>> charlie: welcome to our program. tonight, following up on our series of conversations with leaders in the middle east, we talk to the defense minister of israel, ehud barak. >> when the time comes for signing a deal, you will need magnifying glass to see the difference between what was on the table 10 years ago and what will be signed. in fact, i told arafat in front of clinton, at the time, that if we fail to reach agreement now, thousands of palestinians, maybe thousands of israels will be -- thousands of israelis will be buried before we complete a circle and we will follow -- our successors will have the very

same issue. that's the tragic nature of negotiations in the middle east. you're not going to change the topography, it will get even worse in time, weapons become more lethal and the need to take these courageous decisions -- it's painful. it's short of perfect. we are short of perfect. the other side is short of perfect. no one is perfect in our region. >> charlie: ehud barak for the hour. next. >> welcome to our program. funding for charlie rose was provided by the following.

>> and by bloomberg. a provider of multimedia news and information services worldwide. ♪ captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> charlie: ehud barak is here. he is defense minister in the coalition government of benjamin netanyahu. he's the most decorated soldier, a former general and leads the party -- from 1991 to 2001 he was prime minister. this month 10 years ago he, president clinton and yasser arafat tried to reach a peace agreement at camp david. period in the united states brokered proximity talks but can't agree how to move forward on direct talks on the core issue it is. ehud barak has been in washington to meet with

secretary of state clinton. tomorrow he meets with u.n. secretary general ban ki-moon. tonight i am pleased to have him back at this table. welcome. >> thank you for having me. >> charlie: washington first. what was the purpose of your meetings down there? >> first of all, to see certain defense-related issues between us and the j.s.f. on the table. we have to make decisions in coming few months. some other issues have to do with keeping the qualitative military edge of israel and, of course, i wanted to see what could be done about pushing forward peace process, our negotiations with the palestinians and whether there is an opening for a wider regional structure to enter into the picture based on the common or shared interests of us and all the moderate arabs in the region. >> charlie: did iran come up? >> yeah.

you have to have a discussion between israel and america now without iran being in the background somehow as well. >> charlie: do you and the president and the secretary of state and national security council and the pentagon see iran the same way? >> i think in terms of the iranian tension, we are quite close in our diagnosis of what's happening there. the iranians are determined to defeat and defy the whole world and move forward toward a nuclear military capabilities. we all agree, at the same time, that by now it's time for sanctions but sanctions should be limited in time, should be extremely effective in order to stop the iranians from moving toward nuclear -- >> charlie: how long a time will you allow sanctions to work? >> i don't want to put kind of a

red line on the calendar, but i think that the basic issue that we should think of is the fact that while they are working, they are widening their plan, making it more redundant and somehow better protected a long time, and they are accumulating a long time more and more enriched uranium and now even medium-level enriched uranium and more centrifuges of more advanced types and so on, so we have to bear in mind a certain point. they will enter a kind of immunity so there will be no practical, physical attempt in blocking them might be effective. so that's something that should be borne in mind somehow. >> charlie: what do you make of the iranian spy story? >> iranian?

>> charlie: iranian spy story -- nuclear -- >> probably he was somehow brought into this kind of opportunity to make a choice and to probably share some of his information, and probably he chose deliberately to go back to iran after contemplating and considering the alternatives. >> charlie: you don't necessarily assume he was a double agent from the beginning? >> i don't know enough about it, but it's clear that the iranians -- they are a gifted people. they have quite solid scientific base and they are really determined to reach nuclear capability. the administration said loud and clear -- at first the administration used to say we're not going to allow them to turn nuclear. now they are saying even more actively we are determined to prevent them from turning

nuclear. >> charlie: so that suggests to you the united states has a more urgent need and desire and commitment to stop iran from having nuclear weapons? >> i think that the administration will understand that nuclear iran changing the landscape of the wider middle eastern war in more than one sense, it will ignite an extremely intensive arms race toward nuclear capability -- at least three or four pillar members of the middle east will have to join the game. it will end up with a tail wind to all al qaeda-jihad in iran, somali and all other terror -- it will create a very intensive atmosphere of intimidation to the neighboring gulf states and

a nuclear iran will clearly act vaft the countdown toward the vision -- that is shared somehow -- clearly activate the countdown toward the vision -- that is somehow shared by the president not to have nuclear device in the hands of terrorists. it is quite a disturbing situation -- the gulf is still the place where some 40% and quite a fraction of the chinese needs are supplied, and to think of a demonic iran is quite disturbing -- think, just 19 years ago since bush senior ordered the saving of kuwait from being eliminated from history and the map. >> charlie: invasion by iraq.

