>> charlie: welcome to the program. we begin this evening's immigration reform and the president's speech last night. i talked earlier this evening with john dickerson, the political director at cbs news. >> on the republican side, this is a big opportunity for all republicans who want to run for president to define themselves on an issue that the grassroots cares a great deal about, and it's both a substantive question -- how do you want to handle undocumented workers -- but then there's also a tactical question -- in other words, you can have a position that is very tough on undocumented workers but suggests restraint in combat with the president, keeping in mind some of these political realities. and how the candidates of 2016 position themselves in this argument will tell us a lot about which bucket of conservative voters they're going after in the presidential primaries. >> charlie: we continue with

al hunt on the story with david ignatius and kareem sagipor. >> my sense is we're not going to reach a comprehensive resolution but neither a comprehensive failure. i call it managed irresolution. i think both capitals, both washington and tehran recognize no one wants to go back to status quo escalation. president obama certainly doesn't want to go to war against iran. so we'll kick the can down the road, but come march is when they're talking about extending the deadline until. i still don't see by march us being in a position whereby we're able to really comprehensively resolve this issue. >> charlie: and we conclude with lawrence wright, book called "thirteen days in september," carter, begin and sadat at camp david. >> carter had a navy idea. he liked both these men initially. he loves sadat. he and begin didn't get along, after all.

but he had the idea you could bring these two honorable men, put them in this mountaintop in maryland away from the press and they would get to know each other, like each other and find their own way to peace. rosalynn said by the end of the second day, they were screaming at each other by the top of their lungs, carter had to physically separate them. he had to block them from trying to leave camp david. and it wasn't until the fifth day that he realized he was going to have to do something he didn't want to do, which was to put forward an american plan. >> charlie: john dickerson, al hunt on the story, and lawrence wright when we continue. >> rose: funding for "charlie rose" has been provided by the following: >> rose: additional funding provided by:

>> and by bloomberg, a provider of multimedia news and information worldwide. captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. authority to make our immigration system work better. the day i sign a bill into law, the actions i take will no longer be necessary. meanwhile, don't let a disagreement over a single issue be a deal breaker on every

issue. that's not how our democracy works, and congress certainly shouldn't shut down our government again just because we disagree on this. americans are tired of gridlock. what our country needs from us right now is a common purpose. >> charlie: joining us is john dickerson, chief political correspondent for slate and political director of cbs news, we'll talk about this speech. i begin,, with the question, any surprises? >> well, i guess surprises only in that it had a little bit of a limitation. there was some thought that perhaps the president would extend this deportation protection to the so-called parents of the so-called dreamers. he didn't go that far, but he still went certainly pretty far and farther than republicans wanted him to go. >> charlie: saying what he said and picking the fight he may have picked, is he sending a signal about how he's come a long way from where he began when he came to washington?

>> well, he sure is. remember when he campaigned as a senator, he was going to change the toxic atmosphere that had grown up over the bush years, he was going to have a new kind of way of operating in washington. now that started to die almost as soon as he encountered the republican opposition, which was very much against him when he first came to washington, and it's been slowly eroding. what's different here is the president is not just cay goaling, he's not just putting forward policies republicans don't like. this is a bit of a punch in the nose. this is action he's taking that has real consequences and now he's saying go ahead and undo it, republicans. that is a further step for him and really sets the tone for his final two years. >> charlie: why hasn't he chosen that path is this. >> according to white house officials i've talked, to he's chosen it for a couple of reasons. one, he doesn't think republicans are going to move. they think we've given them plenty of chances and opportunities over the last several years. they cite the fact that since

the senate passed its bipartisan immigration bill it's been 500 days since house republicans didn't move. so they don't think the republicans will move. also they have to move quickly. they're worried about the lame duck status, the cold hand of the end of his presidency and he wants to move fast and do big things and this might be the biggest thing he's able to do in his final two years. >> charlie: did the president make a thinks take in not going to congress before the midterms and asking for the kind of immigration reform he wanted when the odds were better then because of the results of the election? >> well, they would say at the white house two things -- one, the president was operating under guidance he'd gotten from john boehner and marco rubio who said if you get in the middle of the fight of immigration and meddle in the congressional progress on this, immediately republicans will have their back up and not going to want to do anything you overtly support, so

