president. maybe today we will find out a little bit more. the united states secret service acting director ronald rowe is holding a news conference. he is set to update the american people on the investigation into that first assassination attempt against trump at his rally in butler, pennsylvania. now we are also hoping that there will be some mention of the second attempt just on sunday. it is only friday. just take a minute. the news moves so quickly sometimes we don't take it all in and this times we don't have any excuses not as journalists, and if you are doing a podcast, whatever you do because i know kamala harris' people and her campaign seem to think that is journalism, too, wherever you can ask some good questions of this administration, let's take in how to protect our leaders, current, past, and future. thanks for watching "outnumbered" this week. have a great weekend. "america reports" now. >> sandra: acting secret service tractor ronald rowe is about to speak.

this is going to be happening any moment now. a briefing, okay, from the nation's agency that has been running this investigation into the first assassination attempt against former president donald trump. this is an important moment that is a live look in washington where it this all about to go down. hello, everyone. i'm sandra smith in new york. hi john. >> john: these things typically happen on time, have an early the last time so we expect the next few seconds or minutes or so. i'm john roberts in washington and this is "america reports." this hour the agency will also release a summary of its internal report examining the security failures that occurred on july 13th at that now-infamous location in butler, pennsylvania, peered fox news is told the final report will be released in the coming days, maybe a couple weeks, which wilo congress before it is made public. >> sandra: as the secret service continues its probe of what went wrong, so horribly wrong there in pennsylvania, critics are asking how a security lapse could happen again after a man armed

with a gun comes within several hundred yards of the former president in florida. that briefing is now beginning in washington. let's listen. >> dynamic threat environment. the mission of the secret service is clear. we cannot afford to fail. after reviewing the planning, event details, and coordination with partner agencies regarding the attempted assassination of former president donald trump on july 13th, our mission assurance review is nearing its completion. as i've said, this was a failure on the part of the united states secret service. it's important that we hold ourselves accountable for the failures of july 13th. and that we use the lessons learned to make sure that we do not have another failure like this again. the findings of the mission assurance review have prompted the secret service to move into the accountability phase of this process. the office of professional responsibility and the office of integrity are reviewing the findings.

and as a result of these failures, what has become clear to me as we need a shift in paradigm in how we conduct our productive operations. as was demonstrated on sunday in west palm beach, the threat level is evolving and requires this paradigm shift. but here are some of assurance review. with respect to command and control of the site in butler, pennsylvania, the secret service has the main responsibility of building the site plan. we cannot advocate or defer our responsibilities to others. advance team personnel have an obligation to ensure that each site meets the protective requirements and principles of secret service methodologies. the secret service did not give clear guidance or direction to our local law enforcement partners. there were communication deficiencies between law enforcement personnel at the site. for example, the secret service did not colocate its security

room with local law enforcement. there was an overreliance on mobile devices. resulting in information being siloed. for example, at approximately 18:10 local time, secret service informed personnel the local police were addressing an issue at the 3:00 of the outer perimeter. at approximately 18:10 local time, via phone call, the secret service security room calls the counter sniper response agent reporting an individual on the roof of the agr building. that vital piece of information was not relayed over the secret service radio network. at approximately 18:10 and 54 seconds, verified through body camera footage of local law enforcement, officers confront the assailant on the roof of the agr building. at 18:11:05, via phone call, the

site agent calls the assistant site agent to find out what exactly is going on at the 3:00 and during that call shots ring out. at 18:11:32, verified through body camera portage, the first series of shots are fired by the assailant. at 18:11:36, again verified through body camera footage, a second series of shots are fired by the assailant. at 18:11:47, through body camera footage, secret service counter snipers neutralized the threat. with respect to diligence, line of sight issues were acknowledged, but not properly mitigated. issues were encountered the day of the visit with respect to line of sight concerns, but they were not escalated to supervisors. while some members of the advanced team were very diligent, there was complacency on the part of others that lead

to a breach of security protocols. with respect to accountability, the mission assurance review has identified deficiencies in the advanced planning and its implementation by secret service personnel. these employees will be held accountable and this agency has among the most robust table of penalties in the entirety of the federal government. and these penalties will be administered according to our disciplinary process. do to federal regulations, i cannot get into personnel matters as they are proceeding. with respect to a paradigm shift, we are at a pivotal moment in the history of the secret service and at a pivotal moment in the history of our country. and i have directed that the secret service embark on a significant paradigm shift that will redefine how we conduct protective operations. what occurred on sunday demonstrates that the threat environment in which the secret service operates is

tremendous and under constant threat. and we have been in this heightened and increasingly dynamic threat environment since july 13th. this reality has necessitated that we significantly increase our protective footprint, and we have already begun to do so following the events of of july 13th. this increased operational tempo requires additional resources to not only account for costs being incurred today, but ensure we have the tools, the technology, and personnel needed to meet these new requirements and execute our mission going forward. the paradigm shift will be a driving force to move the secret service from a state of reaction to a state of readiness. the mission is for the secret service to be more agileo escalate protection to the highest levels for numerous protectees for undetermined periods of time. but in order to do this, we need additional personnel, technical

