was told this morning by inquiry was told this morning by former downing street director of communications lee that of communications lee cain that covid was the wrong crisis for bons covid was the wrong crisis for boris johnson's skill set. >> and we'll be live in scampton as the high court hears an injunction application from west lindsey district council to stop up to 2000 migrants being housed on the former site of the dambusters home. the council argues the home office does not have planning permission for such a site . such a site. >> and we'll also . be live in >> and we'll also. be live in tel aviv as israel continues their ground offensive in gaza, their ground offensive in gaza, the idf reports a large exchange of fire overnight. we'll have the very latest on the ground. and here, labour leader sir keir starmer says the right to self defence is fundamental . all but defence is fundamental. all but it is not a blank check . it is not a blank check. >> and we'll have the latest from kenya as the king and queen embark on their first state visit to a commonwealth and

african country. charles acknowledged the painful aspects of the uk and kenya's shared history during the couple's four day state visit . but before we day state visit. but before we sort all of this, here's your latest headlines with sophia . latest headlines with sophia. good afternoon. >> it's 12:01. good afternoon. >> it's12:01. i'm sophia wenzler in the gb newsroom . a wenzler in the gb newsroom. a pubuc wenzler in the gb newsroom. a public health catastrophe in gazais public health catastrophe in gaza is now imminent. according to the world health organisation , the mass displacement of people coupled with damage to water and sanitation services is creating a dire situation for residents. it comes as israel's prime minister dismissed calls for a ceasefire in the war against hamas , saying that it against hamas, saying that it would mean surrendering to terrorism more than 8300 people have been killed by israeli attacks in gaza . rishi sunak attacks in gaza. rishi sunak government has been clear in its support for israel, but is urging for a humanitarian pause in the fighting to get aid into

gaza. sir keir starmer has reaffirmed labour's support for a humanitarian pause in the israel—hamas war. speaking a short time ago , the labour short time ago, the labour leader said it was the only credible approach to the ongoing conflict, but he urged that a permanent ceasefire could risk more violence in the region, giving hamas a chance to carry out more attacks . out more attacks. >> this pre—staged during this crisis. my approach has been dnven crisis. my approach has been driven by the need to respond to both of these tragedies , to both of these tragedies, to stand by the right to self defence of any nation which suffers terrorism on this scale alongside the basic human rights of innocent palestinians , caught of innocent palestinians, caught once again in the crossfire , the once again in the crossfire, the covid inquiry has heard dominic cummings warn boris johnson the cabinet office was totally behind and had no plan to deal with the pandemic. >> mr cummings served as boris johnson's chief adviser until he

was forced to quit in 2020 for breaking lockdown rules . lee breaking lockdown rules. lee cain, who was director of communication, spoke of a lack of leadership and says the former prime minister should have done more during the pandemic's early phase . as the pandemic's early phase. as the government has called off plans to close train ticket offices. the transport secretary asked train operators a short time ago to withdraw the controversial proposal to shut offices in england . a public consultation england. a public consultation launched to gauge the public opinion on the closures received received the largest ever response with the rmt union, saying most people opposed the closures. mark harper says the proposals didn't meet the high thresholds of serving rail passengers . there's more relief passengers. there's more relief on the way today for households feeling the pinch from the rising cost of living. though those eligible will receive a payment of £300. the second in a series of support packages . the series of support packages. the money will be deposited into the bank accounts of people on certain benefits and will have no impact on existing benefits .

no impact on existing benefits. more than 8 million households will be helped by the cost of living payments . around 400,000 living payments. around 400,000 patients who've waited the longest for nhs care will be asked if they're willing to go elsewhere. people who've been on wait lists for more than ten months may receive letter, months may receive a letter, text message or to ask if text message or email to ask if they'd consider travelling for treatment or transferring patients to other hospitals. could help bring down record backlogs in the health service. currently standing . at 7.75 currently standing. at 7.75 million yellow warnings for wind and rain are in place across the country until friday as storm kieran approaches. flooding has hit parts of northern ireland this morning, with hit parts of northern ireland this morning , with people this morning, with people advised not to travel. an amber warning is in place in counties antrim down and armagh. it comes as the storm is set to bring strong winds and heavy rain to the uk. newry and armagh mp mickey brady says the government is doing everything it can to protect homes and businesses . protect homes and businesses. >> we're dealing with nature here. i mean, it's

unprecedented. the amount of rain has fallen over the past day or two and as i said, it may lifetime and i've been around a long, long time. i have never seen it this bad. we're trying to do our to best ensure that the least damage is done. and i know the lack of bid and other agencies locally are trying their to ensure that their best to ensure that sandbags are provided and the businesses are made as secure as it possible . it can be possible. >> the pomp and pageantry were on full display this morning as the king and queen touched down in kenya state visit. in kenya for a state visit. their majesties were greeted in nairobi by kenyan president william ruto. it's the king's first visit as monarch to the country where his mother became queenin country where his mother became queen in 1952. the king paid his respects to kenya's fallen heroes, military and civilian , heroes, military and civilian, at the tomb of the unknown warrior . he at the tomb of the unknown warrior. he also at the tomb of the unknown warrior . he also visited at the tomb of the unknown warrior. he also visited a model farm which serves as an information centre for the local community and also provides food for the hospital . this is gb for the hospital. this is gb news across the uk on tv, in your car, on your digital radio and on your smart speaker. by

saying play gb news now back to martin and . emily and thanks for martin and. emily and thanks for that sophia. >> okay. the uk covid inquiry is braced for the explosive live testimony of former chief adviser to prime minister boris johnson. of course , that's johnson. of course, that's dominic cummings. as he prepares to launch what is largely expected to be a devastating and withering broadside attack on the former prime minister's handung the former prime minister's handling of covid. >> yes. earlier today , the >> yes. earlier today, the inquiry heard from johnson's first director of communications in number 10. that's lee cain, who didn't mince his words, did he? he said that johnson was the wrong prime minister to handle the pandemic tick and how his actions result in greater damage being brought by the virus. well our deputy political editor, tom hannood is outside the inquiry. >> so, tom, at the moment, we have the support act, the warm up still there. lee cain , we're up still there. lee cain, we're getting ready for the highlight

act, the rod stewart, if you like. we're expecting a halloween horror show, aren't we? >> we certainly are. and to some extent, the highlight bits of the first part of the inquiry today of the morning, of the inquiry today, even though it's been lee cain that has been being questioned, some of the most highlight moments have been messages that dominic cummings has sent in the last ten or so minutes. we've heard the covid inquiry lawyer read out some pretty spice icy language sent from dominic cummings to individuals including lee cain. describe the cabinet in 2020 as, and i quote , useless f pigs . and i quote, useless f pigs. although the word f was read out in rather a more expletive form , in rather a more expletive form, as you might be able to imagine in the cabinet were or certain members of the cabinet were also described by mr cummings in one email as c words. and we were heanng email as c words. and we were hearing a lot about how mr cummings wanted to force boris

johnson to reshuffle people like matt hancock out of the picture. but that isn't all that we've been hearing. of course , lee been hearing. of course, lee cain has been putting fonnard his own views, which seem to have differed pretty starkly from those of the government, particularly over the summer of 2020 and the beginning of the autumn of that year where mr cain seems to be agreeing with mr cummings that the government was not acting in the best interests of the country, was being led more by the media than by the science. and mr cain saying he was supporting more restrictive measures . in restrictive measures. in september 2020 as the government was trying to get people back to work. >> um, what time are we expecting dominic cummings to take to the stage and what might he say that's new? he's already said quite a lot, hasn't he ? said quite a lot, hasn't he? >> he has. although what we've found throughout the course of

this morning is that there is more and more information often coming out in terms of these whatsapps and these emails. this inquiry has statue tary powers so it can comb through all of this information and of course the submissions provided by the individuals. it is questioning does reveal new material . so it does reveal new material. so it is likely we will see some new messages come out from mr cummings on top of those that he has already made public. of course, we don't know exactly when mr cummings is going to take to his seat. i have been told that they wanted to get to him early this afternoon. mr cain was to be the morning mr cummings was to be the afternoon. but but mr cain is running a little bit over, as we've seen throughout this week in this inquiry. the questioning is taking rather longer than had been expected. so it's a bit of a moveable feast. it may well be that mr cummings takes to the stage after lunch, although he has, of course, arrived at the inquiry in the last few

inquiry building in the last few minutes. an tom, of course, cummings will have a few spicy words . words. >> is there anything in it? i mean , is this a bitter employee mean, is this a bitter employee with an axe to grind? no love lost , of course, between dom and lost, of course, between dom and bofis lost, of course, between dom and boris , us and all the major boris, us and all the major allegations in the past, boris has simply brushed aside out or and or denied. are we expecting anything to come out of this or is it just. anything to come out of this or is itjust. is itjust pure is it just. is it just pure popcorn time, box office and great politics and a great spectacle for the rest of us to watch? >> well, some of it, of course, will be fireworks and popcorn time. but we've got to look at this inquiry through a more analytical lens. i suppose these are players who were key to making decisions throughout the course of the pandemic who are each now presenting their own vision of history. no doubt some of these people will be trying to paint themselves as in the best possible light and perhaps dunk former colleagues in in the

problematic areas . but of problematic areas. but of course, we will be hearing new information. and i think most pertinently, more than what is said by the individuals in their testimony today . it will be the testimony today. it will be the what's shapps and the emails that will reveal what was actually said at the time. this could be the real spice and the real disagreements at the top of government. the oscillation that lee cain has been describing this morning of those making decisions between whether there should be more restrictive, harsher measures or whether things should be opened back up . things should be opened back up. it's interesting that lee cain this morning seems to be giving more more credence to the government in the early stages of the pandemic when things were unknown, when it was an entirely novel virus, and when, as he described, the tracks were being built as the train was going on, where lee cain was more critical was in the second wave of the pandemic when the government seemed to be making all the same

mistakes, in his view, over again for a second time. it will be interesting to see if dominic cummings has that same criticism. if dominic cummings can find areas where he is willing to praise the government that he has been up till now pretty critical of or whether he will be just entirely critical. that will be an interesting point. how much nuance there will actually be in the following discussion. yes. well fundamentally, we want to find out what exactly went wrong and what we can do better in preparation for another pandemic if and when it comes. >> thank you very much indeed, deputy political editor there, tom hannood from outside the covid where lee cain is covid inquiry where lee cain is still giving evidence. we're awaiting dominic cummings, of course, i just think that what this highlights is there completely dysfunctional. >> they didn't really know what was going on. they were kind of making as they went along . making it up as they went along. the messages, let's the whatsapp messages, let's they have some choice language. i mean the expletives we were

debating earlier weren't we debating this earlier weren't we off over whether whatsapp off air over whether whatsapp messages like these should be made public like difficult for people in positions of power to make decisions knowing that they may then their private messages may then their private messages may then their private messages may then become public. >> but then others would say this is important for scrutiny. of course. >> and what was interesting, of course, is that boris had that seven automatic whatsapp seven day automatic whatsapp message, delete function added, criticise at the time, but now he might be grateful for that. yes, i imagine so. >> well , all sir keir starmer >> well, all sir keir starmer this is moving on to another story here, sir keir starmer says now is not the right time for a ceasefire in the middle east. he claims it would embolden hamas and risk further violence immediately. and a speech in central london, the labour leader said a humanitarian pause is only humanitarian pause is the only credible approach to the conflict in gaza , calling it conflict in gaza, calling it terrorism and brutality on a scale few countries have ever experienced. yes our security editor, mark white, is with us

from tel aviv , live from tel from tel aviv, live from tel aviv. let's start , mark, i just aviv. let's start, mark, i just want to get your view on some breaking news that we're hearing from paris police have shot an unarmed woman who was threatening to blow herself up at a paris metro station . can at a paris metro station. can you bring us the latest on that . you bring us the latest on that. >> yeah, well, we know, of course, security services and police right across the west are on a heightened state of alert for potential terrorist related incident . it's linked to the incident. it's linked to the conflict here in israel. this incident unfolded at a metro station, the francois mitterrand metro station in central paris with a woman apparently clad in a full burqa, shouting allahu akbar, shouting save palestine. and also shouting that she had a bomb and was going to blow everything up. now she apparently refused to obey police commands and to reveal whether she had a bomb or not.

and the police it seems, were left with no choice but to shoot her, because clearly clad in a full burqa, there was no way that the police were able to tell whether she did have a device or not. there's no one anybody, no way anybody could get near her. she was clearly in the minds of the french police posing a significant threat to the surroundings and people in that area. so she was shot. we were told she was shot in the torso and is critically ill taken to hospital, still alive at this stage, but critically injured. interestingly, she was apparently not carrying any device, but how would any officer know that when she is clad and she is refusing to obey those basic police instructions? so that's an indication , as so that's an indication, as i say, of the heightened state of alert we had here in israel just yesterday. a police officer stabbed and critically injured

in jerusalem by a palestinian man. so some real tensions in many cities, towns and cities right across the west. and, of course , here in israel . to get course, here in israel. to get back to your introduction there about that speech from sir keir starmer in central london, an important speech, i think, for the labour leader reiterating the labour leader reiterating the fact that he does not want to see a cease fire, but he does want to see humanitarian pauses and he said the reason he did not want to see a cease fire is because he believes that a ceasefire effectively ends the fighting with both sides throwing in with the capabilities that they currently have. and for hamas, that would mean that they still have the capabilities. and we know this because every day we're still getting rocket attacks into israel. we had one just a few moments before you came to us into the area around the gaza

strip . and so keir starmer said strip. and so keir starmer said that would leave hamas emboldened and able to regroup and to try to create more turmoil in israel by causing more terrorist attacks in the future. but he did want to see humanitarian pauses. he said they should take place as a matter of urgency to get more aid supplies in to help the people of gaza who are , you people of gaza who are, you know, clearly suffering greatly at this time in a very interesting and powerful part of his speech, i thought, was when he said that in conflicts like this, the most painful blows are those that land on the bruises of history. and for palestinians, the threat of displacement sends a shiver down the spine. and he said then, in response to that that israel must give an immediate guarantee to the palestine people in gaza , to the palestine people in gaza, that although they might have to

move out of harm's way at the moment, they would be allowed to return as a matter of urgency . return as a matter of urgency. he once there was a cessation in violence whenever that might be. one final thing to bring to you. i think that is important as well. talking about powerful speeches we heard from an israeli commander address seeing his troops in gaza at the moment over the radio, in their tanks . over the radio, in their tanks. this very powerful speech to those troops pushing fonnard in gaza. i want you to take a listen to what was said . listen to what was said. >> the north southern command forces this is the commander. >> we are striking hamas and the terrorist organisation in the gaza strip . gaza strip. >> we have one goal, victory . no >> we have one goal, victory. no matter how long or how hard the fighting will be, there is no other outcome than victory .

other outcome than victory. listen we will fight with professionalism and strength based first and foremost on the idf values which were instilled in us dedication to mission and the pursuit of victory. we will fight in alleys. we will fight in tunnels . we will fight in tunnels. we will fight wherever necessary . wherever necessary. >> well, we're told that that we're told that on the battlefield at the moment that the israel and the idf forces are moving fonnard slowly and systematically. they are coming unden systematically. they are coming under. we're told, heavy arms fire from some hamas terrorists , fire from some hamas terrorists, missiles that are being launched towards their armoured vehicles and also machine gun fire. but they apparently, according to they apparently, according to the idf, are dealing with this one placement at a time . one placement at a time. >> okay, mark white, live in tel aviv, thank you very much. that latest update, the whole area on a knife. asia. now, of course, that's spreading into paris and

who knows where next? >> yes. well coming up, we'll be live in scampton as the high court decides whether former military bases can be used to house asylum seekers . and we'll house asylum seekers. and we'll find out the very latest shortly

>> the atrocities that were committed on the 7th of october effective . right? effective. right? >> welcome back to gb news live . >> welcome back to gb news live. >> welcome back to gb news live. >> yeah. and breaking news, dominic cummings has just arrived. in fact, he's just sat down at the covid inquiry about to give evidence there. we have live shots from there, expected to be an explosive session . been to be an explosive session. been very much looking fonnard to this all week . this all week. >> the inquiry understands that . >> the inquiry understands that. from two thousand and seven to 2014 , you were a special adviser 2014, you were a special adviser to michael gove, mp is that correct ? correct? >> yes . in october 2015, you

