>> rose: welcome to the broadcast. from washington, d.c., a conversation with the commander of american nato forces in afghanistan, general john allen. >> so if you're the taliban and you believe that on the 31st of december 2014, that's the end of the international presence in afghanistan, that's a faulty assumption. and there will be an international presence in afghanistan for a very long time. there will be a government relationship. there will be diplomatic relationships, there will certainly be economic relations but there will also be, very importantly, a security relationship between the united states and afghanistan but the broader international community as well. in many respectes, the taliban has had difficulty sustaining themselves inside the human terrain because they've been rejected. the people do not want to go back to a taliban environment. they were on the fence for a while because they were not sure how this would turn out.

but as local governance continues to gain traction, as economic opportunity becomes more widespread throughout afghanistan, what you find is the people, the people who might have accepted the taliban at some point in the past, see that there now is a future that could be different than the taliban darkness, a future that could be in fact an afghanistan that is aligned with the west, an afghanistan that is aligned with the united states. and they see the improvement in the quality of their lives. >> rose: general allen for the hour next.

he is in washington for meetings at the pentagon and congressional testimony. allen was questioned about the current u.s. mission in afghanistan and the impending draw-down in testimony before congress. >> the campaign has been long

will no longer be terrorized by the taliban. second, as a coalition, the largest in recent history, we are well along in our progress to meet our 2010 lisbon summit commitment to transition security lead to the afghan national security forces by december 2014. and third, our troops know the difference that they're making every day, and the enemy feels that difference every day. >> rose: this comes at a time of strained relationship between the united states and kabul. tonight sergeant bales were charged with killing 17 afghanistan civilians. this happened shortly after american soldiers burned korans at a u.s. military base in afghanistan. despite widespread criticism, president obama and president karzai reaffirmed their commitment to finishing the mission in afghanistan. president obama has asked the

pentagon to bring home 23,000 troops in september of this year. i am pleased to have general allen with me here in washington. >> it is good to be with you. >> rose: army sergeant robert bales has been accused of 17 counts of premeditated murder and could possibly face the death penalty. i know you can't speak to the merits of that case, and he will be accorded full due process as he goes through the process. but we can ask you how you see this incident and the implications it has for the war and for the men and women in afghanistan. >> well, clearly, we offer our condolences to the families in afghanistan that were affected in this tragic case, this tragic situation. we also offer our condolences to the bales family and what they will have to go through as this trial unfolds. i think the relationship with afghanistan is a very strong relationship. it's a resilient relationship.

and while i'll never minimize the tragedy of this crisis, we will get through this. we will hold a full and complete and thorough investigation and the trial will ultimately unfold itself, will reveal and complete the charges and from that, we will continue to move the relationship forward. >> rose: there are many people who are now looking at this and talking about this in an interesting way, including dexter fillkins, a war correspondent, who writes for "the new yorker" magazine and he said on this program recently. >> i think this is the beginning of the end. it certainly feels that way. i think the question is what-- the only question is what the end-- what the end looks like. if, as president obama has sashed we will stop fighting there by next year, and we will be gone by 2014, i mean, i think-- i think at this point it

lobbies pretty bleak. i mean, if you just take exhibit a, the afghan government, the government that we have largely built and which americans are fighting and dying to defend, it is, you know, it is corrupt from top to bottom. it does not have a large degree of support of the afghan people. can that outlast our presence after we leave? i-- i-- there's not a lot of evidence that it can. so i think-- it's not-- it's not looking good right now. >> well, i don't accept the fact that this is the beginning of the end. i think this relationship has endured a number of hardships and tough times. it's been bruised from time to time, but it hasn't been broken. and we've come through some very difficult times of late. the koran burning was a very difficult time, even before the tragedy of the shootings. but what we learned from that particular incident, as it

unfolded, was that there were demonstrations across the country, and some of those were violent, but they were not widespread. and even when they were violent demonstrations, the afghan national security forces stood their ground to defend both afghan citizens and the international security assistance force in a very difficult situation. so it point to, i think, the emergence of a sophisticated afghan national security forces, one that will ultimately support the development of this government in afghanistan. there is corruption in this government. but president karzai has been clear-- he desires to end this culture of impunity, and that public statement on his part has been followed up by actions, frankly, on his part. he has established a presidential executive commission to partner with us in certain measures to reduce criminal patronage influence in the country. both of the security min cities

are undertaking transparency and accountability, surveys of their ministries, so they can chart those areas where there is corruption, the idea being in partnership with us, to take up a series of measure to reduce corruption, ultimately to produce a fair and capable security mechanism that can defend the government and provide president karzai and his successor eventually the kind of time necessary to develop the institutions of government and to put down strong roots of democracy. >> rose: i hear you saying then that you believe that there has been corruption in the karzai government and throughout the administration in afghanistan, which might impede if being able to deliver on what is expected of the afghan government, however you believe that president karzai is doing all that he can to clean up that corruption? >> i believe that president karzai is committed to cleaning up corruption. now, obviously, we didn't arrive here in a day. and we're not going to solve this problem? a day. and i believe that he, the leadership in the afghanistan