stay general, stay away from the details and we'll handle it and try to get it through. ultimately, though, republicans in the house made the calculation and the decision that they wouldn't put forward legislation of any kind on immigration because it would create an internal fight within their party. why should they tear apart themselves when they saw the 2014 elections as being very good for republicans, they wanted to keep the focus on the president. >> charlie: knowing the congress that we have and will have in january, is it possible that this could lead to a government shutdown? >> the possibility seems remote, and this is as much a test of the new republican relationship with themselves as it is a test mxetween the president and the new republican leaders in congress. basically the challenge for republican leaders is can they control their wing that is closest to the grassroots because grassroots conservatives find this deeply offensive. they think what the president is tight do is not just change immigration policy but change

the very fabric of america, and they are very passionate about this and that is reflected through some of the lawmakers. but what republican leaders want is an orderly swift and tough response to the president but not one that talks about impeachment oroa government shutdown. >> charlie: because that would be politically advantageous for the president? >> it would be political advantageous for the president and republican leaders believe they have to show that as republicans they can govern, that given control of both the house and the senate that they can actually go forward with the people's business and do it in an orderly way, and a fight over a shutdown they feel like they'll lose that fight and while they're losing that fight they're also not showing people that on the things that they care most ant, which is to say their economic well being, that they need to show that they can do -- they can deliver on that question. >> charlie: can the president be very tough on border crossings without losing the support of the hispanic vote and the hispanic community by saying to them i can get you more

things about amnesty and the absence of deportation, allow me to be tougher on the border? >> i think that's a model for the way he's likely to proceed. we saw him do that here with this specific action where he's basically taking -- not deporting one group of undocumented workers but then putting new money on focusing on criminals and on the border. so i think that is the kind of tradeoff that he would be okay with. >> charlie: how will this play out in 2016? >> well, we saw hillary clinton came out and supported the president right after he made his remarks, so there were a lot of democrats who were wondering how she would play this, and she has associated herself with the president on this, and that is important not just for immigration policy and latino voters but also sending a signal about her, how close she's going to stay to barack obama. one of the things we saw in the 2014 elections is the democrats

can't really get away from the president, and a lot of democrats think if hillary clinton runs, she's not going to be able to distance herself from back back and shouldn't even try and she certainly didn't try to distance herself on this front. on the republican side, this is a big opportunity for all republicans who want to run for president to define themselves on an issue that the grassroots cares a great deal about and it's both a substantive question, how do you want to handle undocumented workers, but then there's also a tactical question. in other words, you can be -- you can have a position that is very tough on undocumented workers but suggests restraint in combat with the president, keeping in mind some of these political realities, and how the candidates of 2016 position themselves in this argument will tell us a lot about which bucket of conservative voters they're going after in the presidential primaries. >> charlie: what more do reform advocates want that the president is not prepared either in executive order or in

legislation to give them? >> well, i think they would want more protections for that larger share of undocumented workers in the united states so if there are 11.3 or 12 million undocumented workers, they would want larger protections, and his argument has been and he's been saying this -- in fact, he's said it so much now republicans are using these quotes against him, but he is circumscribed in terms of acting, in terms of his discretion on deportation, he thinks he's gone as far as he can get on that, and advocates would like some further action from him, but he thinks he's used up as much legal authority as he can. >> charlie: i talked to a person who traveled around the country for democrats, advocating democratic elections in the midterms, and that person told me, you can't imagine how deep-rooted the feeling is about immigration in this country. do you understand that when they say that? >> yes. i mean, on both sides. so one of the things white house

advisors told me this week is the reason the president had to act is, a, he sees himself as acting in the large sweep of history and if we look at his second inaugural address, you saw him talk about rights for same-sex marriage, for women, talking about civil rights progress that happened while he was president, and this can be put in that category. that's one motivation. the other was that he couldn't delay on this because the latino community and the democratic constituency that's a part of the folks who elected and reelected him would have been furious. there have been already been enough delays and this would have been real damage to his legacy but also other democrats who want to run in 2016. then on the republican side, as i mentioned, it's this feeling among conservatives that this is messing around with kind of the core of america in terms of allowing people who broke the law to kind of get off free here

