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it reminds us of the importance and centrality of blog. >> supreme court weak start sunday october 4 on c-span. and to complement our original production, free resources at c- span.org. >> now senator richard lugar on the state of the nato alliance and its future. the ranking member spoke for about an hour to the atlantic council. he was introduced by the council's share, a former senator. o>> welcome, and we're privileged to have you and we appreciate you taking time today.

to share the afternoon with us. i know that it is not by happenstance that you are here because the new secretary general of nato is in town. but to spend some time and some of our members of a last -- next couple of hours, we appreciate it. and best to your children in high school. that is a significant challenge that you enand your wife for dealing with as well. i have the personal honor, as well as in my capacity as chairman of the atlantic council, to introduce fixed lugar -- to introduce date soaker -- dick lugar. i was asked by reporters, it is there any member of the united states senate that you would

like to model your next six years after? and i did not hesitate and said yes. there is one member in particular and he is the senior senator from indiana. and i said, the reason i would very much like to emulate senator lugar is because what i know of him, i have watched him carefully since he was elected in 1976, and his previous service as mayor of indianapolis, and previous to that as the distinguished nuclear naval officer in the united states navy, is that he has always been a leader of purpose. he has been a man committed to a noble and higher costs, assisting his country and to make a better world. and his style, the way that he has done it, not just always being informed, and he always

has something to say when he is ready to say it. he reaches into every corner of the political spectrum. he is as respected as any member of our legislative body here in washington and across the globe. that did not just happen, as we all appreciate in all of our lives that you build that. you build that block by block and it does not come quickly or easily, especially in this town. and for that, all citizens of the country and of the world had benefited greatly from dick lugar's wise leadership over the years. he has been chairman of the senate foreign relations committee and a ranking member as he is now for the senate foreign relations committee for about -- and the last 12 years i had the privilege of sitting right next to him or very close

by. even the united states senator with the limited capacity, i even learn something from senator lugar. it does give me a great amount of personal pleasure that he is here to be one of our first speakers in this series, which i think is relevant. i think that it is important, especially at a time in the world where we are truly shaping and redefining a new world order for the first part of the 21st century. we will continue to rely to a great extent on senator lugar's leadership. senator richard lugar. [applause] >> first of all i like to thank

fred campbell and the atlantic council for this remarkable invitation to address this very important gathering. by hosting today's dialogue, the council once again has proven why it is held in such high esteem within the atlantic community. it is a special honor to be introduced by my dear friend, chuck hegel, who has contributed enormously to the nine the next -- to the united states senate and the united states national committee -- national security. i continued to benefit from his wise counsel. the new nato secretary general has made the formulation of a new strategic concept one of his first priorities in office. he has passed a distinguished group of experts to lead that effort. i am grateful for the opportunity to offer my thoughts on the state of the alliance. since 1991, it's axiomatic to

begin discussions on the future of nato by affirming that the alliance is at a crossroads or facing a crisis. even before 1991, this was a common refrain. at a conference in brussels in 1979 commemorating nato's first to 30 years, one person presented a paper with two slogans. the situation has never been so serious. nato rocks but does not sink. even as statements of alarm have been characteristic of alliance discussions since its inception, nato has achieved impressive longevity. it has been a fundamental component of the basic peace and stability enjoyed by europe for many decades.

no contributions are too often taken for granted. it is remarkable that nato is involved in combat 3,000 miles from europe. we should also celebrate the fact that nato membership has been mr. -- a tremendous engine of reform among prospective members, helping them to achieve the institutional structures needed for success in the 21st century. and like the perennial debate on capitol hill concerning the size and direction of our foreign assistance budget, sweeping reforms undertaken by nadab are in large extent self driven and self funded, constituting of foreign policy bargain for nato governments. the concept for more prosperous countries has been an indispensable element of european stability during the last two decades. we must not repeat the folly of the early days of the cold war