assets, and equipment for the sustainment of immediate and future needs. our personnel have been in a state of hypervigilance following july 13th. we are certainly working our people hard, and i have used this term publicly, redlining. this cannot be about working our people harder. so with respect to changes, the workforce, the american public, they can expect changes in our processes for advances. there will be an increased use of technology. not only to assist in communications, but also situational awareness when we are doing our protective mission. there will be organizational changes. for example, i've already directed the creation of an applied research and development section to field to new technologies, leverage the research of other government agencies, and calibrate our technical security assets to stay ahead of threat vectors and technical collection impacting

secret service equities. this will be an iterative process, meaning it will be constantly evaluated, validated, updated, and evolving. we cannot be stagnant. and we must be weaned off the reliance of partners within dhs to assist us during high operational times. the secret service should be self-reliant outside of national special security events. however, we recognize that we will always need assistance from our partners within the department of homeland security and our partners at the department of defense. and i want to take this moment now also to thank you, to thank our workforce. i want to conclude by thanking the men and women of the secret service who are working tirelessly. this summer, we experienced an unprecedented operational tempo for our agency. within a 45-day period, the secret service successfully implement it are operational security planning at three national special security

events. the nato summit, the republican national convention, and the democratic national convention. we success we protected both the the president of the bait in philadelphia and multiple protectee visits commemorating f his attempt 11th attacks. all of this took place while protecting major party candidates on the campaign tr trail. this high operational tempo continues as the secret service prepares for the united nations general assembly next week. where we expect to protect more than 140 visiting world leaders and heads of state. i am proud of all that we have accomplished in a very difficult and tumultuous time for the agency. and i recognize and thank the men and women of the secret service and their families for continuing to make great sacrifices in support of our enduring mission. and with that, i will take questions. >> reporter: director, given

all of the tension and risk routine a related to these evenn all the attention and scrutiny related to these events do you believe your highest level protectees will now need to campaign differently and how they organize their events an end how they live their daily lives? things like trips to golf courses or recreational time? will they have to live differently in order to be safe? >> ultimately, kelly, it's the responsibility of the secret service to make sure that we provide a secure environment for our protectees. we want them to make sure that they can live their lives with some type of normalcy, but they must do so with us providing the highest levels of protection, which we have been doing since july 13th. and so it's ultimately our responsibility to make sure that wherever our protectees go, we are creating a safe environment, and that comes back to us being able to use our methodologies, to use our redundancies, our systems that we have in place to

create those secure environments. >> reporter: outdoor events, that kind of thing? >> director rowe: so since july 13th we have been securing successfully outdoor events. and what you are seeing is an increased use of assets, increased use of ballistic glass, so we certainly make sure that when they are out there and at outdoor venue, we are using our protective methodologies to create that safe environment. >> reporter: hello, director. thank you for taking the time. could you just kind of go into a bit more detail about the conversations you had with the trump campaign staff about selection of the butler site? the report says that secret service agents saw it as a challenge and staff wanted to have the rally there. did the staff go against your recommendation? can you speak to exactly what was said and what the outcome was? >> director rowe: so, listen, the staff chooses a site, and

ultimately it is on the secret service to secure it. so when the site was selected, the advance team went about identifying areas of concern. the agr building was one of those hazards that was identified. but let me just be clear, maria. ultimately, it is the secret service's responsibility to secure a site. we certainly have conversations, and it doesn't matter whether it is a campaign staff or white house staff, we have conversations, and we have very good working relationships with those staffs. but ultimately it is the secret service's responsibility to secure a site. >> reporter: director, thank you. based on your review and analysis, what is the reason -- what's the best explanation for why there was not law enforcement personnel covering the roof, physically on the roof itself, or making sure someone could not get on top of

the roof? and the follow-up question would be, how disappointed are you in what you described as deficiencies in diligence? >> director rowe: sure. so ultimately, we have to be very direct and clear when we are talking to our state and local counterparts. with respect to butler, i think what the mission assurance review has identified is that there was that lack of clarity. and i can tell you, since july 13th, when i have been out on the road and i have watched field offices, and i gave guidance upon becoming the acting director to the field, we have to be very clear when we are talking to our state and local partners, we value those relationships with them. we need them to be assisting us and be shoulder to shoulder with us. and it appears that there was that lack of clarity with respect -- with respect to butler. and go again with your foll