government desire ultimately to neutralize and clean up this corruption in a way that permits this government to be a viable member of the international community. >> rose: and you see measurement of that? >> sure, again, the establishment of a governmental presidential commission. to secure the airports from the grip of organized crime and criminal patronage networks. it's got to start somewhere and he's made the decision to start that. upon transparency and accountability working groups in the min see of defense. it has plotted everything in that ministry from the accession of troops to the acquisition of weapons, any everything in between, within the ministry of defense. the idea being is if we can expunge corruption from the ministries responsible for security-- and this is the world i live in, the security world-- then we can creata an environment where a responsible government can be defended by responsible mechanismes of security. and it's got to start somewhere

i think we've had a good start. >> rose: let me read something to you. you wrote, according to the "washington post," a letter to the naval academy students when you were brigadier general. you said you had been touched by reading classic military historians, steven ambrose, and russia widely. you wrote in a letter, if my house was on fire and we were all running for my lives, i would save my family and then all my volumes by these writers. you know history, and there are people who say that afghan's history tells you that it has not had a strong central government that has the confidence of its people, and it is unlikely to have a strong confident central government. >> well, i think we have to recognize that there will be a central government in afghanistan, but we have to leverage that within the afghan society, which resonates with the people. and that is subnational governance as well. we have to leverage strong provincial governments.

strong district governments. we have to assure that the it village elders and elders in municipalities are also empowered. it's not just a strong central government that launches edicts from kabul. that central government has to be connected to the people. we believe through subnational governments, governments that are credible and acceptable to the people at the provincial and district and municipal level, that that is how we'll ultimately see the credible governance of afghanistan. >> rose: you believe that by seaport of this year, how many afghan forces do you believe will be able to handle the responsibilities we expect? >> well i think a large number. we have about 168 or so battalion-sized formations, and a large number of those are either effective with adviser, independent with advisers or effective with assistance. that number is growing.

we will continue the process of working very closely with them and importantly, in the near future, with advisers as well. to continue to accelerate the capabilities of the afghan national security forces. they've come a long way. they're not done yet. we've got more work to do. but they are a force where the leadership and the soldiers are interested in taking responsibility. they want responsibility. they want to create a force that can provide for the sovereignty and the protection of this government and the people of afghanistan. and i think we're well on the way to -- >> they believe they can trust karzai government and that the car sky government is clearly tried-- karzai government is trying to rid itself of corruption. >> i think the people of afghanistan desire and support a credible, honest government in kabul, and so my sense is as the a.n.s.f. grow in their capability to defend and protect those people, that confidence in the government will continue to grow as well, and that's what we're seeking. we're seeking the the people of

afghanistan having confidence not just in their government but the security forces. if the two of those things can exist together at the same time, i'm confident for the future afghanistan. >> rose: when president karzai suggested american military should go back to their of their headquarters and not be in the villages, there was lots of attention to that and what he meant. what do you think he meant? and where does that understanding stand today? >> i will be headed back to afghanistan shortly, and we'll have a conversation about it. and i know as we always do-- we have very candid conversations -- that we'll be very clear when i walk out of the office. in the same conversation, though, where he mentioned that stipulation, he was also clear with the president of the united states, and his commitment, ultimately, to the lisbon summit concept of transition. that is transition for the security forces to be in the lead by 2013, and to complete the process of being in security lead by the end of 2014. that requires a campaign to

continue to build that capability, and that campaign relies on our forces partnering with the afghan, in villages and towns for some period of time, but importantly, as thank you campaign continues, we will depart the villages and towns. we need to get clarity from the president. >> rose: that is a clear counter-insurgent strategy, is it not? >> it is. >> rose: to take and hold the villages so the people there feel safe from the taliban. >> that's correct. and it's part of the campaign, and as he affirmed his support to the concept of lisbon-based transition, it would appear that he still supports the counter-insurgency campaigns. we just havev to go back and get clarity from him on what he intended with that comment. >> rose: anything else you think you need clarity from him on? >> we talk all the time. we talk all the time. as two governments will, we address issues and we address opportunities. we're constantly in conversation about the strategic partnership agreement that's coming. we're in conversation about the future and the role of u.s. u.s.

