the point is yes, we're going to have to continue to contain this threat. >> in excuse for the failure of the withdrawal. >> mr. chairman, point of order. >> mister rogers of the ranking member on the committee and i will give them time to respond. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i did note the stephanopoulos interview and i disagree with your interpretation. >> mr. stephanopoulos came back and asked him again, you're saying that nobody advised you to leave the troops and that was his response but i think that the general officers here and the secretary made it very clear that they gave the president advised that he would listen to. the last president they gave him advice and he did listen to it. so i'm not challenging it. i am not in any way disparaged these great gentlemen.

in my opening remarks i made it abundantly clear i don't want them, not bringing blame for what happened in this withdrawal when it was the administration, the state department. >> wister crow -- mr. crow was recognized. >> thank you. i can't help but think back to my last deployment in afghanistan in 2005. there was a moment where i'd been awake for several days walking with a heavy rucksack in the mountains of afghanistan and wondering and asking myself, where was the debate? why weren't people asking the questions then? why weren't people paying attention? i'm glad they are. but is chairman smith, i don't

really -- [video breaking up] ten congresses. it's a 20 year conflict that our country owns and we have to have a broader discussion. it's not a two-month conflict. i appreciate your candor and i appreciate the seriousness with all -- with all three of you have dealt with. serious issues to be addressed. i've two lines of questioning. one about our continuing obligation to our partners in the next about the planning in advance of the evacuation. i want to start the partner question with the recognition that i believe firmly that all three of you share as deeply as i do. we have a continuing obligation. all three of you served i know that all three of you have friends who were still there. they have names and faces.

i'm not going to question your commitment to this. the department has a very narrow but important role going forward in that role is to provide employment verification to folks so they can be properly vetted and evacuated. that's very hard to do without boots on the ground now so what can the department do more going forward and what is the plan to do that employment verification, and to get the paperwork in the hands of her friends so we can get them evacuated? >> one of my under secretaries is leading the effort to ensure that we can help improve the process of employment verification. if you think back 20 years ago when people were helping us, helping contractors that were

working for us, some of the documentation very, very difficult to get your hands on it. we are working to see what we can do to improve this. we want to work with congress if there's any way we can adjust requirements or adjust our ability to ease the process along, we certainly want to do that. we are taking this on in a very serious way. >> i appreciate that we stand ready and willing to continue to work with you to solve this. certainly our combat operations are over but we have that continuing obligation, as you have often noted. the last is about the evacuation planning. there were two tabletop rehearsals, one in june and one in august, the june 111 dealt with processing of evacuees. interagency tabletop exercises that involve department of state.

the august 61, my understanding that with scenarios for both the permissive and nonpermissive neo so for the august 6 tabletop, the statement was involved in that. coming out of that tabletop exercise, the department had an opinion adequate understanding as to the state departments plan and role to conduct vetting and processing of evacuees at hkia. >> i believe they did but i also urged state. i felt that by nature the department of defense can move very fast on issues like this. i felt like we were not completely lined with state. there are some things that they could do faster and i believe they tried their best to address those in terms of providing additional processing power to move people through the chain. state representatives took that message on board very seriously at the tabletop exercises. >> the lack of complete alignment in your view has to do with the processing power that

is necessary to push forward on the ground. >> probably other things. that was from my perspective, being responsible for identifying people, getting them out of afghanistan and getting them into the pipeline. that's what i was personally most concerned about. there were other issues. that was my principal concern. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i yield i yield fact. >> congressman crow. 20 april and 8 may pay >> the gentlemen's time has expired. i recognize mr. banks. >> general milley, why is it important the military to be nonpolitical? >> in a political military is critical to the health of this republic. >> yesterday and today you spent a significant amount of time talking to political book authors and political reporters. what compelled you to do that? >> i believe part of my job is to communicate to the media what

we do as a government, what we do as a military to explain to the people. i do interviews regularly with print media, books, documentaries, videos on tv, tv interviews. i think it's part of the senior officials job to be transparent and i believe in a free press. >> what happens when a military general becomes a political figure? >> i would -- >> you would agree it's dangerous. >> i would agree it's dangerous i've done my best to remain personally apolitical and keep the military out of domestic politics and i made a point of that from the time i became the chairman. >> you told us yesterday that you hadn't read the book or any of the political books that have come out. i don't know how anybody could read the bob woodward book. i don't know how you couldn't read it and be greatly embarrassed about its contents especially how it's related to you. are you embarrassed by the book? >> i haven't read the book. >> were you embarrassed by the

portrayals of the book. no doubt you're aware? >> embarrassed, no. i'm concerned that there is mischaracterizations of me becoming politicized as an individual and that it's my willingness to be politicized which is not true. i'm trying to stay apolitical and i believe i am. it's part of my professional ethic i'm trying to keep the military, the actual military of actual domestic politics. >> do you regret speaking with bob woodward? >> no. i think it's important for me to speak to the media. >> want to talk about some of the contents of the book, since you haven't read it maybe i can read some of it to you. we've heard a little bit about the back-and-forth with you and speaker pelosi. in that conversation, you said in a phone call with speaker pelosi, she said "republicans are enablers of president trump's behavior. you know he's crazy. he has been crazy for a long time." you replied, "i agree with you on everything."