follow-up. >> reporter: so there was a lack of clarity, that roof should be secured? >> director rowe: there was discussion about how the roof was going to be secured, and i think what it came back to his we should have challenged what that, how that mechanism was being implemented, meaning we should have been more direct. we cannot be too -- we cannot be overly deferential to the state and local law enforcement. ultimately, it's our responsibility, so we just have to be very clear when we are asking them for our support. they want to help us, and what we found is that, in this, they -- in the mission assurance interviews, it became apparent, in comparison to prior visits to that area, there was one prior visit in 2020, that there was a lack of assertion with respect to what exactly state and locals would have to require or would be required to support that advance. >> reporter: how disappointed

are you when you see that this report states that some personnel did not follow secret service protocols? >> director rowe: well, not going to get into employee disciplinary matters, but what i can tell you is the men and women of the secret service are dedicated professionals. and so while july 13th is a failure, we are not proud of it, but we certainly have been rising to this moment. the men and women in the field are rising to this moment. they are working tirelessly to make sure that the people we protract are safe. so i will never be disappointed in our folks. i am proud of this agency. i am proud of our people. >> reporter: thanks so much for doing this. on the question of the agr buildings, is there a process that is standard for the day of the event that somebody from the secret service looks around and makes sure all of the assets are where they are? and since the roof of the agr building was such a glaring

omission, why didn't anybody raise that issue at the time or, secondly, in the security room, look and say i don't see any local police in here, how are we going to hear them? >> director rowe: i think that was a failure to challenge our assumption, the assumption that local police were going to have a more presence in that agr building. going back to your question, there is that diligence that has to be done by the site agents to make sure that hey, all of the assets are in place, and so there was an assumption that they had it covered, but there clearly was not that follow-up to make sure. >> reporter: but is there a process, a checklist? >> director rowe: it is part of the principles of our advance and our protective methodologies. reporter matt to follow-up on the campaign question, you said it is ultimately the secret service's responsibility, so when there is disagreement between the campaign and the secret service on a security issue, was the last word? >> director rowe: it is not about disagreement, it is about a note to go sheesh in.

they certainly don't want any harm to come to their principal so they respect us. usually what it boils down to is escalating up to a supervisor and a senior staff level. what i can tell you is if there were discrepancies, and there were, how the site was supposed to a bench occurred, supervisors were briefed, and supervisors reported in their mission assurance interviews, they envision harder assets to be able to secure that line of sight, to be able to mitigate anything that might have been looking in or created openness on the site at the butler farm show. and so on the morning of, if there were those deficiencies, they were never escalated up to the supervisors to be able to resolve. >> reporter: thank you, sir. i have two questions. they are related. the first is looking forward. the house just voted within the last couple of hours unanimously from those that were present in the chamber to give presidential candidates the exact same

secret service protection as sitting presidents. my first question is, can you handle that? >> director rowe: we've been doing that since july 13th, david. >> reporter: so what is the purpose of the bill? >> director rowe: i don't know, you have to ask members of congress that. when i say the highest levels of secret service protection, the former president is getting tactical assets. he is getting everything that the former president -- i'm sorry, that the current president has with respect to secret service assets. >> reporter: that was my second question. can you explain that president, former president trump is getting the same protection as president biden and vice president harris? because a lot of numbers of congress on capitol hill are skeptical about that. there is a lot of talk saying clearly he didn't have the same protection because if he did, the golf course would have been secure in west palm beach. can you tell people what's going on with that? >> director rowe: so with respect to west palm beach, what i can tell you that getting into our ttp's, techniques and tactics, procedures, but i can

tell you is on that day there were counter sniper elements that were present with the former president on the golf course, in proximity. there was an entire counter assault team that was there in proximity. there was also a jump team in proxim the advance agent who is part of the first element, whose goal was to sweep ahead, did his job. that young man is a very young agent, early in his career. his vigilance, his reaction, is exactly how we train and exactly how we want our personnel to do. he identified a threat, and individuals a long gun, and he meets with decisions and took a swift action to be able to mitigate that. no shot was fired at the former president. the former president was not exposed to where he was on the golf course. and what i've said, and i said this monday, that the procedures work. the redundancies work. so that high level of protection is working. >> reporter: acting director,

thank you very much for doing this. two questions, just one on west palm beach. the busy public road that is adjacent to that sixth hole where the suspect was hiding, is a well-known blind spot on that specific golf course. why did no one within the u.s. secret service sweep behind that fence line for threats? >> director rowe: they were sweeping, they were sweeping ahead, nicole. so i just explained, that element, the lead element was going ahead, sweeping. >> reporter: but was there anyone behind the fence where the road was sweeping there to see if anyone was in the bushes? >> director rowe: having been there and seen the vantage point, whether they were on the public slider the private side, bottom line is the individual was detected. >> reporter: on butler, you testified before congress that all assets requested for the butler rally by trump's detail were approved, but there are secret service assets that may have prevented the tragedy on july 13th, most notably a counter assault advance team that would have surveyed the site ahead of time or enhanced

counter drone protection that might have prevented the tragedy. were those specific assets requested by trump's detail? if they were, were they denied, if they weren't, why were they requested? >> director rowe: so the counter assault team had an element that was there that had embedded with local law enforcement, so we had tactical elements in place. the counter assault team leader that day had been in direct contact in the days leading up to july 13th with those tactical elements. >> reporter: just to be clear, did the trump detail ask for any additional resources that were denied by the secret service? >> director rowe: so based on the asset, based on the information i have right now, the asset request, all those assets that were asked for were approved. and so what we are looking at now is where there any additional ones that came in through other channels? but what i can tell you, based on the information i have now, the assets were approved.

