information not be put in the public domain. >> it is up to the british government. >> led the british courts work it out. but they did. >> know, there is an appeal. -- no, there is an appeal. >> you can see this breaking in its entirety tonight at 1:25 a.m. eastern here on c-span or anytime on our website, c- span.org. >> this is c-span, public affairs programming courtesy of america's cable companies. next, a discussion on u.s. options in afghanistan. then a look at americans without health insurance. after that, the director of the cdc out lines pandemic flu preparations.

vermont gov. talks about state and federal cooperation on health issues. . gentleman. -- good morning. thank you to go than to for joining us on this difficult friday morning. is also difficult in terms of the challenge that president obama and his national security of our service are confronting

when it comes to what to do about the challenge of afghanistan. as you all know, that question is being given a lot of consideration in the white house these days and also on capitol hill. of course, the debate is taking place in the public arena as wall. that is where we felt it was important to participate, bringing together a group of experts with diverse views to consider the options and discuss with you in the audience what the best course should be. as in most foreign policy challenges these days, national security challenges, the president seems to be faced

with a series of bad options, if there were a clear cut good option i don't think we would be here today. it is in that spirit of understanding that there is no correct clear path, but judgment has to be made about the costs and benefits of each of the paths forward. joining me on the panel, and i will introduce them in the order they will give their initial remarks. on the right is bruce riedel, who is senior fellow in the center for middle east policy at brookings. bruce has had a distinguished career in the u.s. government

starting in the intelligence community, but then in higher policy positions in the national security council where he had is the three presidents -- werke advised three presidents, and the defense department. -- where he advised three presidents. earlier on this year, president obama with him to chair the initial strategy review process that was undertaken before he outlined his initial strategy in march. so bruce brings a particular knowledge of the situation in afghanistan and pakistan. his most recent book, "the search for al qaeda," is one of

the most important books produced recently on the general question of how to carry on the war against al qaeda, which is the heart of what we will be discussing. we are honored to have congresswoman jane harman, a democrat from california joining us today. jane is an authority and commentator. she served for eight years as a member of the house intelligence committee, at the last four as its ranking member, where she helped to shape congress' policy to the 9/11 attacks and played a leading role in the intelligence reform act in 1994. she is in her eighth term as congresswoman and is now the

chair of the homeland security subcommittee on intelligence and terrorism risk assessment. she is an authoritative commentator and a very welcome participant in the public policy debate on this issue. thank you for joining us. to my left is paul pillar. paul has had a long and distinguished career in the intelligence community, where his last position was the nio f or middle east and south asia. he subsequently became professor at georgetown university, where he is now the director of studies in the security studies program at the walsh school of foreign service. paul is the author of a book

that was published by the brookings institution press while he was here after he left government. it is a book called, "terrorism and u.s. foreign policy." it was first published in 2001 and written before 9/11. it became the primary source for people who wanted to understand the role of u.s. foreign policy combating terrorism. it is an essential guide for the more effective coordination between conventional foreign policy efforts and the need to fight terrorism. therefore, paul's work in this area is particularly relevant to the discussion we will have today. finally, martin indyk -- michael

o'hanlon you know him all for his work on security and defense. in this particular context, mike has been doing innovative work. if you have seen the afghanistan index project, which the foreign policy program launched, but also for a book that is about to be published he has been working on called, "toughing it out and afghanistan." mike is the director of research in the foreign policy program. with these experts we will have a discussion in which i would like to take you all into the situation room. and had you and then i imagine

that -- have you and them a imagine you are sitting with the president at the table. he goes around the table and asks everybody to express their opinions. this is essentially to frame his question, the issue is best put this way. that hte -- the objective is to defeat and possibly destroy al qaeda that is the clear objective. that is a counter-terrorism objective, but in terms of assessing the options, we are essentially caught between two

choices. one is to pursue a counterterrorism strategy to achieve the objective, and those of you who have followed the debate are aware it that kind of to counterterrorism strategy would not require an increase of troops but could result in a decrease of troops with a focus on more promote approaches to defeating al qaeda. the second approach, which is to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy in order to achieve a counter-terrorism objective. the counter insurgency strategy would require at least some more troops and perhaps a lot more troops. essentially, the question is, do we pursue a counterterrorism strategy or do we pursue a counter insurgency strategy, or