>> yes. in october 2015, you became a director of the organisation. >> vote leave, which culminated , >> vote leave, which culminated, of course in . the june 2016 of course in. the june 2016 referendum and i think it's fair to say you were an architect in the successful leave eu campaign . rain. forgive me, sorry. >> our campaign was called vote leave. the other one was called leave. the other one was called leave the eu. >> thank you . on the 24th of >> thank you. on the 24th of july 2019, you became a senior adviser to the to the then prime minister is that correct ? minister is that correct? >> a general election was called relatively shortly thereafter . relatively shortly thereafter. >> do did you as is customary , >> do did you as is customary, resign as an adviser for once parliament had been dissolved or did you stay in that post throughout the election campaign

and then continue their after? >> i'm afraid i can't remember the exact legal status that i had between the election being called and through the through the election. >> there are complicated rules and also had a slightly odd role in that time because i wasn't i was neither in campaign headquarters nor was i full time in number 10. i was kind of in a separate room and i, i continued doing some government work dunng doing some government work during that time. for example, with and some national with nato and some national security . i think security things. i think there was terrorist episode, floods, security things. i think there was tnthings. episode, floods, security things. i think there was tnthings. epi: i nde, floods, security things. i think there was tnthings.epi:| wasfloods, security things. i think there was tnthings.epi:| was sortis, security things. i think there was tnthings.epi:| was sort of various things. so i was sort of hopping around between two different things. >> all right. mr cummings, i'm going ask you, please, to going to ask you, please, to remember you give remember that whilst you give evidence, it's essential that you try to keep your voice up and you speak as slowly as possible. that way, we may better understand your evidence as did you play a part in the general election campaign , general election campaign, culminating in the 12th of december election? yes all right

i >> -- >> i'd like to turn, please, to some of the government structures which form the large part of your witness statement and about which you express. >> i think what may fairly be described as very trenchant views , starting with the . views, starting with the. cabinet you say in your statement that the cabinet was largely irrelevant to policy or execution in 2020. the combination of its size. the prime minister's inability to chair it and its constant leaks meant it was seen by everyone in number 10 as not a place for serious discussion. you go on to describe how those working in number 10 see it as another problem to manage. while real discussions happen elsewhere . discussions happen elsewhere. the inquiry material shows that

there were , although this may there were, although this may not be reflected in the minutes frank and constructive debates held in cabinet, as they say in diplomatic circles , and that diplomatic circles, and that there were important decisions made in cabinet and important matters debated . is that a fair matters debated. is that a fair summary , therefore, of the role summary, therefore, of the role of cabinet during the coronavirus crisis ? coronavirus crisis? >> i think it depends . to some >> i think it depends. to some extent it depends what you mean by the word decision. i mean formally a lot of things are decided in cabinet. obviously that's the formal constitutional structure, but very rarely is that actually a reflection of the reality of how the decision unquote, is actually being made . unquote, is actually being made. >> so is it more of a reflection of the fact that important decisions started to become taken elsewhere , predominantly taken elsewhere, predominantly in number 10? >> i wouldn't say started to be. i think that was the case in

2019. and of course, it's been a feature for many decades of this trend increasing , if we may call trend increasing, if we may call that process a sidelining of cabinet. >> did you contribute to that process, do you think ? process, do you think? >> i would say more that i just managed it as a sort of like the weather. i mean, it was just a sort of fact of life. it was a combination of the constitutional crisis in 2019 and the prime minister's own personal temperament and habits that grown up in the cabinet that had grown up in the cabinet office over over many years, going back a long period. i actually said to the prime minister, slow down, mr cummings, please slow down. >> i actually said to the prime minister, i suggested to the prime minister both in the last week of the election campaign in 2019 and in the first week of january when we discussed the future generally , that he should future generally, that he should strongly consider a major reshuffle and be radically shrinking the size of the cabinet back to where it was something like 100 or so years ago, because as anyone who knows

knows who has dealt with very large organisations, it's impossible to have serious conversations with 25 or 30 people in a around a table like that. >> the prime minister did not want to, due in large part to your own whatsapps. >> mr cummings we're going to have to coarsen our language somewhat . somewhat. >> i apologise. >> i apologise. >> you called ministers useless pigs >> you called ministers useless pigs or or in the emails and whatsapps to your professional colleagues . do you think you colleagues. do you think you contribute colleagues. do you think you contrib,te colleagues. do you think you contrib, it colleagues. do you think you contrib, i think i was reflecting >> no, i think i was reflecting a widespread view amongst competent people at the centre of power at the time about the calibre of a lot of senior people who are dealing with this crisis extremely badly. >> slow down, please. mr cummings are you suggesting that

your views expressed in those revolting ways were shared by others? >> well, the my appalling language is obviously my own, but my judgement of a lot of senior people was widespread and do you feel that you expressed your views too trenchantly that your views too trenchantly that your opinion of ministers and of the cabinet overstated the position ? no. i would say if position? no. i would say if anything, it understated the position as events showed in 2020, cabinet meetings appear . 2020, cabinet meetings appear. >> according to your statement and the material that we've seen in to have been . to some extent in to have been. to some extent scripted . but insofar as cabinet scripted. but insofar as cabinet committee meetings were concerned and they were very

largely scripted ministers were given scripts to read out just the quick message here. >> apologies if you're offended by some of the coarse language, but of course this is the direct transcript. ocean of whatsapp messages that were exchanged dunng messages that were exchanged during this inquiry. they were simply being replicate and live by the questioner . apologies by the questioner. apologies again, if you're offended by the coarse language. >> obviously are >> obviously there are exceptions are some exceptions and there are some people who chaired cabinet committee who did an committee meetings who did an extremely so i'm not extremely good job. so i'm not claiming this is universal. claiming that this is universal. i'm that was general i'm saying that it was a general feature and it was much more often true than not. >> you refer in your statement to cabinet and cabinet committee meetings being potemkin meetings. what did you mean by that? >> they were potemkin in the sense that they were for show as part of the sort of show of the constitution that unfortunately , constitution that unfortunately, a large part of how the system works is that ministers parade

up downing street, the cameras click, people act like cabinet is actually deciding things . but is actually deciding things. but everyone behind the number 10 door actually near power knows that that's very rarely actually what's going on. that is usually what's going on. that is usually what's happening is that senior officials have actually decided what's happening and the ministerial performance is often slush, usually a performance . of slush, usually a performance. of course, that changes according to historical situations and crises. and sometimes cabinet. even in 2019, 2020, became genuine , important. but i'm just genuine, important. but i'm just trying to give a general picture on the cusp of the coronavirus pandemic. >> we where was power exercised? where was the effective decision making by cusp? >> where do you mean sorry, january, february . well, it january, february. well, it certainly wasn't in cabinet. >> where was it ? >> where was it? >> where was it? >> well, most power really is in is nominally in the hands of the prime minister and to a very

large extent in the hands of the cabinet office. i would say the cabinet secretary. he is something like ten times or 100 times more powerful than anybody else cabinet, apart from else in the cabinet, apart from the prime minister all sorts of elements of real power actually, now in our system answer to him. but a large part of the performance and the media coverage is aimed at trying to coverage is aimed at trying to cover up this fact and to try and portray the ministers as actually in charge over time . actually in charge over time. >> you recommended and you brought into effect and two very important meetings or two important meetings or two important processes . one was the important processes. one was the 815 officials meeting at which you and other officials discussed the day's events as raised valve to raise important matters that needed to be debated. and then at 915 days, lee there became meetings with the prime minister in his study or in the cabinet room where did

that take place ? the sort of that take place? the sort of formal part of it was in the so sorry, the 815 was in the cabinet room every day. >> the 915 was usually also in the cabinet room. sometimes that would be precede by a smaller meeting in the prime minister's study , which adjoins the cabinet study, which adjoins the cabinet room through a kind of joint door were your 815 officials meetings minuted or noted ? i'm meetings minuted or noted? i'm not sure exactly exactly what the. well the process changed. obviously the 815 and 915 meetings as i originally created out of the kind of air of disaster. and they were very informal , disaster. and they were very informal, but disaster. and they were very informal , but they went through informal, but they went through different iterations . so they different iterations. so they they became called different things . the 815 they became called different things. the 815 and they became called different things . the 815 and the 915. things. the 815 and the 915. i think there was at least three different formal iterations. and the bureaucratic processes will have been different for each one. i think right at the very

beginning at 815, there were kind of action points taken because it was very much an action oriented thing. it wasn't any kind of formal structure. so i would guess that there were not formal minutes at those meetings to begin with, but there was certainly action points that imran, the private secretary, or others would write live during the meeting and then circulate immediately aftennards i >> by and large , as you say in >> by and large, as you say in your statement, there was little transparency or visibility . transparency or visibility. traces of discussions might only be in an email or whatsapp if they exist at all. is that correct ? correct? >> i think it's certainly correct about the very first part. as i said, when we just created the meetings because they had no kind of formal position of any kind though i don't think that's accurate about later . on the cabinet about later. on the cabinet office to which you've referred, you describe in this way that it had more sand in the petrol tank rather than the rolls—royce

gearbox or gearbox. >> it is often described as what did you mean by that ? did you mean by that? >> well, if you speak to many people who've been who've knocked around the system for a very long time , the cabinet very long time, the cabinet office over a long period of time has accumulated more and more power, formal and informal. it's become incredibly bloated. it's become incredibly bloated. it's acquired huge numbers of people , huge numbers of teams . people, huge numbers of teams. and particularly on the whole , and particularly on the whole, the sort of deep state national security side crisis manager moment has become come in all sorts of ways , extremely opaque sorts of ways, extremely opaque and effective , completely and effective, completely invisible to any political figure, including the prime minister. so it was extremely difficult to know in number 10 who exactly in the cabinet office was doing what, whose responsibility it was, who were

we supposed to talk to, to, to to, get action. and that was critical in in particularly in the first couple of months was this a function of staffing levels , inadequate staffing levels, inadequate staffing levels, inadequate staffing levels, or or over staffing or in particular parts of the cabinet office or a reflection of the personalities, the people who were actually in the cabinet office? >> i think it was a mix, like all dysfunctional systems, it was a mix of a lot of the wrong people in the wrong job. >> decades of accumulated power, no real scrutiny and insight. a culture of constant classifying everything to hide mistakes and hide scrutiny . management was hide scrutiny. management was bad , incredibly bloated, with so bad, incredibly bloated, with so many senior figures that they themselves. helen mcnamara's statement makes clear the senior people themselves didn't know who earth was in charge of what. >> in your statement , you to the

>> in your statement, you to the inquiry. you say that. in 2020 a handful of senior officials were the wrong people for the posts . the wrong people for the posts. and this is in the context of your views on government generally. so not just the cabinet office, but number 10, this meant they were unable to replace other people who were wrong for their posts . however, wrong for their posts. however, it's the prime minister who is responsible for the wrong people all remaining in crucial jobs. where in your opinion, the wrong people in those crucial jobs in the cabinet office ? the cabinet office? >> yes , i think there clearly >> yes, i think there clearly were some people in the cabinet office who were in the wrong jobs. the cabinet secretary and i had had quite a few frank discussions about some of these problems going back into 2019. he actually removed some of the people that my request and moved them on to other things, though of course, it's all been whitehall. they were often promoted than actually promoted rather than actually removed. , there were . i

removed. so yes, there were. i agree with the thrust of your question . question. >> who else did you have in mind by that observation that there were the wrong people in those jobs as well ? jobs as well? >> i think . you'd never sought >> i think. you'd never sought that job, bob. and he had serious doubts about the wisdom of combining the cabinet secretary's job and the national security adviser job. i think that that was correct. and mark was a very able diplomat. he had enormous skills in all sorts of ways . but that . the way in which ways. but that. the way in which the cabinet office has evolved so well, perhaps we'll pause there. >> we'll just stay on the issue of the cabinet. secretary that the cabinet secretary, mark sedwill , now lord sedwill , whom sedwill, now lord sedwill, whom you've described as a as a talented and able diplomat or

able diplomat in all sorts of ways , you denigrated and ways, you denigrated and insulted by your whatsapps and text messages, did you not? >> i guess so . text messages, did you not? >> i guess so. i'm not text messages, did you not? >> i guess so . i'm not sure >> i guess so. i'm not sure exactly what you're referring to, but it's certainly the case that that i came to the view that that i came to the view that he did not have visibility of the fundamental disaster powers that were that were unfolding inside the cabinet office . office. >> you use obscenities to describe him. and then in a series of texts and whatsapps, you said he was off the pace. his staff knew he was off the pace. he was unable essentially to function at all as the head of the cabinet office i don't think i actually said that he was unable to function at all. >> but the rest of what you said is correct. and this was not just my view part of what i was expressing to the prime minister was other people was that other people in the cabinet office and crucial people in officials, not

political in the prime political people in the prime minister's said to minister's office, had said to me , we fear that both the me, we fear that both the cabinet office has gone dreadfully wrong and that mark doesn't understand just how badly wrong this has all gone. you you were under unimpressed by the principal private secretary. >> you believe that he deferred too much to the prime minister. he didn't force him to face up to hard choices . is that correct ? >> yes. i think that one of the most i think so. that role is highly, highly underrated. i think. and understanding how government really works, it's an extraordinary , truly powerful extraordinary, truly powerful position in all sorts of ways. again, much more powerful, really than anybody in the cabinet, apart from the prime minister. it's a critical role and my view was that a role like that in a country like ours should be filled by one of the absolutely most able people that we can possibly muster in our country. and i made that

argument to the prime minister before january during the election, actually about making a change in january. i lost the argument, slow down, please. >> mr cummings. slow down. you lost that argument? i lost the argument. >> i made it again after the first wave and i lost the argument again. >> your views on the secretary of state for the department of health and social care are very well known, and we'll be looking at some of your your remarks about him in due course. but overall , all the tenor of your overall, all the tenor of your statement , it's the fact and statement, it's the fact and this is to use your words , that this is to use your words, that senior ministers seem mere officials and senior advisers like yourself have failed disastrously short of the standards that the public had to expect. is that a view you adhere to? still? it is. >> i also think that there were many exceptional people, as i've tried to also explain in my

statement, but they were all enmeshed in a fundamentally dysfunctional structure. and that meant that even the great people couldn't were often unable to do great work. >> also that it is >> you also say that it is completely crackers that someone like you should have been in number a view you number 10. is that a view you still maintain? >> for sure ? >> for sure? >> for sure? >> ultimately , who bears the >> ultimately, who bears the responsibility , mr cummings for responsibility, mr cummings for appointing the individuals who you whom you have described in these terms ? these terms? >> well, lots of them obviously were appointed, lots of the critical cabinet office roles were appointed before me in the prime minister arrived . the prime minister arrived. the prime minister arrived. the prime minister arrived. the prime minister obviously bears responsibility for the cabinet. he appointed the cabinet in in summer 2019. contrary to all the media reports, i had zero involvement with that . i tried involvement with that. i tried to get him to change it in january and failed to try to get him to change it in february. and almost completely failed. who appointed you? >> mr cummings? >> mr cummings? >> prime minister , the inquiry

