m. tonight bill burns former deputy secretary of state now president of the carnegie endowment for international peace. >> my years in russia have been a long exercise in humanity about my powers of prediction or analysis about put noon because he surprises you always? >> yeah, he's a very agile tactics and he's shown that in ukraine. but the thing i think to remember about russia, too is he's playing over the long term a relatively weak strategic end. russia is still basically a one-dimensional economy. it's had the potential to diversify. it's got a smart, well-educated population but hasn't done that yet. corruption is eating away at the rising middle class in russia. demography is a huge challenge. when you think in the whole huge expanse to have the earth, runs from the euro mountains across

siberia to the far east, there are only about 30 million or 40 million russians sitting on everything of the table of elements looking at the border of the chinese, so russia has a lot of chal learnings before it but i think in ukraine we've seen the most significant challenge of european order since the end of the cold war. >> charlie: bill burns for the hour next. >> charlie: >> charlie: funding for charlie rose is provided by the following. >> charlie: additional funding provided by. ed >> and by bloomberg, a provider of multimedia news and information services worldwide.

from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> charlie: few have held as many high level positions as bill burns. he was deputy secretary of state from 2011 to 201414, prior to that under secretary for it political affairs. u.s. ambassador to russia and jordan, holds highest ranking and is to become deputy secretary. retired from government last year and has become the president of carnegie endowment for international peace. i am pleased to have him at this table for the first time. welcome. >> thanks so much for having me. >> charlie: based on everything you know and as you see the world today, tell me what the threats are that you consider the most serious and immediate. >> well, there are some obvious immediate threats, i.s.i.l which gets a lot of attention which is a challenge for the united states and the coalition partners to focus on but then

there are a lot of putin's aggression and ukraine and other immediate challenge but overamping challenges as well to keep focused on whether climate change and what that can mean as a genuine national security problem over time. cyberissues. how do you begin to develop rules of the road not just in commerce but also in national security for dealing with that whole set of issues that's going to be so important? >> charlie:. >> charlie: and global health? exactly right. we were reminded of that with the ebola crisis most recently. that's an area where there's been a great deal of progress going over the past two administrations. the pep far initiative which made a huge difference and lies with people in africa and elsewhere around the world. >> charlie: is the middle east your highest sort of -- does it have a special place for you? >> well, it's the part of the world you never have the luxury of neglecting or ignoring. if you look at the challenge of

disorder in the world today, the old order we've become accustomed to after the end of the second world war, much is crumbling in the middle east today, so you have the phenomenon of failed or failing states and vacuums developing out of which extremist groups like i.s.i.l emerge, so it will be a challenge with us and that region for the next generation. >> charlie: the failed states are possibly syria possibly libya possibly yemen. >> yemen. >> charlie: and they are the dangerous thing that can happen because if you have a failed state, you have possibilities of al quaida or someone like that finding a refuge and a power source as well. >> that's right and then using it as a platform to threaten us and others around the world. and so the challenge of i.s.i.l is the very complicated one as i know you've discussed many times before. part of the challenge i think, is demonstrated puncturing their

image of success because nothing works more in a region that's as uncertain as the middle east and that image of success so it's stopping i.s.i.l's advance. it's acquisition of further territory. but at the '-me time i think it's also important to demonstrate to expose the fact that, you know, they're not able to succeed in governing in those areas they do control that kind of eighth century play book used by the leadership of i.s.i.l isn't a very good guide to producing and delivering things people want whether electricity or other kinds of services. and last but not least and here's the biggest challenge, you have to try to create alternative model also to demonstrate that people can find purpose and economic and political opportunity through other kinds of model also. so in iraq it means, you know, appealing to the sunni arab community there so that they feel a sense of inclusion in the iraqi government and a sense of possibility that they haven't felt in recent years. then it's working with important

partners, whether in jordan or tunisia that's begun to develop a habit of compromise to help them succeed. >> charlie: the success story coming out in the spring. >> it's a very grim terrain now but all the more reason to try to invest in those kind of places and help them to succeed. >> charlie: the immediate threat of i.s.i.s. or i.s.i.l or whatever term we would like to use is to stop their expansion into new territory right? >> that's right, charlie, and then begin to roll it back. >> charlie: i assume that means retaking mosul. >> it does, and in iraq i think, you know, there's clearly a strategy for beginning the to first stop and i think their momentum has been stopped largely in iraq and then begin to roll them back and mosul is a huge challenge. i think this is bound to be a difficult struggle but an achievable one in iraq. >> charlie: how long will it take? they always say they'll do it when they've got the iraqi army