>> reporter: two questions. when we are talking about florida and the idea that this was the secret service working as it should, does this mean that no security will change for trump when he goes golfing again? >> director rowe: well, i think what we try to do, after every incident we look at it, what could we have done better? we look at everything. and it doesn't matter whether there was a crackle incident that occurs. so we are looking at we are reevaluating to look at do we need, i have had conversations with sheriff bradshaw in palm beach county so i will leave it to the local field office to carry on those conversations. about making changes. that's where i will leave that. reporter mack and then on butler if we controlled on the specific timeline a little bit, 6:oh eight we know a local radio call went out that a man was on the roof. now my understanding is that the state police were in a separate

area with locals and their job was to communicate any local chatter to the secret service. why was that 6:08 radio call not communicated to the secret service, or was it by the state police? >> director rowe: so the information i have is we had a member of the pennsylvania state police in our security room, and that is what spurs that phone call to the counter sniper response agent at 18:10. >> reporter: so the state police never comedic aided a local radio call at 6:08? >> director rowe: the personnel that was in the security room passed that information and that triggers the 18:10 phone call. spray. >> reporter: okay. >> reporter: hi. i know congress has sounded a little resistant lately in terms of what it might do for funding for the secret service. given the sort of paradigm shift that you've laid out today, i'm curious what you'll be looking for from congress and sort of what you are seeking from

lawmakers to carry that out. >> director rowe: we have been briefing. we have been providing information. right now, i do think, and you know, congress has questions. we are responding to those questions and providing them information. but at the end of the day i think everybody wants a strong secret service, and that's what i'm working towards. that is what members are working towards. so we will continue to have those conversations. >> reporter: hi. thank you so much for doing this. republicans in congress, they want the same level of security on the president and the candidates. how realistic really is that? can you be more specific on that? i know you answered that question, but can a candidate have the same level of security of a sitting president? and also, what changes are we expecting in the security area? where most of the incidents happen? >> director rowe: so how i

approach that, claudia, is this. the way the secret service is structured, the president of the united states has the highest level of protection of any world leader. period, the end. the number of assets that the secret service provides and the department of defense provides is at the highest levels. those same highest levels with respect to the secret service are being provided to the former president's detail. and so when it comes to maintaining this, where we are at right now, we have finite resources. the way we are structured with some of our classified assets, with some of our personnel, and with -- we have now expanded that to include the former president. and so while we can do this, it is certainly -- we are burning through a lot of assets and resources. and that's the argument that we've been trying to show. this isn't some pie in the sky trying to say hey, we want this now. we are not capitalizing on a

crisis. we are showing the math. we have finite resources. and we are stretching those resources to their maximum right now. which is going to require us to replace these assets. it's going to require us to also adjust, to look at this and evaluate that if we have to do this again, or do it because of some other situation that we have no other control of, we have to be able to sustain that for an indefinite period of time, and so i am hopeful and i am certainly engaged in these discussions, and i feel like at the end, we will get there because we have no other choice. >> reporter: what changes are you going to make outside of the secure area? that zone where everything happened? >> director rowe: the outer perimeter. i think that is where we have to be very direct and clear with our state and local partners as to what we are asking of them. >> reporter: thank you, acting

director. i've got two questions. the first, it is understanding it takes anywhere from 4-10 years for an agent to go through the training that rises them up to a presidential detail level. you've described a manpower issue. given that, do you think that training time frame might so you can expedite getting more officers to a presidential detail, should you need that? >> director rowe: so we are not going to drop standards, joe, we have not dropped standards. you do need to develop those agents. when agents start, you cannot put them on the highest level protection protecting a protectee. when they graduate from our facility, they go to a field. they do advances. they do criminal investigations. the importance of having that, what we call phase one, that is where those agents that are doing federal investigations, that are interfacing with local law enforcement, those are skills that they learn, analytic skills, how to conduct a federal investigation, how to interact with a u.s. attorney, how to interact with a state or local agency, and all the while they

are doing that, they are also popping in and out doing protection, whether they are doing it in new york city for a united nations general assembly, or they are doing in advance for a visiting head of state or world leader that comes into their field office district. that is where they cultivate and sharpen those skills, and it will take them up until probably four years, ideally that sweet spot is between the fourth and fifth year, where we send them off to a permanent detail. that is where we are getting to as far as the career path. and so it's critically important that we make sure that we still develop people. being on the presidential protected division or the vice presidential detail, it is a very, very high pressure situation. and it requires a lot of maturity. it requires decision-making, analytic skills, and the ability to problem solve. and it takes time to develop those skills. even though we have put you through training. the more seasoning you have in the field, the better off you are going to be as far as being