and that that is why this is such a red-hot issue on the conservative side. >> charlie: john dickerson, thank you so much. >> thanks, charlie. > charlie, the iranian nuclear talks hit another deadline in a few days and indication no, sir final deal is likely but there could be an extension of the talks. we are joined today by david ignatius, the premier foreign policy columnist for "the washington post" and the mideast expert of the carnegie endowment. please to have you both here. david, what's going to happen next week? the talks extended, collapsed? what? >> the honest answer is we don't know as we speak. the indications are that they're still too far apart on the basic numbers that would add up in the minds of u.s. negotiators to provide sufficient breakout

time. they'd like to see a year before iran could assemble a bomb to a combination of lower stockpile of enriched material or a reduced number of centrifuges that can enrich the material further. they have been kickerring with the numbers for the last year. it appears from what people like me and kareem know that they're too far apart to get to a deal that could fly in the capitals, but we don't know. and we don't know further for they can't get there on monday if they want to announce they want to package the progress they've made over the last year which most analysts think is significant and make perhaps a joint communique that describes what they've achieved and go on with an extension to work on the additional tough parts. secretary kerry, the u.s. secretary of state and chief negotiate said he's not looking for an extension, he wants a final deal by monday.

>> a big challenge is finding a technical resolution to what's really a political conflict. i testified before congress yesterday and remember the congress talk about iran, the nuclear issue certainly is a concern for them, but what animates them about iran is iran's regional policies, rejection of israel's existence. rejection of u.s. influence in the region and support of groups like hesbollah. my sense is we'll not reach a comprehensive rules nor will it be a comprehensive failure. i call it a managed irresolution. both capitals in washington and iran realize no one wants to go back to status a escalation. president obama certainly doesn't want to go to war with iran. we'll kick the can down the road. but come march is when they're talking about extended the deadline until. i don't see is in march us being in a position whereby we're able

to comprehensively resolve this issue. >> is that because to have the larger geopolitical questions that you just cited or is there -- is the big issue centrifuges? is the big issue r.&d., inspections, all the above? >> my own take, al, is for the iranian government, in particularly the iranian supreme leader ali khomeini, ruling since 1989, and they say about revolutionaries that you're revolutionary till you get power then you become a conservative. i would say for the supreme leader not doing a big nuclear deal is an economic risk because iran is facing economic challenges but i argue a potential nuclear risk to do a deal if you're a supreme leader because this is someone for 25

years has prioritized hostility with the united states vis-a-vis is outside world and to make a major concession like this nuclear deal and would require a long-term concession, you know, ten years, that could be political risky for him at home. we say in the united states the first rule of politics is know your base and the supreme leader's base in tehran is those who have been intransit toward the united states. >> it's fascinating. one can argue it's in both countries' interest to have a deal. that's an argument that's easy to make. both face quite similar elements of whatever we want to call them, hard line factions of what complicate this interest. >> both have hardliners at home who say how can you compromise with the regime that represents everything that's bad about the world? iranians say that as much as we do. i was struck when i went to tehran last december to interview the rinerson foreign

minister who's their principle negotiate who's meeting as we speak with secretary kerry, i was struck by several things, first, the yearning of most iranians to be part of the modern world. and this is a sophisticated, technologically advanced country. and the reason that president rouhani was elected by a wide margin when he was not expected to get that many votes is he said, we don't want to be a country that only has friendships with russia and china. we want to be part of the world. and that really resonated with iranians. on the other side, you have this revolutionary guard. henries kissinger is famous for saying you can deal with iran if it's a nation, but not if it's a cause. in other words, once it stops seeing its identity as a

revolutionary nation, it will become impossible to negotiate deals like this and others. and i think that's one question. >> you don't think we're there yet? >> i wasn't sure when i was there in december. i had one senior person very close to the supreme leader say to me any deal is unacceptable because any deal will mean our revolution is over. and i think that that is the benefit for the west. if they make a deal, even if it's sort of an ugly deal, it will mean they've begun to turn. >> you wrote a fascinated column a few weeks ago, i wish you quoted kareem, talking about a potentially key figure here, the head of, i think, the iranian security council, alley shankhani, i hope i pronounced that correctly, do you have any idea of the role he played in the recent weeks? >> i was struck in a recent trip to the middle east that his name came up in every capital among officials well connected with