that was repeated three times in a prologue of the book that you told speaker pelosi you agree with her on everything. is that an accurate portrayal of your recounting to bob woodward about the conversations? >> not exactly, no. i know what i said which was that of speaker, i am not qualified to determine the mental health or assess the mental health of this president or any president. >> you told the speaker you agreed with her on everything. >> what i was referring to was that i agreed we need to have processes and procedures in place to make sure that we don't have an accidental, illegal, unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. i do agree and we do have those procedures. >> you said you'd agreed with her. >> i'm not agreeing with her assessment of the president. >> the book also goes on talking about the january 6 riot. it says you told bob woodward

that you wrote in a list in your notebook of groups who personally believed were responsible for the attack and that you associated with it. you called these groups "domestic terrorists" or domestic terrorism. that list included in your notebook according to bob woodward and your conversations with him, nazis and oath keepers but it also included two conservative media outlets you listed in your notebook, including the epic times would by the by the way is a news outlet founded by critics of the chinese communist party and newsmax, which is the second most-watched conservative media outlet in the country today. do your notes about january 6 reference epic times and newsmax is on a test of domestic terrorism. >> i'm not recalling this conversation at all. >> it's in the book. >> and may be in the book. i haven't read the book. >> not recall the conversation. >> do you have a notebook that

lists newsmax and epic times as domestic terrorists? or is bob woodward lying to us? >> it could be a misunderstanding about what was actually said. recognize for 5 minutes. >> thank you for being here and for the work you've done. i think obviously the level of back-and-forth on the committee

today represents some real stress in the system about the withdrawal and what it means but also about an interest in politicizing national security issues which i have real issues with. can i just asked, i think the question i get asked the most in my district about our withdrawal from afghanistan is are we safer now than we were on september 10, 2001. i believe in life certainly answered many veterans who have reached out that i believe their work was valuable and worthy. we kept al qaeda and other groups distracted and destabilized so that we could build up our national security apparatus, our homeland security here to make us safer. it's hard to hear from this

panel that right now we are safer but we have to watch for the reconstitution of terrorist groups. no one likes to hear that. i would ask that we get a classified briefing on our over the horizon posture just so we understand, understand we can't do it in open session. just so we understand what on this committee, what we can expect when it comes to watching those threats. i would ask that commitment. as someone who served in iraq, with the cia, we watched the reconstitution of al qaeda in western iraq which we came ices. one of the tripwires? secretary austin and general milley that you are looking for they would push you to engage the white house to say we have a real problem here? what are those specific things that you're looking for that would change your assessment from one of we are all right right now to we need to take

more significant military action. >> thanks, first on your request for an over the horizon capability brief. we will certainly sign up for that. i committed to the chairman to do that early on. will have general mckenzie and the joint staff in my policy people in that brief as well. in terms of specific areas that we are focused on, we are looking at their ability to develop a capability to export terror to the homeland here. whether or not we see senior leaders beginning -- freedom of movement in afghanistan, if we see them develop a capability and training camps and other things, if we see them moving people back and forth across international boundaries, those

are things that we are looking for. it will take time to develop true intel picture of what's going on and we have begun that. we will remain focused on this. >> general milley. >> of the specific indicators and warnings i would like to take to a different session. in general what we are looking for, leadership, capability, training, those sorts of things, demonstrations of intent that al qaeda and/or isis is going to do external operations against the united states or our interests. if we pick up on those, it's our obligation to present to the president. >> general milley, we have seen some reports that in our attempts to try and get over the horizon posture in countries around afghanistan that we have had discussions with the

russians left out some cooperation. can you help us understand that? for many of us, that gives us -- the hair on our neck starts to go up. can you expand what we are discussing with the russians and what we are willing to do and not do with the russians. >> i prefer to take that into a classified session. as you probably know a week or ten days ago i discussed in europe with the russians, how session. all of the nato nations oneida separate session with my counterpart. i can talk to you what a classified session. in the main, we're not asking permission, not negotiating i guess is the word. president putin and president biden had a conversation and i was following up on that conversation at the direction of my superiors. >> i would say i think given that it's not permissible to share classified information,

this committee should be informed should there be any movement towards that with the russians. >> the gentle ladies time has expired. we will have continued briefs. south asia will be a crucial policy. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general milley, january 6 we had a violent attack on our capital. it was an effort to stop the constitutionally prescribed process accounting electoral votes, the first time in our nations history we did not have a peaceful transfer of power. in the aftermath of that attack, many of the members of our constitutional system failed to do their duty. many of them today are still attempting to obstruct the investigation into that attack, attempting to whitewash what happened. general milley, you found yourself in your constitutionally prescribed rule