in a position to carry it out on the ground. >> which is a very reasonable approach to take, i think. the iraqi military will take some time to rebuild and retrain, but i'm confident it's possible to begin to roll back those gains, but as i said before that's the security dimension of the challenge which is extremely important, but there is a political dimension involving giving sunni arabs especially in iraq more a sense of participation in the political system. >> charlie: we've had a change of prime ministers. has that make a difference? >> i think so. prime minister maliki alienated large parts of the population. >> charlie: i had the egyptian foreign minister here. heare coalition partners prepared

to provide troops because i.s.i.s. is that kind of an emergency? >> i think you have in the iraqi millet r military once retrained and reequipped, i think there's the potential to roll back i.s.i.s. as a gains there. syria is a much bigger challenge. there's the long-term train and equip program for the syrian moderate opposition but it's important to look to other arab coalition partners as well as took to see what contributions they can make over time. >> charlie: do they recognize the threat of i.s.i.s. not being stopped? >> i think they recognize the threat. what you've seen many terms of their air forces participating is an encouraging sign but it will require that kind of sustained coalition effort to succeed. >> charlie: it comes down to the ground troops doesn't it? >> yes. >> charlie: in iraq you at least have the iraqi army. i understood susan rice had everybody's nose because of some of the language she used. i understood her to say to me

that, in fact, that the top priority in syria has to be i.s.i.l, and then they can go back to whatever considerations they have for the syrian government. >> i think i.s.i.l is the most immediate threat and it is in the sense that you just described the priority, but it's a little difficult to disentangle the two because as long as the assad regime is there, it's a magnet for foreign fighters and others who flock to i.s.i.l. so it's very difficult to see a more stable future for syria unless you have a transitional leadership in damascus as well. that's a tall order. >> charlie: that's a diplomatic order isn't it? >> i think, ultimately. but there is also going to have to be leverage on the ground as well to produce the circumstances in which you might be able to make progress diplomatically. >> charlie: meaning what? meaning, i think, there has to be a sense that the regime is not going to be able to sustain itself in the way that it is right now and for its principle

backers whether russia or iran to begin to see more clearly that if they want to see a stable syria that -- and a syria that's not a platform for all sorts of extremist groups that can threaten russia and other parts of the world that you're going to have to see progress toward that transition. >> charlie: let me understand that because you are as good a diplomat as we could find. what you have to do is first you have to meet the challenge of i.s.i.l i assume and try to support moderate forces in whatever you can do and make them the primary focus of your attention and not assad but you've to deal with assad and in a diplomatic way. are the russians and the iranians prepared to do that at some point? and what do you have to do to have on the table to encourage them to do that? >> that's a good question and not clear to me alt this point -- at this point that either are ready to play that role. i hope that changes over time because without a transition to

new leadership i think syria will remain an explosive and unstable place for a long time, and if you look alt russia's internal challenges and the threat that islamic extremists of one kind or other could pose in russia, they're vulnerable in a lot of respects, too so they should have a an interest in the kind of transition that might make for a more stable syria but it's not evidence they share any sense of urgency. >> charlie: what do you think -- we'll talk ability ukraine in a few minutes. what do you think putin's intent is in syria other than to have an ally in power in the middle east and whatever advantage nat gives him both in terms of a port and a place to communicate? >> i think that's all true and i think right now he also doesn't see an alternative to assad that would suit russian interests better than assad does right now. i don't think he has any sentimental attachment to assad but i don't think he's been convinced yet he needs to look for an alternative. >> charlie: there is a point in which i'm told assad thought he might lose and had to think about his options.

would russia have accepted him, do you thinkdo you think? >> they might have. there was a point in the winter of 2012 beginning 2013 where i think the russians were a little nervous about assad's future. you know, the balance on the ground started to shift a little bit against the regime. but then hezbollah in 2013 supported assad. >> charlie: with the encouragement to have the iranians. >> mm-hmm, and that moment passed, i think. but i hope we can re-create it in the future because the human suffering in syria is so huge. a huge challenge of reconstruction whenever that day comes. the sooner you could have that tranadditional leadership in a diplomatic settlement the better. >> charlie: what drives the passion of the saudis against syria and assad? is it religious? is it a battle of supremacy in the region?

>> part of it i think is the competition with iran with the assad regime on the outside. part in late king abdullah's time was personal, too. i think he felt betrayed by basher assad as well and that entered into it as well. but it's a combination of factors. but the determination is clear. >> charlie: you know the iranians. tell me what you think about them, about their intent about the nature of their country, about the possibility for regime change, all of that. >> well, i think -- i mean, you know, when you look at the challenge that's posed by the behavior of this iranian regime across the region whether support for hesbollah, lebanon, howhouthis in yemen. >> charlie: hamas. not so much hamas because of damascus, that's been a rift there. first, in american policy, when you look at iran or the nuclear issue, you have to embed it in a