>> prime minister, the inquiry has heard evidence that the cabinet office plays a vital role in government as the coordinating centre . coordinating centre. >> it liaises with other government departments. it broke issues, it resolves debates and issues, it resolves debates and issues , issues between line issues, issues between line departments . it is the hub of departments. it is the hub of government . on your arrival in government. on your arrival in downing street in july of 2019, when did you believe that the cabinet office was effectively performing that role? no . the performing that role? no. the cabinet secretary. the inquiry has been told, has an equally important function of . important function of. exercising such institutional levers as may be required in order to make other parts of government work . were those government work. were those institutions levers being effectively operate by the cabinet secretary when you

arrived in downing street in july 2019? >> no , but i would also >> no, but i would also obviously there was a middle of the worst constitutional crisis in a century. and i certainly would be extremely unfair to blame the cabinet secretary for all the problems that we had at that time throughout the rest of that time throughout the rest of that year and at the beginning of 2020, did you discern any improvement in the structural system concerning the cabinet office in some ways, yes . i office in some ways, yes. i think it did improve on the very first day that i arrived, i sent an email to the cabinet secretary regarding how i thought that that brexit should work in terms of the brexit, what became known as brexit strategy and brexit operations. so the cabinet secretary agreed with me . we set that up. i think with me. we set that up. i think almost everybody involved with the process , yes, thinks that it the process, yes, thinks that it radically improved. how how the government dealt with such an

extremely complicated question . extremely complicated question. and i think also everybody that i know who i spoke to about it thinks that contrary to the impression that one often gets in the media, in fact, going through that admittedly nightmarish process of xo during 2019 actually proved extremely useful in terms of dealing with the covid crisis. so overall, i would say i did say to the prime minister in december 2019 as the election was ending, overall the system is completely dysfunctional, but within that, the cabinet secretary did make various important improvements. i think . i think. >> do you think your description of your colleagues is the way in which you described them, their functions, their abilities , functions, their abilities, their talents added to that dysfunctionality . dysfunctionality. >> no, i think the opposite. i think my job, a huge part of the problem of the culture of westminster and whitehall that

was so disastrous in covid is people not speaking out about core problems. and i regarded my job as i'm not a very smart person. i'm not a specialist in all sorts of ways, but i had built very effective teams and i felt that part , a crucial part felt that part, a crucial part of my job was to say to the pm and to other people, if i thought that someone couldn't do the job, then to make that clear because a that's so fundamental to performance and b, the issue is so often buried in whitehall on the 3rd of may. >> so after the initial crisis in the first wave of the 3rd of may 2020, i 253940 you sent an email . all to martin reynolds, email. all to martin reynolds, the principal private secretary, stuart glassborow . claire stuart glassborow. claire brunton imran shafi, the prime

secretary for health matters education and other policies. hannah young and emily benyon, as well as munira mirza . and you as well as munira mirza. and you copied it back to yourself . you copied it back to yourself. you said, we're wasting far too much time in crap meetings. said, we're wasting far too much time in crap meetings . we're not time in crap meetings. we're not using the pm's time. well changes from tomorrow, no papers go to pm on anything related to covid 19, including from cab of cab cabinet office and rmt. unless they're cleared by chinna. that's tom chinna. yes. or me . nobody else any chinna. that's tom chinna. yes. or me. nobody else any chair brief and anything related to covid 19 must be cleared by chinnor or me. nobody else . and chinnor or me. nobody else. and then there are some further directions concerning papers for prime ministerial meetings , prime ministerial meetings, chinna high, whoever else you need, you think you need five? we must start cancelling meetings and telling the . pm and meetings and telling the. pm and so . on did that direction that

so. on did that direction that nothing would go to the prime minister on covid from the cabinet office in rmt include anything from the cabinet secretary . secretary. >> you mean? did that mean that the cabinet secretary could not write directly to the prime minister unless cleared by you or tom chinna? no. >> so who was being excluded in effect within the civil service from communicating long papers to the prime minister without your intervention ? your intervention? >> so essentially what i was trying to do here, they actually all quote or me unquote, is actually not really very relevant . what i was actually relevant. what i was actually trying to do was empower tom chinna, who is an excellent official. we had a fundamental problem. well, we had many fundamental problems to the most obvious ones were the cabinet office was a bomb site and we had a huge problem of, of, of quality control of documents going into meetings and

inconsistent data , inconsistent inconsistent data, inconsistent facts being read out. and many officials had come to me and said this is causing chaos. there has to be some formalised system to actually grip this because the cabinet office was a dumpster fire and chinna was extremely able to essentially why i was trying to do here was say there has to be someone who actually takes responsibility for saying that they they and a team have checked the information and are certifying that it's accurate so that we would get away from these nightmare meetings that we'd had all the way through the previous few weeks of documents coming up people then saying this is wrong, this is out of date. everyone looking at each other like spider—man meme not like the spider—man meme not being clear. actually being clear. who's actually responsible. to responsible. so i was trying to say that actually establish a proper structure with proper structure for this with someone everybody respected . someone who everybody respected. >> was like you, an >> tom chinna was like you, an advisor with the civil service to the prime minister. >> with respect, he was not

really like me. no, he was. >> he was an advisor. insofar as he was not a member of the civil service. he was an advisor to the prime minister. >> no, with respect, that's not correct. >> what was he? he >> what was he? he >> he. he had been an official. he then left . he then came back he then left. he then came back in as official role. i think in as an official role. i think he was well , to begin with, his he was well, to begin with, his exact status was slightly unclear. obviously for the first few days because he arrived on the 16th of march. >> did you but he bring he was a civil servant, not not an advisor. >> you bring him in? >> did you bring him in? >> did you bring him in? >> cummings? i did. what was >> mr cummings? i did. what was it wise in hindsight to concentrate this degree of control in yourself and mr chinna? >> i think bringing tom in and empowering him the way i did was one of the single. i'll probably handful of best decisions i've made in the whole nightmare and by the way, the cabinet secretary strongly agreed with me. i think he'd worked with tom chinna lot of brexit issues chinna on a lot of brexit issues and with jeremy heywood a few

years earlier. so it wasn't like i was imposing this on them. i actually spoke to mark and said, here's my idea. are you happy with it? and he said, yeah, that sounds really great, sounds great on the 15th of may, according to your statement, you had a long discussion with the private office in downing street to review what had gone wrong with the cabinet office . with the cabinet office. >> you raised issues about lack of coordination across whitehall , the duplication of requests , , the duplication of requests, in essence a failure to grip whatever issues or problems confronted the cabinet office . confronted the cabinet office. what was your view of the private office within downing street, with whom you were having those conversations ? having those conversations? >> i think the private office, as i made clear in my statement, was in all sorts of ways absolutely excellent. and i think it had some of the finest pubuc think it had some of the finest public servants in the whole system. i think the country was lucky to have have them. i think

, though, that there was i would say that there was a there was one very obvious problem , which one very obvious problem, which was that apart from the leadership of the private office, he was a notable exception. but there was a core problem, which is that private secretaries and the prime minister's office are generally quite junior. minister's office are generally quite junior . officials are quite junior. officials are quite junior. officials are quite a few of them are young women . and at that meeting on women. and at that meeting on the 15th of may and on and on other occasions, some of the young women in the private office said to me that they thought that there was a serious problem with senior people in the cabinet office not paying attention to what they were saying, talking over them generally , just a bad culture of generally, just a bad culture of a lot of the senior male leadership in the cabinet office, which was something which i agreed with. well we'll be looking in due course at some of your emails and texts to other members of the team .

other members of the team. >> is it fair to say that you were critical also of the private office, that you sent emails and texts saying the private office is systemically flawed in certain regards , as flawed in certain regards, as well as the cabinet office ? well as the cabinet office? >> so i think there's two separate things. i was generally highly impressed by the by the private secretaries in the private secretaries in the private office who i thought did an absolute extraordinary . job an absolute extraordinary. job but i thought that the overall structure in which the private office operated clearly didn't work. and you know, you had a relatively tiny number of people with, as i say, relatively junior, junior people suddenly being completely swamped by by being completely swamped by by being asked to solve huge numbers of problems from all across the system. so my, when i say the private office didn't work, it wasn't that this is not a criticism of most of the people in it. it's that it was

swamped by the broader dysfunction of the cabinet office >> could we have please the letter that you sent to the inquiry ? 48313 at page 56 this inquiry? 48313 at page 56 this i think is a if we go back to the previous page. thank you very much. we can see this as an email you sent on monday. the 13th of july, right at the bottom of the page . it's bottom of the page. it's a lengthy email , isn't it? mr lengthy email, isn't it? mr cummings in which you set out your views on a number of different parts of the government machine ? yes, there government machine? yes, there had been for some time. you'd raised the issue in january of the overall structure of the government. you'd raised it again in may. you had repeatedly returned to this subject and you returned to this subject and you returned to this subject and you returned to it in july over the page on page 57 , there are page on page 57, there are references to the cabinet office not working for anyone. in the

second paragraph. yeah . further second paragraph. yeah. further down the page you are critical. it's about halfway down of cobra and c.c.s. the c.c.s . the civil and c.c.s. the c.c.s. the civil contingencies secretariat and how it failed in multiple ways . how it failed in multiple ways. yeah. you are critical of the data system . i'm correct . yeah. data system. i'm correct. yeah. over the page . page 59 . you are over the page. page 59. you are critical of institutional friction in turf wars , the friction in turf wars, the existence of blame games . page existence of blame games. page 60 you refer to bloating a copy list . culture the 61 . we've

list. culture the 61. we've experienced disaster . the pm has experienced disaster. the pm has said sorted out. experienced disaster. the pm has said sorted out . we're still said sorted out. we're still a low performing entity while deaung low performing entity while dealing with the next phase of covid, an economic horror . we covid, an economic horror. we need a timetable for key actions . simon and tom should informally scout out possible key people for this . now was key people for this. now was there any part of the government machine , mr cummings, in which machine, mr cummings, in which you did not find fault. >> well, in summer 2020, i spent quite a lot of time talking to british special forces, and i found that they were exceptional . well, no. >> mr cummings you know perfectly well that this is evidence directed at the coronavirus pandemic . and we are coronavirus pandemic. and we are debating the mechanics of number 10, the cabinet office and the

government response there were isolated. >> so if you're asking purely about the number 10 and cabinet office system, i'm talking about the structure concerned with the response to the coronavirus pandemic . i would say overall, pandemic. i would say overall, all widespread failure, but pockets of excellent people and pockets of excellent people and pockets of excellent teams doing excellent work within an overall dysfunctional system . dysfunctional system. >> in your statement, you describe how. so following this email , the prime minister , email, the prime minister, whilst initially agreeing with the sentiment of your trenchant views on aspects of the government machine, listened to, to use your words, poppins and then got cold feet . what are then got cold feet. what are poppins so the obviously the context for this for this document is that it comes after eight weeks of a nightmare situation kicked off by the pm.

i do apologise mr cummings what are poppins poppins are what was what people in private office referred to when the prime minister would make a decision about something , some element of about something, some element of the system , often in the cabinet the system, often in the cabinet office would not like what had been agreed . been agreed. >> and in the best, sir humphrey , westminster style , they would , westminster style, they would wait for me and other people to not be around the prime minister and they would pop in to see the prime minister and say, oh dear prime minister and say, oh dear prime minister, i think that this decision really wasn't the best brave , prime best idea. very brave, prime minister. perhaps you should trolley on it. and this was a general problem . general problem. >> you should trolley on it, meaning well, i'm using this sort of generic term that we often used about the pm, the term you used, and his cabinet secretary used and his director of communications used it, and other officials no doubt about

his propensity to pretty much everyone called him the trolley. >> yeah. >> yeah. >> change direction cobra if you're moving on, mr keith, i appreciate that. >> it's a little early, but i think we've had quite a long stint for yes, indeed. and mr cummings, like me, does speak very quickly. so i think we'll take a break now. i shall return at 1:45. thank you. >> all right . >> all right. >> all right. >> okay. we're just wrapping up for lunch there. the first session. promise to be explosive. and by jove, it certainly was right from the first off, mr cummings has to be said at least he wore a shirt and tie. emily, not a scarf and and tie. emily, not a scarf and a hat, but straight away, the big the big points for me were who was in power? and he said, they're all most certainly it was not the cabinet, the cabinet secretary. he said at the time was mark sedwill was 100 times more powerful than anybody other

than the prime minister and unelected bureaucrats running the country . me, in unelected bureaucrats running the country. me, in our unelected bureaucrats running the country . me, in our darkest the country. me, in our darkest hours, not just the cabinet, of course, apologies again for some very choice language , but that very choice language, but that was a direct readout of some of the whatsapp messages that were exchanged. emily and the man asking the questions was hugo keith. >> casey and he read at the beginning quotes from a statement given from cummings where he said cabinet was largely irrelevant to policy or execution in 2023. so that's a big statement there because the cabinet, they are elected to run the country, but yet he says the cabinet secretary, a civil servant, had more power over crucial decisions that were made. of course , he said a lot made. of course, he said a lot of negative things about the prime minister, the former prime minister boris johnson, and his handung minister boris johnson, and his handling of the situation there. talking of, well, we get the impression that it was chaotic.

yes disorganised. he also spoke about misogyny in parts of the government. >> interesting how he said, of course, that everybody pretty much everybody he said by this point referred to boris johnson as the trolley and to repeat that meant somebody who changed direction randomly and without notice, like a supermarket trolley would just kind of veer off its course . cummings agreed off its course. cummings agreed that the public deserved better from ministers who he said routinely fail. what came out of well, for me, emily was a real culture, just a bedlam. on the specific issue of were any minutes or recordings of these meetings held. cummings said. i don't recall the only the only record seems to be the whatsapp messages. and we know that the prime minister, boris johnson's were automatically deleted after seven days. therefore, we have a process of everything being classified, everything being syncretised because they were scared of what would come out. all the records entirely missing altogether. yes

>> and this, of course, what dominic cummings is saying today is very much his view, his perspective on those months where he was essentially the prime minister's right hand man. we know they are now sworn enemies or appear to be in many ways. he described the cabinet office as a bombsite and a dumpster fire. that's what the covid inquiry heard today. dumpster fire. that's what the covid inquiry heard today . so covid inquiry heard today. so very, very strong language . of very, very strong language. of course, there was even more strong language, coarse language used with regard to whatsapp messages . he said yes , it was messages. he said yes, it was coarse language, but that was the mood and other people shared that mood with him. that feeling, it seems like generally a landscape of chaos , a coarse a landscape of chaos, a coarse language landscape and itjust, language landscape and it just, i think, is going to be a dumpster fire for the rest of the day. >> plenty more to come after the lunch break. but for now, here's your latest news bulletins with

sophia . sophia. >> good afternoon . it's 1:03. >> good afternoon. it's 1:03. i'm sophia wenzler in the newsroom . a public health newsroom. a public health catastrophe in gaza is now imminent. according to the world health organisation , the mass health organisation, the mass displacement of people , coupled displacement of people, coupled with the damage to water and sanitation services, is creating a dire situation for residents . a dire situation for residents. it comes as israel's prime minister dismissed calls for a ceasefire in the war against hamas, saying that it would mean surrendering to terrorism . more surrendering to terrorism. more than 8300 people have been killed by israeli attacks in gaza. rishi sunak government has been clear on its support for israel, but is urging for a humanitarian pause in the fighting to get aid into gaza . fighting to get aid into gaza. sir keir starmer has reaffirmed labour's support for a humanitarian pause in the israel—hamas war. speaking a short time ago, the labour leader said it was the only credible approach to the ongoing conflict, but he argued that a permanent ceasefire could risk

more violence in the region, giving hamas a chance to carry out more attacks at every stage dunng out more attacks at every stage during this crisis. >> my approach has been driven by the need to respond to both of these tragedies , to stand by of these tragedies, to stand by the right to self of any nation which suffers terrorism on this scale alongside the basic human rights of innocent palestinians , rights of innocent palestinians, caught once again in the crossfire . crossfire. >> now the covid 19 inquiry has heard that dominic cummings warned boris johnson of big problems due to inefficiencies in the cabinet office. the inquiry heard that mr cummings told the former prime minister in a whatsapp message that the cabinet office are useless and the then health secretary, matt hancock, is proven liar. he hancock, is a proven liar. he served as boris johnson's chief adviser until he was forced to quit in 2020 for breaking lockdown rules . lee cain, who lockdown rules. lee cain, who was the director of

communications , spoke of a lack communications, spoke of a lack of leadership and said mr johnson should have done more dunng johnson should have done more during the pandemic's early phase. during the pandemic's early phase . the government has called phase. the government has called off plans to close train ticket offices , as the transport offices, as the transport secretary asked train operators a short time ago to withdraw the controversial proposal to shut offices in england. a public consultation launched to gauge pubuc consultation launched to gauge public opinion on the closure received the largest ever response with the rmt union , response with the rmt union, saying most people oppose the closures . as mark harper says, closures. as mark harper says, the proposals didn't meet the high thresholds of serving rail passengers . there's more relief passengers. there's more relief on the way today for households feeling the pinch from the rising cost of living . those rising cost of living. those eligible will receive a payment of £300, the second in a series of £300, the second in a series of support packages . the money of support packages. the money will be deposited into the bank accounts of people on certain benefits and will have no impact on existing benefits. more than 8 million households will be helped by the cost of living payments . police in paris have payments. police in paris have shot and critically wounded a

woman at a metro station after she was heard threatening passengers with jihadist slogans. the woman was wearing a huab slogans. the woman was wearing a hijab and a full body veil and behaved aggressively, according to the french government. the shooting comes as france is on its highest state of alert following the murder of a school teacher in a suspected islamic terrorist attack earlier this month . flooding has hit parts of month. flooding has hit parts of northern ireland with people warned to avoid travel. storm kieran is bringing strong winds and heavy rain to the uk. parts of newry in county down have been left undennater after a canal burst its banks with water levels in the city at unprecedented levels. the met office has issued a yellow rain across northern ireland for tonight until tomorrow morning, warning some communities may be cut off by flooding . cut off by flooding. >> buddy, who has lived here as ihave >> buddy, who has lived here as i have for generations, we had flooding in 47. there was flooding in 47. there was flooding in 47. there was flooding in 63. you know, these events are have occurred in the past, but what we need to work together to try and mitigate the impact of them . and with modern

impact of them. and with modern technology and modern ways of managing flood water, of course, we can introduce schemes that can assist in that process . can assist in that process. >> and pomp and pageantry were on full display this morning as the king and queen touched down in kenya for a state visit there , majesties were greeted in nairobi kenyan president nairobi by kenyan president william the king's william ruto. it's the king's first visit as monarch to the country where his mother became queenin country where his mother became queen in 1952. the king paid his respects to kenya's fallen heroes, military and civilian , heroes, military and civilian, at the tomb of the unknown warrior . he at the tomb of the unknown warrior. he also at the tomb of the unknown warrior . he also visited at the tomb of the unknown warrior. he also visited a model farm which serves as an information centre for the local community and provides food for the hospital . this is gb news the hospital. this is gb news across the uk on tv, in your car, on your digital radio and on your smart speaker. by saying play gb news now . now it's back play gb news now. now it's back to martin and . emily to martin and. emily >> well, it's already an explosive afternoon. dominic cummings has launched a scathing