when the appearance of rigid u.s.-drawn printer invited the perception that we would defend any thing beyond that line. we must help the baltic region. to abide wait a, i start with the resumption that after 60 years, it is still a work in progress. alliances must continually reassess -- reassessed their purposes. if one takes this term -- as long term view, it could not seem insurmountable. no possesses enormous assets and its sister -- and history of achievement that would prompt leadership. before we can chart a course forward, the alliance must ask

itself, what is it that the new secretary-general has inherited? what is it that we are supposed to fix? we must articulate a vision for nato that buzzed for pairs for any traditional threat from traditional rivals and needs unconventional threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, cyber warfare, energy manipulation. this challenge is magnified by the fact that most of our domestic constituencies no longer perceive our security and our way of life to be under imminent threat. the forthcoming strategic review must grapple with at least four central issues now facing the alliance. first of all, how do we strengthen the credibility of article 5? recent developments have eroded some of nato's current value, both in the eyes of those is

supposed to be deterred by it and those who are supposed to benefit from such deterrents. this erosion has occurred as members of the alliance had expressed less enthusiasm for nato expansion and found an increasing number of reason to avoid committing forces to afghanistan. the decline in the deterrent value of article 5 became more apparent with the onset of the energy crisis in europe and the adoption by several western european governments with policies respect to oil and natural gas or arrangements with the russian river -- russian federation. the perceived success of moscow's foreign energy policies has and live in a spa said in russia for privilege sphere of influence, calling allies on the periphery to be increasingly nervous about the credibility of article 5. in this context, the recent decision by the obama

administration to alter alliance missile defense plans has the potential to further damage confidence in article 5. at the time of the russia- georgia conflict, and u.s. negotiators were engaging poland and the czech republic on the terms of deployment of theater missile defense shields to protect against an iranian missile threat. in response to the rising domestic opposition, these governments expended considerable capital to keep talks moving forward. bolling russia's escalation in georgia, the poles expedited an agreement. the presence of american soldiers and trainers on polish soil, ostensibly charged with maintenance of the systems, was

a way to reaffirm the united states commitment to polish security. it was in this environment that the obama administration announced its about-face on missile defense last week. the timing of the announcement was not a surprise for several reasons. the quadrennial defense reviews had not been completed. over the past month, the administration has withheld final decisions on several other national security items on the basis that they were not completed. it would appear that at least a portion of the npr was accelerated or set aside to justify this announcement. let me be clear -- i am not opposed to the new missile defense architecture proposed by the president. it may well turn out to be a technical improvements in meeting the projected to read

over the original design proposed by the previous administration. but iranian missiles never constituted the primary rationale for polish and czech decisions to buy into the bush administration's plans. rather, it was the winning confidence in nato and article 5 in particular that led missile defense of political credibility that exceeded the military merits of the plan. the united states must be sensitive to events that have transpired in the broader european security environment since the bush plan was proposed a negotiated. the risk is that whatever strategic benefit the alliance might realize from the new version of missile defense, it would be outweighed by the insurer allianz -- the entrance -- intra-alliance costs.

our reinvigoration of military exercises in eastern europe, and joint planning for contingencies would be a first death. the administration must also raise the profile of u.s. political and economic cooperation for eastern europe. perhaps even to find ways to put american boots on the ground in selected countries. the second question nato must ask is, should the alliance's performance in afghanistan lead to a reassessment of out of area activities? during the cold where, a majority for an extension of naidas interest beyond its territorial and military court, thinking they could endanger the consensus over a direct soviet

risk -- threat. many focused -- many thought that a focus on elsewhere would bring out differences between alliance members and sharp and ideological differences. that may have been true at some points during the cold war, but the geopolitical situation we face today is very different. the alliance would be greatly diminished if it were to constrain itself to defending only against conventional military threats targeted against members. the success of nato in afghanistan remains inextricably linked to the americas on a legacy there. we would also lose the influence among local populations that derives from

any activity conducted with a coalition, especially civilian- intensive operations as in afghanistan to the united states has struggled to garner greater european participation in afghanistan, despite strong strategic incentives for europe. territories in the region had been used as training towns for terrorism perpetrated in europe. continued unrest in afghanistan also has the potential to expand throughout the region and disrupt energy, and it's -- disrupt energy conduits' on which europe depends. nato's security as a fundamental but it does not translate into sufficient contributions in afghanistan. the situation is not monolithic. many allies have suffered severe