forces today and isap forces over the long term and nato forces over its long term so we're in constant conversation. >> rose: the use of forces at night. where does that stand? >> we're in the process now of beginning negotiations with the government for a memorandum of understanding which would update ultimately shape night operations in afghanistan. >> rose: but you have said, as far as i understand, you don't think that you can accomplish your mission would you tell us having that option. >> it's essential, i believe, to the counter-insurgency campaign. >> rose: to be able to do what you have to do at night in terms of tracing down people that you think are essential to either kill or capture. >> that's correct. >> rose: and you can't accomplish a mission without being able to do that. >> as i said, it's very important to the campaign. it's essential to the campaign. >> rose: do you understand how afghans feel when their homes are invaded at night? >> we do understand that. in fact, president karzai has been very clear on that issue. that is why we've made decisions in the last several mocks that

have put afghans in lead on night operations. the number of afghans ultimately-- and every one is a tragedy-- the number of afghans ultimately who are killed and injured, innocent afghans, on night operations, is a very, very small number relative to the scope and the numbers of these operations that we run. and so with president karzai's concern that only afghans enter afghan homes, we've gone a very long way to doing that and appreciating in fact and imprinting-- implementing his desires and regards and we're going to continue to do those kinds of things which accelerate the movement of afghan forces into the foreso they can be fully responsible for the security of the afghan government and the protection of the afghan people and we're well on the way in night operations. >> rose: you seem to be saying and saying ist very clearly that having a very good relationship with president karzai is very important, thereby one. and number two, you have that kind of relationship with him. characterize him as you see him

for us. >> well, i think he's an afghan patriot. he certainly are is a historian of afghan history. he is an individual in all of the conversations that i have had with him, the conversations are always constructive. they're positive. but we can talk about difficulty issues-- the koran burning, the shootings, and while there was tension in the room, he was always a very genteel host. his hospitality is legendary, but the conversations can be very difficult conversations. yet, we can work our way through these issues and we coon a regular basis. and i appreciate his leadership in that regard. >> rose: so you believe most of the things that are in conflict with president karzai can be solved. >> i believe that he's willing to have the conversation to seek a solution. >> rose: he has a positive attitude about seeking a solution? >> yes, he does. but if i may, he's very oriented on afghan sovereignty, which is

extraordinarily important, and all of what we're seeking to do is to achieve afghan sovereignty. the whole business of the lisbon summit and the concept of transition, the moving of the afghan national security forces to the fore, the development of a credible afghan national security force, all of that is about ultimate patrick leahy giving the afghans tough tee for their country and the ability to protect their people and that, i think, is often at the heart of president karzai's conversations with us and his motivation. >> rose: what is your mission, and what's the timeline of your mission? >> well, certainly it is to prevent al qaeda from having a safe haven in afghanistan and preventing afghanistan from becoming a launching pad for international terrorism. but it's also to prevent the taliban from overthrowing the afghan government and creating within the afghan national security forces a credible security force that can stand on

its own and ultimately defend that government so that the government can become a viable governing-- or governing institution. >> rose: and those who argue that the taliban simply knows that there's a timeline for the u.s. to leave and that they're prepared to wait because they know what the timeline is, and then to engage in as good a civil war as they can engage in, is that, in your judgment, an appropriate analysis? >> i think that the taliban need to listen closely about the conversation that is unfolding between both the united states and afghanistan. others of our partners in afghanistan listen to the conversation that is unfolding. first of all, in the bahn 2 conference, not recently, there was a very clear determination by the international community to support afghanistan well beyond the concept of transition, which ends at the ends of 2014. >> rose: what does that mean? >> it means that the international community is interested in creating stability

in afghanistan in supporting afghanistan with development. and that process is beginning to unfold at the it chicago conference, which will occur in may, other heads of state, hosted by president obama, the heads of state of the isaf nations will come together to discuss its long-term security relationships with afghanistan. the idea being to support afghanistan in a security mode for the period of time beyond 2014. >> rose: people that i know think that's an essential step. >> it is. >> rose: somehow, if in fact withdrawal takes place as expected, you have to have some understanding of what kind of international presence there might be. >> that is correct. and that presence will both be a nato presence. that conversation is unfolding in nato right now, to be determined what the contours of that will look like, and even the roles and functions. but the conversation is unfolding, but also in the context of our strategic partnership agreement with the-- between afghanistan and the united states. that conversation and the aftermath of the strategic party

agreement will also unfold about a specific united states presence in afghanistan over the long term. so if you're the taliban and you believe that on the 31st of december 2014, that's end of the international presence in afghanistan, that's a faulty assumption. and there will be an international presence in afghanistan for a very long time. there will be a government relationship. there will be diplomatic relationships. there will certainly be economic relation but there will also be, very importantly, a security relationship between the united states and afghanistan but the broader international community as well. >> rose: many people have said for the president to announce a timeline was the wrong thing to do. are you saying that it has no impediment in tes of you being able to achieve the mission that you have been charged with? >> i believe we can achieve this mission. >> rose: so the timeline does not get in the way of the mission you think you are charged to have. >> the campaign as it is unfolding, the campaign as we have developed it and it is being resourced right now, is a campaign i believe can accomplish this mission based on