attack on the government's record during the covid 19 pandemic. as he appeared today before the inquiry. yes, calling the cabinet office a bomb site, remarking that important decisions were taken away from cabinet and that the government was a mix of the wrong people in the wrong jobs. >> strong stuff . the former >> strong stuff. the former chief adviser pulled no punches as he unloaded on boris johnson's tenure as prime minister for. but should we take it with a pinch of salt? let's ask deputy political editor tom hannood, who is outside the inquiry and has been listened very carefully to what was said . very carefully to what was said. as i said there, tom, what have we learned and should we take dominic cummings testimony with a pinch salt . a pinch of salt. >> honestly, there were sharp intake of breath from other journalists just inside moments ago as the covid lawyer read out the words f pigs and c words to describe dominic cummings descriptions of senior government ministers , as he was

government ministers, as he was asked, was that a particularly productive thing to do? and dominic cummings replied, saying that it reflects the general sentiment of many people in government, the disdain that he had for many sitting around the cabinet table and indeed many senior civil service counts as well, were for in his ire, particularly those running the cabinet office, a body within government that dominic cummings described as a dumpster fire and a bombsite. it seemed there were very few areas of the mechanisms of government that dominic cummings would say were working. frankly early through the summer of 2019 and into 2020. describing how he attempted to promote certain people he viewed as able and frankly, remove people he thought were unable. but in the struggle nature of everything as well. dominic cummings saying that this was

simply a structure of government that did not work and tom, another revelation that came out was a culture of classified trying everything to hide, missed takes and scrutiny . missed takes and scrutiny. >> the notion that cabinet minutes weren't even kept in some of the most important meetings in recent british history. so therefore, the accountability aftennards is complete and at a bedlam, isn't it ? it? >> certainly. but more than that , the most senior meetings were not amongst the cabinet. we heard from dominic cummings confirmation of something that has been widely understood for several decades now that decisions aren't made around the cabinet table. they're made within senior groups of advisers and the prime minister himself within number 10. and dominic cummings described the cabinet as a potemkin exercise,

pretending to make decisions, walking down, downing street for the cameras, all for show when actually the decisions were made by a far smaller group at meetings that occurred at either 815 or 915 that were not minuted. and he was speaking about those small groups of advisers making decisions and saying that at one point he advised boris johnson in the final week of the 2019 general election campaign to cut the cabinet down, then back to the size it was 100 years ago, saying it was impossible to make decisions with a group of 25 or 30 people sitting around that cabinet table. impossible to make those decisions or have constructive conversations without it leaking. he also was deeply critical of boris johnson's ability to chair those cabinet discussions , almost cabinet discussions, almost referring to the cabinet as something that was useless and for show, again, pointing to much smaller meetings of people that most people would never have heard of making the crucial

decisions that affect our lives . decisions that affect our lives. >> tom, just very quickly , a lot >> tom, just very quickly, a lot of our well, a few of our viewers and listeners are asking who is in that room in the covid inquiry besides dominic cummings and the case who is there? listen thing in the background . listen thing in the background. >> well , i'm listen thing in the background. >> well, i'm up in a press room. >> well, i'm up in a press room. >> that's slightly different from the actual room in which everything is happening in the press room. we've got a transcript that the stenographers are rapidly typing out and some other resources. but in the room only a small handful of for journalists can sit at any one time and once you leave, if you're in there, you can't then go back in until there's a break. and of course there's a break. and of course there are these periodic breaks we're in one now. things are returning at 12:45, but but within the room it is, of course, the lawyers from the inquiry be the stenographers . inquiry be the stenographers. and of course, dominic cummings as well. that's generally the

setup here. and it is interesting to really see the forensic detail with which the lawyers are going at their questioning. they've read these mammoth submissions that the people being questioned have submitted to the inquiry and the questioning sessions as people will have probably been able to work out, are going through particular areas of those submissions that have already been put before the inquiry . been put before the inquiry. >> and tom, as well as criticising the size of the cabinet, dominic cummings was criticising the usefulness at all. he was saying here the cabinet secretary was 100 times more powerful than any body other than the prime minister putting into into view the very serious notion that in our darkest hours of lockdowns , the darkest hours of lockdowns, the people in charge of the country , people in charge of the country, they weren't even elected. they were unelected bureaucrats , were unelected bureaucrats, certainly . certainly. >> and we must emphasise at this

point it wasn't just the people around the cabinet table that dominic cummings had great at, great criticism for it was also the people leading the cabinet office, particularly the cabinet secretary mark sedwill, who was mentioned by dominic cummings in the interview. in the interrogation , really as someone interrogation, really as someone who was basically useless in his job, dominic cummings described him as an able diplomat, but someone who simply did not have a grip on how the cabinet office worked. people did not know who were making which decisions, and indeed even the documents being submitted to senior politicians from the cabinet office were muddled and inconsistent . and muddled and inconsistent. and frankly, in the words of dominic cummings, a dumpster fire. so he really did not hold back from criticism, not just of politicians, as we've heard a lot of, but also of some senior civil servants , ants, and the civil servants, ants, and the ability of people in very crucial roles. many of those

roles , as dominic cummings roles, as dominic cummings described, many of those civil servants, many, many times, ten times, 100 times more powerful than the cabinet ministers, that we may well know the names of at home. >> thank you very much indeed. tom hannood with a single protester behind him with a sign there saying callous liar. presumably that's referring to bofis presumably that's referring to boris johnson, or it could be referring to dominic cummings. who knows. thank you very much indeed, tom hannood, our deputy political editor outside the covid indeed both of them. >> and they are currently breaking for lunch. we expect that to be around about an hour, although they look although they do look a long lunch westminster. but we lunch in westminster. but we will going back to covid will be going back to the covid inquiry for more later. tom hannood throughout the hannood there throughout the afternoon. we will not miss a beat of horror on beat of the horror show on halloween . halloween. >> h alloween. >> yes, halloween. >> yes, it is halloween . so sir >> yes, it is halloween. so sir keir starmer says now is not the right time for a ceasefire in the middle east, claiming it would embolden hamas and risk further violence immediately in a speech in central london, the labour leader said a

humanitarian pause is the only credible approach to the conflict in gaza, calling it terrorism and brutality on a scale few countries have ever experienced . experienced. >> yes. >> yes. >> meanwhile, the world health organisation has warned a public health catastrophe is imminent in gaza amid overcrowding and the breakdown of vital services, including access to clean water. and we can speak now to mark regev, senior adviser to the israeli prime minister. >> thank you for joining israeli prime minister. >> thank you forjoining us on >> thank you for joining us on the gb news. first of all, strong words from your prime minister. you never surrender power to hamas, quoting the bible. this is a time for war. this despite the fact there has been serious pressure from the united nations. can you tell us the latest about israel resolve to fight hamas as well? >> resolve is exactly the right word. we are committed to getting this done . israelis, getting this done. israelis, frankly, refuse to live next to

this. isis hamas enclave on our southern border . southern border. >> that's clearly not sustainable . we refuse to go sustainable. we refuse to go through the sort of attacks we've had to undergo over the last few weeks. we will never experience again what we did on october seventh, and we'll put an end to this this terror kingdom on our southern border . kingdom on our southern border. we are committed to destroying hamas. and at the same time , we hamas. and at the same time, we are committed to providing civilian population of gaza with humanitarian aid . and we're humanitarian aid. and we're working very closely with the international community to do that. our enemy is the hamas military machine. that. our enemy is the hamas military machine . we do not military machine. we do not target the innocent population of gaza. >> mark, are you concerned? great to speak to you. are you concerned with the groundswell of support for palestine for the residents of gaza? there's huge pressure at the moment and the volume is getting louder and louder. calling for a ceasefire, calling for israel to stop the

bombardment of gaza , to for us bombardment of gaza, to for us in israel, it's a matter of life and death . and death. >> we saw what hamas did to us just three weeks ago. we saw their brutality. we saw that horror in all. we saw it close up. they raped. they beheaded, they burnt people alive. frankly, they burnt babies alive. frankly, they burnt babies auve.the frankly, they burnt babies alive. the young people at the open air concert were driven into a rage and were machine gunned. it reminded us of terrible moments in jewish history from the 20th century. it was a terrible, horrific event . and we are determined to event. and we are determined to put an end to this. this terrorism on our southern border. now if people can't understand that , i don't know understand that, i don't know what else to say . we saw in the what else to say. we saw in the words of the german chancellor schulz, we saw type violence. these people all butchered, massacred . how can anyone even massacred. how can anyone even justify their behaviour? >> yeah. and mark, there have

been calls for from america, for example , for a more laser example, for a more laser targeted approach , each air fire targeted approach, each air fire and then special forces going in. but your your tactics of going in on the ground have yielded results haven't they, with the extraction of at least one un hostage privates ari megerdich overnight. so are you confident that your approach is the correct one or. >> look, we're always happy to listen to the words of friends, whether they're friends in london or friends in washington . london or friends in washington. and we want to target and destroy hamas terrorist capabilities. we want to end their political control over the gaza strip. we think that's good for us. i think it's also good for us. i think it's also good for palestinians to be rid of this terrible, terrible regime that have governing . but we want that have governing. but we want to be as surgical as possible. we want to destroy hamas . and at we want to destroy hamas. and at the same time, we're working with allies and friends . and on with allies and friends. and on this humanitarian corridor in the south so that gazan civilians who vacated the north

to avoid the fighting can find a zone of safety in the southern part of the gaza strip , close to part of the gaza strip, close to the mediterranean coast and closer to the rafah crossing with egypt. so they are close to the humanitarian supplies that are coming in. >> can i ask one more mark? >> can i ask one more mark? >> i understand we understand that there are still over 200 hostages, israeli hostages being held by hamas. concern is growing over their safety and security. of course . how are the security. of course. how are the israeli forces going about retrieving these hostages? they must frankly be terrified . must frankly be terrified. >> so you're correct. this is a major problem. until those people who had a ceasefire ask them after boko haram abducted and kidnapped an even larger amount of schoolgirls, you'll recall that a few years ago, did anyone call for a ceasefire with boko haram ? ridiculous. hamas boko haram? ridiculous. hamas

has declared war on all civilisation in their behaviour and we have to destroy them . any and we have to destroy them. any ceasefire just protects hamas from from the from israel's counter—strike. and that's wrong. of course we have to do more to support the civilian population and we are doing more on your question. they're holding these hostages. we will continue to try to free the people we to can rescue the ones we can reach at the same time, we can reach at the same time, we think the way to get them out is to keep beefing up the pressure, to ratchet up the pressure, to ratchet up the pressure on hamas force them to feel the pain. maybe we'll get more concessions and people released that way . released that way. >> okay, mark regev, thank you for joining us on the live desk . for joining us on the live desk. superb stuff. let's move on now and let's go to mark white live from us in tel aviv . mark, we from us in tel aviv. mark, we just heard there from mark regev, senior adviser to benjamin netanyahu . the resolve benjamin netanyahu. the resolve seems strong . they said they seems strong. they said they will not stop until they have wiped out hamas.

>> yeah, and they still have a job to do. they know that because hamas still has significant capability. there have been multiple rocket attacks launched at israeli civilian communities , cities civilian communities, cities today. the last one, just about 15 minutes ago, a large barrage here into tel aviv. we could hear very significant booms from the iron dome missile system as those missiles went into the air to enter sept. those rockets. now, there are some reports circulating on social media suggesting that there have been a number of hits in the north—east of tel aviv , about 28 north—east of tel aviv, about 28 minutes or so, drive from where we are there is a video that's circulating. we're not to going show you that at the moment because we're just trying to gauge the accuracy of that video . it's the only one, the only video that's out there at the moment. and normally, if there was rocket impacts, there would

be multiple videos coming out fairly quickly so that just rings the odd alarm bell . so rings the odd alarm bell. so we'll just try and bottom that out. but what we can tell you is a significant attack on a significant rocket attack on tel aviv within the last 15 minutes with the sound of explosions from the rocket interceptors of the iron dome missile defence system going supersonic and then hitting those rockets over tel aviv as well . and this comes just a well. and this comes just a couple of hours after the labour leader, sir keir starmer , was leader, sir keir starmer, was giving his support to israel in a sense, saying that he is not calling for a ceasefire. but on the other hand and saying that he does want humanity , ovarian he does want humanity, ovarian pauses, that the toll on innocent civilians in gaza is very significant indeed and that humanity , korean policies are humanity, korean policies are required to try to get more in the way of aid trucks in. incidentally we've been told that there may be about 80 or so aid trucks going into gaza today

, say some have already been checked , but we're not sure how checked, but we're not sure how many have entered gaza as yet. the israelis have said that they are willing to countenance the idea of a humanitarian safe zones to allow these aid trucks to come in and to unload all of the aid to be distributed throughout southern gaza in particular, which is where the bulk of the population has now moved to. having said that , moved to. having said that, there are still hundreds of thousands of people in the north that have either refused to leave or are prevented from being leaving, leaving or actually are just not in a position to leave because they're elderly, infirm or they're elderly, infirm or they're sick in hospitals . we've they're sick in hospitals. we've also, as the ground war continues , it's pushing further continues, it's pushing further and further into northern gaza, coming under very heavy fire fire from hamas terrorists in entrenched positions. the idf

say they're taking out those positions slowly but surely and continuing to advance . there was continuing to advance. there was what we can only describe as a very stirring speech, i guess, from an idf commander to his troops in the tanks waiting in northern gaza to push fonnard this is what he said just a little earlier this morning . little earlier this morning. >> the north, southern command forces, this is the commander we are striking hamas and the terrorist organisations in the gaza strip . we have one goal, gaza strip. we have one goal, a victory . no matter how long or victory. no matter how long or how hard the fighting will be, there is no other outcome than victory . milford nitzan we will victory. milford nitzan we will fight with professionalism and strength based first and foremost on the idf values, which were instilled in us dedicate to mission and the

pursuit of victory . we will pursuit of victory. we will fight in alleys . we will fight fight in alleys. we will fight in tunnels. we will fight wherever necessary. >> well, thank you, mark. and closer to home here in paris . closer to home here in paris. you brought us earlier the very latest from paris, the paris metro station where police shot an unarmed woman wearing an islamic veil who had reportedly been threatening to blow herself up while shouting allahu akbar . up while shouting allahu akbar. what do we know . what do we know. >> well, i think you've just about said most of what occurred, but i think this just comes against a backdrop of a heightened terror threat right across the west in particular, we've had a number of terrorist incidents of late that have been unked incidents of late that have been linked to the conflict here in israel , and linked to the conflict here in israel, and that one in paris. we know that this woman is critically ill in hospital at this hour . they have not, as far this hour. they have not, as far as we know , found any kind of

as we know, found any kind of improvised explosive device. but then again, those police officers who opened fire weren't able to tell whether she did or she didn't because she was wearing a full veil. and was non—compliant with the officers. she was refusing to obey their commands. >> okay . mark white, live from >> okay. mark white, live from tel aviv , thank you very much tel aviv, thank you very much for that latest update . there's for that latest update. there's plenty more to come yet on gb news live and we'll see you shortly