a protection agent. >> reporter: so how do you address the manpower issue quickly? >> director rowe: so right now we have had robust hiring. this year by the time we close out the fiscal year we are going to hire more than 400 special agents this year. right now it looks like we are going to have a net gain in the hundreds, triple-digit net gains. something that we have not seen in a little while. i can tell you that applications right now are at an all-time high for applicants seeking employment with the united states secret service. so i do believe that we are going to meet this. we have no choice. we have the 2028 summer olympics ahead of us in los angeles. the secret service will be responsible for the security planning of that. that is going to require a tremendous amount of personnel, tremendous amount of resources, and a tremendous amount of collaboration with state and local and other federal partners. we are going to get there. we are getting there now. we have filled all of our training classes going into this next fiscal year. so we are getting there. we have turned the corner.

we are showing those metrics to congress. and i think that is the question that they have had, and we are going to show them that we can deliver on this. >> reporter: and second question, former president trump has said he is going to the alabama georgia football game this weekend. are those kinds of events, particularly concerning given he could be around tens if not hundreds of thousands of people? >> director rowe: so i'm not going to comment on protectees schedules. i will tell you each event is complex at each advance is different. those advance teams, they know what they have to do to make a secure environment for our protectees. >> reporter: thank you for doing this. you said we were now moving into the accountability phase of this butler investigation. you did not want to discuss names of who might be punished, so to speak, but can you give us more detail, at least maybe how many people would face punishment or repercussions for what happened in butler? at what levels of the

organization those people represent, and what level of punishment again they may face. >> director rowe: again, i can't comment on this. this is a personnel matter that is still pending. what i can tell you is i have not asked for anybody to retire. that was not -- i know some of that was reported. that is false. and with respect to the disciplinary process, it will be handled in accordance with our table of penalties that will be led by the office of integrity and coordination with our office of professional responsibility. >> reporter: and then one follow-up, as well. all this talk about making things more robust, more agents in the field, this type of thing. this is not the first presidential election you guys have had to secure, so why weren't all of those moves put in place prior to this year's election? >> director rowe: so the former president has had robust security around him since he left office. more robust than prior former presidents.

>> reporter: thank you, acting director row. has security been adjusted or increased following the florida attempted assassination attempt, after all according to congressman matt gaetz, a dhs official has warned there are five assassination teams targeting former president trump. the official warned there isn't enough protection to deal with that level of threat. are you aware of this assessment and what is the secret service doing to respond? >> director rowe: so i will tell you, as i mentioned earlier, we of course are evaluating coming out of west palm beach and we are having those conversations with state and locals. i am not going to talk about unnamed sourcing or the report you mentioned. i'm not familiar with that. >> reporter: and local law enforcement doesn't have the same training that secret service agents do. will the secret service be training local law enforcement ahead of events to prevent another butler? >> director rowe: we are

actually having some very good discussions with the federal law enforcement training center about developing a curriculum to assist our state and local partners. what i will say is some of the things we have been talking about, our state and local partners -- and i know people have said they are not trained like the secret service. men and women of law enforcement protect their communities every day. they understand how to handle a crisis situation. they understand how to respond to a violent felony in progress. they know what their jobs are. we certainly, when we ask them and enlist their assistance, you know, we are relying on them. so i think it is important that we always try to get back to them, whether it is through training or forensic support or investigative support, so one of the things we are contemplating now is partnering with the federal law-enforcement turning center to develop not only in law enforcement guide, but also develop a training curriculum with a cadre of secret service

personnel to be able to train them in the principles of advance. that will help them when dignitaries come to their district or perhaps they are protecting a mayor or locally protelected official. next month, we are going to unveil a guide on how to come up with a multidisciplinary threat assessment team. going to be led. we are very in tune with our state and local partners, constant evaluating what we can do to not only bolster those relationships but give back to them. >> reporter: thank you. >> reporter: and a lot of ground in the questions. i guess i would just ask... guys, i don't know. you guys have really covered it, i'm sorry. i'm going to give my question.