loss fighting alongside american forces in those parallel zones of southern afghanistan. i understand the historical sensitivity and that the first military situation of our military friends. there was need for military budgetary constraints on both sides of the atlantic. the european nations spend about one-third as much per service member as the united states does. we must reverse the growing perception of a two-tiered alliance. it inoculates current allies -- certain allies from risks. we need to arrest these trends and build strong defense

institutions on both sides of the atlantic. a third question, how should never respond in an era where computer tax -- how should nato respond in an era where computer attacks and hazardous material can threaten a nation's security in zero way that only military forces once would. one failure was to incorporate energy security into nato's mission. three years ago what the nato served -- at the nato summit, i and curtin's alliance to assist other alliance members. i argued that there was little distinction between an energy

cut off and on the invasion. shutdown of natural gas supplies to a nation in the middle of winter could cause death an economic calamity on the same scale as a military attack. merging nrc boards internet as core mission would also strengthen alliance cohesion and reinforce public support for the alliance. the challenge of securing stable, affordable energy supplies is one that looms at the top of every allies agenda. it cuts across policies. i do not expect my proposal to be immediately embraced by many alliance leaders. but i hope it would stimulate more thought about made them -- about nato to achieve collective the solutions against energy insecurity. i many kurds that nato -- i have

been encouraged that nato has made strategic planning, infrastructure planning, and intelligence analysis. but even as nato works to confront energy threats, we have not answer the question of how nato will respond when energy was -- is used as a weapon. in the past years, they have cut shot off the spigot to six nato allies or neighbors. the atlantic community must work together to establish a committee that removes energy discussions from an area that would exploit others. this july, we saw promising signs of a common strategy being achievable. i was invited to join a u.s.

envoy for the signing of a landmark agreement to move forward a pipeline project. this agreement among 12 countries and the european union was a breakthrough that had only dim prospects even one year ago. apart from natural gas, it illustrates that parochial interests can be surmounted with a common cause of energy cooperation. the fourth question i raised is whether closer cooperation between russia and nato is possible? despite setbacks in the last year, nato must continue to advance common interests with russia through the russia-nato council on such issues as weapons preparation, terrorism, and missile defense. russia faces critical foreign- policy challenges. it requires alliances. russian participation in this in

active endeavors in each in -- eastern mediterranean and a joint rescue of a crew in an atlantic archetypes of operations that can translate into cooperation with moscow in other areas. while while -- while vital decisions must be made by members only, we must not let diverging views keep away a more closer work with russia. i was one of those who urge net -- that nato should not become a relic but recast as a strategic rationale to meet emerging threats. nato had to go out of area or out of business. some called for retrenchment, but i believe that the proper response is to strengthen those

guarantees and find creative ways to address the more nuanced threats that we face today. and mr. teeter -- and its strategic review must reinforce those principles that led to its creation. the provision of security assurance within europe and is a central part of our foreign policy. our continued commitment to net it does not come without cost. it remains the most promising the vehicle for projecting stability throughout europe and the political fault lines with asia and the middle east. i am hopeful that the new strategic concept in undergird nato's continued success for many decades to come. i think each one of you for your leadership in your concern -- i thank each one of you for your leadership in your concerns capacity -- and your concern.