is there some other option that our experts would like to recommend? bruce riedel, what is your id vice to the president? >> thank you for the kind introduction. -- what is your advice. >> since i have had this question with the president i think i will remain consistent with what i have said. that is we need a proper the resources war in afghanistan against the taliban and al qaeda working together in a union against us. if that means both a counter- terrorism effort and counter in surgery effort. it also means a robust diplomatic effort and putting money into development that we need in afghanistan and pakistan. the president probably --

properly identified the most dangerous place is the border line between afghanistan and pakistan, where al qaeda and its allies have been operating for the last 15 years. it is from there that the attack of 9/11 was planned. it is from there that other attacks against the u.s. and its allies have been planned, like the bombings in london, a 2006 plot to blow up 10 jetliners, and it is there where we discovered al qaeda was reaching out to an afghan american to carry out a new attack. the president promised in his campaign and on his speech in cairo and other places to make this a priority. i think that is the way to go. i am -- i think we need to do both. exactly how many troops that means? i sat in the situation enough to

know that the devil is in the details. those details are critical to understanding. the media will banner headline the total number, but the details are important. let me make a couple of observations. first of all, the status quo in afghanistan is not sustainable. we are losing this war. is not yet lost but we are losing. bob woodward and stanley mcchrystal have done us a great favor in giving us their insight. they are the mechanism in which we got it. i think the assessment is on the mark. for a 7.5 years we have under resource this war. we took our eye off the ball and allow the taliban to stage a

remarkable military comeback. it is because we failed to properly resource the effort. we did not put the intelligence out there and the military assets. the talha band could snatch something close to victory. -- the talha band -- the taliban could snatch something close to victory. we face an animate -- we face an enemy in the the problem is they are determined to fight us as long as we are in afghanistan. i find there is a little bit of unreality about the debates these days. people are saying we should i get into a quagmire. of course we should not been -- into a quagmire, but we are in one now. and unless we change what we're

doing, we will only have to outcomes. a stalemate of indefinite amount or a steadily deteriorating situation, which could get even worse in the situation we have today. the president has ruled out the option of leaving afghanistan. that means we now have to figure out the strategy that takes us to something bordering on success. that, i think, means a smart strategy with a political dimension to divide the taliban to see if we can separate but soldiers. it means intelligence and more combat troops. the second observation i would make is this -- the operations we carry out over pakistan and afghanistan are incredibly effective. but they're not the solution to this problem. they're not a cure all. they are a tactic, not a strategy. let me be clear, i support these

operations. to do, but we have to be careful not to come to the conclusion that this is the answer. we need to be careful not to become addicted to this is the answer. we need to be careful in our own councils not to over hype our effective they are. they had a very significant downside. i talked to a senior pakistani last night. he said you have to understand every one of these attacks is a humiliation to the army of pakistan and the people. it has a huge backlash effect. since pakistan's cooperation is essential, we have to modulate the number of drone strikes against this negative background. we also have to realize they are not always as effective as we wish they were.

there is more than one occasion where we thought we killed a terrorist but they have carried out additional operations. i want to talk about one case. we thought we had killed him in a drone strike in september, but he just gave an interview to the "asian *." -- "asian times." it is a striking interview. i want to talk about this individual, because he helps us address one of the big questions, at the nature of the enemy. his life story tells you about him. he was born in pakistan kashmir. he joined the struggle against india in 1994. he began by taking american, british and israeli hostages.

he went on to have a spectacular career in supporting the struggle against the indian army in kashmir. he was trained by the special security forces. he was captured by the indians and escaped and became one of the most famous commanders. then he was toasted by the pakistani army as a hero. in 2005, he joined al qaeda and became a convert to the islamic jihad. al qaeda sent him to afghanistan where he was critical in teaching the taliban the tactics of a small unit warfare and ambushes, which they have been successful in using. he has also been active in pakistan. he was responsible for the murder of a former commander in 2008.

he has plotted a tax on chief of army staff. he is number four on the pakistan most-wanted list. my point here is that he is a classic demonstration of how terrorists refuse to stay in line. we want to keep them in little boxes and they don't stay there. they interact with each other. it is the syndicate of terrorism we are facing in afghanistan and pakistan that is difficult to deal with. al qaeda is our number one priority, and the president is right to make it the number one priority. the drones are a useful tool but they are not a cure all. counter-terrorism by itself will not succeed, it must be linked to a larger strategy. that is the operational plan general mcchrystal has put on the table. the most immediate requirement

we need is to fix the afghan alexian fiasco. we have to come up with a better solution than the one we have right now. it is clear from what peter told us, that the un new this problem was coming. that means if we had a second round, we have to make sure this is not marred by fraud and corruption. >> thank you, bruce. >> thank you cannot martin. as president obama said -- thank you, martin. as president obama said, i am humbled to be included in this group. my field in congress is intelligence, which most of you probably think is an oxymoron. one of the things i do know is they are very lucky are very martin indyk here. it is a great institution.