>> reporter: >> reporter: i'm going to go back to the line of sight issues in the roof issues. can you lay out very clearly who is responsible for security on those routes? was it the locals? what was the plan and how did it fail? and secondly you keep talking about a paradigm shift, but what does that mean? can you kind of detail what you mean by that? >> director rowe: with respect to the agr building and that is where you are going, right, when we construct a site, not only are we worried about who can get into a site but also who can look into that site. it should have been clearer direction about what we needed done at the agr building. that was discussed during the advance, but i think there was a lack of follow-through based on the information i have now and what i am seeing. there should have been better follow-through in some aspects of that about access control to that property, but access

control to the collateral property of the agr building, and so it was about not giving the state and locals clearer direction on what we needed d done. with respect to the paradigm shift, this is about looking at the organization holistically. for example, the communications issue. communications were problematic. and i think where i am looking at is we need to have communications that are more closely aligned to the operations, and so coming out of july 13th, what i have seen and the direction i gave is we have to be very -- we have to be very efficient with where we are putting our security rooms. recently i was on a visit where again, similar to butler, there was a unified command post, just as there was in butler. there was one at this location. were not only did you have emergency services in so far as fire life safety, but you had emergency management officials. you had the highway patrol and the state police in that room. you had local law enforcement in that room. you had secret service agents in

that room monitoring frequencies and listening to what was going on in those state and local networks. in addition to that, the locals were flying a drone in proximity to the site. that drone feed was being beamed into that unified command post and our agents had total domain awareness about what was going on. also, they had traffic cams. they were able to pipe in those traffic cams into that unified command post. that is the model by which our field, they have taken this to heart, and those special agent in the field are now having those conversations and they are directing exactly what we need and they are posting our people exactly where we need to be so that when our protectees are in a site, we have total awareness of what's going on around us and we have total awareness of what's being communicated on those local networks. >> reporter: if i could just follow up with one question. down in west palm beach, on the evening of the attempted assassination down there, the local chief bradshaw had said that during when trump was president, there would have been a lot more security around the

perimeter, but basically now the secret service does the best that they can. but you have said that he has got the highest levels of security now. i mean, can you compare and contrast, is it the same now as he would have been while he was sitting president? >> director rowe: so what i will say is the former president has the highest levels of secret protection. i think the sheriff actually went back and clarified his statement so i will point you to that. i believe he did that on monday. >> reporter: thank you, director. i wanted to ask about sunday's incident, as well. is it your view, i know you have talked about the procedures working as intended, is it your view there wasn't any type of security lapsed allowed that armed individual to get within a few hundred yards of the former president? >> director rowe: i can tell you is we are looking at it from an after action report, looking at reviewing that. but what i think it goes to show, that is why we have tripwires. that is why we have systems out there. that is why we have redundancies built into a protective model,

and that is what was demonstrated on sunday. >> reporter: in terms of the report, what specifically will be different on the grand. are you mandating that command have both secret service and local law enforcement in them? will law-enforcement have to communicate on the same frequencies? are there any sort of practical changes you've made that are in effect based on the report? >> director rowe: security room location, being where local law enforcement is. the broad use of technical security assets, ballistic glass, leveraging partnerships with the department of defense to be able to move materials, move personnel across the country in support of a nominee. those are things that we have been doing post july 14th, and those are things that are going to probably be in existing in perpetuity moving forward.

>> reporter: i also had a question about florida. can you say whether there is any indication that this suspect might have surveilled go courses anytime before sunday or what led him to choose that day to be there for maybe 12 hours? >> director rowe: so it's an active investigation, so i would refer you to the fbi for that. >> reporter: and can you say anything more about golf courses are sprawling, open places. anything that would be publicly visible that you could say, here is how we are beefing up protection when a protectee is on the golf course? >> director rowe: so again, what i have said, and i will continue to do this, and i have to be very mindful of our techniques, our tactics, and our procedures. it is probably not good to continuously not only talk about secret service procedures, because we are telegraphing to adversaries. we are telegraphing to people who probably wouldn't tend to do harm to our protectees. but what i will tell you is our

protective model consists of redundancies, the outer, the middle, the layers, and then yos built into that. with respect to golf courses or any open venue, we apply those methodologies. >> reporter: thanks, acting director. with regard to your conve conversation, your conversations on capitol hill, can you talk about, for resources, do you need to have a specific dollar amount included in an upcoming cr to make things work, or would the language that the administration previously requested, is that something you can live with? >> director rowe: i'm not going to get into specifics because we are having those conversations, and out of respect for the confidentiality of those discussions, i'm not going to disclose a number. what i will tell you is we have made several presentations. we are working at the staff

level. and we are having those conversations, and they are ongoing. >> reporter: related to that, you mentioned earlier you want secret service to wean itself from a line on other components of dhs. in its protective mission. is not contingent on getting those additional resources, either right now or at some point in the appropriations process? >> director rowe: don't want to rule out we will never have to enlist the assistance of others through request for assistance and we do those memorandums, and we did that back for several presidential campaign cycles. but i think the importance here, we have to be able to come at a moment's notice, surge people to where they need to go. and if we are going to be having to mitigate -- and that is what we do, we are in the risk mitigation business. we are not in the risk elimination business. and so we have to be able to have the personnel, the assets, and be able to spread those out for an indefinite period of time in the event that another