>> thank you hugely, senator. that was what -- exactly what we wanted to launch this forum. understanding but the value and the challenges facing the alliance. there is much to drill down deeper run. let me pick one issue and then i will turn to the audience for questions. missile defense. and also the relationship within europe. approval ratings in the u.s. are 60% and above. does that concern you? and when you talk about books on the ground and exercises, can you be more concrete? what would you have the obama

administration to right now to specifically reassert central and eastern europe? >> first of ouall, with regard o poland there could be reasons why the percentage is 11% besides the recent situation. i will not try and analyze that. others are more gifted in that respect. i would to say that leaving aside poland, when i visited nato headquarters a year ago in brussels, i saw representatives of the baltic states, for example, who were deeply worried about article 5 for the same reason the polls and the czechs and the others might be worried about them. they are really asking very directly, if something happened to us, would you come? that is, america, not just the rest of know what this point. i presume that we would. i think that this is a commitment under article 5.

but he clearly has not been contemplated in much discussion by the administration or congress or various other people. i would say that there is some reason for anxiety because because prior to the oil prices tanking, the rationing soubrettes over being back had led to some pushing out the -- the russian exuberance over being back at led to some pushing out. i suggested in this message today that the poles had been assured that there would be patriot weapons are some other weapons on their souls that would constitute a reason why american boots might be on the ground in poland. but there are other countries that would like that reassurance that are not involved in missile defense. i think that this is something

that we ought to be thinking through with our allies, the fact that unilaterally we come to that conclusion that this is just the antidote for any fear of consequences, it does not mean that other european countries would agree with such unilateral decisions. this is a point for discussion rather fallen an american decision, but as americans we ought to be prepared to play a role an alliance which reaffirms article 5 and is a robust quality to that aspect. >> vice-president biden earlier this year in unit spoke of pushing the reset button with russia. the missile defense decision, some would argue, gives us a very good opportunity to do that. do you see an opportunity to have some sort of breakthrough in russia? does this of the fans do it? and then if not, should rush to

become a member of nato? should we entertain mad that's idea of a new security structure? -- but that dead -- mad medvedev's idea of a new security structure? >> that does not address specifically denied a situation but it is an area where russians are eager to work. one group is been making good headway. their agenda it may be so ambitious that we rubber taken this. -- we may be overtaken by this. the importance of inspections, pervasive inspections both on the russian and the american side, are tremendously important. they offer some guaranteed to both countries that missile

reduction, work on chemical production, what have you, is continuing and we can reassure ourselves and the rest of the world, even if we're talking about broader disarmament questions. we ought to follow through on that. i went to moscow in mid december 2008 and visited with a foreign minister. he was eager to talk about that. i was pleased with that and i reported that to the president- elect who not yet taken office but has a great interest in strategic weapons, i believe. we do have opportunities on the ground in branching out from that that have a relationship which is important, because both russia and the united states understand the dire circumstances of having fissile material or other material for

that matter, chemical and biological, spread elsewhere, particularly to be used against us, the two parties that are involved. the chemical weapons destruction situation is tremendously important. during some of our trips, sam nunn and i saw sheds in that area that had tens of thousands of missiles filled with nerve gas. these are easily portable. i put one in the proverbial suitcase, a small breed case. the russians to pictures of it and had it all of the country. you can carted away. that single particular small weapon could be put in a football field in the united states and killed all 35,000 people who are sitting there. it is not -- and kill all 35,000

people who are sitting there. taken a this is still going on in the world. i stress this type of activity because we have something going for us. a better relationship for more consequential items. >> and there are other areas which could create disagreements. you did not mention georgia and ukraine. >> i did mention an expansion and the fact that nato should not be bashful about the thought that georgia, the ukraine, some of the ball to end -- baltic states and others have not been incorporated. it seems to be important that we keep that out there. we talk about it as opposed to simply saying that this is not the time, this is not the

place, we do not care this year to have a go at it. >> don't take your eye off the ball of your commitments to central asia. let me turn to the audience for questions. it could identify yourself as well. >> richard burke, a member of the atlantic council board. i like to push you a little further on specifically the emergence of a problem with the ukraine. as you know, that country is facing a presidential election in a couple of months, but it seems very likely that whoever wins the election, ukraine will remain a very divided country. they face very serious economic problems and a variety of pressures, including pressures from russia. if the situation deteriorates

and here again -- in your brain and begins to resemble a failed state, it seems to me that there would be very strong pressures from the russians and others to intervene, not necessarily militarily, but politically, economically, and others. and we could face a real crisis there. what in the western community do, and i am not talking here about nato, but really thinking about the european union, the united states, and other groups, to try to get ahead of this problem and stabilize the potential crisis? >> i think that the european countries, especially the united states, should be paying a lot of attention to the ukraine for the reasons that you have expressed. they're dysfunctional and able -- and unable to go forward or backwards because of a economic crisis that continues to be severe in the country.