the concept of lisbon base transition and in the aftermath of, that an enduring presence. >> rose: basically asking-- the idea of a timeline, you are saying, is not a problem for you? >> it is not. >> rose: at all. you don't think the taliban will take advantage of it because you'll still have an international force there in some form. >> that's correct. and that international force will be there to continue the development of the afghan national security forces. >> rose: this is the "washington post", and there was a testimony with john mccain, and i just want to make sure they understand what you intended to say. this is karen young, a very, very distinguished reporter. she said in the first paragraph, "the top u.s. commander in afghanistan on thursday--" that being yesterday-- indicated he believes there should be no american troop draw-downs in 2013, leaving the total at the 68,000 who will remain following scheduled withdrawals this year. the scheduled withdrawals are year are the surge troops, the 23,000." correct? >> that's correct. >> rose: what did you mean?

>> that statement is not correct. i was very clear in my testimony. after we recover the surge, i'm going to give the president some options with respect to the kinds of combat power that we will need in 2013. >> rose: there thank you will be in september. >> it will be after. it will be well after we recover the surge forces. i have to evaluate the state of the insurgency, and have to look at the operational environment in 2013, and the combination of forces ultimately will be the quirk dimension of the recommendations that i'll give to the presidents. it's not just about 68,000 u.s. forces. there will still be 40,000 isaf forces as well, so the recommendation will also go up the nato chain. but there will also be increasingly capable isaf as well. there is not just a recommendation of 68,000. i did not say i wanted to leave 68 thought on the ground throughout 2013. i owe the president analysis of that, and i owe the president my

views on the courses of action of how much combat power will be needed in 2013. some part of that will be a u.s. presence, obviously, within the context of isaf. some part of that will be ultimately the ans f as well. it will be a comprehensive recommendation, and i don't know yet exactly how much force it i'm going to need among the u.s. forces in 2013. >> rose: it could be less? >> yes, it could be. >> rose: with with the addition of the nato forces. >> it isn't just a single number. it's a composite number. that's the key thing, the u.s. force as a component of isaf, and in partnership with the it ans. i have to see what the insurgency is. i to see what the state of the insurgency is. i have to look very closely at the operational environment that we anticipate that will unfold in 2013. and in view of those, offer the president some courses of action with respect to the u.s. forces within the context of isaf, nato

forces, in 'with the ans f. that's a comprehensive recommendation i owe him. >> rose: when will you do the survey and ascertainment that leads to that recommendation? >> i think by the latter part of the year. >> rose: by the end of 2012. >> certainly by the end of 2012. >> rose: you go to the president and say this is what i think based on what i analyze in the ground that we need in 2013. i can perhaps recommend we have less than 68,000 american troops. >> i don't want to speculate. >> rose: could it be 68 or could it be more? >> we end can 68. i can't imagine i would ask for more troops but we'll end the draw-down on 1 october with 68,000 u.s. forces. with that as the starting point of my analysis, and in conjunction with the 40,000 non-u.s. isaf forces and with the probably 330 or so ans f forces, that combination of capability nview of the state of the insurgency after the fighting season of 2012, and anticipating what the operational environment will be

in 2013, that will require a comprehensive assessment of what the forces-- combat power will be needed and the force levels will be need forward 2013. i owe that to the president, and i intend to give it to him before the end of 2012. >> rose: and what is the biggest issue in that consideration that you think needs to be defined. is it, for example, the buildum of the ans f force. >> it's the buildup of the ansf force and it's the state of the insurgency. we have had success against the insurgency in 2012, and we anticipate continued success,. i need to look at what the insurgency looks like in the aftermath of the fighting season in 2012 so i can make a comprehensive recommendation on the kinds of combat power that will be needed in 2013. so it isn't just a simple, single factor. there are multiple factors that will play ultimately in the insurgency, for example, we'll be using-- we'll be inserting

advisers into the afghan formations in 2012, and that process will begin here in a couple of months, and we'll stream out across the summer and into the fall. those advisers could have a dramatic impact on the acceleration of ans f capabilities so we'll want to think about how that is going. we'll want to see if the insurgency was successful, as they seek to do, to get back into the population. i don't think they will, and if they don't, and they're outside the population two years, particularly in the south, it's going to be very bad for the insurgency in 2013. so i really have to take a good, hard look at what the insurgency will look like as we come out of the fighting season in 2012. i need to see how the ans f is doing. they're getting better every day, becoming more numerous and more capable every day. with regard to all of that and as we anticipate what the operational requirements will be in 2013, that gives me the ability to make a comprehensive recommendation to the president. >> rose: is the strength of the taliban in march 2012,

