if anything would reopen the door that iran has worked hard to close, it would be a military strike on iran. iran knows how to use that to its own benefit. it would actually work in a counter productive way. you would see iran's numbers go back up and america's number slowdown and the arab government-supported the strike would be impacted. -- america's numbers godown and the arab governments that support did that strike would be impacted. the government being less able to control it. we have allies in the region who were able to control and tamp down this descent. they are less capable of doing that right now -- tampa down this dissent. they are less capable of doing

that right now. >> when did you find most notable or surprising in the data? >> what i find surprising is the fall of iran's standing in the region. but i think these numbers would have a sobering effect on the iranian government. i am sure it will be picked up and written in the reformist press. the policy of the government for the last 32 years was that we do not care about the government in the arab world. we care about the arab street. ayatollah khomeini first, the supreme leader, their constituency is the arab street. under the sun shining -- there was an effort to mend relations with saudi arabia and some of the countries in the persian gulf.

they have good relations with qatar and good economic relations with dubai. the bulk of iran's trade is done through dubai because of the sanctions. my sense is that the turning point -- and this is a question for jim -- was in 2009. the arab street was faced with brutality by the regime that they did not expect. they did not expect such brutality in public. i think that was the turning point. also, the support of the iranian government of syria must have played an important role. the point i would like to make is that the arab spring created such a momentum in the arab

world and it was their own doing. then comes the supreme leader of iran and says this is an example that iran sets. this is going to be the islamic revolution repeated -- this is an example that iran set. that put off a lot of people on the arab street. >> jim, we will get a chance to get your reaction, too. let's get reaction from the panel first. you have to say something about lebanon. >> let me start with a quick caveat. i have they done this -- jaundiced view of polling, particularly in the arab world. there are historical reasons why i have doubts about this polling in general.

that is one point. >> we will just have a jaun diced view of you. >> iran was never popular since 1979. it was never seen as a model to be emulated. the revolution was never seen as such at any time. 2006 in lebanon was an exception. 2006 in the arab world was an exception. you have an after fighting the most powerful world -- country in the middle east. the israeli air force is the most capable and powerful. and yet a nine-state actor with a few hundred spartans -- non- actor with a few hundred spartans made a dent in the strategic deterrence.

for a few weeks or months afterwards, the leader was seen as a conflict -- as a 10 foot tall cairo. not because iran is a model or because hezbollah is a great organization, but because they stood against the israeli onslaught in lebanon, which visited an incredible amount of destruction on a country name lebanon. in 2008, when hezbollah took over westbury -- to cover west beirut, the reaction was this role against hezbollah and against the shia. we have the political views that are driven by sectarian considerations and sectarian animus. the shi sunni divide in -- the

shia-sunni device is the worst i have seen in my life in the worst i've seen in the middle -- divide is the worst i have seen in my life. when i was looking at the results, i was dumbfounded by in lebanon. 84% of the lebanese favor iran. the lebanese are infamous for their sectarian release. they think they are the most sophisticated people in the middle east. if you look at the lebanese attitudes through the sectarian prism, there is no way under the sun that 84% of lebanese would have a favorable view of iran. 75% of the sunni in a lebanon have a favorable view of iran

tumbled 81% of the christians? i was born in that committee -- 75% of the sunni in lebanon have a favorable view of iran? 81% of the christians? only 22% of the christians have a favorable view of the united states. i am not doing a good job as a journalist if that is the case. this was really a shocker. 80% of the lebanon -- lebanese look at qatar as a model to follow. what is there in qarar to follow -- qatar to follow? seriously. that is difficult to believe. lebanese christians, 77%, see

iran as a model to emulate. in 2009, when jim was talking about the green revolution, the figures in lebanon are staggering. 83% of the lebanese supported the iranian government's crackdown on the green revolution. 83%. iran as a role model for my country. 86 i -- 86% agree with that. i will ask a question of jim. he is an old friend of mine. these are the numbers from the pew research center issued in february. widespread opposition to iran requiring -- acquiring nuclear weapons. 62% of the lebanese oppose.