we are about half a re-enactment of the election of 2004, and in that particular case, many of you were involved in that, and i was out there representing president bush, as it turned out, and that but it does a jewish -- in that particular situation. many were bitterly is disappointed her -- were bitterly disappointed with the results. attention now is very important so that was rented bridget whatever the aftermath is in this election, there is a strong relationship, and understanding that if the problems in the crimea, for example, or other touch points that could offer all sorts of difficulties, we

understand those problems and that the russians know that we understand those problems. in other words, we do not slide into something in which i am large no one saw it coming. we can see it coming. this is a very ominous potential crisis. it is a country in which as we know the president has said that getting into inato would not be up or bonds -- all foregone conclusion how the people would look at it. the timeframe is very short period >> -- the time frame is very short p. >> as you alluded in your

remarks, there is some parts in eastern europe, a declining cents that nato would come to their defense, if in fact something happen. and the missile defense issue in a way is a reflection of the decision, their desire firm -- for this lack of confidence in aid in, and wanting us stronger bilateral reassurance from the united states. but the dilemma, it seems to me, is that the more that we did that, the more that we would in fact we can nato. if we substitute of bilateral security measure because there is lack of confidence in nato, then everyone will want more reassurance from the united states. idc is getting around swearing that circle? -- how do you see us getting

around squaring that circle? >> it is not simply a unilateral or bilateral decision of the united states. in other words, it seems to me that the french, the germans, the italians, everybody needs to talk about this. what does this mean? a friend sharing on the situation. i found for example at the summit where i made this statement about the energy situation and cut offs, that privately are and ministers at that dinner came around and said this really is a problem. this is almost an existential problems. it is so serious that we do not talk about it to other people. you try to work it out bilaterally, like the gas pump with the russians, or others

will say that this is just an e.u. problem. their reticence to come to grips with a sharing, an open forum was marked on the energy topic. so it is with article 5. people will come to you if you go through brussels and so forth. what do you want to do about this? it is undermining nato. but to have a round table in which nato itself is a member, but frankly discuss this, and maybe publicly discuss it said that everybody understands we're talking about it, supplants really the surreptitious conversations that are likely to turn out to be disastrous. at some point, something will probably occur. i did not know what the answer is, cutting off the electronics

or computer is of the baltic state, and whether it knocked down the state, and i tried to illustrate in my comments that it is not just the armed forces marching across. in sophisticated ways, countries can be undermined and we need to talk about that, too. >> it sounds like what you're saying is that article 5, as it currently exists, is not enough in a new strategic concept has to get tougher. -- is not enough and i new strategic concept has to get tougher. what you are saying is let's revisit this and perhaps make more absolute and take it into the cyber rahm and the energy rahm. let's talk in this up. a lot of people did not want to go there because they are not

sure that there is the political will in the alliance. >> i think that it would bring political will. of different varieties. if you straw poll country by country, they will say leave us alone. we've got enough problems solving the economic crisis in our country. we've already downgraded their military budgets. we cannot send anybody anywhere if we wanted to. there for article 5 is interesting philosophically, but as a practical matter, neither are people or our budgets, we don't even have an aircraft that would avoid that way. nato is going to be reinvigorated in the strategic situation if we talk about these things. if we frankly discuss why this makes any difference to reach of the countries, those are little bit further away from the gas problems as well as those are up

tight and might be threatened. >> if you could reintroduce result. >> senator, you said that beyond our security we should engage woulith the poles and the chethe ch-- it would be better for you, russia, if your neighbors feared to less? might that have an impact? >> on the second issue, i am not certain that our counsel with russian friends right now on the subject would have much of fact, although maybe over the course of time.