>> the camilla tominey show sunday mornings from 930 on gb

news is . news is. >> it's 130. news is. >> it's130. i'm sophia wenzler in the gb newsroom . israel's in the gb newsroom. israel's prime minister has dismissed calls for a ceasefire in the war against hamas as a ground assault on gaza intensifies . assault on gaza intensifies. quoting the bible. benjamin netanyahu , who said this is netanyahu, who said this is a time for war and that calls for a ceasefire would mean surrendering to terrorism. more than 8300 people in gaza have been killed by israeli attacks . been killed by israeli attacks. rishi sunak government has been clear in its support of israel, but is urging for a humanitarian pause in the fighting to get aid into gaza. the covid inquiry has heard dominic cummings warned bofis heard dominic cummings warned boris johnson the cabinet office was totally behind pace and had no plan to deal with the pandemic. he also said the former prime minister was known as the shopping trolley due to his tendency to change direction in. mr cummings served as boris johnson's chief adviser until he was forced to quit in 2020 for

breaking lockdown rules. the inquiry is continuing this afternoon . plans to close train afternoon. plans to close train ticket offices have been called off. the transport secretary asked. train operators a short time ago to withdraw the controversial proposal, a public consultation on the closures received the largest ever response with the rmt union saying most people oppose the plan. mark harper says it didn't meet the high threshold of serving rail passengers . flood serving rail passengers. flood has hit parts of northern ireland with people warned to avoid travel. storm kieran is bringing strong winds and heavy rain to the uk. parts of newry and county down have been left undennater after a canal burst its banks with water levels in the city at unprecedented levels. the met office has issued a yellow rain alert across northern ireland from tonight until tomorrow morning, warning some communities may be cut off by flooding . and you can cut off by flooding. and you can get more on all those stories by visiting our website, gbnews.com

i >> -- >> fora >> for a valuable legacy, your family can own , gold coins will family can own, gold coins will always shine bright. >> rosalind gold proudly sponsors the gb news financial report . report. >> and here's a quick snapshot of today's markets. a pound will buy you 1.2152 and ,1.1446. the price of gold is £1,644.37 per ounce. and the ftse 100 is at 7348 points. >> rosalind gold proudly sponsors the gb news financial report . report. >> welcome back to gb news. live with me , emily carver and martin with me, emily carver and martin daubney . it is lunchtime for the daubney. it is lunchtime for the covid inquiry. currently we were just watching dominic cummings giving evidence to hugo keith kc. he was asking him many questions relating to a statement he gave and also asking fresh questions relating to whatsapp messages where there

was rather a lot of coarse language and lots of key points coming across , weren't there? coming across, weren't there? >> that's right. we expect acted it to be a horror show on halloween. and by jove, cummings did not pull any punches , did not pull any punches, started off calling the situation a dumpster fire a bomb site. but at least he was wearing a shirt and tie. not his usual kind of woolly hat regalia. some very, very coarse language in the open, in the salt, which would make us squaddies hair curl, it has to be said . but squaddies hair curl, it has to be said. but the squaddies hair curl, it has to be said . but the key point for be said. but the key point for me was who was really in power? dominic sparing no punches. the cabinet secretary, he said, was 100 times more powerful than anybody dodi in government. other than the prime minister, emily clarke , only indicating emily clarke, only indicating that the cabinet, the elected cabinet, they were about as useful as a chocolate teapot. >> yes, that's what he had to say. at least . certainly the say. at least. certainly the debate is raging in our inbox now . people asking who's in

now. people asking who's in charge? who's running the country? is it elected ministers elected members of parliament or civil servants? dominic cummings certainly seems to think that the cabinet was not making the policy decisions during that time at least, and lots of people getting in touch to say, can we take what dominic cummings is saying as gospel ? cummings is saying as gospel? should we be taking it with a pinch of salt? they're also mentioning barnard castle, aren't they? yeah yeah, of course. >> i mean, they're having a pop. can we trust this ? is this a can we trust this? is this a wronged lover, so to speak? an embittered former employer there on lunch at the moment, they do like a long lunch in westminster. so we may be some time, but for sure we're going to be cutting back over to that. promises to be an explosive afternoon of fresh revelations from the covid inquiry. >> yes, i reckon they'll probably have about an hour for lunch, we'll bring back lunch, but we'll bring you back to when we hear he is back to that when we hear he is back in the inquiry. but food price

inflation has fallen for the sixth month in a row, dropping to its lowest level in over a yean to its lowest level in over a year. that's according to new figures from the british retail consortium and nielsen iq. >> and it's strengthening the case for the bank of england to keep the base rate of interest at 5.25% this week. ahead of course, of their decision this thursday . thursday. >> yes. so joining us in the studio is none other than liam halligan, our economics and business with on the business editor with on the money . liam, good news is it is money. liam, good news is it is good news these aren't official numbers. >> these are numbers from the british retail consortium. but their survey numbers , they're their survey numbers, they're not numbers produced by the office for national statistics. let's just have a look at where we are on inflation. these are the official numbers. if you can see here. >> i think we've got a graph that you can see. >> well, we haven't got the >> well, if we haven't got the graph, well there it is. >> hey presto, the magic of >> we hey presto, the magic of television. see the peak of television. you see the peak of inflation there up above 11.11, 11.1% october, inflation

11.1% last october, inflation has been coming down pretty steadily, not in a straight line . you see it's flatlined in the last few months, july, august and september . and september. >> 6.8, 6.7, 6.7, of course, way above the 2% target where it should be, but at least it's coming down and then we have these british retail consortium numbers and i can show you them now. >> so in september , the british >> so in september, the british retail consortium said inflation was 6.2. >> this is from their surveys. they call it shop inflation. >> so it doesn't include services and things like that or legal things or it's what we experience when we go out to the supermarket in october. >> here's the new number, 5.2. >> here's the new number, 5.2. >> so a big drop. >> so a big drop. >> oh , now we know the bank of >> oh, now we know the bank of england is making its next decision on interest rates on thursday. that's the second in november. and then the next official inflation number for october that comes out in the middle of november. so, look , middle of november. so, look, this is good news. it suggests it's another reason why the bank

of england should hold interest rates on thursday. another reason that you won't have heard much about on the television because it's a little bit technical, you technical, but i'll tell you about this is gb news about it because this is gb news and we don't talk down to our viewers and listeners, do we? we think handle this. think they can handle this. >> dumb it down >> feel free to dumb it down a bit for us. >> martin a little bit. a little bit. so you have these things called monetary aggregates, and they're money they're measures of the money supply economy. it's supply in the economy. and it's not just cash. it's not not it's not just cash. it's not even cash. how even mostly cash. it's how quickly bank credit is expanding. and that's really important and we important for inflation. and we know only bank know that not only isn't bank credit expanding , it's actually credit expanding, it's actually contracting . you can see that contracting. you can see that when i was talking about the mortgage numbers yesterday, far fewer mortgages extended mortgage numbers yesterday, far fewer mc same as extended mortgage numbers yesterday, far fewer mcsame month extended mortgage numbers yesterday, far fewer mcsame month thanznded than the same month than september year . you've got september last year. you've got less demand for credit from companies because they're worried about the future. they don't know if the demand for their is going to be their product is going to be there. they don't want to go into debt because interest rates are bank of are high. and the bank of england out some numbers england brought out some numbers earlier showed england brought out some numbers earlbroad showed england brought out some numbers earlbroad monetary showed england brought out some numbers earlbroad monetary aggregates the broad monetary aggregates really constricting that

really constricting now and that is as near an allure as you get near to law as you get in near to a law as you get in economics, that when the monetary aggregates can strict pnces monetary aggregates can strict prices down because there's prices come down because there's just less demand in the economy thatis just less demand in the economy that is happening . and given that is now happening. and given those monetary aggregates constricting, given these british retail consortium numbers, given the downward trend in inflation that i've showed you earlier in this discussion, i really would be surprised if the bank of england didn't hold interest rates on thursday at 5.25. it held them last year. we've had 14 interest rate rises . let them work rate rises. let them work through the system. well mystic liam, you're normally right in these things , but before we get these things, but before we get too excited about shop inflation, itjust too excited about shop inflation, it just means that our our stuff isn't going up in price as much as it. >> that's right. it's not coming down. >> it's not coming down. >> it's not coming down. >> we're still getting poorer. >> we're still getting poorer. >> we're still well, yeah, pnces >> we're still well, yeah, prices are still up, prices are still going up, though. inflation higher though. wage inflation is higher than more like but than 6.2. it's more like 7. but of course, average. of course, that's on average. not everyone a pay rise not everyone gets a pay rise today. kind depends today. so it kind of depends where crumbles, as it

where the cookie crumbles, as it were . look, is good were. but look, this is good news. i don't think we're completely over this inflation surge. it may be that it gets worse when the winter comes. if there's lots of geopolitics, oil pnces there's lots of geopolitics, oil prices spike, be prices spike, i'd be irresponsible to not say that. but we do know that the ofgem energy price cap came down from the beginning of this month. so that should mean that the october number, when october inflation number, when it in the middle it does come out in the middle of november , will be lower than of november, will be lower than the one. and that's the current one. and that's another reason why bank of another reason why the bank of england hold fire. england should hold fire. >> just very, very quickly, if we if the bank of england we keep if the bank of england make decision to keep the make the decision to keep the interest rate where is 5.25% interest rate where it is 5.25% at 5.25, would we be an outlier? are other countries still raising rates? raising their interest rates? >> well, no. question, >> well, no. great question, emily. a will emily. tomorrow the us of a will decide . the federal reserve will decide. the federal reserve will decide. the federal reserve will decide what happens with interest rates. will it hold? i think it will. and if the fed holds tomorrow, i mean, nothing in economics is ever certain , in economics is ever certain, but it's as nailed on as it could be that the bank of england will hold because we sometimes follow their lead,

don't we? we often follow their lead on. there we go. lead on. oh, there we go. >> you. liam liam halligan >> thank you. liam liam halligan our editor. our economics editor. >> stuff. nice >> superb stuff. a nice optimistic note to end on there you gb news live. and after you with gb news live. and after the break, be joined by the break, we'll be joined by a royal correspondent look at royal correspondent to look at the queen's visit to

isabel, monday to thursdays from six till 930 . six till 930. >> welcome back to gb news live. it's a 1:45 now. the king and

queen have officially been welcomed in nairobi at the start of the state visit to kenya. the first commonwealth nation. his majesty has visited as sovereign i >> and it's not without some controversy . but here to explain controversy. but here to explain all is cameron walker, our royal correspondent here in the studio with me. and martin, so tell us what king charles, therefore saw and what's happened so far. >> well, it's a very poignant visit for king charles. kenya, of course, the place his of course, is the place his mother, queen elizabeth went mother, queen elizabeth ii, went up to the treetops safari lodge as a princess came down as queen in 1952 as king charles, his first visit to a commonwealth nafion first visit to a commonwealth nation since becoming king charles as well. and it's called let's remember that it's the british government that sends the king on a state visit. so it's clearly their intention to strengthen relationships with kenya diplomatically . it's an kenya diplomatically. it's an increasingly competitive place , increasingly competitive place, that area of africa . it's got that area of africa. it's got influence or. reporter from from china, russia and america as well, all competing for

entrepreneurial ship and business and trade. so the british government really wanting to use king charles's power of soft diplomacy . power of soft diplomacy. >> we're just watching here the late queen's visit to kenya , i believe. >> yes, that is black and white images. yes, that's her just arriving in kenya as princess elizabeth. and in this is 1952. and that safari lodge i mentioned earlier, where she spent the night in, which is when king george, her father, sadly passed away and she became queen. that was burnt down. two years later in what's called the mau mau uprising , which is mau mau uprising, which is a controversy for king charles and the british government because ancestors of those who fought in the mau mau uprising were, amongst other things, white farmers were attacked because they want because the people who were who created this uprising want did not want britain, britain ruling kenya as a result of that, the british rulers, it's estimated , had either it's estimated, had either killed, tortured or maimed

around 90,000 kenyans. that's according to the kenyan human rights watch and their ancestors. now want a formal apology from king charles during the state visit. and reparations. that is unlikely , reparations. that is unlikely, in my view. >> and it's interesting, cameron , because back in 2013, the british government at the time in duncan smith agreed a package worth nearly £20 million in reparations . as for this is this reparations. as for this is this business not done and dusted? as i understand it, kenyan politicians want to move on. >> yeah, there was a high court case back in 2013 at the time of the british government expressed regrets and, as you said, paid out nearly £20 million to 5000 elderly kenyans who suffered this abuse from kenyan rulers . this abuse from kenyan rulers. but of course, as you say, that was kind of done and dusted. but the kenyan government, as we understand it, wishes to move on and really look to the future and really look to the future and building what's been described by buckingham palace as boosting mutual prosperity . as boosting mutual prosperity. and we've seen this today with his majesty the king on a number

of engagements. he's been speaking people , in speaking to young people, in particular young tech entrepreneurs . there is a huge entrepreneurs. there is a huge skills gap here in the uk of tech , as we understand it. tech, as we understand it. speaking to someone called professor chris imafidon , who's professor chris imafidon, who's an education expert here in the uk , he was at the kenyan uk, he was at the kenyan reception at buckingham palace last week speaking to king charles, and was saying that charles, and he was saying that actually this is one of the benefits state visits benefits of a state visits because uk has ageing because the uk has an ageing population kenya, huge population in kenya, has huge youth unemployment with a skill set which could potentially be useful to the uk. so that's just one example of king charles shining a light on an issue which could king charles negotiating our migration policy with kenya. >> he might be better off just doing the royal wave to. all >> but kenya is a significant trading partner. cameron two way trade worth around £12 billion a year in in the last year on year figures . so there are year figures. so there are significant trading involved and this is the perfect kind of soft diplomacy. the trade allegiance

that the royal family should be doing. >> absolutely. and defence as well. a massive thing that we're going to be seeing over the next few days, particularly in mombasa. the king, as we understand is going to be understand it, is going to be watching a demonstration of a beach conducted by beach landing conducted by british kenyan british marines and kenyan marines because armed marines because british armed forces do help train kenyan armed forces in the region. so that's something, again, that king charles will be shining a light on. >> well, will you be keeping an eye on everything that happens over the next. certainly. well this day isn't this is a four day visit, isn't it ? it? >> keeps on my toes. it? >> iteeps on my toes. it? >> it does on my toes. it? >> it does keep my toes. it? >> it does keep you toes. it? >> it does keep you ones. it? >> it does keep you on your toes. i believe we are ready to. oh can we ask you one more question? cameron seeing as seeing as we've you here, seeing as we've got you here, what other things might what kind of other things might happen? will there be a banquet? dinner? be some pomp dinner? will there be some pomp and ceremony? >> a banquet? yeah, there's always that's always a banquet that's happening we've had happening tonight. so we've had the pomp and pageantry of the ceremonial state ceremonial welcome at the state house this morning house in nairobi this morning with armed forces playing with kenyan armed forces playing the national anthems, etcetera. tonight right. there is going to

be state banquet during that be a state banquet during that state king will state banquet, king charles will be delivering that be delivering a speech, and that is where is expected to nod , is where he is expected to nod, give a nod to the mau mau uprising. and what things. okay. >> cameron thank you, rachel. we have to leave it there. from the banquet to kenya, they've just finished lunch in london and we're now going back the we're now going back to the covid inquiry. we understand covid inquiry. as we understand our on how on how our limitations on how on how cobra entirely properly cobra worked entirely properly because requirement to because of the requirement to keep the physical area secure from russia and china and blah, blah, blah. >> right. that was one. >> right. that was one. >> so that's a practical consideration. >> yes. also, it just didn't scale. so it was used to dealing with relatively small things like floods , like terrorist like floods, like terrorist attack with five people getting killed or something like that. um, but, but with a crisis like this, which is much more on the scale of a war, it was just it, it just couldn't physically , it it just couldn't physically, it couldn't function data wise. it

couldn't function data wise. it couldn't function. all the systems going in and out of it didn't, didn't scale was the prime minister rather averse to attending cobra on account of its physical location ? it's hard its physical location? it's hard to say. i mean, he certainly preferred to be in his study and he didn't like going to cobra . i he didn't like going to cobra. i deliberately put the so as i referred to earlier on when we created the excess and structure , created the excess and structure i , created the excess and structure , i deliberately put that in cobra so that there were kind of live screens on the wall. we could record action notes in real time . it was just could record action notes in real time. it was just a more effective way of handling the ministers and handling the decision . he wasn't decision making. he wasn't enormously on it. no right. enormously keen on it. no right. >> cobra was still used from march 20th, 20 onwards, despite the institution of the 915 daily meetings in downing street . it meetings in downing street. it was an important part of the continuation of the cobra system. the fact that it allowed the devolved administrations to

take part in the process correct i >>i >> i mean, my sort of impression slash memory is that from roughly speaking , slash memory is that from roughly speaking, mid—march, the main function of cobra after that was actually be the sort of just the process rather potemkin process of handling the days. in fact, i'm not sure if i even went back to cobra for covid after something like the 12th or 15th of march. >> you ran down the cobra system. mr cummings because your view was that with the devolved administrations party to that process , there was an process, there was an unacceptable risk of leaks. you you were violently opposed to the fact that the media was briefed aftennards and you were again , hence, therefore the again, hence, therefore the continued use of cobra as a crisis . resolution machinery.

crisis. resolution machinery. i'd say that that's overstating things . things. >> so first of all, i didn't have the authority to run it down and didn't run it down. i think it's more accurate to say that it was superseded by by broader things . it was broader things. it was superseded by the 815 meeting that i started, the 915 meeting. how those two meetings evolved into the covid task force. so i didn't run it down. it continued and i'm sure in some ways it did very useful work. and also it's important to point out , unlike important to point out, unlike other parts of the system that i've been very critical of, the people who ran cobra in my opinion, did an extremely professional job. the problem was not in this instance similar to the cabinet office, where a lot of the people were unsuitable. the problem here was a much more structural one that the cobra thing just just didn't scale needed . scale to what was needed. >> could have page 22, >> could we have page 22, please, your letter to the please, of your letter to the inquiry for 8313.