>> in the first gulf war. think what would have happened if you had to consider this operation if saddam hussein could have said credibly that he has three crude nuclear devices. probably, you could never take this decision to save kuwait. and i say because -- >> charlie: if kuwait, it might have been saudi arabia next. >> at least kuwait, and i say, because sometimes people ask, will iran drop a bomb? and i say i don't believe so. they're intelligent enough to understand what will follow. too many neighbors are nuclear. but it will start the countdown toward having a nuclear device in the hands of terrorists. it will end any possibility of a stable or controlled effort against proliferation, and it clearly will end up with certain

crude device in their hands, and with the first half dozen of crude devices this will be a different iran -- you won't be able to act against them, and the very fact that they had it would make them much more effective, coercive power all around the region. >> charlie: can they be stopped militarily? >> i don't think that that's the time to talk about it, but we recommended loud and clear to all our friends not to remove any option from the table, and we mean it for ourselves as well. >> charlie: for yourself as well. >> yeah. >> charlie: you have to prepare for that possibility. >> yeah, i think that we have to prepare for a variety of possibilities. the americans have to prefer, the russians have to prepare, we cannot afford a nuclear iran. it's nothing to compare with russia and china, with india and

pakistan. it's total different story and we see it more closely. we look at it the way you might have looked at a case of -- i don't know, cuban leader or venezuelan leader announce that he wants to kind of erase somehow florida or district of columbia from the map, from history, and. >> charlie: it is the worst fear of the israeli government, national security fear? >> i don't call it fear. we are responsible people. we have responsibility for the history for the continuation of our people. we had people on a tiny piece of ground, highly sensitive, surrounded by kind of a wide

spectrum from terror to proliferation. we have to prepare for all cases and be able to -- never to blink in front of tough realities. >> charlie: but you will have to have fly-over rights and lots of other things in order to have a military strike. >> we're not at the stage of contemplating the details of a possible strike. i am just saying that we are responsible for the history, the future of israel and the jewish people and we cannot deal with threats like the iranian too easily and nonchalantly. >> charlie: do you think you have all the information you need to know about what they have? is your intelligence that good? >> you can never know whether you have everything, but we -- we know what we know and we don't know what we don't know. >> charlie: you have also said that if syria would split -- if

you could peel off the syrian relationship with iran, it would be a game changer. >> we always think on those issues in terms of opportunities and challenges. hezbollah is a challenge. iran is a challenge. hamas in the south. but syria represent also an opportunity as well as the palestinians. we think thatumently we will have to strike at the syrians about an agreement, israel is strong enough and self-confident enough to afford talking with the syrians about how to put an end. i tried it 10 years ago as prime minister with the father of president. we couldn't reach it at the time, but i think it's of strategic importance for both sides and it could change the

landscape because syria is a keystone in the radical -- radical shiite banana, so i call it. >> charlie: but you know what their price is for a peace agreement, which is the return of the gerulaitis to the 1967 borders. >> -- the return of the golan heights to the 1967 borders. >> both sides understand the price and it is the effort on both sides to find the right timing and circumstances, hopefully not deep into the future. i basically say that the issues -- it's true about the syrians, it's true also about the syrians, it's clear in which an agreement should be achieved and it's about courage, leadership, and readiness to take decisions, sometimes painful decisions on both sides in order to achieve it. we have our security worries. we want normalcy.