standing in the region for any member of this committee, any american, to question your loyalty to our nation, to question your understanding of our constitution, your loyalty to our constitution, your recognition and understanding of the civilian chain of command, is despicable. i want to apologize for those members of this committee who have done so and i want to thank you for standing the breach when so many, including many in this room, failed to do so. with respect to afghanistan, the only question for us with respect to the deployment of troops in afghanistan, what is u.s. security require? the circumstances we found ourselves in in afghanistan, the deployment of forces was allowing us to conduct counterterrorism operations, counterintelligence operations, enabling us to prevent terrorists from establishing safe havens. general milley, terrorists now have an entire country of

afghanistan. could you tell the committee whether or not you think the current situation in afghanistan following the withdrawal of forces which began with the doha agreement and the orders that you've described in the trump administration which was carried out in the biden administration, can you tell the committee whether or not you think we are more safe or less safe? whether afghanistan presents more of a threat or less of a threat to our home land. >> i think right this minute we are more safe because of the efforts of the last 20 years but i do think that conditions are more likely than not to develop for the course of time that will allow for the reconstitution of al qaeda and/or isis. that time varies depending on which analyst you're listening to. sometime between six to 12, maybe 36 months. >> when you look at the situation that we face today in terms of what's going to be

necessary, and the loss of life, love the loss of charter has been tragic, devastating. when you look at where we are likely to find ourselves, do you think that our ability to defend ourselves will now be more extensive? will cost more in terms of lives and treasure going forward? or do you believe that the withdrawal present a situation where we have less resources for the war on terror? >> i think the ends are going to remain the same to protect the american people but the means will change. not impossible. we have the can abilities and means to do it but it will be more difficult. >> secretary austin, are members of the haqqani network still a potential target for the united states military? >> we do recognize that members of the haqqani network are recognized terrorists. >> they are a potential target

for the united states military question mexico potentially. >> secretary austin, the biden administration has been saying that the doha agreement is still in effect and that they will hold the taliban to their quote counterterrorism commitments in the doha agreement. but the taliban is using this agreement to protect terrorists. the taliban is intertwined with the haqqani network and al qaeda has in fact sworn to the taliban. can you explain exactly how that agreement that the terrorists was going to be useful in some kind of tool to hold the taliban to any kind of commitment? >> i think we should do everything in our power to keep pressure on the taliban to do what they said that they were going to do. we heard what they said. we will watch their actions. i think we should continue to apply pressure wherever possible to cause them to keep al qaeda

activity in check. again, you've heard her say couple times today that we recognize that this is the taliban and trust is not an issue necessarily. we hear what they are saying and we are watching what they do. >> thank you. my time has expired. >> thank you. secretary austin, general milley, general mckenzie. i have quite a few questions. some i may have to submit for the record because i think it's important to start with this. and echo my republican colleagues opening. we have continued to see attacks on our democracy and our values. members represent and at least historically would've been the extreme elements of the republican party. attacks including but not limited to the horrible attack on our capitol and congress. one of the cornerstones is

civilian, not military rule. it is sacrosanct to those of us who have worn the uniform. judging from the attacks by some members of this committee, it's poorly understood by those who have not. i have concerns about how the neo was executed but i must applaud all of you for scrupulously insuring our civilian government remains the decision-making authority as you continue to provide your best military advice even when at times your advice differed from the decisions made. thank you. i'd like to now turn to some questions that i have related to the timeline of events. as i understand, in february of 2020, president trump made an agreement with with the taliban to withdraw u.s. troops by may 1, 2021 in exchange for several conditions including halting attacks against u.s. forces. by the time he left office, president trump had drawn down

forces to 2,500 and publicly indicated his intent to complete the withdrawal if he had been reelected and i think chairman milley, you mentioned the ten november 2020 withdrawal of troops by 15 january 2020 which was rescinded and the 17 novemb0 by 19 january. is that correct? >> it was a memo dated 11 november, two days after the secretary was fired. on the 17th it was rescinded. the first memo said go to 0 in the seconds and go to 2500. >> thank you. were you consulted on the decisions to open negotiations away with the taliban to the exclusion of the afghan government, general? >> very, very late in the game, days before the signing. >> general milley, where their concrete plans for withdraw from the previous administration that

were shared and developed with military leadership? >> we were at 12,600 on the day that the doha agreement. u.s. military in afghanistan when the doha agreement was signed. part of that agreement was to go then it was to bring down all the u.s. military nato contractors, close all bases by 1 may. it was agreement signed by the government, we dutifully executed over time from february 20 all the way through based on set of milestones. we did withdraw and had lay plan to withdraw. >> did the plans include plans to evacuate civilian american personnels and siv holders? >> yes, general mckenzie and sitcomdid develop neo plans, not large siv holders and lots of american citizens,