stronger or weaker than it was in march 2011? >> that's a difficult question. i'll just say a number of things. on 1 january of 2011, we had about 600 of the taliban that had re-integrated, had come off the battlefield, had elected to rejoin their society. >> rose: you mean they stopped fighting, they changed sides? >> they stopped fighting. they visibly returned into afghan society, were welcomed back into their villagees, 600 on 1 january 2011. today, 3880 or so have come across, and there's another several hundred in the pipeline. so there are clear indicators in the aftermath of 2011, where in many respects the insurgency was rejected and eject read from the population in the south, and as

we see insurgents in larger numbers coming over and asking to be reintegrated back into their society, we're seeing real indicators that something could be at work here. the taliban are very clear in their desire to get back into the it population and hurt the ans f before the ans f become a credible source. the heart and pillar home of the taliban. >> rose: has there been a rise of assassinations by the taliban and do you see that as an act of desperation or a change in tactic? >> i think it's both. let me finish the storied about 50 talibans. they said there were two reasons they came over. one was the constant pressure they were feeling from the campaign, a campaign that is both a coalition and ans f campaign. also, they said while fighting foreigners they could get

together on the cause but when they started encountering capable ansf forces, it's a different ballgame. it's going to become a different ballgame across afghanistan as the ansf move into the lead, as they become more capable across the battle space. >> rose: is there a difference in the terms of the ansf makeup, their ethnic background and the taliban. the ansf is primarily what? >> well, the proportions we seek to have be representative of the population of afghanistan. so there is a large proportion of pashtuns, and other of the minorities. >> rose: what percentage is pashtun, do you think? >> i would have to get you the number but it's about 40%. >> rose: and the rest? >> i would have to get you the number, though. >> rose: karzai is a pashtun. >> yes, he is. >> rose: sergeant bales accused of those murders. you had the burning of the

koran. you've had other incidences. it is said that this has been a huge recruiting bonanza for the taliban. do you see that? >> i think it can be. but i also believe that so much of the prop alation in afghanistan is tired of the taliban, that in many respects the call for recruits may be falling on deaf ears, frankly. >> rose: what percentage of the afghan population do the taliban represent? >> well, it's a pashtun insurgency, primarily. >> rose: they say we're not an insurgency. we wish to be in power. is that just semantics? >> it's their rhetoric, it's their it narrative. >> rose: negotiations with the partunes. have they suspended negotiations? >> they say they have. >> rose: but they have not? >> i can't answer that. i'm not involved in the negotiations in any way. >> rose: but you're aware of them, of course. >> i take them at face value. they say they have suspended the

discussions for now. >> rose: when we talk about negotiations with the taliban, are we talking about everybody including mullah omar and the toughest and most determined leadership of the taliban or are we talking about somebody else? >> again, this is an afghan-led process, and i leave this to the afghans, and while the u.s. has sought to be helpful in the process, to be helpful in terms of facilitating the discussions, i am not involved -- >> is it your impression president karzai wants to have negotiations with the taliban? >> i believe that he understands that a conversation with the taliban can help to end this conflict. >> rose: and do you believe that? >> oh, i do, sure, of course. >> rose: in fact, that is probably the way it will end. >> well, all counter-insurgencies end with some kind of a political involvement or a political settlement. >> rose: when you look at the taliban today, how are they different today than they were a year ago when you took over? >> sure, when i was down in kandahar, kandahar province,

kandahar city not long ago, i had a conversation with an afghan commander out of the afghan national security forces, and at the end of 2011, which was a pretty important year for the success of the campaign and not a particularly good year for the taliban, that commander said that, that year, this year, 2011, he said the taliban was the away team. so what's happened is in many respects where the taliban had been inside the population and in an insurgency, the critical terrain is not physical terrain, necessarily. it's the human terrain. in many respects, the taliban have had difficulty sustaining themselves insided human terrain. because they've been rejected, frankly. the people do not want to go back to a taliban environment purpose they were on the fence fair while because they weren't sure how this would all turn out but as the ansf continued to build in their capabilityes, as local governments continued to gain traction, as economic opportunity becomes more widespread throughout afghanistan, what you find is

the people, the people who might have accepted the taliban at some point in the past see that there now is a future that could be different than the taliban darkness, a future that could be in fact an afghanistan thatta is aligned with the west, an afghanistan aligned with want united states. and they see the improvement with the can quality of their lives. they see the opportunity for girls to go to school. they see an increase in the life expectancy, and an improvement in the literacy rate of the afghan people. they see all those as opportunities they never would have imagined under a taliban regime. what you find is a greater willingness, ultimately, to regret that narrative and a greater willingness to accept an afghan governance. >> rose: this is a phrase you've heard before-- we can't do the job for the afghans that they need to do for themselves. how do you respond to that? >> within minutes of my taking command back in july, i gave my commanders my four priorities. the first priority was to maintain the continuity of the