their intelligence as someone who was a new figure on the scene in iran. in a sense, he bridges the world of the supreme leader and the revolutionary guard on the one hand and president rouhani and the state on the other. he runs the national security council that's supposed to organize between the two and, interestingly, he was the person who managed to get the deal in iraq to get iran's supported nouri al-maliki, this polarizing prime minister who served so disastrously, and shakhani brokered the deal. he's standing back in iran, seen as a rival or maybe moderating face of the heads of the figure of the revolution, the guy fighting battles in iran and all

the place where iran is fomenting trouble. >> for a long time we got used to calling the iranian government the clerical regime islamic republic. but in realty the institution of the revolutionary guards eclipsed the institution of the clergy in terms of wielding domestic power and controlling iran's foreign policy. david touched upon iranian society and its aspirations to be part of the outside world, and this is really the paradox of iran that you have a society which aspires to be like south korea -- prosperous and globally integrated -- ruled by a government whose instincts more closely resembles north korea -- isolation, ideological purity. i think the real challenge we have of bringing back to the united states is the policies we use to counteriran's nuclear aspirations, political and economic isolation, in many ways

entrench these hardline forces in iran we're trying to get rid of. somehow i think we have to think more creatively about how we get on the right side of the iranian people's aspirations as well and not just the government. >> the sanctions have been effective. they really bite. that's the incentive for the other side. >> they bite. the iranians are good at suffering. they suffered through a long war with iraq. and i think americans should be careful about assuming that additional sanctions -- you kb+, these sanctions brought them to the table, additional sanctions will bring them to their knees, to capitulation. i wouldn't think that that would happen. >> that would be a mistake, you both agree? >> absolutely, and the other danger here is the person who really deserves credit for iran's international isolation

is the president president. this time it's much more difficult to isolate iran. if we pass unilateral sanctions that jeopardizes international coalition between the countries and russia and china may bail. >> is there any differences in the recent months with china, russia, great britain and france? >> modest. in my conversations with russian diplomats, they stressed we are very much a part of the coalition. it's thought they want a deal that offers more concessions the u.s. is now willing to offer. the hardest line member of the coalition appears to be france. i think in a sense, it's the arab neighbors and their views and the way in which they will react to whatever's negotiated that's most concerning, plus israel. i mean, you know, saudi arabia has decided if a deal is made, are we going to insist on a nuclear program as aggressive as

that of iran because that's a big proliferation breakout. then you're heading toward a region where everybody's basically got a bomb making program. they said they're going to do that. do they mean it? it's a more dangerous world. what's israel going to do. netanyahu said over and over again it's dangerous and america is wrong to do it. what's he going to do about it? there's always a risk israel might decide this deal that's been negotiated leaves i recall more insecure and takes a military or unconventional action. so after monday and the outcome monday, or the prolongation, there's so many branches in the road that people will need to think about because they lead us into areas where there can be military conflict. >> we both mentioned what happens if they're not a deal and the role of the israelis if this ever collapses, either short term or they try to go to march and don't get any kind of a long-term deal, what is the

likelihood of a military action either by, a, the israelis or by the americans? >> well, it's been believed that the israelis have concluded that they don't have the weapons to strike iran hard enough in these hardened mountain facilities where they keep some of their subterfuges to make an attack worthwhile. the u.s. could, the israelis can't. i think the danger is a little bit different. you know, we have a region in absolute chaos. it's turned upside down. it's disintegrating, some people in the region say, and a real dilemma for the united states going forward is should we try to work with this iranian regime to try to rebalance the region? should we try to draw iran and saudi arabia together for talks about regional stability?

should we, you know, try to bring shia-sunni balance? you know, this is threatening to become an absolutely destructive, you know, 30 years' war, and, you know, we may be in one of the last periods where you can stop it. i think that, for president obama, secretary kerry, is a crucial issue. they decided to put the nuclear issue first but this one is in some ways even bigger right behind them. >> i also think the likelihood of military action is extremely low. president obama, you know, if you're looking to calm the middle east, the last thing you want to do is open up another military conflict with iran. the challenge here is whether you can rely on iran to fight a group like i.s.i.s., you know, which is fueled by sunni disenfranchisement. if you fight that with shia

radicals, you're likely pouring more gasoline on the fire. but i think the likelihood of military action is low because iran is clever enough not to drive their nuclear car 90 miles an hour, even if they recommenced the program, they'd do it in a pretty deliberate way not to trigger military action on our end. >> it will be a fascinating week and probably a couple of months. kareem and david, thank you very much. back in just a moment with with charlie. >> charlie: lawrence bright is here, won the pulitzer prize for book about al quaida called the looming tower in 2006. new book is called "thirteen days in september," carter, begin and sadat at camp david, a day by day account of the summit and the days that preceded it. he calls it the greatest days of the 20th century. lawrence wright. welcome.