martin is now in charge of foreign policy at brookings. congratulations, my friend. i agree with much of bruce's analysis but i don't agree with his conclusions. let me say something positive, which is that the news in today's newspapers, there may be a recount. ballots have been printed. that is good news. i don't know whether that means we actually have a run off, at which will have to be held in the next few weeks because winter is coming, or whether it miraculously in the next 24 hours some government purchased with major opponents in the last election round in some of the ministries.

i am not sure which way is better. obviously this solution should be an afghan solution, but i would hope that what comes out the other end is a smaller national government that is focused on fewer tasks which has ministries' headed by capable people. if they reflect different ethnicities that would even be better, but they need to be capable and need not to be corrupt. some of you may have seen my writings. one of them was called "it's the corruption, stupid." i felt that the massive, rampant paid to play system in afghanistan was making it impossible for a ct strategy or coin strategy to succeed in afghanistan. i still feel that.

i have said repeatedly the question that should be put to congress is not about troop levels. i don't think congress right now would be very receptive to a request for more troops. the question to put to congress is, how can we partner with this administration to reduce the rampant levels of corruption and afghanistan? i was there in april, i met with the opposition candidates and president karzai to talk about the election. the opposition candidates were clear that the election would be corrupt, that the result would be fraudulent, and their security would be compromised, and there were right -- they were right. we did not work on this problem and that was a big mistake. i was then in canada are with tribal elders. -- i was in kandahar and they

said unless president karzai's half brother goes, they will join the taliban. these were the heroes of the soviet war who were very impressive and very active elders in their community. they concluded that the karzai government could not deliver them safety and basic services. when you use that as a backdrop, i conclude it is the corruption. maybe the steps we will be taking in the next week will lead us in a better direction. having said that, what should u.s. policy be? as we speak, there are fewer than 100 al qaeda and afghanistan. the number has gone down since 2003. the number in pakistan is large.

the taliban is affiliating with other unattractive terrorism groups, including the taliban and other groups in pakistan. the threat to the pakistani government and civilians is growing as we sit here. the attacks are surgical and effective. al qaeda is also growing in yemen, somalia and the united states. if your policy has to be that providing for u.s. security requires going after al qaeda, then it seems our policy has to be focused on pakistan, yemen, somalia, northern africa and our country. i hope that it will be.

that leads me to say that at a time of scarce resources, we have lost a lot of people in afghanistan and iraq. our army and military are worn out. we have to be very careful about what commitments we make in afghanistan, so i hope that after a constructive redo of the election or the national government in afghanistan we would proceed to do the three things that were in general mcchrystal's report. that report was not about troop levels, it was about a counterinsurgency strategy. it made three points. the first one was we need to move our troops out of the our land to the population centers. we saw the sad consequences of

our failure to do that more quickly when our troops were ambushed and we could not protect them. it was a black hawk down type situation. second recommendation was make sure the government can deliver affected services. the third -- can deliver affected services. the third is to train afghans to fight for their own country. that becomes easier once the corruption problem is addressed. they beat the tribal elders revisit this situation and make a different choice because they no longer feel that the taliban will protect them more than their own local government. i want to conclude by mentioning that -- one of the current strategies in afghanistan is that rights for women are being rolled back.

-- one of the current tragedy is in afghanistan. it is for certain that women are having fewer rights and afghanistan. there are 328 parliamentary delegates. -- women are having fewer rights in afghanistan. it would be an enormous tragedy if their forces were silenced. -- if their voices were silenced. women have traditionally been very well-respected figures in age and afghanistan. there was a famous heroin. -- well-respected figures in ancient afghanistan. she demanded that afghans fight for their country. i don't wear a veil, but let me wait my flag and demand that

afghans fight for their country. >> thank you. paul. >> thank you and good morning. the alternate objective of everything we do in south asia is to enhance the safety of the american people. unfortunately, a lot of debate about this afghanistan issue has confused that objective. particular emissions that may or may not enhance that objective and -- particular missions. i don't like to be the dichotomy of counter-terrorism strategy versus counterinsurgency strategy. when you look at what the theater commander has been focusing on, he is quite properly focused on strategies