we want peace. we expect that if there is a breakthrough with the syrians it will be followed by the dismantling of hezbollah and put an end to the conflict with lebanon. we don't have any claims about lebanese territory and probably weaken the influence of iran in the region, and clearly will weaken hamas because they have their headquarters in hamas, so i think that syria has a lot to gain from it, not just the golan heights but a lot of issues that are between them and the free world led by the united states. i think that there is an opportunity here, not at any price, we cannot impose it on the other side, it takes two to tango, both sides have to be ready but i think that we should consider it very sincerely. >> charlie: i have interviewed over the last six weeks of prime minister of turkey when he was at the g-20, i went to syria, to damascus to talk to the

president and more about khalid. do you need turkey? >> turkey is extremely important country in the middle east. -- during the previous government i was also defense minister but the recent two years somewhat deteriorated relationship with turkey that we have epitomized in the flotilla where they backed somehow the i.h.s. -- we still have to iron out it, so i think that at the present, probably better not to go, but no one can lose sight of the importance of turkey in the middle east and probably in any

future construct of a stable, peaceful middle east. >> charlie: they have been strident in their denunciation of what happened with the flotilla. >> they have. >> charlie: and criticism of israel. >> we also are sorry for the loss of life of these people, these activists, but basically, gaza is under marine kind of blockade not because we do not respect the needs of the -- to normal life, a product that will allow them to live normally, but we suffered since hamas came three years ago, israel for years suffered thousands of rockets on civilian population at the end of it, we had to put an end to it somehow. we entered into gaza. afterward, another round of even

more accelerated munition or rockets, load ended up there, so we have our responsibility vis-a-vis our citizens to protect them against such attacks to make sure that armamentes, war materials and the rockets and missiles -- that armaments, war tomorrows and rockets and missiles are not entering it. >> charlie: the provocation was what? the shelling of israel? >> no, the sending of a flotilla to open the blockade directly to gaza while we offered to them -- i talked to the turkish -- and to other for mr. -- mr. abdullah gul, we will check whatever is on board those vessels and allow them to bring it -- we will bring it to gaza. so basically, the provocation

was the attempt to break the -- and go to gaza. >> charlie: you're the defense minister of israel. do you approve of the way that was handled? >> yeah. >> charlie: in the middle of the night? do you approve of that? you have no reservations about what happened at all? and you approved it yourself? >> at certain point -- at certain point, when our soldiers entered there, coming there with kind of a police-like equipment in their hands and only small pistol to protect themselves, they were attacked and then found themselves under immediate risk to their lives, each one of them coming down attacked by several people so at certain point they found themselves attacked, even shot at by pistols that were grabbed from

them, and they -- under this situation, they had to use live fire. >> charlie: and it was not unnecessary? >> no. i don't think so. >> charlie: you don't? >> it was not -- no, i don't think so. it's, of course, under kind of an investigation within our debriefing -- >> charlie: what are you learning from that investigation? >> to the extent that we learned it was all under immediate risk to their lives and under their need to take some of their colleagues that were taken hostage in the lower decks, but that's basically part of the investigation that we are having now. under the formal supreme judge -- israel supreme court judge and i believe that everything that we should know will know, i am strongly confident that what had been done had been done

under immediate risk to their lives. >> charlie: do you think israel suffered in the court of world opinion? if that matters to you -- and that there is some effort to delegitimize israel as some have suggested? >> places like human rights council will -- united states didn't join this forum until a few years ago because you as well as us judged it to be extremely biased. this body when in the last few years probably 30 investigations, 25 of them were aimed against israel. with participants, countries i don't want to mention by name but the standards of human rights is far from anything that you or me would have taken as acceptable and they are passing judgment so easily against israel, so there is a strong bias there, but it doesn't mean

that we have to ignore -- we should not ignore the voice and the atmosphere in the world, but we have a primary contract with our people to protect them and we are determined to do it even if it ends up with certain friction and some other members of the u.n. >> charlie: turkish -- i think it was either -- may have been the foreign minister -- threatened that if israel didn't apologize, to sever the relationship. >> i hope that common sense will take over and ways will be found short of severing relationship -- i think that turkey -- >> charlie: it's a possibility, do you think? you take them seriously when you say that? >> i take abdullah gul and --

and erdogan seriously. we have our responsibility to take care of the crucial interests of israel even if it comes at certain points into a conflict with the views of neighbors, including important neighbors and i think that we have to look for ways to overcome it. without giving up our vital interest what is a sensitive ear to the needs and sensitivities of others in the region. >> charlie: how would you do that? >> by trying to use our common sense, not to be overimpulsive but not to kind of -- we cannot afford being weakened by the very fact that someone criticizes us. >> charlie: you have, my understanding, allowed more things to come into gaza because of all of the furor over the attack on the flotilla.