situation, a geopolitical conflict or some other tension requires us to do so. >> reporter: thank you. you have addressed the golf course incident in great detail, but i just wanted to ask, are you fully satisfied with the way the secret service managed the florida incident on the golf course, or would you change anything? can you answer the question that way? >> director rowe: i would say based on the information i have right now, i would say that situation was managed according to our training. you know, as soon as our agent discovered the individual, took swift action. took steps to neutralize that threat. immediately upon doing so, he communicated over the radio. there was a communication of shots fired. which immediately not only did our personnel assigned to the

close protection of the president, of the former president, here the shots, they immediately went into action. the counter assault team went into action. the counter snipers went into action. supervisors and shift personnel immediately evacuated the president. took the most expedient route to where he needed to shelter in place. he had ballistic protection around him. they sheltered in place until they could determine, was this just the first wave of an attack? immediately, local law enforcement assets responded to the scene. local tactical assets that were partnered with our counter assault team were also present, immediately responded. so that barrier, those layers of protection, those redundancies, the redundancy was the agent that first discovered, followed by another set of agents that also set up that middle perimeter around the shift that was evacuated. and so, in the case of west palm beach, based on the information i have now, and again, we will review it, it appears that those agents, those supervisors, made swift

decisions and made correct decisions. >> reporter: thank you. hi come acting director. i want to drill down on this issue of resources. you sent a letter to senator murphy and to senator britt on september 5th, and it became public. and it said in the letter, you wrote, "we do not believe that the security failures of july 13th, 2024, was the result of a lack of resources." i'm hearing you talk over and over again, and it says here at the bottom of this press release, you guys have today, the agency must increase its protective print including personnel, technical assets, and equipment. how do you square those two things? how do you ask congress for more money when you yourself have determined that what happened on january -- july 13th was not a lack of resources? >> director rowe: so how i square that is as follows. following ju 13th, we immediately took steps to

elevate the vice president, former president to the highest levels of secret service protection. we also took steps to elevate the protection of senator vance and eventually governor walz to high levels of secret service protection. and what i was talking about earlier is the way we are structured, and i go back to this, the president of the united states is the most highly protected individual on the face of the world. that is how the secret service is built. that is what we are primarily focused on. and then once you have those assets and resources, they are also committed to the vice president. so how i square this is as follows. following july 13th, when now we are -- because of his hyper dynamic threat and the operational environment in which we find ourselves in, we only have so much of those assets to go around. and so while we are providing

them to the former president, we are providing them to the president, to the vice president, two other protectees, and so at this point, what i'm telling congress is we can do this, and we will do this, but there has to be a replacement. there has to be life cycle replacement on this. there has to be, if we are going to be called upon to do this again or do this now, because the threat is not weaning. the threat is not going to evaporate anytime soon. and so we have to be prepared for this. and that is the argument that we have been making, and we have certainly made some inroads, and we are having these productive conversations with the fill. >> reporter: can i just ask you also, will the secret service have the resources to protect the capitol on january 6th? i know that has not been designated the agency will be leading the protective services detail for that day. you are describing protecting all these different people, right now. how will january 6th play out? >> director rowe: so the generous six proceedings were designated a national special security event.

we are the lead security planner for that. but again we have great partnerships with all of the law enforcement agencies in washington, d.c., and most of the u.s. capitol police which are our partners when we do the state of the union or when we do any event at the capital that rises to a national special security event like the state of the union or state funeral. >> reporter: so you feel confident you will have the personnel, technical assets, and equip menu need for that day? >> director rowe: we will have what we need. >> reporter: do you think that by congress legislating the protective detail regulations, do you think that is helpful in terms of being able to staff up or staff down the agency when you need? >> director rowe: so i have not done an analysis of the legislation. i assume it's pretty direct.

but look, as i stated, i'm sure congress wants to make sure that the secret service is strong. i don't know the intentions behind this piece of legislation. but i will just point back to, coming out of butler, coming out of july 13th, we have been providing the highest levels of secret service protection to the former president. >> reporter: thank you. >> director rowe: all right, thank you, everyone. >> sandra: a lot to take in there, a lack of follow-through were the words of the secret service director describing what contributed to that building, john, being left unguarded, which then allowed the shooter to take a shot at the shoot at the former president at that day. secret service internal investigation did find there was communication gaps and a lack of diligence ahead of that july 13th shooting of donald trump. that is the official statement and read out from the director. he also said that there is a paradigm shift needed after that

july 13th trump shooting, and of course a lot of the questions that followed were about exactly that, john. >> john: all right, let's bring in a former secret service agent, the former department of homeland security advisor. sorry, my neighbor. on the subject of this paradigm shift, here is what ronald rowe set about that. listen. >> with respect to a paradigm shift, we are at a pivotal moment in history of the secret service and at a pivotal moment in the history of our country. and i have directed that the secret service embark on a significant paradigm shift that will redefine how we conduct protective operations. >> john: so a paradigm shift is all well and good in the week of something like what happened back in butler, but that is something that is going to take weeks, months, if not years, and what do you do about the culture and the protocols at the secret service now?