for accomplishing his assigned mission as he currently understands it, which to put it simply is to stabilize afghanistan where to prevent the current government from fall. president obama needs to focus on a broader question, which is whether counterinsurgency in afghanistan would advance the safety and security at the american people enough to justify the risk entailed? or to remind the question even more with a counter terrorist focus, with the terrorist threat that the american people and american interest based, without tenter and stringency -- without counterinsurgency be enough different from what we would face with it and if the difference is in the right direction, to justify the cost and risk of properly researched proper insurgency. in my judgment, that difference

is at best, slight. it may not even be in the right direction. the main reason for that is the terrorist threat from al qaeda or any other group is not to be equated with control over a particular piece of real estate by the group itself. just about anything of importance that terrorist group do that grow into their operations can be done elsewhere. mentioned the planning of operations. -- bruce mentioned the planning. that can take place anywhere. the fact that many things have taken place in south asia does not mean that a terrorist group would be significantly handicapped if they were forced to do it elsewhere. let's assume that a physical

safe-haven is important. the group we are most concerned about already has one, on the other side of pakistan, successful enough to keep bin laden at large for the last eight years. i have a hard time distinguishing between the terrorist threat of that haven poses to us or anyone they will establish on the other side. if the threat will be series to us, -- if the threat is serious to us. there is the idea if they need south asia at all. there is somalia and yemen, and how far we chase these people to the ends of the earth. they are changeable, they move, they don't stay in their lane. that is why the disproportionate

concentration in afghanistan is a mistake. let's assume even despite all of that that there was something special about afghanistan. a properly resource counterinsurgency strategy would still not prevent a haven from being established there. the general made it clear that such a strategy would involve protecting the afghan population in the areas that were deemed most important to the survival of the afghan government, but leaving many other parts of that country outside of control of the government or us. if a group still somehow felt it necessary to disestablish and -- to establish a haven and afghanistan, there would be plenty of places to do it. what other factors as our

military effort have in afghanistan? -- what other a fact does paramilitary have? also the fact that they do not constitute a death blow against al qaeda. but the same thing is true with operations in afghanistan. one of the effects is an erosion or a plummeting of support and sympathy by the afghan people for what we are doing. there was a poll published earlier that tracked the precipitous drop in our numbers. why is this happening? it is the perception that we have become occupiers, rather than liberators or protectors. number two, because of the

collateral damage that occurs from even the most carefully planned military operations, one of the more specific effects of this is a swelling of the ranks of insurgents who we put under the general label of taliban, most of whom have little or no sympathy for the extremist ideologies, but rather they are opposing what they have come to see as an occupation. i noted in the news coverage of one of those recent engagements in which the u.s. forces suffered higher casualties, our military command did not think it was inappropriate to describe the enemy as caliban, but tribal militias. -- inappropriate to describe the enemy as taliban. the struggle against al qaeda is not to be equated with anyone effort.

the military instrument is but one of numerous instruments and tools to be used to try to reduce the threat from international terrorism. south asia is only one of the places to use it. i respect the president's decision to take off the table any withdrawal from where we are now. that does not mean the only other option is to go up. there are useful things to be done in the meantime with our military presence in afghanistan, including the training mission as part of the afghanization of what is going on. and including the administration of buying off of those in certain elements, very much like

what we did in the anbar province in iraq. this is not a prescription for gloom and doom in regard to what we face with al qaeda kut there are other ways of combating at -- what we face with al qaeda, but there are other ways of combating it. >> thank you everyone for being here. i also want to thank my colleagues, jason campbell and his jeremy shapiro. there is and afghanistan woman who i am writing this book with and it is an honor to work with her. this is somewhere between a friendly discussion and debate, but i will make it more towards a debate. responding to paul pillar, it is

a formidable task to respond to him, who has been not only a great servant of the u.s., but what of the top three best selling offers -- best-selling authors from brookings. i greatly enjoyed having him here. i think many of his points are very solid, but let me try to sharpen a little bit of disagreement on a couple of things. first of all, i am glad paul has conceded that going to a counterterrorism strategy with a minimum force would concede afghanistan. he pointed out that is not really an option the president is considering, but much of the conversation was about what happens if a safe haven does get established.