>> yeah. probably. >> charlie: searching of the -- >> we started before them. before the flotilla came. and even before we started, there was a kind of a -- practically, a lot of product -- most product needed by civilian population could enter the gaza. we eased it a little bit. but basically, the principles remained the same. that the product should come in the same way they go to nablus. they go through an israeli port, being checked. if there is nothing that is forbidden, it goes directly to the district. we don't have a claim against the gazans. gazans are normal people like me and you. they deserve normalcy. unfortunately, they happen to be under the control of hamas, or a group of terrorists, and they are not just talking about terrorism, they are acting -- acted and acting right now, and

that's what makes it more problematic. >> charlie: i want to show you in a moment what khalid mashab said to me about what he views as happening in the middle east. >> once the violation comes, they in the west bank, is there resistance? there is no resistance in the west bank. why israel. is not with the resistance. when the occupation comes to an end, the resistance will end. >> hamas reigns over a terrorist movement, unfortunately for the palestinian people they're totally different from abu mazan and fayad. they are just in the last few years, last seven years, they

bombarded israel -- >> charlie: yasser arafat led terrorist activities against israeli citizens. you went and negotiated with him. you went and negotiated with him at camp david and came close, some say, to -- >> yeah. >> charlie: political risk -- >> yeah, at certain point, yasser arafat said, "ok, i will try." he didn't live up to his commitment but he said "i will try to avoid terror, try to put an end to it and try to negotiate something." >> charlie: they'll put an end to the resistance -- >> he said he accepted the general concept of dealing with an israeli state, that's something that he also never lived up to it when the moment of truth came but there is a -- he played the game this way for quite mileage. i never heard hamas say something similar, never, until now probably they will say something -- if they live up to

the full demands of the quartet, they probably will cease to be the hamas we knew. >> charlie: so it's possible that hamas could change? >> everything is possible, but we have to wait and see that it happens. basically, when people ask me how come you believe that now negotiation -- direct negotiations with the palestinians could lead to something when you personally experienced it failing 10 years ago? i say, people do change. when i came back from camp david, both ehud olmert, future prime minister and tipi livni, future leader of -- >> charlie: and prime minister -- foreign minister -- >> they were extremely against it, they said it's almost a crime what barak was ready to do. it ended up with change. the same happens, and could happen on the other side. certain years ago the arabs

competed, rejecting any proposal for peace in the last decade, they are competing whose peace plan will be adopted by the rest of the world, so people do change. to paraphrase on martin luther king day, the middle east conflict between us and the neighbors is a -- the arc of the conflict between us and the middle east neighbors is a long one but it bent toward reconciliation, very slowly but in a direction, and we should not let the opportunity slip out of our hands. but there is an opportunity now. >> charlie: opportunity retire for direct talks with president abbas and prime minister fayyad. >> they have to reach their own -- >> charlie: and you are ok if they reach their own agreement. if the palestinians come to you

and say "we have reconciliationed with hamas, you're fine with that? >> it's not that simple, but basically we do not pretend to be able to negotiate the relationship between hamas and the p.a., we feel that the authentic, legitimate representative of the palestinian people is the p.a. and the fatah movement. if we try to meddle, this issue will end up somehow making it worse. i don't think it's our role. they're basically two branches of the same national movement, hamas and fatah, and we prefer, i think, that every normal leader in the world should prefer that the p.a. will take the lead. if they reach certain understanding between them and

are legitimate in the end of the p.a. and they will represent the palestinian people, we will have, of course, to negotiate with them. as long as hamas is there, there is a major problem because the reality is that the p.a. negotiating with us but they do not control one-third of their people and extremely crucial piece of land that gives them the connection to the sea and to the rest of the world. it's part of their future state. i think that's the most important development for us in peace because we know we're -- the dominant that peace could be achieved, exact issue on the table 10 years ago at camp david. >> charlie: everybody knows what has to be sought and everybody knows what the outlines of a future agreement are. >> yeah. so we emphasize -- and part of what will come to the table very early in direct negotiations is