campaign, pressure the enemy. but the seconds priority-- and it's only just slightly behind the first-- is do all we can to move the ans f into the lead. when foreign forces participate in an insurgency, you seek to accomplish two things. you want to shape the insurgency , but the other really important thing you want to do is develop the defeat mechanism of that uncertainty, which is the indigenous forces. and that's what we're seeking to do. we're seeking to do all we can in partnership with the afghans to build their national security forces -- the army, the police-- on to build those forces in a way where they can ultimately take the lead in the insurgency and ultimately end the insurgency. >> announcer: seem to be saying if they stay on the same trajectory that they are now, they will be fully able to handle the security needs of the afghan people and resist a taliban takeover. >> i believe that they will be.

now, it's not going to be pretty. >> rose: no. >> we've got a lot of work to do. we still have to build the force. this is like building an airplane in fight. this is a force being built with contact with the enemy. we have work to do. the force, however, which would have been recruited at 352,000 by 1 october is going to be recruited months earlier than that because afghans want to be part of the afghan national security forces. and beyond that we have some fielding we have to do. we have to field all of the combat units and that's going to take months beyond that. there's still work to be done. there's still work we will have to do in terms of the conventional fight and the special operations fight. but as i said, remember, we're shaping that insurgency as we're building its capacity of the ansf, so that they can move to the foreand it-- foreand be the lead echelon, ultimately, and the principle defeat mechanism in the counter-insurgency in this taliban. >> rose: it is said you were

the handpicked choice of david petraeus, that you were the man he wanted to see succeed him. is there any difference in terms of your strategy and his strategy? has anything changed, because of circumstances on the ground? >> that's a fair question. what i think i have done is to take the strategy that he envisioned it, and i believe we are moving it to the next level. a 11 level he would have sought -- >> you're taking it to where he was heading? >> oh, i believe so. >> rose: what about the presence of al qaeda there? >> al qaeda is a relatively small force there now. >> rose: less than 100? >> we think so, but i don't necessarily put a quality dimension on that 100 members because it doesn't take many to plan an international attack. and so it's-- it is my constant attention to where we may be able to find and deal with al qaeda tol prevent them had from creating some kind of a

safe haven, even within 100, to permit them to have a planning cell or to create a launching pad for international terrorism. so i'm going to remain on the hunt for al qaeda throughout the period of time that our forces are there. and we're going to remain in the hunt of al qaeda because we cannot permit them again to plan and execute attack as they did against the united states on 11 september 2001. >> rose: there are many people who say you cannot accomplish the mission in afghanistan unless you can do something on what happens on the border between pakistan and afghanistan. >> well, the safe havens in the tribal areas are going to be a difficulty for some time to come. >> rose: can you do anything about it? >> well, i think pakistan is seeking to do something. >> rose: so we're left for pakistan to do something they have not done before, at times of strained relationships with

pakistan to ensure the mission in afghanistan can achieve its objective. >> the pakistanis had been fighting as well. i think it's important to understand in the last two years, they've suffered over 3,000 dead. that's not an inconsequential number of casualties and a couple of tens of thousands wounded. they have an i.e.d. problem similar to the one we have. pakistanis are making an investment in this as well. >> rose: they have a problem with the taliban as well. >> exactly. >> rose: their own taliban. >> we would ask them to do more. that's ultimately a decision that's going to have to come from continued discussion between our government and theirs. but i believe we've-- i've had good conversations with general kaani about cross-border operations and operations on each side of border where we can leverage each other's capability. >> rose: you mentionedly the magic name in terms of pakistan. you're convinced he's doing everything he can in order to influence the isi, and influence

the troops under his command, to make sure are are. >> you'd askv to ask the general. >> rose: i'm asking you, are you convinced he's doing everything? not whether he is. >> again, you'd have to ask him. we've had good conversations -- >> how would you characterize "good conversations?" franks, as they say-- >> frank conversations about the strategy associate with the long-term trajectory of afghanistan, and the region, but we've also had tactical conversations about how we might operate on the border. >> rose: you're satisfied he understands the urgency of doing something about this and understands the issue as the united states sees it and is sensitive to the united states concerns. >> i hope so. we have tried-- we have had conversations and i think we wonder hard to depict on the 31st of december, 2014, it isn't the end of the u.s. relationship with afghanistan, or the international relationship with afghanistan. and part of, i believe, his comfort with the role of the--