that is a majority. support for a tougher approach toward iran -- use of force generally supported. 47% of the lebanese support the use of force. 36% oppose. one final thing. iran widely disliked -- members in lebanon, 61% this like iran. >> if these poll results are overstating the results, iran is really in trouble. that is why i have a jaundiced view of polling. pew has been doing these polls

in the region for a number of years. the discrepancy in terms of the number is is really staggering. i am not equals the. i know the history of the region. the numbers in lebanon on iran do not correspond with what i know about lebanon, do not correspond with what i know about the region. >> first of law, that was a classic lebanese response. [applause] it is not always about lebanon. the lebanon numbers are out of sync. you are absolutely right. if you look closely at the polls and look closely at the other numbers, the other lebanon numbers were right on target with everything else we have done over the years.

attitude toward america the same. attitude toward saudi arabia the same. attitudes toward turkey and russia the same. nothing moved by iran. why did the iran numbers move in november of 2012? the pupil is april of 2012. -- the pugh -- pew poll was in april of 2012. they were not seeing iran at that point through the prism of the united states. they were seeing it through the prism of israel. they were seeing it in a different way and they came up with different answers. 77% of pakistanis have a favorable view of iran. they had different numbers on each than we did. i do not think 50% of some arab countries support a military strike. our numbers were different than that. if you are planning a military

attack on iran and you want to go with the pew numbers, you pay the price for it. i am not sure what we find out -- found out was not true. i know what your view is of it. i remember dealing with liz cheney and telling her that saudi arabian men were more supportive of women having equal rights. she said, i met four saudi arabian women and they disagree with that. i said we interviewed 1000 and they had a different view. your four were included in that 1000. i cannot dispute the numbers when they have been done twice, when they were redone and can. >> you are also calling attention to trends. the trends are disturbing and real. lebanon does stand out. the rest of them are on target.

the rest of them -- we have to look at the lebanon numbers and say, what are they telling us? what are they trying to say? was made a difference? as we ask those follow-up questions, we found that people were saying something about lebanon's situation in the world, its sense of the late demands -- its sense of still playing a victim. that is something to take into consideration. >> let's let barbara and mark have a crack. >> the support for iran was an aberration in 2006. there was also a certain aberration for iran. i remember living in lebanon in the 1980's and iran was more democratic than the arab countries. expressing admiration for iran was like a protest.

it was a way of sticking your finger in the eye of the pro- western autocrats in charge of your own system. once the government decided to be overthrown, there was the longer a need. iran crackdown viciously on its own people during a presidential election. whatever sense of admiration started to disappear then. i agree with youagreejim, that the nail in the -- i agree with you, jim, that the nail in the coffin seems to be syria. i will quote a middle east

scholar who calls iran a strategically lonely nation. indeed it is. its closing the west closest relation with a neighboring state is with armenia. it is not exactly a power house. iran is person. it is shia. it has historically not had good relations with turks and with arabs. your poll confirms that with the added factors. the nuclear issue, i found fascinating. there are small numbers that would consider supporting military action. >> thanks. i would echo some of the concerns about polling in general. it is far more commonplace now, far more standard. newspapers do it all the time.

i am worried about trying to pull what are effectively failed states and conflict zones and yemen in particular. yemen is a mess. polling there is not going to be easy. it might be interesting to talk about some of those cases. i had a couple of thoughts about how you might interpret the data taking it at face value in a different way. we in washington have a temptation to look at this and see what is essentially a good news story that iran's favorables are down and that means that hours are up or that our allies are in -- ours are up and that our allies are in a better position. i agree with other speakers that if there were military action,

it would revert quickly. we should not read that as a green light. it would certainly put us back into the prism of american interventionism. i was struck by something else. much of what we are seeing is rooted in the spread and entrenchment of a quite frightening sectarianism around the region, which is extraordinarily divisive and extremely hard to ratchet back once it has begun. the events in bahrain and syria and growing conflicts across the region. you see these even in places very few shia -- with very few shia in the population. yet you see the growing speculation and entrenchment of anti-shia attitudes. i see this as a cautionary tale

about attitudes in the middle east. we need to be cognizant about feeding or relying on this kind of anti-shia as opposed to anti- iranian sentiment. this can come back and haunt us as we are in a region of popular empowerment and increasingly permeable and open states. one other point that i would like to throw out there for us to talk about is that even some of the things we identify as crucial to undermining iran's power and influence, such as what is happening in syria, can create opportunities for syria. when president assad false, iran is not going to go away. iranian influence in syria is not going to go away. one can easily imagine the emergence of an insurgency, which is fighting against what appears to be a pro-western