>> that's a great point. look, i think the tone of the press conference was the buck stops with the secret service. there is no running away from this. they are responsible for creating and effectively implementing the overall security plans no matter where any of their protectees go. and as far as telling protectees where to go and we are not to, they can't throw that flag every day. they have to protect the venues that are chosen by these campaigns and candidates. now as far as this new paradigm that he is speaking of, look, they've got to resource to the threat instead of resourcing to the title or position. you heard it spoken about often where they were giving the resources based on the fact that former president trump was just that: a former president. and that's not the reality. so it takes us to your point, and that is the resourcing. is it realistic, for example, that the bill that was just passed by the house to create

both of these candidates as presidential protective details, do they have the resources to do that? and my answer would be the house just passed a bill that the secret service can't staff. they don't have the manpower to staff three presidential level protection details and two vice presidential protection details and then do all the national special security event work that they have. the employees are already suffering from burnout, so this is like, to your point, this is a longer-term conversation that involves manpower, and manpower takes a lot of time to hire, to train, and then to put into the field to gain the experience to then send to these high level protection details. >> sandra: and then don't forget the part, to retain, as well peered once you do all that, you have to ensure it is an environment in which those workers want to remain with the agency. this is more from director rho on the expected changes

following all of this, listen. >> this cannot be about working our people harder. so with respect to changes, the workforce, the american public, they can expect changes in our processes for advances. there will be an increased use of technology. >> sandra: but to bring up, he says we will have what we need, trying to assure the american public we will get there and he able to do our jobs but to suggest that if you can't work people harder, but yet also in the same breath during this news conference he said that there was complacency. this is what he blamed in part for some of what led to the breach of security protocol, so there was an acknowledgment that some who were there on the ground that day just didn't do their jobs and were complacent in it. >> and why is that? that's the question. was it inexperience? was it burnout? or was it just outright disregard? you heard him mention that

during the advance process in butler, pennsylvania, the agr building was identified as a threat, and local police were designated to cover that, however there was no follow-through. there was a breakdown in communication. and that ultimately, to my point earlier, falls to the secret service. they are responsible for making sure that when state and local law enforcement officers are requested to help with the overall security at a venue, that the assignments that they have been given are actually followed up upon. that cannot be a finger pointed back at state and local law enforcement. that's bad for the secret service. they cannot conduct their protective mission without the support of them. so that includes everything from motorcade advances to street closures to site security. so the secret service has to take the hit on this, but they've got to make sure that their personnel that are going out to these assignments have the 10-year in the job, have the

experience, and have the know-how and follow-through on d local partners to make sure the job is getting done. >> john: i thought it was very interesting that the agent who spotted the rifle at the trump national doral course in west palm beach was a relatively new agent. experience and motivation can go hand-in-hand, motivation can certainly sometimes trump experience depending on who you are talking about here. charles, thank you so much for being with us. we really appreciate it. a lot more on this to come. >> sandra: thanks a lot for joining us on the breaking news. we are going to have more reaction to that news conference, a lot to dig into, coming up. shannon bream will be here. rep jim jordan also on deck, and paul mauro is here. stay tuned. we will be right back.

i want to turn to the issue of abortion. for 52 years, they've been trying to get roe v wade into the states. i did a great service in doing it. it took courage to do it. and the supreme court had great courage in doing it. i have talked with women around our country.

you want to talk about this is what people wanted. pregnant women who want to carry a pregnancy to term, suffering from a miscarriage. being denied care in an emergency room because the health care providers are afraid they might go to jail. and she's bleeding out in a car in the parking lot. she didn't want that. her husband didn't want that. a 12 or 13 year old survivor of incest being forced to carry a pregnancy to term. they don't want that. i think the american people believe that certain freedoms, in particular the freedom to make decisions about one's own body, should not be made by the government. i'm kamala harris, and i approved this message.

my grandfather's run meyer the hatter for over 75 years now. 99 years old and he'd come five days a week if we let him. shape is great, the color's nice, that's a swell lid for you, baby! finding the exact date on ancestry that our family business was founded, really struck a chord with my grandfather. i've never seen this before. look at it - where has this come from? all the stories that's he's been able to hand me throughout the years, for me to hand him that information.. you don't get that moment every day. (vo) if you have graves' disease... ...gritty eyes could be more than a rough patch. people with graves' could also get thyroid eye disease, or t-e-d, which may need a different doctor. find a t-e-d eye specialist at isitted.com.

could this be menopause? clearblue menopause stage indicator uses an app that combines your age, cycle data, and fsh hormone levels over time in a personalized report to share with your doctor to get the clarity you need. >> john: the secret service just wrapping up a news conference after a second assassination attempt on former president trump.