i think that the russians would say to us, we're pretty good judges of what our interests are. back off. but with regard to the more interesting question, i think, it seems to me that we have been engaging with the checks in the polls -- with these countries. it is important there be investors, that there be american scholars, american medical people, and in other words, the sharing of all the cultural weapons and strengths that we have our unceasingly important. likewise, the acceleration of student exchange programs would be very important terms of the future leadership. some idea for them to know who we are, and why we make a

difference. a lot of that is going on and i don't for a moment diminished the extraordinary efforts, but it appears to me that this is a very timely avenue for acceleration of those programs. >> thank you very much. >> senator, i would be grateful for your views in a different part of the world regarding afghanistan, pakistan, and india. nato had been -- that very much of its future on what happens in afghanistan. -- nato has bet very much of its future on what happens in afghanistan. neither india nor pakistan has been responsive to each other. we're still suffering from buy. they could possibly increase their nuclear arsenals to high- yield, above 200 kilotons per

weapon. the pakistani is have courageously surat -- shifted their attention to the west. but that could cause them to go back to their traditional enemy. what might you suggest to propose further to the tensions between india and pakistan said pakistan can really continue to be engaged in the issue at hand, namely, dealing with insurgency and not becoming transfixed with the indian threat? >> i had been impressed with the ambassador pulling together the top leaders of pakistan and afghanistan to the united states. i have been privileged to participate in two of those conferences and various junctures, as we met during the week or at the embassies. it doesn't get to the indian problem, but for afghanistan and pakistan, this is the first time

that most americans had ever really heard or seen these persons engaged in dialogue. my impression that it was the first time some of these leaders themselves had ever had a good chance for a meeting or pressed to give answers. i think it was important. that had the pakistani military and had a good relationship with ad mollen. having met their counterparts in afghanistan for the first time, i think they like each other but they saw each other. they had some sense of how those countries operate. that is critically important for the future as it deals with india, because in our conversation with the indians, which are much closer and more abundant, it is important that

they know that we have some sophistication in terms of pakistan. we know the people are, can call them or argue with them, and a point of crisis perhaps intervene so that there is less chance of a confrontation. and i think that this has worked remarkably well in what has been a difficult set of circumstances. now india, as you suggested, as orders for a large amount of new armament, a lot of it from was. in our defense contractors are very eager to make those exports -- -- a lot of it from us. and our defense contractors are very eager to make those exports. there was a program announced by the president, but carry-lugar bill. people of interpreted this in various ways. the pakistani press is filled with that every day, suggesting

how the money, $1.5 billion, might be spent, not just this year but for five years. and the important consequences that this is not an in or out proposition. that there be a multi-lateral commitment for that period of time. i think that we are moving pragmatically want to some steps that would be helpful in the india-pakistan relationship quite apart from pakistan. with regard to nato, each country will have to make up its mind as to what he wants to do there. without trying to get ahead of the subject today, our country will have to make up its mind about afghanistan. and the president is measuring a good number of thoughts even as we speak. they will have implications with regard to how we are perceived by nato allies, quite apart from everyone else in the world at

that point. i do not believe that afghanistan defines the success or failure and made of. i'm impressed that i number of nato nations have sent troops and have stayed and i suspect it has been the cause of their alliance with each other and the united states as opposed to understanding all together what the mission was and how it might come out. i think that that has been important. i respect that. >> he said the obama administration has to make up its mind on afghanistan. how would you assess itheir policy thus far, and what is your response to the mcchrystal report that was leaked any "washington post?" >> i am going to duck a lot of that. these are arguments still to come and but it's still to be

cast. -- and votes still to come. but president obama, at the time he took hold of our foreign policy, made some decisions with regard to iraq. as a part of that decision making process at the time, he indicated that as had been planned previously, supplement of troops would go to afghanistan with the thought that there would be an examination down the trail. when this adage -- when the strategy was saidet, that is wht we thought with the additional troops. the agreement was that as some point general mcchrystal would outline things as he saw them, whether that strategy was working or not, or what he needed to make it work, for a variety of reasons.