the security demands of israel. we should make sure that what happened in lebanon from which i pulled out -- i ordered the pulling out of lebanon to the last inch 10 years ago. it ended up that in spite of a further war and several u.n. security council resolutions, area is full now with 45,000 rockets and missiles of all kinds. sharon, out of all people, made this gallant u-turn and pulled out from gaza, last square inch, every settler, every soldier out. it ended up in spite of a further military operation -- so first of all we should make sure that the west bank, if we end up in an agreement executed will not be filled with rockets, that the terror wave that caused the loss of life of thousands in

israel ended up with a major operation, will not repeat itself from 2001 to 2003, the wave of terror will not repeat itself and that any geopolitical major changes will be dealt with properly -- or could be dealt with properly by israel. that's tough demands. could be solved, i believe, by the palestinians, might be solved i believe in a more smooth way within the context of regional structure of moderate states -- america, the europeans, israel, facing against the radical terror, israel has hegemonic ambitions and the like -- >> charlie: you have said that your responsibility is to the history of the people of israel and to the state.

you are charged with a responsibility for the future as defense minister, as a former prime minister, you have taken risks. risk. do you believe that you could convince the israeli people that the risks you were taking were worth it at camp david? >> yeah. >> charlie: here is the question. what is necessary for you to be satisfied about -- you and the prime minister and the coalition government -- to be satisfied with the security of israel? what would justify -- what could they do to convince you that israel was reasonably secure? >> we need the palestinian state to be demilitarized -- >> charlie: demilitarized? >> demilitarized by a viable form -- >> charlie: what's your idea to do that? >> they should just agree to be demilitarized. >> charlie: so if they want to

be a state -- >> if they want police-like security forces, they will have -- they've basically agreed to it in the past. that's not something that -- you know, you have several other examples in the -- in other corners of the world of demilitarized state. they should be demilitarized. they can be independent viable state, politically, economically, whatever. >> charlie: is your need for security so huge that you leave them with a -- not much of a state because you're not talking about a presence on the jordanian border as well? >> i believe we will have to have a long-term presence and probably a gradual one -- probably milestones should be set along a long time frame in which we'll see a performance based -- a difference of change in this situation.

i don't believe that the underlying principles of israel's security which i describe, no rockets and missiles in the west bank, no terror from the west bank and capacity to face an eastern front if it arises once again sometime in the future, i don't think that all those combined can create a plan which shouldn't necessarily be prohibitive for palestinian state. i think that if we sit together sincerely, looking for ways how to bring together israel's security needs, settlement blocs, continuity of palestinian territory, the economic potential, their need for access for the rest of the world, save passage to -- safe passage to gaza -- we cannot solve to them how to take over for hamas or how to reconcile the conflicts,

but that's something should be left to them. i think there is a viable opportunity to see the opportunity, and i clearly feel that the alternatives are much worse for both. it's about time. we are waiting over the palestinians for this for years. it's totally -- inconsistent with the 21st century and with our own needs. we need a solid, jewish majority under our control. we are not doing the favor to the palestinians by entering into these direct negotiations. it's oun own interest to have this two-state solution to eliminate a border inside the land of israel not because we don't have biblical rights but the realities are that there are millions of palestinians there, they have their nation aspiration, they want their state.

if we continue to reign over them, we will become inevitably, either nondemocratic or nonjewish and neither alternative is implementation of the vision. >> charlie: you cannot afford to be either nondemocratic or nonjewish for the future of the state of israel. >> yeah. yeah. yeah. if this bloc of millions of palestinians vote, it's a binational state even if we call jewish a local state. if they cannot vote, it's not a democratic system. we cannot establish the zionic vision with a nondemocratic state. so basically, we have to delineate this border inside the land of israel in a way, under security and demographic consideration in a way that there will be a solid jewish majority for generations, on the other side a vibrant, contiguous palestinian state with safe

passage, probably a tunnel or fly-over to the gaza strip and i believe that certain rights should remain with us and -- the main settlement blocs which contain some 80% of the settlers over a very marginal amount of percent of the land. >> charlie: are you in favor of continuing the moratorium on the west bank? >> i believe that if we open direct negotiations with the palestinians, now, you know, let's say in few weeks, we will approach this issue under much -- kind of favorable circumstances to be solved. i don't want to make statements about it, but i can remind you that under olmert government there were negotiations.