please, of your letter to the inquiry for 8313 . this is a inquiry for 8313. this is a message a whatsapp between yourself and mrjohnson dated the 12th of march 2020. >> sorry sir, it hasn't popped up. i can't see it if it's important . important. >> 12th of march 2020. you need to chair daily meetings in the cabinet room, not cobra on this . cabinet room, not cobra on this. from tomorrow i'm going to tell the system this not capital letters, but the days on the phone all the time either. so people can't tell you the truth . people can't tell you the truth. well, you did run down the cobra system, mr cummings. well, you did run down the cobra system, mr cummings . you thought system, mr cummings. you thought that if the cobra system continued , people either continued, people either wouldn't tell the truth or the devolved administrations would leak to the media or brief the media thereafter. >> so i certainly thought that the cobra meetings that we'd had with the pm were very potemkin.

they were extremely scripted. and then having had these sort of pointless things is that you then had all sorts of people running straight out and yabbering to the media about what had just been said in a completely undisciplined way, which then undermined public confidence in things, caused a lot of but with lot of trouble. but with respect, wouldn't say this is respect, i wouldn't say this is running cobra system. running down the cobra system. the cobra system continued . what the cobra system continued. what i saying was that it was i was saying was that it was clearly completely unable to cope with the scale of the crisis and that a different system needed to be created. just 1—1 very simple thing. we literally couldn't show the pm crucial data . the in the cobra crucial data. the in the cobra room because it couldn't be piped through because of the strap restrictions. what you're going back now to the practical considerations and the practical difficulties of which you spoke earlier , sir, could . we have earlier, sir, could. we have 174673 ? 174673? >> page one. this is an email between yourself , i think helen between yourself, i think helen mcnamara and others dated the

13th of march . your email is in 13th of march. your email is in the middle of the page , the pm the middle of the page, the pm view and mine on those cobras is that they are hopeless as decision making entities and actively cause trouble for comms given they just brief immediately . so there you're immediately. so there you're focusing not on the practical difficulties of data for or the national security restrictions over the use of the room. but because you thought they were hopeless as decision making entities and they caused trouble for comms . yes. entities and they caused trouble for comms . yes . on the 15th of for comms. yes. on the 15th of march in a whatsapp thread number 10. action 236371 page 52

this is a whatsapp sent after sir mark sedwill , now lord sir mark sedwill, now lord sedwill, the cabinet secretary, had produced a note to the prime minister concerning the committee structure moving fonnard . the institution of fonnard. the institution of something called ministerial implementation groups and the 915 meetings pm it would be good if you could sign off the note from mark sedwill on moving to the next phase structures. et cetera. ideally before the meeting this pm so we could get things moving that. dominic things moving on that. dominic cummings can you send on whatsapp? my work computer battery flat. i can't recharge for an hour. the draft i saw looked okay as it was basically drafted by us. who is us? >> i'm not sure exactly, but some combination. i think of me. imran, ben warner .

imran, ben warner. >> except it's still too keen on cobras with da's the pm daily meetings must be in the cabinet room with spider phones and screens. not in cobra, where nobody can take laptops and phones. so there is a clear reference to the practical considerations , but also you considerations, but also you were not keen on the devolved administrations being concerned in and attending cobra no , in and attending cobra no, that's not the there are different issues. >> if you're having meetings to actually figure out the truth, then meetings like that have to be conducted in a very different way. they can't be one of these things with 50 people on a video conference with the days when things immediately those meetings were not meetings to try to figure out the truth about hard issues. they were meetings as part of the kind of performance and coordination and the constitutional function and my concern was that even at this late stage in the crisis , a lot

late stage in the crisis, a lot of people in the cabinet office were still fixated on the kind of potemkin maintaining the potemkin aspects rather than actually getting to the heart of things. and we couldn't get to the heart of things in that room because we literally couldn't take in the information and show it to the pm and have a proper discussion about it. >> did you michael gove >> why did you want michael gove to be in charge of regular devolved administration updates and the minister? and not the prime minister? >> would handle >> i thought gove would handle it times it ten times better. >> what? times better >> handle what? ten times better handle the process of dealing with the da's and also bear in mind that i'd , as i said before, mind that i'd, as i said before, the whole exco structure. >> michael gove had more experience of anybody . experience of anybody. >> slow down, please. mr cummings . cummings. >> michael gove had more experience of anybody in that room. the cobra briefing room , room. the cobra briefing room, because he was in there literally daily from july, august, september , etcetera, all august, september, etcetera, all the way through 2019. so i knew that he understood the whole rhythm , the process, the rhythm, the process, the structure of the staff. and it

just seemed like an obvious sort of way of divvying up responsibilities . responsibilities. >> uh, mr gove was the chancellor of the duchy of lancaster , was he not? yeah. was lancaster, was he not? yeah. was he the prime minister ? he the prime minister? >> was he. was he. >> was he. was he. >> was he the prime minister? no, obviously not. no did you not want the prime minister to be in a meeting room with the devolved administrations as the constituent parts of the united kingdom? >> i thought it i thought it preferable to have the prime minister actually focussed on the impending catastrophe that we faced on that day . and i we faced on that day. and i thought that generally speaking, him talking to the da did not advance lance any cause . advance lance any cause. >> the devolved administrations had an entitlement, surely to be able to confer with the prime minister of the united kingdom in the face of this unprecedented crisis. >> they did and they did confer. but generally speaking, it was better for them to confer either with officials or with michael

gove than with the pm was number 10 in any better ? 10 in any better? >> you describe it as a hopeless structure for dealing with a major crisis . what did you mean major crisis. what did you mean by that ? by that? >> i mean , i don't know how much >> i mean, i don't know how much detail you want me to go into. >> well, be succinct, please. mr cummings. why was it a hopeless structure ? structure? >> well, um . number 10 is not >> well, um. number 10 is not configured to be the nerve centre of a national crisis like covid because of the absence of personnel or the absence of structure that allows people in number 10 to liaise with all the other parts of government in every in every way, physically, in terms of date, in terms of the physical layout and the lack of the proper rooms that you would have for a crisis centre . would have for a crisis centre. in terms of the personnel , in

in terms of the personnel, in terms of the power , as i've terms of the power, as i've tried to explain real power on these things is almost entirely in the cabinet office , not in in the cabinet office, not in number 10. so so number 10 was just completely unsuited for this. that's why i tried to change it in january and try to change it in january and try to change it in january and try to change it again in the summer in paragraph 301, you say, as with the cabinet office , its problems the cabinet office, its problems and lack of specialist skills combined with its responsibility for human resources and recruitment . recruitment. >> there were problems with the number 10 structure. you brought in friends or colleagues. tom shinner , who may have been shinner, who may have been a member of the civil service, but he was also an adviser , mark and he was also an adviser, mark and ben warner , demis hassabis , why ben warner, demis hassabis, why didn't you approach the relevant parts of the cabinet office in number 10 and say, we need other people taken from other parts of government and brought into number 10? why was it necessary

to have your friends and your colleagues put into number 10? >> well , i did colleagues put into number 10? >> well, i did do colleagues put into number 10? >> well , i did do exactly what >> well, i did do exactly what you just asked, what you said, why didn't i do that? i literally did do that at scale . literally did do that at scale. ispoke literally did do that at scale. i spoke to the cabinet secretary about it. the deputy cabinet secretary, multiple other people in cabinet office, part of in the cabinet office, part of the whole point of bringing tom shinner in was that i knew that he been involved in the he had been involved in the cabinet with whole cabinet office with the whole brexit, brexit, no deal preparations , which was as close preparations, which was as close as anybody had had probably since world war ii, to actually managing an extremely large scale, very, very complex set of operational and logistical questions. i knew also that tom had had because of this and also because of some other aspects of his career, which i won't go into extensive networks across the system, into the military , the system, into the military, into all sorts of things. so he could he was he was much better placed than me or anybody else

really in number 10 to know oh, how we should call general so—and—so and get him to help with this. we should get so—and—so in to help with that. so was the logic behind so that was the logic behind what tom was. >> mark warner , a member of the >> mark warner, a member of the civil service ? yes. civil service? yes. >> no, mark warner was is a ceo of a company , but he was working of a company, but he was working at that time with simon stevens and patrick vallance on data issues around the nhs completely fortuitously. so it obviously made sense given that him and his company were kind of embedded in the nhs structure . embedded in the nhs structure. and so sorry, just to make it completely clear , mark and completely clear, mark and faculty got involved with the nhs and data before covid ever started , and so they were started, and so they were already in there working on these issues. so obviously made sense for us to all kind of integrate. and then they helped build the dashboard. >> was ben warner a member of the service? the civil service? >> was a special well , i >> he was a special well, i think his status at this time was actually might not might not

have been officially confirmed, but he became a spad when you asked him to join number did asked him to join number 10, did he come from the civil service? >> he did not. did demis hassabis come from the civil service when you asked him to attend sage and to assist you in your hour of need? he was ceo of deepmind. >> he was very different category of person. >> was he a member of the civil service? >> of course not. no neither was tim gowers. he was professor of maths at cambridge , a number of maths at cambridge, a number of witness statements before the inquiry refer to the fact that there was a dysfunctionality , there was a dysfunctionality, i.e. there was a dysfunctionality, le. a lack of a proper working relations between the cabinet office number 10 and other departments. >> there was a lack of clarity about who was leading . there was about who was leading. there was about who was leading. there was a an overall absence of a sufficiently organised response . sufficiently organised response. nobody knew in essence, who was

in charge . who do you go to in in charge. who do you go to in order to get decisions out of the government machine? would you agree with those sentiments ? you agree with those sentiments? >> that was a general description. 2019 and 2020. i would say it improved, obviously once the covid task force was created that brought in a lot more clarity and the kind of covid esque covid. oh, so things certainly improved from the summer, partly thanks to tom and helen macnamara and others. but certainly until we did that , it certainly until we did that, it was extremely chaotic . was extremely chaotic. >> you attempted , according to >> you attempted, according to your statement, to bring about a major reorganisation in the layout and the structures of number 10 initially in late january, early january first, week of january. >> all right. >> all right. >> well, late january is taken from your statement . you then from your statement. you then returned to this subject in may. and we know, of course, that there were changes to the cabinet office structure to and the committee structure in number 10 or that the meeting structure in number 10. did you

in general terms have success in your attempts to reorganise the structures . structures. >> um, i would say generally failure with pockets of success. i think we managed to create the number 10 data science team, which i started working on in the first week of january. it was obviously interrupted by the covid first nightmare , but covid first wave nightmare, but we created that and that proved really critical. it brought in crucial different skills , crucial different skills, crucial different skills, crucial different skills, crucial different people, people with a different, very different mentality to the civil service so that was a that was a i would say a rare success. but if you're asking, just pause there, please. >> mr cummings so in relation to the establishment of a proper data science team and a process, a system for getting in data and disseminating it around number 10, yeah, that broadly worked. and we know that of course there

was a dashboard and there was a ten team set up. >> yes, in january there was some scepticism about the whole thing in the cabinet office and resistance. but once everyone had gone through february, march , april and the nightmare then actually resistance completely flipped and the cabinet secretary and many other senior people actually completely supported doing it. >> were there some changes to the personnel in number 10 or the personnel in number 10 or the cabinet office? there were a human resource side, yeah . human resource side, yeah. >> there were huge changes in the cabinet office and core teams that were put in charge of covid were repeatedly created and repeatedly dissolved . we and repeatedly dissolved. we were repeatedly told that number 10 that they had burned out from stress and they'd gone. so yes, there was a um, i would say until by september there was a little bit more stable. the task force structure existed . people force structure existed. people had a much better sense of what their job was. had a much better sense of what theirjob was. it had a much better sense of what their job was. it was still

dysfunctional in various ways, but it was much different than it had been in may. >> what about the department of health and social care as the lead government department? your statement states that the dhsc was ovennhelmed by the scale of the crisis in february to may, it couldn't build capacity on testing on drugs and was bad at asking the cabinet office for help. when it became apparent that the dhsc was unable to discharge the heavy burden placed on it as the lead government department. why were not? why were changes not instituted ? i'd . well, i think instituted? i'd. well, i think the cabinet office were was remember, the cabinet office is responsible for dealing with the problem like that. >> and the cabinet office itself was ovennhelmed. it was ovennhelmed by the crisis . it ovennhelmed by the crisis. it was ovennhelmed by its own staff being out with covid. it was ovennhelmed by internal ructions about how the hell this had all been allowed to happen . so

been allowed to happen. so i think the cabinet office was slow in getting to grips with the problem of the department of health. i think, though, also undoubtedly i'm afraid that . the undoubtedly i'm afraid that. the story that the secretary of state for health kept telling us around the cabinet table contribute to that. as the cabinet secretary himself , said cabinet secretary himself, said hancock has not been clear in asking us for the help he needs and that's contributed to the problem . so i think, you know, problem. so i think, you know, as i say in moscow, everyone's white and everyone's unhappy. this one of those examples this was one of those examples is that the cabinet office had serious problems. department of health had serious problems. the coordinating mechanism to solve that had crumbled under that itself had crumbled under the pressure . it is very obvious the pressure. it is very obvious that there were a large number of criticisms made by you of the secretary of state for health and social care. >> matt hancock will look at some of those observations later . where did you or number 10,

however , suggest that structural however, suggest that structural changes to the lead government department to the dhsc changes in the way in which it operated in the way in which it operated in order to ensure a better service in the face of this crisis? where is that debate? where were those changes proposed? so you also bear in mind, so in april when we really started to discuss this, i discussed it with the cabinet secretary, of course, the pm had just nearly died and was off in chequers. >> so discussing it was was inevitably very tricky . but i inevitably very tricky. but i talked to the cabinet secretary in april about these issues. we discussed the possibility of splitting up the department of health in various ways , health in various ways, formally, informally , we formally, informally, we discussed creating various task forces to take critical work away . and of course, we actually away. and of course, we actually did that. one of the in an ironic , odd way, the scale of ironic, odd way, the scale of the nightmare in march , april the nightmare in march, april actually made it much easier for

us to make such a monumental decision as taking vaccines out of department of health and creating a separate task force . creating a separate task force. so similarly on testing to pause you there , i'm going to ask you, you there, i'm going to ask you, please, to try to keep your answers a little more concise. >> i appreciate it's difficult . >> i appreciate it's difficult. so the way in which the task force task forces were set up was a reflection, if you like , was a reflection, if you like, of the understanding that the dhsc was not performing . so you dhsc was not performing. so you had a test and trace task force, you had a vaccine task force, ppe task force and so on. yes. is that correct ? is that correct? >> correct. but to be fair , not >> correct. but to be fair, not just that they were under that they were performing poorly . it they were performing poorly. it was a once a century event and they were clearly ovennhelmed. and i think in any even if you imagined everything had been working times better, there working ten times better, there would still have been very powerful argument for having specific forces aimed at specific task forces aimed at specific task forces aimed at specific things. all right. >> the choir has heard a great deal of evidence about the

workings of sage and the majority of that evidence has been received from members of sage , its constituent parts from sage, its constituent parts from the viewpoint of number 10. did the viewpoint of number 10. did the sage government liaison, the process by which the government received advice from sage work? well um, so i think sage did a brilliant job at coordinating a scientific expertise , as i think scientific expertise, as i think patrick vallance did, a brilliant job in chairing it and organising it. >> but i think that the, the, the, the mechanism whereby the sageis the, the mechanism whereby the sage is thought processes were conveyed to . number 10 could be conveyed to. number 10 could be radically improved because they were fundamentally daily oral briefings from patrick vallance and chris whitty. on the one hand and the consensus minutes

on the other hand, and then often very confused interpretation of what they had heard and by officials in the cabinet office who did not necessarily have the skills and background and technical understanding to be able to explain those things well to number 10. so that pausing that just to split those answers up, please. >> mr cummings in relation to the reporting system through the chief medical officer and the government's chief scientific adviser , were those briefings by adviser, were those briefings by them to government recorded or were they oral ? were they oral? >> what would you mean by record ? do you mean minuted? >> were they minuted? did they produce papers in support of everything they said ? or was everything they said? or was this funnel of communication largely an oral one? >> it was largely an oral one, though of course, the private secretary would record notes from the meeting and then issue action points and other things from in the normal way, from the private office. >> the sage minutes were , as