of pakistan in the region is the hope, the desire that afghanistan will remain a stable state, a stable state with constructive relations with islamabad, and with pakistan. and it's important then that we have a conversation between pakistan and the united states, and that afghanistan has a conversation with pakistan, that leads us all to the common belief and the common conviction that a stable afghanistan that is aligned with the united states, with good, constructive relationship with pakistan, is in everyone's interest, not just the u.s. interest, not just the afghan interest, but with pakistan. and in their interest as well. >> rose:let question is do they accept that and understand that? >> i hope so. i hope so. you'd have to ask them. >> rose: if it doesn't go well and the taliban is somehow going to come back to power that they have some influence with the taliban, that's the conventional wisdom about pakistan playing all sides. >> my guess is that, again, you have to ask the pack taken government or you have to ask general khanai, my guess is

their interests aren't served by aital began government reinserting themselves. the taliban have not made a visible or public effort to separate themselveses from al qaeda and if that is in fact the case then they remain a menace, and they remain a menace to the region, not just a menace to the afghanistan people and the afghanistan government. so my guess is that the pakistani government and general khanai, probably very much understands a taliban resurgence in pakistan and ultimately the overthrow of the afghan government is not in their interests, either. >> rose: what is their responsibility, your responsibility, if you made a judgment that the mission that you had undertaken was not achievable? >> it's my responsibility to identify that requirement to my chain of command, and ultimately, they would carry that to the president. >> rose: and that's not where you are. >> no. >> rose: but you're constantly analyzing where you are? >> absolutely, absolutely.

that's my responsibility and any commander would be doing that. >> rose: if in fact you can't achieve the mission, in a hard-headed analysis you would not recommend you continue on the course? >> it's not a stark, binary decision. it's not a revelation where i would wake up one morning and decide -- >> it's an ongoing assessment. >> absolutely. and i have asked for help, additional isr, additional surveillance, assistance in logistics. those kinds of things are an ongoing conversation that we had. the good news is, the congress of the united states has resourced us very well. the services have left no stone unturned in making sure that i have the right kinds of joint forces and ultimately the president's policies have been fitted well with the strategy. i owe my chain of command and i owe the president a constant analysis and the progress of the state of the campaign to ensure if i need something to be

successful i identify that early enough that it's not a crisis. we can get those resources in plenty of time to keep the campaign -- >> and the next important date. >> it's going to be an important recommendation. >> rose: what do you think might happen if it does not go as we want it to go? what's the fear? you have to have a reason to be doing this. >> the reason to be doing this is to keep the taliban ultimately from overthrowing that government in kabul. >> rose: and return to where it was and the kind of government that they had, and the kind of attitude towards women and the kind of attitude-- all of that. >> it was a horrendous period of time for the afghan people, for the women, for everyone. i attended not long ago the re-opening of gauzy stadium. gauzy stadium was renowned during the darkest of the taliban as the killing ground. there were horrendous execution of men and women from across

afghanistan there. that day, the stands were full of young afghans in athletic suits. we kicked a soccer ball to cut the ribbon at the 50-yard line, and there were soccer games there that day and the second so, game in gauzy stadium on that day of rededication was a woman's soccer game which we could not have even begun to contemplate during the darkness of the taliban. and another key point-- that day the taliban desired in a very real way to disrupt that celebration, that dedication, because of what gauzy stadium had meant to them, and the afghan national security forces protected that day and protected those people and the taliban were ineffectual in their attempt to disrupt that very important ceremony. yet another come of how the ansf are doing. >> rose: what support does theital ban ki moon get outside of the country of afghanistan? does it come from iran? >> there is some support from

iran. it is not-- it could be more. let me put it that way. but at this juncture, there is support that is given to the taliban. >> rose: it used to be that the iranian and taliban were enemies. >> that's correct. and i would imagine iran would also not be particularly happy for the taliban to return to power in kabul. >> rose: but you see some participation themselves of-- some support by some kinds of militias from iran. >> but there's some material support and some training support to the taliban. >> rose: iraq. where you served and played a part and an important turnaround there. where do you think it stands today? >> i left at the beginning of 2008, so it's been a bit since i have directly been associated with it. but we hope that many of the institutions that we were participants in strengthening and building, democratic institution, we hope that those

will take root. we hope the interests of all of the elements within the iraqi population -- shia, sunni, kurd-- all of the minorities, we hope their voices will continue to be heard in a representative form of government in baghdad. and so it is our desire that iraq become a stable contributor to the gulf region, and ultimately with the potential for vast oil wells to become a stable contributor to the community of nations. >> rose: is this a big concern for you, the fact of american men and women are being asked to serve two, three, and four terms of duty? >> look, we've been in a counter-insurgency war in two theaters of operations now for a long time. and some of these magnificent troops have been asked to go over and over again, and they haven't only gone to iraq. they've gone to afghanistan as well. >> rose: right. >> but it's also important to understand that it that doesn't leave you a victim.