the way was much higher before the freeze -- the rate of building was much greater before the freeze than after the freeze. when i negotiated with arafat it was higher. once you are dealing with the issues and it's about to be -- decisions have to be made, it doesn't matter whether there is an ebbing of whatever, of some residential places for people there, the whole area, of all the settlements together is a tiny fraction of the land, and the settlement blocs even under the bush administration and clinton administration were supposed to be part of israel. we are feeling sometimes that when the palestinian pushes it to the corner, want first of all to make the continuation of moratorium a litmus test. it's bringing things ad absurdum. >> charlie: you have said how important it is to have these direct talks now.

if it makes it more politically viable for them to engage in the direct talks, why don't you simply say what you have just said, which i read to what you have just said to say, "we're prepared to perhaps do a mortum but come talk before we make that announcement." why not do the moratorium and then talk? >> i say the palestinians cannot hold the kind of -- the two ends. when we initiated, it was unprecedented. my government never did it. rabin never did it. olmert didn't do it. the negotiators, all of us. out of all people, bibi did opposite end of spectrum, now they treated it as something -- it's nothing. they say it's nothing. doesn't matter. now, they said just few months ago doesn't matter. now it becomes something that the cornerstone. it doesn't. it smells somewhat tricky.

that could be the tactics of someone who doesn't want really to negotiate but to throw the onus, the responsibility for failure upon our shoulders while waiting for something better down the stream. i think that both the administration which is essential to the american president is essential to any successful negotiation in the middle east and for us and for them it's important to start negotiations -- they say, "we don't trust netanyahu." israelis say "we don't believe you can deliver." the proof of the pudding is in the eating. both sides should be ready to enter the room, start serious negotiation. we all know where it should end, we all know the painful decisions should be made from both sides, we all know that

americans should put the world's kind of goodwill on the table and help both sides to stay in the room until decisions are made. and a change of the direction of the middle east is achieved. >> how different will it be, what you agree to at camp david? >> i say all along the time that when the time comes for signing a deal you will need magnifying glass to see the difference between what was on the table 10 years ago and what will be signed -- in fact, i told arafat in front of clinton at the time, that if we fail to reach agreement now, thousands of palestinians, maybe thousands of israelis will be buried before we complete a circle and will have -- our successors will have

to follow the very same issue to the slightest detail. that's the tragic nature of negotiations in the middle east. you are not going to change the topography, it will get even worse over time, weapons become more lethal and the need to take these courageous decisions -- it's painful, autoshort of perfect, we are short of perfect, the other side is short of perfect, no one is perfect in our region, but we have to take this -- to make these decisions and to put an end to it. it will not solve all the issues of the region. there are many -- a lot of problems still to be solved, but it will change the direction for us. if will change the direction for the palestinians and it will

change the overall battle success in the middle east. >> charlie: and you are convinced that the coalition government in israel can do this? can make this kind of deal? >> i convinced that we should be ready to go. we are strong enough. we should be self-confident enough. we should not feel the need to make decision -- of course, we should be open eyes and take care of our security and other interests. i'm convinced we have to do it and i keep telling our public that if the present government cannot hold together while moving into it, and it's not necessarily the case, but if we find that we cannot go together, then we should end up widening the government -- it's time for history, not for politics and if

the neetdz needs of history demands that we make a wider government, let's do it. the future of israel is more important than the ego or the interests of any individual or party involved and i basically, i feel that netanyahu fully understands. the historic nature of this period. i think that we were able to convince president obama. i think that the position of the administration led by president obama is extremely important. he is perceived as extremely unbiased, honest broker in this whole situation -- >> charlie: by both sides? >> by both. >> charlie: you and the israeli government have no problems with barack obama today. >> i don't have problem. i don't think that the government has a reason to have problems with him.