>> the sage minutes were, as you've described them , consensus you've described them, consensus documents and others have described them similarly . did described them similarly. did number 10 get a proper understanding of the width of debate that had taken place before sage and of the nuance of these extremely difficult and complex issues ? complex issues? >> in my opinion, obviously not. i mean, there's no substitute for actually listening to these conversations oneself and interrogating people. i'm not saying that that the sage saying by that that the sage minutes themselves were bad minutes themselves were a bad product. they were a product. i think they were a good and useful good product and a useful product. if you're asking product. but if you're asking about the nature of a crisis like this involving the prime minister having to make extraordinary decisions, he obviously needed much richer information than the sage minutes could provide . minutes could provide. >> you are critical in your statement of the way in which the cabinet office commissioned work from sage, and you say on occasion the wrong questions were asked of sage . you and we were asked of sage. you and we know i think demise. hassabis

your friend attended sage . why your friend attended sage. why did no one say to sage bluntly and plainly , we want you to and plainly, we want you to indicate much more clearly what your recommendations are . we your recommendations are. we need a much clearer understanding of what you suggest . and understanding of what you suggest. and this is our the government's strategy so that, you know to what you should direct your advice with. >> with respect, it wasn't my job to try and take commandeer sage and start giving them orders about how they should operate. i spoke privately to patrick vallance about things i suggested, for example, getting some external people like like gowers and hassabis to, to, to attend and listen and review the papers. but it wasn't for a political adviser to start giving sage orders about how it should operate . should operate. >> well, if you allow me to suggest mr cummings, you weren't just a political adviser, you were in a position to exercise a

significant degree of control and power at the heart of number 10. if you saw there was a problem in terms of the root of advice and the communications that you were receiving, why was this not publicly raised ? this not publicly raised? >> well, as you know, from from from the various evidence i sent ben warner to attend the meetings and discuss them, i listened to some of them myself also from the beginning of january, i had weekly meetings, at least weekly meetings, sometimes 2 or 3 times a week with patrick, where i would talk to him myself about the about all sorts of things, about science. but also obviously as time went on increasingly about covid. so i did push on these things and i did probe and i did talk to patrick about about them all. my criticism is not of patrick. i think the fundamental problem was , is the interface problem was, is the interface between sage dhsc and the cabinet office and my point that

you refer to in my evidence is this is not my i'm not a technical person , so this is not technical person, so this is not my expertise. i'm reflecting on the data people who were extremely smart and able , all extremely smart and able, all who came in to help us, they said to me, the cabinet office is asking the wrong questions and misinterpreted getting the answers. and that was a problem both before the first wave and as we emerged out of the first wave. you asked your friend ben warner to attend sage. i did . warner to attend sage. i did. >> you spoke privately to the government's chief scientific adviser, sir patrick vallance . adviser, sir patrick vallance. you hadn't held back from making recommendations in relation to sir structural changes that in your view, were required to be made to the cabinet office, to number 10, to the nsc? why did you not publicly say there is a real problem with the structural route by which sage advises the government and we are not

getting a proper understanding of the picture? >> well, i don't think it would have been a good idea for me to say publicly that something like that. but but i do. >> your colleagues in government did that to colleagues, to did say that to colleagues, to colleagues did say that to colleagues, to col|i agues did say that to colleagues, to col|i also spoke to patrick about >> i also spoke to patrick about it, about making the sage. i also had a very strong view that the sage minutes and other documentation should be made pubucin documentation should be made public in february for scrutiny . public in february for scrutiny. and actually patrick was very good about that and patrick completely agreed . completely agreed. unfortunately, again, the culture of secrecy in the cabinet office blocked that, not just february, march, but actually kept blocking it. i can't remember how long, but for a very long time. >> in your statement in relation to the to the issue of the substantive advice you received from sage, or rather the advice that the government received from sage, you say that it was represented to the government that sage was broadly in agreement with the strategy of

mitigation, and we'll come back in a moment to look at that in more detail or plan a, as you call it. yeah, but that subsequently you were told that sage members, members on the sage committee denied that they had been generally in support of a mitigation strategy . yes. when a mitigation strategy. yes. when were you told that that representation of sage's position was inaccurate ? position was inaccurate? >> i'm not sure exactly, but you could start to see it in what they themselves said after the first lockdown happened . from first lockdown happened. from that point on, a lot of people around sage started to talk as if they'd been recommending this for a long time. if they'd been recommending this for a long time . whereas, as you for a long time. whereas, as you can all see from the evidence, they weren't even recommending it in the week of the 9th of march. >> that that was obviously an extreme , serious problem. the extreme, serious problem. the government sole scientific advisory group for emergencies .

advisory group for emergencies. was was not, it would seem to you and what you were told accurately giving you a proper reflection of the debate in that committee . we well i wouldn't committee. we well i wouldn't put it like that . put it like that. >> i think i think actually i would say the problem in lots of ways was actually worse than that or that it was represented to us even in the week of the 9th of march. that that sage collectively agreed with the plan of single peak herd immunity by september . and immunity by september. and indeed, as you can see from the pubuc indeed, as you can see from the public record in youtube, many people from sage actually gave interviews that week articulating that plan, strategy. >> so . the at least after the >> so. the at least after the first wave. mr cummings it was obvious to you that . the obvious to you that. the information that you had received from sage on behalf of the government was to some extent inaccurate. it hadn't

been a fair reflection on what you've said of the views of its members . sage as you say in your members. sage as you say in your statement , had members. sage as you say in your statement, had not made plain that there was a viable alternative to the mitigation they had not made plain , at they had not made plain, at least until quite late in the day, that the numbers of deaths and hospital cases would be massive. >> oh, sorry . i would massive. >> oh, sorry. i would i massive. >> oh, sorry . i would i would massive. >> oh, sorry. i would i would. the last sentence is not accurate until quite late in the day. >> when did sage tell you that they had concerns that the infection fatality rate and the infection fatality rate and the infection hospitalisation rate would mean an inevitable wave of death and hospital cases ? death and hospital cases? >> i don't remember the exact date , but if you look at date, but if you look at multiple graphs from cobra that went through set, that multiple graphs from cobra that went through set , that went went through set, that went through sage , you can see that through sage, you can see that that people were envisaging a scale of death that would

ovennhelm the nhs. certainly in february, late february wasn't it? >> mr >> mr >> cummings i would say early february. >> well, we'll have a look and you can tell us where those documents are. did sage tell you that effectively there was no means of controlling the virus onceit means of controlling the virus once it had reached the united kingdom ? kingdom? >> i wouldn't say that sage told us that. i would say that that was that number 10 was told that that was the consensus view of ccs in the cabinet office and the department of health and sage that . fundamentally we sage that. fundamentally we fundamentally number 10 was told in january and february that the most significant danger that we faced was a second wave happening later in 2020. and that was what everyone was trying to avoid. and that's why the single peak by single major peak by september approach was taken. >> we'll come back to that

doctrinal debate and strategy. but i'm asking you, mr cummings, why why, if it had become apparent to you that you had not been able to understand accurately what sage believed or you had not received a fair reflection on what sage was debating and what it thought, why , after the first wave did why, after the first wave did you not bring about changes to the sage structure and the advisory structure in the way that you had advocated for the cabinet office , the dhsc number cabinet office, the dhsc number 10, the civil contingency secretariat, and so on? >> well, i literally did. i mean, we created the data science team and the whole part of the whole point of the data science team was that you had actual very deep technical experts that could red team and explore what sage was saying and give the prime minister advice on what was on what was coming from sage, how to interpret it, potential problems with the advice that was coming from sage.et advice that was coming from sage. et cetera. and that team actually did that job.

>> excuse me? that it was data within downing street. you set up the ten days, the ten data system or 10 downing street data system or 10 downing street data system . what changes did you system. what changes did you advocate or propose in relation to the constitution of sage and the means by which it informed government of its advice ? government of its advice? >> so the main thing that i personally did was to was to institute the ten data science team because that was the exact approach , that kind of thing, approach, that kind of thing, that number 10 needed to interpret these these scientific and technical questions joins with skills, with tools that didn't exist at all in january, february, march in number 10 or the cabinet office . i did not the cabinet office. i did not regard it as my job to tell the sage people and patrick vallance how to manage sage. my sage people and patrick vallance how to manage sage . my view was how to manage sage. my view was that number 10 and the prime minister's office, chris, typically needed deep technical,

scientific and data science skills and tools. right at the heart of power that could interpret information coming in not just from sage but from everybody all around the whole system , including test and trace system, including test and trace , including the joint biosecurity centre and dozens of other entities . all right . other entities. all right. >> we're going to move on to a new issue which is the consideration of vulnerable and at risk groups in the course of the decision making between february and the lockdown decision of the 23rd of march, can you tell the inquiry, please, to what degree the position of vulnerable and at risk groups was considered by decision makers in downing street on the run up during the run up to the decision to impose a national lockdown ? a national lockdown? >> could you say exactly what you mean by vulnerable and whatever it was, i'm sorry. yes

>> persons who would be potentially vulnerable to the impact of a lockdown on members of minority ethnic groups , of minority ethnic groups, people who are vulnerable in terms of socioeconomic deprivation in victims of domestic abuse, people for whom there was plainly a case to be made that they would require the specific consideration in terms of what the impact of the lockdown decision would be. i would say that that entire question was almost entirely appallingly neglected by the entire planning system. >> there was effectively no plans or any plan, even to get a plans or any plan, even to get a plan for a lot of that. as you could see from the evidence , one could see from the evidence, one of the most appalling things of the whole enterprise in lots of ways was on the 19th of march when we realised that there was essentially no shielding plan at all and the cabinet office was trying to block us creating a

shielding plan . i think there shielding plan. i think there was a there was a brilliant young woman in the number 10 private office called alexandra burns, who tried to raise war things about things like wives who are being abused and children in care and a lot of similar things. and i don't think the system ever properly listened to her. >> do you recall when the prime minister was advised of the risk of long term sequelae arising from covid infection in watts, the queen i mean , consequences the queen i mean, consequences so persons who suffered from what is now known as the syndrome long covid, when was it first understood that there could be long term health problems , health conditions problems, health conditions associated with it? it was obviously discussed in january. >> in general terms in the sense of patrick and chris and others saying to us, of course, you know, we don't know what the long term consequences of this might be. they essentially said this kind of problem, a how many

people it just kills immediately and then then there's problem b, what the long term health consequences may be. the consequences may be. at the moment, obviously, definition moment, obviously, by definition , data and , we've got no data and information that . so knew information on that. so we knew it a problem in it as a general problem in january, but it really kind of bubbled up, i would say. but i'm guessing if that's i'm not sure if that's helpful in roughly may i think in may the prime minister shared on a whatsapp group with you, the chief scientific adviser, the chief medical officer, you and matt hancock, whatsapp group , an hancock, whatsapp group, an article entitled mystery of prolonged covid 19 symptoms. >> do you recall that ? >> do you recall that? >> do you recall that? >> vaguely. >> vaguely. >> what about the issue of the disproportionate number of deaths in the black and minority ethnic communities ? ethnic communities? >> i mean, it was discussed after the first wave when did it first become apparent that there was a disproportionate fatality rate in those communities ? i rate in those communities? i can't remember. i'd be guessing ,

can't remember. i'd be guessing, but i think the data that came out of first wave showed that that was an issue. >> all right . preparedness . much >> all right. preparedness. much of your statement focuses on your opinion that there had been a critical failure to plan for the type of pandemic which, in the type of pandemic which, in the event ensued and an absence of critical capabilities , as you of critical capabilities, as you describe them . in essence , that describe them. in essence, that in january and february 2020, the there was no system, no plan, no structure in place that could have allowed either the borders to be sealed or for any kind of scaled up test and trace process for dealing with those two aspects. in turn , in two aspects. in turn, in relation to the borders , the

relation to the borders, the material shows that in downing street there were there was regular consideration reconsideration of what could be donein reconsideration of what could be done in terms of keeping the virus out of our border . what virus out of our border. what was the advice that was received from sage as to whether or not that would be an efficient or effective process as it was twofold. >> first of all, it was that well through threefold. first of all, we didn't actually have the capability to do it because obviously britain has not been able to control borders for able to control its borders for many many years. it doesn't many for many years. it doesn't have do it. it doesn't have data to do it. it doesn't have data to do it. it doesn't have the infrastructure it have the infrastructure to do it in general, mind for in general, never mind for a pandemic. first of all, there pandemic. so first of all, there wasn't the capability. second, we were told even if we had the capability, it would only delay things by a relatively trivial amount. and third, of course, the people at that time, the reaction from a lot of people was closing the borders is racist. you remember when the supermodel caprice said on tv,

why aren't we closing the borders ? a lot of people, public borders? a lot of people, public health experts, mocked her as if she was an idiot. that was the prevailing conventional wisdom from from the public health system and was reflected and the dismissal of caprice. i would say, was reflected in number 10 by public health system and of course, if you're going for a single for a single wave herd immunity by september , immunity by september, fundamental strategy then faffing around at the borders wasn't regarded as relevant or coherent with such a strategy . coherent with such a strategy. >> by that do you mean if the strategy of the government was is to accept that by mitigate dating the worst severity of that first wave of the virus and thereby by allowing a proportion of the population to become infected? nevertheless . there

infected? nevertheless. there was no point in trying to shut our borders because part of that strategy entailed allowing part of the population to become infected . is that correct? infected. is that correct? >> that's what the prime minister and i were told. and yeah, but sage and nervtag specifically advised the government against border screening because they took the view that it would be ineffective. >> you you can't test in the absence of a testing system for asymptomatic patients , you can asymptomatic patients, you can conceal your symptoms and you may even become infected on a plane. and no symptoms will show until after you've arrived. so so did the government not appreciate that, that in practical terms such a step would be extremely difficult to put into practise as well? >> yes, we would sort of i'm not sure if i misunderstood, but one of us is misunderstood . we were of us is misunderstood. we were told that it was impossible. we were told the british state couldn't do it in january. we

didn't have the infrastructure to do it. they didn't have the tests to do it . we to do it. they didn't have the tests to do it. we didn't have any of the things that you need to it to control the border. to do it to control the border. but at the same time, it wasn't regarded as a big problem given that people didn't want to control border control the border anyway. >> fair ? mr cummings >> is that fair? mr cummings sage and nerve tac produce papers which were sent to the government in which you presumably saw setting out why in practise screening risk precautions or even an elemental quarantine system would not work in practise? it wasn't a doctrinal position, was it? no. >> well, i think that's obviously if you're just saying, do you create do you actually control the borders, does that solve the problem? of course, the answer is no. and if you're looking at just at the specific issue of what the effect of controlling the borders would be, then of course, the answer is clear. and what's sage in nervtag said surge and nervtag said, makes sense. but that's

obviously not the real question . obviously not the real question. the real question is should you have the capability is like singapore or taiwan in to combine actually all serious border control , all with border control, all with a domestic test and trace regime and the data to support it and all the other things you need to support it and then roll out mass testing. if you had the capability to do that, which i very strongly suggest this country ought to acquire the then obviously controlling the borders is a critical issue. >> mr cummings without a scaled up test trace contact , isolate up test trace contact, isolate system , shutting the borders system, shutting the borders will not suffice is itself so the problem here was not that there was a doctrinal decision not to consider shutting the borders . it was that in practise borders. it was that in practise it would do no good and without a test trace contact isolate

system and there was none . it system and there was none. it would never work . correct. the would never work. correct. the nub of the issue. it's half of the nub of the issue. >> but the other the other half of the nub is that if you regard the whole thing in a fatalistic way anyway , which and the way anyway, which and the cabinet office and sage did at the beginning and you think that there is no effective alternative to herd immunity if you if you say that there are an overall conceptual level, there's either a shape, a curve towards herd immunity or b, try towards herd immunity or b, try to build your way out of the problem or the entire system. in january, february, early march, thought that the only plausible approach to this was to shape the curve of herd immunity. no one thought it was really practical . well, to build our practical. well, to build our way out of the problem, the fundamental u—turn that we shifted to was to try and build our way out of it instead of fatalistically accepting the material shows that you spent a

great deal of time , um, in april great deal of time, um, in april , may, june, trying to get on top of the task problem . top of the task problem. >> yeah . at what point in >> yeah. at what point in january and february or indeed even march did the penny drop in the government that the absence of a scaled up or significant test and trace system effectively meant that there was no means of controlling the virus once it had reached the united kingdom ? united kingdom? >> well, of course , until the >> well, of course, until the week of the ninth of the 9th of march, the entire system was just sort of rolling along the single single peak strategy. by september . and there were september. and there were conversations in references before that week to we've obviously got to do more testing. but that wasn't not in really in the that was more just

sort of you know we need more tests for the nhs and maybe a few thousand and blah blah blah. it wasn't it wasn't conceived testing wasn't conceived at the end of february , beginning of end of february, beginning of march in the context that it would be seen in april, may, june , i.e. scaling two hundreds june, i.e. scaling two hundreds of thousands , then millions, of thousands, then millions, then potentially tens of millions . i then potentially tens of millions. i think what really brought it home to certainly to me in the pm was when we were suddenly told in that week of the ninth and it was one of the things that involved pennies dropping that essentially testing had been stopped 12th of march. yes. if you say so. it was around then. >> and so that we can understand the importance of this issue. is it your position that if there had been a sophisticated . had been a sophisticated. a competent cispe item for test tracing , isolate in existence or