>> good to be back. >> charlie: what makes ate diplomatic triumph? >> there have been few instances in history like this. when camp david was going on, the under secretary went to the state department and said to the historian, has this ever happened before? the historian said teddy roosevelt in the war of russians and japanese, he brought them to the portsmouth navel station and got them alone and negotiated peace and was the first american to win the nobel peace prize. but in history there are few examples where peace has been negotiated like it was in camp david. >> charlie: there was not negotiating an end to war... >> it was a negotiations that ended war between two parties that had been at war five times in the preceding 30 years. >> charlie: the egyptians and the israelis. >> the israelis, yeah. >> charlie: and fought over the sinai, in fact, and who would give up what. >> yeah, and it was a

hard-fought -- people don't realize what a close call it was because the israelis were being asked to surrender sinai, which was their strategic depth. >> charlie: and their buffer. yeah. and for sadat, there wasn't a single arab leader in the whole arab world who would even recognize israel's existence. for him to go to israel as he did and actually broker peace with israel, it was an extraordinary step for both these men. >> charlie: having said that, at camp david, the thing almost collapsed until jimmy carter. >> carterhead -- carter had a naive idea. he liked both men initially. he loved sadat. he and begin didn't get along after all. but he had the idea you could bring these two honorable men, put them in this mountain top in maryland away from the press and they would get to know each other, they would like each other and find their own way to

peace. rosalynn said by the end of the second day, they were screaming at each other at the top of their lungs. carter had to physically separate them and blocked them from trying to leave camp david. it wasn't until the fifth day that he realized he was going to have the do something he didn't want to do which was to put forward an american plan. when he did that, it was no longer just about peace between israel and egypt, it had to do with their relationship with the united states. when sadat called for the helicopter and threatened to leave, carter said he'd never been angrier in his life. he went and said, if you do this, the relationship between our two countries is over, our friendship is at an end, egypt will be alone and helpless for a generation. do you really want to do this? it was a real come to geds moment. >> charlie: for sadat. and begin on a couple of occasions said he was planning to leave and carter said, i will go to congress tomorrow and tell them you are responsible for the

breakdown of the talks. he even had a speech writer draw up a speech in which carter was going to ask the israeli people to vote down their own government. >> charlie: but in tend none of that worked and they were going to close up shop and carter went to see begin. >> yeah. are you talking about the last days? it's so amazing to think about what history can turn on. sadat had asked carter for a letter, a side letter about jerusalem stating the american position which is it is occupied territory. had nothing to do with the accords. so carter supplied it and there are lots of side letters in the accords. begin got it. it's sunday afternoon. the 13th day. the networks has been alerted the signing is that night. they're setting up the east room to have the white house and begin exploded and said you've got to get rid of this letter or there will be no signing. carter said, i can't betray

sadat. so begin called it off. >> charlie: said there will be no agreement. >> no agreement. carter went back to his cabin as depressed as he had ever been in his life. it happened that there was a photograph of the three men sitting on the porch in the early days of the negotiation, and carter had had copies printed up for begin's nine grandchildren, and he had thoughtfully asked the secretary to call israel and get the names of the children. >> and my doctor, soon klaw with, decided on her own to call up israel and find the names of his eight grandchildren. so i wrote "with love and best wishes to... "and i wrote the girls and boys names and signed it. i took it to begin's cabin and he was ready to go to washington in defeat. he looked and said, thank you, mr. president. he was very angry with me. he turned around and looked at the first photograph and he called out the name of his

grandchild. and then he looked at the second one, and his lips began to quiver and tears ran down his cheeks. and i shed tears, also. and finally he looked around and he said, why don't we try one more time? >> and then he went back to his cabin and sold sadat the signing was off. just then the phone rang and begin said he would sign. >> charlie: did begin say why he did it? >> well, carter said that he would amend the language in the side letter. the only change he made -- originally he quoted the u.n. ambassador going back to arthur goldberg spelling out this is american policy. the one change he made was that american policy is as it has been stated by american u.n. ambassadors. so there was no substantive change, just cover for begin to accept it. >> charlie: tell me about each