but he is extremely respected by the other side in a way that could -- or should brought them to seize the opportunity rather than to erase the bar every time that some gesture is made. and i think that we -- -- it's so important that if we can do it, we have to do it with the present government, if we cannot for this or that reason keep moving the whole way with this government we have to widen it. i'm not afraid of changing governments in order to -- >> charlie: bring in kadima. >> part of kadima. american tv is not the right place to -- discuss israeli politics but we need the capacity to go into the peace process on all its aspects,

palestinian regional, syrians in the future, in the most sincere and daring way. if the government can do it, can be convinced to do it, let's do it to this government. >> charlie: under what circumstances would you leave the government? >> i think it's incong ruent with my feeling about how intimate and genuine is the discussion within these inner cabinet including with people that thinks opposite to me like begin or lieberman sometimes -- i don't think i have to hold kind of a parent, ultimatum or sweat that tells if this or that doesn't happen until certain date i will leave. my position is very clear. they know from day one i am the only left-of-center party in the government, i came there in order to make sure certain

issues regarding sgeenzian bargain, we came into this government to -- regarding keynesian bargain. our basic position is clear, i said it in public in israel, we should move into these negotiations. we should be ready to take. we are strong enough to enable helping them -- the bottom-up construction of the -- an embryo state -- state in embryo that fayyad is building and helping abu mazan in the top-down process and move without losing sight of our security either but move. if it cannot be done with the present government, we have -- it's our responsibility to widen it and to make sure that there is enough power base to do it. the israeli public who voted for

the right-wing parties did it because they do not agree with me on this need to solve the issues. they voted right wing because it seems that part of the left are too utopian politicians that the parties do not trust to make these tough negotiations so the people believe that somehow right-of-center people will negotiate in a more thoughtful manner, but they do not have a mandate to stop the world -- you know, to block the process. there is huge silent majority in israel -- huge. half of likud. three-quarters of lieberman's party. 90% of kadima believe the same as i do. that we should move -- try our best to put an end to it even if it takes painful decisions about

everything -- to settle and to get rid of this conflict once and for all. >> charlie: is benjamin netanyahu prepared to make those painful decisions? >> i think that he's thoughtful person, extremely heartfelt in coming to -- it's easy for him to come to grip with historic realities, son of historian probably different from me and it is not easy for him on the -- looking into his background or probably his gut feeling. no one can penetrate the soul of any one of us. but i'm confident that he's extremely sincere about it. fully understanding the need to push forward keeping our security and vital interests on one hand and being ready to move

forward in the political process. i cannot promise you what will happen along the way. i cannot promise it with regard to abu mazan, i cannot promise it about our government, i can promise you that we -- that myself and our party will not sway about this objective. trying to move israel toward reconciliation of the conflict. >> charlie: i hear -- and this is my last question -- i hear in your voice and your intensity and your passion the sense that we are at, as they say, a pregnant moment. >> it's clearly the time to make a choice between history and politics. certain reality checks about the mechanics of politics do it and about our security interest that cannot be ignored when we move toward this.

and be realistic about the fact we need another partner, we need the palestinians passionate about ending the conflict. we cannot impose it upon them alone but it's clearly a moment when we have to move intensely and make sure that this opportunity is not missed. >> charlie: and they have to understand your security needs and you have to understand their minimum needs to create a successful state. >> yeah. yeah. clearly so. >> charlie: and you have said to me that when you look at where the final settlement is -- the final agreement that will come at some point, you will need a microscope to find the difference from that and what you were prepared to do 10 years ago. >> yeah. that's true. in fact it's true about the syrians as well and it's true about -- >> charlie: including the arab initiative. >> we did not accept it formally

but the labor party accepted the basics. we have many bases. 242 and 338, there is the camp david, oslo agreement, camp david, there is the road map, there are the arab plans, there are the clinton parameters, there are half a dozen different plans. we have our reservations regarding to each and every one of them but having said that, keeping our reservation on record we should be ready to negotiate based upon any one of them or all of them combined. doesn't matter. it will end up with the same very issues. how to have security issues of israel, how to help them build vibe brant, contiguous kind of viable, palestinian state that

reflects their interests in identity, how to make sure that settlement blocs is due, there is a carefully delineated border, that isolated settlements are brought back into israel or into the major settlement bloc, how to solve the refugee issue, how to solve jerusalem. nothing is beyond human capacity to solve and the alternative which is either bosnia-like or belfast like or kashmir like or i don't want to mention the site of the last -- all those alternatives are much worse for us and i believe for them as well. >> thank you for coming. thank you very much. >> thank you. ♪

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