these-- this force today is a healthy force. its leadership is sound at the officer level. its leadership level is sound at the staff and n.c.o. level. the quality of troops coming in after a decade of war is very high. the services have embraced-- really importantly-- they've embraced the mental health of the forces. they've worked very hard to prepare the troops individually and as units for deployment. when they're in theater, there are mechanismes, behavioral health, religious support teams. there are mechanisms in place in the theater to assist troops that may believe they have problems. we work hard on suicide prevention. and then when they go home -- >> is there a rising incidence of suicide? >> there has been over the years, tragically, but we're working hard -- >> recently? >> there are more this year than before, but it's not-- q. what do you attribute thatto? >> pressures and tensions and we will continue the process of working very hard for suicide--

to reduce suicide and suicide prevention. it goes to what i was saying a moment ago. it's the right kind of of preparation before you come in theater. it is adequate and readily available assistance during the period of time that you're in theater and when you go home, the kinds of attention you might need necessarily to be able to go home and reassimilate back into your community, back into your family. we also assist the families in this regard as well, and to the great credit, the services have worked very hard to address these issues. >> rose: so the question still is, are american forces stretched too thin? >> i don't think that question necessarily follows whether doing multiple tours -- >> why doesn't it? why doesn't that inexorably follow? >> the iraq theater is now closed, for all intents and purposes. 23,000 troops are coming home from afghanistan. that will leave 68,000 u.s. forces. and those will be the u.s. forces in some number thereafter that will be deployed in an

operational and combat environment. so we're returning to an environment where we spend a great deal more time at home station in troop development, in leadership development, in training, associated with families and their communities, we're returning to a time when the troops will spend a great deal more time at home than they will deployed. when we had two theaters of war, where this was high tempo of operations, that put a real strain on the force. but i think that the services did very well in accounting for that strain on the force and did everything they could when the troops were home to give them time with their families and to continue credible, realistic training so they would be successful when they came back into the theater. but that's the nature of the size of our force. it is the nature of the two contingencies that we're running simultaneously. troops did multiple tours in multiple theaters. q. afghanistan is now thelonges.

yes? >> it is. >> rose: what have we learned? >> i think one of the things we've learned is that there are strong cultural dimensions in any long-term insurgency in which we might be involved, or counter-insurgency. and imperative to know about the people, to ensure that our forces have the right kinds of skills and capabilities to operate in's counter-insurgency environment. i think we've learned that there are important regional policies that must be in place to facilitate the military strategy and the strong and enduring political outcome. i think that there have been a lot of lessons learned over these 10 years. >> rose: are we engaged in nationwide building? >> i don't believe so. i think we're-- in the world i live in, we're engaged in creating a security mechanism for afghanistan that can provide support ultimately to a stable,

credible afghan government. i believe in this civil military counter-insurgency, there have been elements within our government that have partnered closely with elements within the afghan government to build capacity that will support and improve governance, but it's not nation building in the sense that we're attempting to create an entirely new nation in afghanistan. we're just seeking to build the capacity and the capabilities within the afghan government that helps to sustain its stability. >> rose: do the afghan want us there? >> i believe they really do. president karzai convened something-- an assembly of 2,000 notable afghans from every walk of life across that great country. and he charged them with with making a recommendation to him as to whether the nation of afghanistan, the people of afghanistan, wanted to have a strategic relationship with the

united states, specifically, and more broadly, a strategic relationship with the international community, a partnership. and they spoke very clearly in their desire to do that. when you go out to the villagees, when you talk to the afghan people and they think back across all of the progress that they have either witnessed or benefitted from in the last 10 years and in particular the last few years, they recognize that so much of that has been accomplished by the partnership that afghanistan has had with the united states in particular, but more broadly with isaf, but the international community, and they want us there. not withstanding these crises that we've had, they want us there. >> rose: you understand when some americans wonder if that's true when they hear some of the things that president karzai says. >> i can understand that. look, he's under a lot of pressure. this has been a long tenure for him as president. ryan crocker is fond of saying

and i absolute support it, it may be the hardest job on the planet. and so when these crises emerge, i can understand his anger or his frustration. and i can also then understand when he uses certain terms that the american people will be frustrated. because there's no such thing, really, as a domestic audience any popular in this world of global communications. q. exactly.>> so words that maye resonated with a domestic audience in afghanistan don't resonate with a domestic audience in the united states. but we have to understand potentially what the reasons were for these words, but we don't have to accept them. >> rose: thank you. it's a pleasure to have you on this program. >> it was an honor to be with you. thank you very much. >> rose: general john allen, commander of forces in afghanistan. for the hour. thank you for joining us. see you next time.

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