let me be clear about my own assumption. i agree with bruce riedel and stanley mcchrystal are headed for defeat. a counter-terrorism mission -- that will lead to the likelihood of al qaeda haven inside of afghanistan. besides huge propaganda value for al qaeda. first of all, this would be a much better place for al qaeda to be dead somalia or yemen. al qaeda will struggle there -- a better place for al qaeda than in somalia or yemen. the bin laden family has not been operating in yemen for a long time. they will have to worry. not everyone will want to see them establish a big headquarters for sanctuary.

have them to agree scituate to somalia or yemen would be a wonderful development. -- having them have to resituate. for the first time in a long time we have some hope the pakistani star taking that situation on would focus. -- we have hope the pakistanis are taking that situation on. we had a chance to go out to them in pakistan and afghanistan. i don't want to just think in semi-defeatist terms about where they will able to be sustaining a sanctuary. the pakistanis are very nervous about developments in their country. we have seen a lot of improvement, as we have seen in

our pakistan index. we have seen a real awareness by the pakistani state that they are in trouble, and some of these groups have not stayed in their lane. this is a concept that is well- understood in the pakistani culture. they seem to be interested in giving this a shot. i would like to think about how we can take al qaeda's bratt said away all at once. -- their broad set. the only place where al qaeda would be welcomed in afghanistan is in the pashtun areas. there are a couple of pockets of

opportunity for al qaeda in pashtun, in the north and west of the country, but if they go there they're giving us an opportunity to surround them and develop human intelligence networks. most of those populations will not want them there. let me emphasize that these are the things you do not sustain or protect if you go to a narrow counter-terrorism missions. you lose them because the enemy kills your friends that you need to find out where the enemy is. we learned this in iraq. if you want to do counter- terrorism you have to protect the people who want to work with you. you have to do counter insurgency. that is the simplest way to explain why a counter-terrorism missions does not work very well. i guess -- there are other

issues i am sure we will get to. to focus on the sentiments of the afghan people towards us, paul is right that the trends have been bad. however, there is more data in 2009 than was alluded to a moment ago. an international republican institute poll shows nato's popularity was up to 62%. i doubt it is that high any longer. i think the election fiasco hurt us all. the afghans don't hate americans the way that a lot of iraqis did. afghans actually want this mission to succeed. it may not come up but they want it to. they don't view us -- it may not, but they want it to. they don't view us as occupiers.

they're willing to do so on the grounds that we be successful occupiers, competent ones who do this under an international framework and get out as fast as we can. the fact that we have 42 nations working with us, we have a norwegian diplomat, that we have a number of civil servants in this mission takes away a little bit of the imperialists it edge. we are not just the latest incarnation of the 19th century british or 20th-century so that's. the pol they note that we're trying to do a good job. they are frustrated. we did they know that we're trying to do a good job. the poll suggests that they're trying to give us one more chance. having said all of that, i would can see many of the points that my co-author has made about how

you possibly use american resources to win a war when the afghans themselves are falling short. i've seen that is the crux of the issue right now pic. the problem is if we do it and are afghan partners do not do it, i think the mission will ultimately still fail. that is what the crux of the debate should be around now. i think we have been spending time on many other issues. i think we should focus on can retrain the afghans faster? if you read the report, watch what general petraeus has done, the strategy already has a big emphasis on trying to reconcile with anyone who wants to reconcile. it has enormous emphasis on training the afghans in a much more vigorous way than has been

done in the past. they do everything together from this port forward. the idea that we're not turning fast enough or not try to reconcile fast enough, that may be true based on previous efforts. general mcchrystal says he wants to do all of those things but he needs more resources. and you. -- thank you. chance to respond, but let me go back to jane and bruce, and see if you have any responses to what paul has said in terms of a counterterrorism strategy. >> i will frame the question differently. one of the questions we ask is, why is stability in afghanistan

important? there are two obvious reasons. first of all, we are there. we have almost 70,000 americans and 30,000 nato forces there. the notion that we should simply say, we will live with a situation in which it is getting worse and worse, is very dangerous. this situation is not static, it is going downhill rapidly. if i was to say what is the single biggest difference between the situation in march and the situation in october, it is the acceleration of the deterioration. a big part is the afghanistan election. we have to fix this if we are going to do it the second time around. a second fiasco and all the king's men and all the king's horses cannot put hunte the dump the back together again. -- . hy -- cannot put humpty dumpty