tracing, isolate in existence or brought into existence in january , february, march and january, february, march and other countries, the inquiry is aware, did precisely that . south aware, did precisely that. south korea is a very good example . it korea is a very good example. it may not have been necessary to go the whole hog and to order to mandate the imposition of a national lockdown because the means of controlling the virus would have been at hand with the test and trace system and therefore no need to control it with a lockdown. >> yes, my view is that what ought to have happened is that as soon as the first reports came at the end of december, on roughly new year's eve , 2019, we roughly new year's eve, 2019, we should immediately fully should have immediately fully closed down flights to china. we should immediately have had a very, very hard core system at the airports and borders. and there should have been a whole massive testing infrastructure ramping up both for test and trace in a kind of conventional sense, but also so a manufacturing and industrial

capacity system to manufacture the rapid tests at scale . i the rapid tests at scale. i mean, i mean massive scale scale of tens of millions a week . i of tens of millions a week. i think if you'd had that combination of actual serious border control in this country for the first time ever, actually controlling its borders and it seriously with and taking it seriously with test and trace and then a kind of out of the box , here's how of out of the box, here's how you massively scale rapid testing and you put all of those things together, brackets arguably also with human challenge trials on vaccines, close brackets, then i think in retrospect, that's clearly the right. there would have been a much better approach, not just in terms of deaths, but also in terms of us being able to keep open the economy, you know, to a massively greater extent than than we were able to be better in both ways . in both ways. >> you say, mr cummings, in retrospect , you no >> you say, mr cummings, in retrospect, you no one, not even you , with your keenness to you, with your keenness to ensure that the government system could be made to work

efficiently , appreciated in efficiently, appreciated in february, march , that with out february, march, that with out such a scaled up test and trace system, the options for the united kingdom government were going to be extremely limited. indeed >> soi indeed >> so i wouldn't quite put it like that. we did appreciate that we didn't have these things and there are, as you can see, the references from me to singapore whatnot in singapore and whatnot in multiple and emails multiple groups and emails and whatnot, like mark whatnot, and people like mark warner were saying to why is warner were saying to me, why is there this fatalist on the there just this fatalist on the subject slow so we were subject so slow down? so we were aware , but nothing could aware of it, but nothing could be done. but it was all obviously too late. you can't just pull the system like this out of thin air in a few days. >> conceptually, doctrinally , >> conceptually, doctrinally, the british government's position in february, in the early part of march had been viruses come in waves in order to ensure that the first wave doesn't strike us during the winter months is the best policy is to mitigate it, to take the

top off, delay it so it's closer top off, delay it so it's closer to the summer and that way we'll avoid the risk of that wave if it is completely suppressed , it is completely suppressed, recoiling like an uncoiled spnng recoiling like an uncoiled spring later in the year with a devastating second wave plan. a why was it not appreciate after march and april and the first wave that such a test and trace system would avoid the risk of a second devastating wave ? second devastating wave? >> well, with respect , i think >> well, with respect, i think it was appreciated . certainly in it was appreciated. certainly in parts of the system. i mean, you can see i wrote it on whiteboards around about the 13th, 14th of march as part of shifting to plan b, so it so people in department of health and elsewhere were building up testing in in february, early march, there were plans to do that, but we were not thinking they were not thinking at that

time about test and trace. once we made this flip around about the 13th to the 15th of we talked to the i talked to the pm about it on saturday, the 14th of march, and vallance and i talked to the pm about it on sunday, the 15th of march as part of this alternative different conceptual approach of building our way out of the of the problem. building our way out of the of the you)lem. building our way out of the of theyou misunderstand me during >> you misunderstand me during that first stage with plan a with mitigation , the argument with mitigation, the argument being put against support suppression was it'll recoil like an uncoiled spring with a devastating second wave. if you push the first wave down, it'll spnng push the first wave down, it'll spring back . yes. so before the spring back. yes. so before the change in strategy, why was it not understood? well don't worry , we will deal with the first wave. but by the time the second wave. but by the time the second wave comes along, if it does recoil like an uncoiled spring, we can deal with it with a proper test and trace system. why that debate had when

why wasn't that debate had when the government was still in the first strategic response? so if you ask why were we not talking about test and trace before roughly , say, the 13th of march, roughly, say, the 13th of march, the answer is because no one before remember , in the first before remember, in the first time that there was no plan for lockdown at all in the week of the ninth, the plans for lockdown only came after we started to change. >> so there was no the whole point of the of the problem up to the week of the ninth was that the whole system fatalistically thought there was no way you could possibly do a lockdown in britain . it was lockdown in britain. it was thought of as a completely crazy idea. so of course people were not thinking, well, let's do lockdown and then build test and trace. everyone thought, well, we obviously can't do lockdown and lockdowns mad because it will all come back. but they were thinking about and they were thinking about and they were advocating suppression . were advocating suppression. >> that is to say, the squashing

down completely of a first wave. sorry. >> no. who was who do you think was arguing for that? >> the one wave strategy. mr cummings envisaged a mitigation in. and then this argument arose as to whether or not a suppression strategy which allowed the wave to recoil the spnng allowed the wave to recoil the spring to uncoil would result in a second devastating wave. so why was there not a debate about what could be done to prevent that second wave? why why was it not thought about, well, i think i'm not i'm not quite possibly i'm not i'm not quite possibly i'm confused by our language. >> i don't know. i'm not quite understand your your your question. but i'll try and put it this way . question. but i'll try and put it this way. up to and including the week of the ninth, the assumption was, so you're suggesting there was some great debate. the whole point was there wasn't a debate. there was an assumption across government, right across the cabinet office, department of health and sage, that lockdown was impossible in a western country anyway. we didn't have the all of the

things that you needed in place to actually do it . you things that you needed in place to actually do it. you didn't have test and trace and whatnot that you would need to have aftennards , that vaccines were aftennards, that vaccines were almost definitely not to going have any impact, at least in 2020 and possibly never . so the 2020 and possibly never. so the whole point was that up to and including the week of the ninth, that the debate you keep referring to, there wasn't a debate. that was the whole problem. there wasn't a debate about the fundamental assumptions underlying plan. a there wasn't a debate until me and others started saying , hang and others started saying, hang on a second. if you actually follow the logic of what plan a is, it's going to be a catastrophe . and we have to ask catastrophe. and we have to ask these questions and we have to consider for an alternative plan b , but before that, there was no b, but before that, there was no debate about this. it was just assumed that there was a debate at the scientific level between mitigation and suppression. >> but it may be that that debate and the merits of

mitigation versus suppression simply didn't reach your level in government. of course, you weren't aware the scientists weren't aware the scientists were debating the pros and cons of mitigation versus suppression. >> of course, it was discussed by people, but as you can see in all of the sage in all of the sage and documents, the assumption from everybody was that it was simply completely impractical . all and everyone impractical. all and everyone was still on the mindset of a flu pandemic. so of was still on the mindset of a flu pandemic . so of course, flu pandemic. so of course, there were debates in one sense going on, and there were scientists, you know, etcetera, etcetera . but the core core of etcetera. but the core core of what we were presented with in number 10 was there is unanimity between the cabinet office, department of health and sage behind the propositions that the real danger is a second wave in the winter and therefore you have to manage a single peak strategy so that herd immunity by september, that was the core core argument that we were

presented with and that was never really properly the first time i actually really saw that being tested was on the 18th of march when mr cirbus said to sage, essentially, i think this whole plan is mad and you should immediately lock down like now this hour, tell the pm to do it immediately that off immediately and that kicked off various and the various discussions and the consequence of the absence of debate , the failure to consider debate, the failure to consider any alternative of the failure to consider strategic logic options. >> other than mitigation and squash the sombrero was that there was a woeful absence of plan . any sort of written plan. any sort of written document for dealing with controlling borders, protecting care homes, shielding quarantine . i i mean, i would say it's actually worse than that. >> and sort of doubly ironic because if you actually if you

actually if plan a had been what ended up being plan b, i.e, we'd actually got on top of it and controlled it and you had to test infrastructure test and trace infrastructure and there and everything else, then there would actually be a much stronger argument for saying, well, shielding well, a lot of the shielding stuff, we need a lot of stuff, we don't need a lot of this, we don't a lot of this, we don't need a lot of that, don't we don't need because we've actually controlled the virus. >> mr cummings please slow down. you're extremely you're making it extremely difficult to record your evidence . and to be fair. evidence. and to be fair. >> well, sorry, just to finish our point, because it's important the situation is worse than what you're describing, because if you are not going to control the virus, if you are not going to have test and trace , if you are just going to have single peak herd immunity by september , where it actually september, where it actually makes the lack of a plan for shielding and care homes and everything else, even more crackers. as you see. my point . crackers. as you see. my point. >> yes . and to be fair , you >> yes. and to be fair, you texted mr hancock . on the 23rd texted mr hancock. on the 23rd of january

texted mr hancock. on the 23rd ofjanuary about texted mr hancock. on the 23rd of january about the existence , of january about the existence, the whereabouts of pandemic plans and preparations . i think plans and preparations. i think you asked. to what extent have you asked. to what extent have you investigated preparations for something terrible like ebola or flu pandemic , and you ebola or flu pandemic, and you were reassured that there were full plans up to and including pandemic levels prepped and refreshed ? it became obvious and refreshed? it became obvious and it's obvious from your statement that you appreciated that there were no plans of the type that you've described by the middle of march, so 16th of march, a week before the national lockdown had number 10 still been provided or had it been provided in any way with departmental plans , cabinet departmental plans, cabinet office plans from line departments dealing with these various aspects of a coronavirus pandemic ? pandemic? >> essentially, no. there were all dribs and drabs came in and you can see from various

evidence of texts and emails from me . after talking to from me. after talking to hancock, i pushed on some of these things through february. imran did as well from private office, but we gradually became aware through the course of february that essentially what hancock had told me on the 25th sorry, correction, just on the date, by the way , the inquiry date, by the way, the inquiry and i wrongly changed the date from the 25th to the 23rd of that text message. so my statement is now wrong, but it should be 25th, but we'll correct that aftennards . well, correct that aftennards. well, but yes, during the course of the 25th, we sorry, in the course of february , we realised course of february, we realised gradually, we pushed and gradually, as we pushed and probed and asked questions for these that they these plans, that they fundamentally didn't exist . and fundamentally didn't exist. and on the 16th, i think you're probably referring to a shocking email in number 10 that says essentially the civil contingencies secretariat says that these plans are not even held centrally at all. so it turned out, to our horror that

the system that we'd been told repeatedly in number 10 trust the system . spud shouldn't get the system. spud shouldn't get involved . world leading best involved. world leading best prepared in the world, blah, blah, blah . it then turned out blah, blah. it then turned out that this supposedly brilliant system that the civil contingency sector had had not even seen these documents at that time because they were not held centrally, which was i mean, when that email was circulated, people thought it was almost like a spoof . was almost like a spoof. >> all right. well, in fact, we do have, of course, your text message to matt hancock and his reply , your very own letter. and reply, your very own letter. and statement, have a screenshot and it shows the 23rd of january. it saysin it shows the 23rd of january. it says in terms 23rd of january 2020. it does. the reason for thatis 2020. it does. the reason for that is extent. have you investigated it? >> does. the reason for that is i was told by the inquiry i got the date wrong and i should change it from the 25th to 23rd. but actually checked and but i actually checked it and it's it should be the 25th. >> don't trouble yourself. your own date own screenshot provides the date of the 23rd of january 2020. so

no , there were a number of cobra no, there were a number of cobra meetings at the end of january and the beginning of february . i and the beginning of february. i want to ask you about an important cobra meeting . on the important cobra meeting. on the 5th of february 56215 . page one 5th of february 56215. page one sets out the ministers who attended page two. the officials and those who dialled in. and we can see that on behalf of number 10, imran shaffi attended, along with sir ed lister , page three. with sir ed lister, page three. the attendees , in terms of the the attendees, in terms of the chief medical officers, page five of . paragraph two, the cmo five of. paragraph two, the cmo provides an update to cobra providing information about the

number of individuals who had died and how long they had been in hospital before they died. this is all to do, of course, with case abroad and particular china, the two most high risk groups appear to be the elderly and those with pre—existing illnesses. if you could scroll back out, page six between paragraphs nine and 11, there is a debate about planning for a reasonable worst case scenario and the director of the civil contingencies secretariat sets out the planning priorities for the work undennay to develop planning assumptions for the pandemic . reasonable worst planning assumptions for the pand scenario . reasonable worst planning assumptions for the pand scenario , reasonable worst planning assumptions for the pand scenario , therenable worst planning assumptions for the pand scenario , there isble worst planning assumptions for the pand scenario , there is then orst planning assumptions for the pand scenario , there is then ast case scenario, there is then a debate about communication strategy , an emergency bill and strategy, an emergency bill and work with local resilience forums . on this day or the day forums. on this day or the day after you sent a text to a whatsapp group, the number 10

action whatsapp group saying the chief scientist told me today it's probably out of control now and will sweep . world were you and will sweep. world were you aware of the tenor of the debate and what was being discussed in cobra on the 5th of february? >> probably . cobra on the 5th of february? >> probably. i don't cobra on the 5th of february? >> probably . i don't remember >> probably. i don't remember that particular all of these meetings are now, i'm afraid, blur into into one another. >> had you seen this minute of the 5th of february, cobra , you the 5th of february, cobra, you would immediately have understood that the thinking expressed in this meeting was not that which you had been told and which was to the effect that the virus was probably out of control now and will sweep the world. did that not concern you? >> yes . >> yes. >> yes. >> what did you do around the fifth and 6th of february to say this cobra appears to be proceeding on an incomplete,

inaccurate basis ? it isn't inaccurate basis? it isn't reflecting what i understand to be the reality , which is that be the reality, which is that the virus is probably out of control and will sweep the world. >> so . i covid exactly. >> so. i covid exactly. obviously now it's three years ago. i can't remember the exact days and whatnot, but around this time . so i spoke to patrick this time. so i spoke to patrick before, obviously that text was sent. before, obviously that text was sent . i spoke to patrick again . sent. i spoke to patrick again. i probably spoke to him each day , actually, fifth, sixth, seventh. we had a conversation about this and about the briefing of the pm. patrick and i agreed that we thought the pm would not be sufficiently briefed on a lot of this on these questions and we were concerned about it and we agreed that i would fix up for there to be a meeting as soon as possible with the pm in his office. and that meeting happened on, i

mean, it'll be in the documents. i can't remember exactly when, but very, very shortly after, after this i think patrick said to me something like, you know, this needs to happen straight away. it's possible that that was the friday and i think i organised it for the monday. but my recollection of the exact dates could be a bit off. >> there was a meeting on the 10th of february. is that the monday, 1045 and 11 115 that could possibly be a monday or maybe a tuesday. so that would fit with with what you've said there was another cobra meeting on the 18th of february, 56227 on the 18th of february, 56227 on pages one, two, three. give us the attendees and page . five us the attendees and page. five gives us a sense of what was being discussed . re repatriation being discussed. re repatriation of british nationals as and then

over the page let legislation a debate about the drawing up of a bill to be employed in a reasonable worst case scenario. and then over the page please page seven. planning for a reasonable worst case scenario. next phase the civil contingencies secretariat said there was work to be done to create a clear plan of activity from the moment of sustained transmission to its estimated peak. transmission to its estimated peak . was there an understand peak. was there an understand adding in number 10 that a debate about repatriation and the drawing up of appropriate legislation and the drawing up of plans to deal with a reasonable worst case scenario did not really reflect what needed to be done in response to the information that was then available. >> so certainly by some of us in

number 10, at that time, there was, yes, but remember, an awful lot of the senior people in in in the centre of whitehall were off on holiday at this time. >> the prime minister the evidence shows , received a note evidence shows, received a note in his box on the 30th of january around about the same time about coronavirus . he time about coronavirus. he expressed the view on the 31st of january that he wanted to spend more time discussing issues with ministers , and then issues with ministers, and then he received an update on the 3rd of february from the civil contingencies secretariat . there contingencies secretariat. there was then an email with an update on the 8th of february and the meeting on the 10th of february, to which you have referred. and we'll just have a look at the diary for that 136739. this is the diary of the prime minister between the 10th of february and the and friday the 14th of february. on the 10th of february. on the 10th of february. so you're right. it's a monday , 1045 to 1115 coronavac

a monday, 1045 to 1115 coronavac virus update before he went to chivenor, which he did on the 14th of february, he received a note in his . box 136743. page . note in his. box 136743. page. four coronavirus international response containment of the virus in china is a key part of preventing the spread of the outbreak to the united kingdom . outbreak to the united kingdom. if what you were told by the chief scientist was right, the chief scientist was right, the chief scientific adviser was right, mr cummings that there was an inevitability or a probable inevitability to the virus sweeping the world, then any debate about whether or not the virus could be contained in china was out of date.