we've all been appraised that general mcchrystal had been writing a report. it is hard to tell him he gives a 2 or send it to or what have you, but this is out there. the second question was that in due course, after the president of the united states and his administration that examine this, there would be a decision and request by the firm more troops or a decision that we would not be sending more troops. that we would be doing something else. but that second paper was not to be forthcoming until the first one was thoroughly examined. those of us in the foreign relations committee in the senate were waiting at the time of the leak in the "washington post" for some idea for what general mcchrystal had to say. we may have had bits and pieces of it, but at the same time, we

not seen the whole thing and maybe we should not. maybe this is a privileged document. but at some point, the critical system in this country reflects the united states public. i suspect we will have to get that decision making process in the white house going a little swifter and some recommendations. it is an unfortunate set of circumstances because much of the president's currents enthusiasm is with regard to the health care debate that we're having a day in and day out. the senate has chosen no signs of going away. and in the copenhagen -- and then a cult phenomenon -- the copenhagen conference which is looming. it is untimely but this is the complexity of public life in america. i hope that the president will respond and send administration

witnesses to our hearings so that we can examine that through television and the american people can examine them at the same time. the public in this country have become confused conflicted, quite apart from public opinion in european countries. and that will not work for long. we will have to settle down the issue one way or the other. >> georgia cannot receive membership planning and and and your agenda had been given to georgia. do you think that george it can become a nato membership -- whether georgia can become a nato member outside this

procedure? >> i still think that is a good procedure for moving the membership. that preparatory step has met -- has served as country well in terms of their own reforms. i know that one of the important aspect said nato is a country seeking admission have made huge reforms, a huge changes and are better for it. they have strong urge democratic institutions to respect human rights, freedom of the press, and i believe as i have said in the remarks that nato should be considering georgia has still in the list. i mention the ukraine and other baltic states. i am not one who would say that this is just beyond the pale right now. i think that we have to keep talking about it. but the need for continued economic and political reform

will be very important, and membership planner not. he may decide on a membership back some plan sometime. -- you may decide on a membership action plan some time. >> let me also welcome you again as the supreme cantocomma. >> thank you. your point on article 5, i do agree with you that we need to define exactly it means today. it is still the glue between the member nations. if you want to hold together the pieces of public, you need had a clear and polished interface which could be a common understanding of security. we had in 1949, maybe in

[unintelligible] d think it will have a common understanding of security in the 20 member nations and how do we get to it? -- do you think we will have a, understanding of security in the 20 member nations and how do we get to it? >> the same way-we all talk about article 5 and read that back in power, you are quite correct. it denounced things that might require new definition. but there is also our willingness to come to each other's rescue. the importance that we proceed in that. not only for ourselves in nato, but to the rest of the world, this cohesive organization of democracies, people the treasured the certain things that we do. i think that there is hope around the world that that is the case, that there are

countries that are still able to articulate things that are most important to human beings generally, and it takes strength that we are able to emulate that, and they might like to be a part of it furthermore. this may lead in fact to some intersection of the nato alliance with other alliances in due course that share those values around the world. this is beyond our agenda today, but nevertheless your question from said. we began to think out loud our values and what security means to us and why we are confident we would come to each other's rescue, even as such complex affairs a cyber attacks and others. >> let me take just one minute before thinking new -- spanking new, to note how important it

was the have you watch this series. there is no voice better respected on these issues among europe or our allies. there's no better way to call you up then with the new secretary general of nato -- to follow you up and with the new secretary-general of native. senator lugar, i want to thank deal and i hope that you all join us this afternoon were senator hegel and general john' -- where senator hegel and general john to be joining the secretary-general. thank you very much. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] >> more now from atlantic council, and comments from the

secretary general. this was his first major speech in the u.s. since taking office last summer. he spoke for about an hour and was introduced by the national security adviser, james jones. >> senator hagel, thank you for your work here at the atlantic council and congratulations on the tremendous success that you are bringing to the council in terms of revitalizing this venerable institution and turning iit into an organization for the 21st century. mr. secretary journ