back together again. this is the problem that has developed. that is why we see a degree of instability in pakistan. talk to pakistani leaders and they will tell you we need a stable afghanistan if we will stabilize our country. why does this matter? i don't think that is hard to figure out. this is the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. there are more terrorists per square mile in pakistan than any other country. the future of this lump comes together in pakistan in a more remarkable way. -- the future of this comes together in pakistan. i think there is a linkage there. the president rightly in his speech in march began by talking about pakistan. he correctly focused on it as

the strategic prize in this region, but i don't think there is a way to get there doing it next door. we tried doing it for eight years, and that is how we got where we are. >> jane? >> i want > > michael o'hanlon -- i want to thank michael. he has endorsed my position and i accept that. the second, it is that bruce played a big role in it. -- the second comment. when the obama policy was announced in march we added 20,000 troops. the nato mission now has 100,000 troops, 13,000 that were redeployed by the bush administration are arriving. that is non-afghan troops on the

ground. i don't think our generals think or our secretary of defense thinks that we can win this, that we can succeed militarily. i am looking for other options, and i think they have a better chance to work. i don't want to under resource our commitment to afghanistan. i know president obama is not talking about walking out the door. we had a moral commitment. we left in the early 1990's and promised tuesday. what i like to stay long term and have an economic relationship with a prosperous afghanistan? you bet, but our military engagement, especially one that is as an offensive engagement is not one that we should enlarge.

the afghans should enlarge that engagement, we should not. we should set up circumstances where they can do that. that is why i continue to say is the corruption, stupid. >> paul, can you respond? let me give you an opportunity to expand on your alternative approach, because you said it acquired a variety of different pieces of counterterrorism strategy, but i wonder if you could elaborate on that. >> to respond to that, the outcome of what is perceived as our contest against international terrorism will depend on the ninth visible day to day work by intelligence -- the non-visible intelligence.

it is not something where we can report progress on a nap, -- report progress on a map. if i could turn to several of mike's points and his forceful and articulate presentation is a challenge. he alluded to a propaganda victory. i know he developed the point more fully elsewhere. the adversaries will depict what ever happens as a win on their part, regardless of how long we are in afghanistan. we are inherently disadvantaged compared to a terrorist group like that in putting a spin on victory verses defeat. they will still be out there. they will still be putting out their audiotapes, and all it

takes is one attack against u.s. interests to punctuate their point that you put in all this big effort and we are still out there. that is going to happen counterinsurgency or no counter insurgency. the question of how easily it would be to stay alive in one of these other places, we are using wrong imagery like is ches.. that is not the way this can works. -- using wrong imagery like chess. al qaeda does not depend on anyone headquarters, it is more decentralized. we hear about the links back to south asia or pakistan. links can mean just about anything. they don't necessarily mean direction or instigation.

what would take place in afghanistan? could they have the qaeda and -- if general mcchrystal's strategy works? i would point out that the people are most worried -- this is something none of us have touched on. that is this assumption that automatically if the taliban succeeds in reestablishing a state in afghanistan, that it would be a no-brainer that al qaeda will rush back in. this for gets and number of things, including the events in 2001 in which the biggest setback that the taliban ever suffered, a loss of what had been power over afghanistan, was a result of their terrorist activity, to which we responded with our operation.

i find it hard to believe that that was erased from their memories. the last point i want to make is it is really all about pakistan. bruce used the term seeps across the line. we think of these things as spatial terms, the analogy to the cold war imagery of red paint. i asked you to consider exactly what this means in terms of the mechanism for stability in afghanistan affecting the course of events in pakistan. one point is the course of events in pakistan will depend on events inside pakistan itself. this includes the pakistani military, which is by far the strongest and most respected

institution in pakistan. it depends on the middle class, to whom everything be -- it depends on a lot of other things as well. to the extent that even if there is a marginal influence of what happens in afghanistan or what happens and pakistan. usually when we think about instability seeping across lines, it is because there are more resources or a there is a base of operations created that was not there before. number one, and he stayed of the taliban -- any state will not bring any big influx of resources. as far as the base of operations, the pakistani taliban already has a -- already has it.

it is outside the pakistani government's control. finally, think of the motivations of the afghan taliban. if they were to establish a state in afghanistan they would have their hands full trying to reestablish their power, >> we're going to feed this discussion to take you live to the u.s. capitol. the house will dabble in for a short session. the discussion continues live at c-span.org. live house coverage on c-span.