of these guys who are there. anwar sadat, menachem begin, jimmy carter, not in the stuff we know, but in the stuff that made them who they were. >> well, you know, we look back at sadat at this great idealist and he was. but he grew up in a town in the nile delta, and a very rural, very, very impoverished territory, but he had this sense of destiny of, when he was a boy, a bunch of older kids were going swimming in an irrigation canal and they all jumped in and he jumped in after them and then realized he couldn't swim. he said his thought was, if i die, egypt will have lost a anwr sadat. what kind of child thinks like that? >> charlie: not many. when he was 12, gandhi came through the suez canal to negotiate a future windia, and

this made a huge impression on sadat, this small brown man with the fate of the empire in his hands. he took off his clothes, started wearing an apron and made himself a spindle, but he also was a great admirer of hitler. >> charlie: supported him in world war ii. >> a nazi collaborator. yeah. >> charlie: did he ever explain that? >> even years after world war ii, after 50 million people are dead, you know, he still expressed admiration for hitler's leadership and his opposition to the british. the other thing that sadat, people don't realize about sadat, i don't think, is he was an assassin. he became a part of a group he called his little murder society, and mainly they were picking off british soldiers who were drunk and wandering around cairo at night, but he turned their attention to political assassination and, on two occasions, tried to assassinate

the egyptian prime minister. they did succeed in killing one other government minister. and he spent five years in prison for collaborating with nazis and also for the assassinations. >> charlie: and then became a general. >> well, he never became a general. he became vice president under naser. >> charlie: wasn't he in the military? >> he was in the military, but he did not rise as highly as naser. he became a part of the government. and then when i was living in egypt, when he became president when naser died in october 70, everybody thought he was a clown because he admits the revolution, for instance, he had been at the movies. it was a double feature and missed the revolution. >> charlie: when naser became king. >> yes. and naser was such a titanic figure in the arab world, nobody believed anwar sadat could be -- you know, measure up to him.

>> charlie: why did naser choose him in the first place? >> well, i think he liked anwar sadat, but i think, also, there was a bit of protection. you know, if you had anwar sadat there would be no impetus to get rid of naser. >> charlie: didn't get rid of him. he died of natural causes. >> he had a heart attack. nobody expected that within a year sadat had rounded up many of naser's corrupt cronies, thrown them in prison. when he lived there, we had no diplomatic relations and there were practically no americans. there were thousands and thousands of russians. it was essentially a soviet military base. he expend them all. >> charlie: partly due to extraordinary diplomatic work by henry kissinger. >> kissinger said he was completely surprise snood one of the goals was to pull egyptians away from russian to the united states. >> but we didn't do anything. you know, it was -- it was a

huge triumph for america, a great victory in the cold war, but we were stunned and unwarned that this was going to happen. after that, he did something nobody ever imagined he would do, he was speaking to the egyptian parliament and, in the middle of the speech, put his pages down, and he said, i would go to the ends of the earth, i would go to israel, to the knesset, their parliament, and speak to them if it would save the life of one more egyptian soldier. everybody applauded it because nobody believed it. it was just considered boiler plate. it was not even reported in the newspapers next morning. ten days later his plane is circling tel aviv, and it was for the israelis, a huge psychological shift. you know, they weren't even sure he was in the plane. they thought it might be full of

explosives or terrorists. there were snipers and the airport. the israeli national orchestra didn't know how to play the egyptian national anthem so they had to listen to radio cairo to get a accepts of how it was played. >> charlie: fast forward to how he died. >> well, you know, i agree with many people that when he signed those camp david accords that was his death warrant. it wasn't just sadat. there were a lot of people in his delegation that were fearful that they would lose their lives as well because of their association with the negotiation. it was so taboo. a number of them didn't even go to the signing because they were afraid of having their names on it sphoo so then he was assassinated. it is often said that when they came and he was watching a