backed regime in damascus that can prove to be popular to certain sectors and pockets in the middle east. we have to be careful about thinking about this in an ahistoric way where we only see our perspective rather than the other perspective. the view from tehran is quite different. i would like to hear barbara's take on this. when you talk to iranian officials, they see an area where iran is under siege and islamic movements are on the rise and they might look at this narrative of a collapsing irani position and say, those americans are fooling themselves. they can read these polls and we know the power is shifting and in our favor. it is important that we not protect our own reading of this data on to tehran. >> as the moderator, one of the things i like to do is find

common ground between one. that mark and jim and barbara agree on is the significance of this growing sunni-shia schism. that was a fact when it wasn't a couple of years ago. i am curious about the other panelists thoughts on this. that is the issue and not the decline in support of iran in the arab world. >> you cannot dismiss the decline in support of iran as a factor. the sunni-shia split is a subtext. i write about that. it is an important one. it is interesting that in some

countries less than others, those are countries doing a little bit better. one of the lessons for governments to come out of this is addressing some of the issues of domestic discontent with minorities or majority shia community is that he'll underrepresented or repressed. it is also an issue about the role of terrorism. what happened in iraq and what is happening in the pakistan is exacerbating this tension. there are other factors as well and all of them have to be addressed. i would not want to on the plan or saying what mark says they may be saying. living in that world that president assad is living in and thinking things are going right, just give us another month and we will figure this out.

it is not going to get better. it is getting worse. >> what you think they are saying in tehran? >> i think the survey will have a sobering affect. >> do you think mark is correct? >> they are cocoon, which i do not believe. we have the support of the arab spring. the government against us no longer exists. we have one big thing in common and this is the islamic tie. this is a big mistake to interpret iran's policy as playing the sectarian role. it just so happens that in the other countries, they are playing it. the iranians never talk about the shiite power.

>> are they afraid of the? >> -- are they afraid of it? >> he doesn't see himself as a shiite leader pushing for shiite hegemony. if we look at bahrain, the first couple of weeks of the uprising, the iranians kept quiet. then they started making statements and supporting and so on. they look at it as an internal issue. they did not want to play with fire. >> picked up on that briefly. we have to get to the audience. >> one reason i cannot believe the iranian city in tirana are not happy with this poll is because iranians fancy -- in tehran are not happy with this poll is that they fancy themselves leaders. the iranians have a 5000 year

history. egypt is probably the only arab country that has the attributes of nationhood. iran is a serious country. culturally and historically have a sense of identity. it is an incredible power and influence of persian culture. the iranians have the potential of being the leaders of the muslim world. they know the arab spring is not with them. they know it is being sent by extremists. in a sunny country like cairo, like egypt, -- is a sunni country like egypt. shiites in pakistan are being slaughtered almost on a daily basis. the sectarianism is being fed by both, sunni radicals in shiite

radicals. he never says he represents the shiites. the arab regimes in syria does not put it in those terms. they always invoked resistance. that is the new jargon that they use. resistance to israeli hegemony and syria as part of that axis of resistance to this kind of hegemony. it cannot be happy with what is taking place on the arab street. they cannot feel comfortable with the split between the shia and sunnis because it hurts their ambition. >> i was in iran in august and i

had an interesting conversation with the speaker of the parliament and his national security adviser. iranians are very pragmatic. they also think they are farseeing. they believed the united states would come around and seek better relationships with iran because of a couple of factors. they see the tall bad as emerging in afghanistan as the u.s. withdraws. they think the united states is going to realize that it has much more income in the -- with the iranian side like we did in -- after 9/11. they have this view that transcends sectarianism and focuses on the fact that they are the inlines islamic fundamentalists and the sunnis are the crazy ones and why don't the americans see that? >> i wanted to call attention to one country we have not talked

about. we have invested so much there, and that is iraq. when you look at these ideas, yet to come to the conclusion that we do not have much to show for our investment in a rock, and least as far as their views of iran -- our investment in iraq, at least as far as their views of iran. >> they talk about how their struggle against al qaeda is the same as the reason they rejects the syrian uprising and the others. you are seeing the emergence of that kind of rhetoric in tehran and baghdad. >> thanks to all of my panelists and thanks to you for coming today. if you want to relive any aspect of this discussion, you will find its archived on the woodrow wilson website.

the woodrow wilson center. it will be a new app on your iphone. thank you very much. [applause] >> tuesday, the man in the hat is back.

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