parade, once the firing started, he stood up and took the bullets. is that true? >> it is true. you can see him almost standing at attention. and here's how i understand it -- when he was a little boy, his grandmother in this little village would read him -- tell him stories about there were the british had come into a nearby village, and they had shot some domestic foul. they were out shooting game, but they shot some chickens, and they -- and the villagers were very angry and started throwing stones at the soldiers, and the soldiers fired and several of these villagers were killed. then the british had a trial, and they hanged several people including a young boy. and sadat always wanted to be that young boyt he identified with being the martyr. you can draw a line -- you know, i'm speculating -- but, you

know, he waited for his moment and, when that moment came, he stood and received it. >> charlie: menachem begin, one of the people who fought in the trenches to create the state of israel. >> he was a famously obstinate and difficult and i think very wounded man. his first memory growing up in a polish village was poll soldiers flogsing a view -- flogging a jew in a public park. when poland was invaded by nazis, menachem's mother was in a hospital and the nazis went through and murdered patients in their beds, his father's pockets were filled with rocks and he was drowned. menachem was hiding in lithuania then sent to the soviet gulags. when stalin released the polls

to fight the nazis he joined a jewish unit and went to palestine and became the head of a terrorist organization directing its energy at that time toward the british. this was very controversial because the british were still fighting the nazis at the time but his goal was to expel the british from mandated palestine. i think you can argue that he did. he was a very relentless and imaginative terrorist leader, and day after day after day, and he had an ability to capture headlines. notably, you know, when the british hanged three convicted terrorist he hanged two british sergeants and booby trapped their bodies. he blew up the king david hotel which was the most luxurious hotel in the region at this time. >> charlie: you will unde un-- l under his leadership.

>> yes. and i think the events had an effect of turning britain against the occupation of palestine. they turned it over to tun. after the british left, he turned his attention the palestinians. most meme rayably this was a little village near jerusalem that he felt had to be taken. he says there was a sound truck sent at 4:00 a.m. to awaken and warn the vinallers to leave but it fell into a ditch and nobody heard it so, when there was resistance, the ergunists went through and threw hand grenades and blew up houses with tnt. it was a real massacre. there were palestinians leaving before that time but after that the gates were opened and 750,000 palestinians left. >> charlie: did he form the party? >> his party chieftain did the

master work of putting it all together but the lakud is dominated -- you can look at begin as being the dividing point in many respects. bengurian hated him and called him little hitler. he was a marginal figure in israel. all the prime minister up till begin had been secular people and bening was an orthodox jew, not very pious, but a practicing. and his opponent, simone perez, was asked what happened because i have to such a stunning upset. he said, what happened is the jews beat the israelis. (laughter) >> charlie: because you've written about al quaida, tell me where you think the connection is between israeli-palestinian

issue and the emergence of al quaida? because two things happened -- israelis will say it had nothing to do with us, they use it as simply a means to attract attention and to rally support but there's no connection. on the other hand, if you talk to arab leaders, their number one priority is an israelis-palestinian. >> the palestinians have been exploided. the refugees who left in 1948 and '67, except in jordan, they have never been made a part of the societies. at the same time, this is a lingering wound that has caused so much trouble, and you think about it, you know, the population of israel and the west bank, 10 million people, that's the size of l.a. county.

all the mischief that has been generated by the dispute, and there's a sense that it's eternal. and it's not eternal. you know, 25 years ago, you could drive from gaza to golan heights, whether israelis or palestinians without a single checkpoint. 100,000 gazaians were going to work in israel every day, 200,000 from the west bank. now they have been walled off and these people don't know each other at all and have become further and further apart. i'm the same age as israel, born in 1947, which is the year the u.n. decided to partition into a state for the jews and arabs. we grew up in segregated south. we have a black man as president. it was a time of cold war.

history changes and can change in the middle east. eth going to take the kind of it political courage these three did. peacemakers are easy targets. it's so easy to disrupt peace. an example was a few years ago, mahmoud abbas, the palestinian leader, had an ideaish let's let the palestinian vote on the two-state solution. why not? every poll showed they were yearning for a two-state solution and that would demonstrate to the world their political will and override hamas, which is dedicated to the destruction of israel. but if the people can vote and show they have a different expression. what happened? hamas abducted the israeli soldier and the israelis invaded

gaza and everything went to hell. people who are opposed to peace act so quickly and it's almost a will to lose on the part of the peacemakers. >> the israelis, in ordered to get back galat, gave up, what, a thousand prisoners? >> i did a one man show about that, i call it the human scale, because it was interesting to me how you measure a person's life. how does one life get to equal 1,000 and what does that say about the mentality of that region? >> charlie: bill gates says the most important thing about his work is every life has equal value. >> i wish that philosophy would spread in the middle east. you know, you see the middle east right now in it's most naked form broken down into tribes and fractured states and clans and everybody at war with everybody else. but something will come out of this. you know, new alliances will be

formed. >> charlie: then there's al quaida which you also did a one-man show about. >> yeah. >> charlie: what do you think of i.s.i.s. and how is it different even though its origins were the leader of i.s.i.s. was al quaida and was al quaida in iraq? >> right. you know, when i was working on the tower, i was puzzled by the fact there were so few palestinians, so few lebanese, syrians. there were some, you know, and some jordanians, but mainly it was saudi, egyptian and gulf phenomenon. i thought, where are the other arabs? >> charlie: sunni. we're still talking about sunni, but there was another training camp in afghanistan at the same time bin laden was training al quaida, and it was zarqawi's camp. actually, bin laden financially supported him, but they were parallel entities.

but if you happened to be a young man from syria or iraq, you would more likely go to zarqawi's camp than to bin ladens, and that was not clear to me until al quaida and iraq erupted and i trace back the o origin of that group. >> charlie: this was connected to anwar sadat in the terms of zarqawi. >> zarqawi camped in afghanistan and that became al quaida and iraq and that became i.s.i.s. from the very beginning, you know, he wanted to affiliate with al quaida. bin laden was ambivalent about it. at first, he wanted zarqawi to be in al quaida and then didn't and then agreed. he couldn't control him. he was sosa advantage. even al quaida back them, was

writing him letters, do you have to cut their heads off? do you have to shoot them all? zarqawi was rampaging over iraq and drawing in interested passionate young jihadis. >> charlie: fueling the sectarian conflict. >> his goal was to create the islamic civil war that we now see underway. >> charlie: between shia. and sunni. >> charlie: and he was killed by special forces. >> yes. >> charlie: and al-baghdadi was a lieutenant to zawahiri? >> baghdadi had been in an american prison camp, and it's interesting the role that prison has played in radicalizing some of the main players. zawahri for instance and now the leader of al quaida was

radicalized, you know made far more extreme by his experience of being tortured in the egyptian prisons, and when he came out, he was the butcher. you know, he had been transformed by that experience. i think something like that happened to baghdadi when he was imprisoned by american forces in camp buca. there were a lot of other more extreme figures there, and the movement seemed to have gotten some kind of tailwind when he came out. of course, you can't give i.s.i.s. as much credit as it seems to have earned because they're fighting against a very weak and broken state and they also have the alliance of a lot of disaffected sunnies. it's going to be difficult for me to imagine those sunnis will continue to support i.s.i.s. -- >> charlie: well, other sunnis in the region are encouraging them not to support baghdadi or

i.s.i.l, aren't they? >> unfortunately, they're still getting money from those -- >> charlie: not from the states but from the foundation. >> you know, from different individuals in the gulf. that the where they got their seed money. now they have got oil wells, doing a lot of kidnapping. they make a lot of money. and the self-supporting terrorist groups, this is something we haven't had before. >> charlie: when you see the president announcing more troops, what do you think? >> the president himself said this is not going to be solved militarily. first of all, let's go back to i.s.i.s. invited us into this fight by cutting off the heads of american journalists. they were provoking us. why would they do that? i think it's because they didn't have any ala lies. you know, they're alone in the region. everybody hates them. everybody fears them. but if you make america your

enemy, then you get a lot more friends. and i think that was their strategy. obama's strategy in return is try to enlist as many of those sunni nations around the region in the fight and put their names on the line so that i.s.i.s. isn't recruit from that -- i.s.i.s. can't recruit from that. it's going to be a contest because the more, you know, we bear responsibility for this. i mean, in iraq, we cracked the egg now we're eating the omelet. our actions -- >> charlie: if you break it, you own it? >> i think if you break it, you eat it is probably it. >> charlie: thank you so much. great to have you here. "thirteen days in september," carter, begin and sadat at camp david. lawrence wright. putsepulitzer prize author. more on pbs.org captioning sponsored by

rose communications captioned by media access group at wgbh access.wgbh.org

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