wider strategy and to be clear-eyed about the fact that iranian behavior threatens us and our friends in the region in lots of important respects. but within that strategy, it's extremely important to prevent the iranians from acquiring a nuclear weapon because that would multiply exponentially any dangers i just mentioned in the region. i have been convinced for a while that the best of the available alternatives through dealing with the nuclear issue is through a strong negotiated settlement. i think it's possible to reach that kind of a settlement but by no means a sure thing and there are a lot of question marks that are going to have to be addressed over the coming weeks. >> charlie: why do you think it's possible? >> i think it's possible partly because we built up a fair amount of leverage over time in terms of sanctions regime which we and partners throughout the world have managed to apply and it's taken a toll on the iranian economy. i think it's in part because we demonstrated alongside the leverage a willingness to engage seriously and to try to work out with our partners in the

so-called p5 plus 1 a settlement that would allow the iranians to have a civil nuclear program under sharp constraints over a long duration. so i think it's possible to achieve that kind of a settlement. >> charlie: turn it around. if you were an iranian other than what sanctions do to you in terms of your own economic welfare and your reputation in the world, why should they do it? why shouldn't they go head long? because they don't believe -- i assume they don't have this sort of sophisticated sense that if we get weapons will cause proliferation in the region and that's not good for us in the end so we'll forgo our effort? >> yeah, and it's hard to generalize because the iranians have lots of points of view and there are hardliners who have suspicious views of these negotiations as well. >> charlie: who represents the hard liners? >> the revolutionary guards, a

lot of people around the supreme leader the ayatollah. >> charlie: and what about him? >> i know he's been suspicious and skeptical of the negotiation, suspicious of american motives. but we helped demonstrate in the interim agreement in 2013 that both sides can comply and deliver on agreements and that provided a solid foundation for the more difficult comprehensive negotiations underway now. in order for them to produce the strong agreement i mentioned before, there's going to have to be an understanding that has a long duration, that has very intrusive verification and inspection measures attached to it, that has some clear sense of what the consequences are if there are violations, so a snapback of sanctions if there are violations. >> charlie: can sanctions be snapped back? >> i think it's possible. that's one of the challenges of writing it into an agreement so if you have a phase lifting of

sanctions, it's very clear what's going to happen if there are violations as well. i think you've heard some of your guests before talked about the importance of a one-year breakout time line so there's enough space in the intrusion inspection measurers so that if an iran leadership ever tried to break out you would have plenty of time to act. >> charlie: a year? i think a year is a reasonable length of time. in the process, you want to cut off or block the main pathways to a potential bomb, both uranium and plutonium if you had an iranian leadership who tried to do that. i think it's possible to constrain in a very systematic way iran's program and to deter it from ever seeking to break out of that civil nuclear program. again, it's a tall order. the president said probably less than 50/50 that it can be accomplished but i think it's well worth the effort. >> charlie: i asked susan susan rice the other day would this be the crowning achievement in foreign policy of his second term if he

could make a deal. do you think it would be? >> i think if our president and international partners could produce this strong agreement he's outlined and i tried to describe, i think it would be a significant achievement. as i said before, it has to be embedded in a wider strategy for dealing with those other aspects of iranian behavior that still cold-bloodedly affect our centers. and we'll have to push back and assure our friends and allies in the region for a long time but trying to produce the strong negotiated agreement is the best of the alternatives. >> charlie: what is your understanding and this has been written about in a variety of places about this sort of multi-year perhaps 12 years in terms of which they would be restricted by the number of centrifuges to go forward? how would that work? >> well without getting into, you know, all the detames of an agreement that's just in the process of being negotiated i think it's really important to produce as long a duration as

possible for such an agreement so that you have, you know, a long period of timenned in which the iranian nuclear program is under sharp international constraints and where you have intrusive verification and inspection mechanisms to ensure against any kind of a breakout. so, you know -- >> charlie: what's the point of 12 years rather than just -- >> well, i think the longer the better, in many respects, and i don't know what the magic number is. >> charlie: a number they would accept, i assume. >> yeah, and the administration has talked about at least double digits. >> charlie: that's right. and i think that's a sensible starting point but what you want to do is prolong that period as long as you reasonably can and ensure that one-year breakout is preserved during that time. >> charlie: are you totally assure that if, in fact they're trying to do something in secret, with the inspections we have now, they could not achieve

it? >> well, i think in the interim agreement, the joint plan of action reached the end of 2013, we managed along with our partners to introduce new verification inspection measurers which are really important. in a comprehensive agreement we would have to build on that much more ambitiously. so there's never a perfect guarantee, but i think having those kind of very intrusive transparency measures will be crucial to the kind of strong agreement we're seeking. >> charlie: what would happen if there was a military attack on their facilities? what would be the consequences of that? >> well, i think, you know -- >> charlie: would it simply delay their nuclear effort? produce intense nationalism within iran? would it lead to some kind of action against people in the region and perhaps here? >> could be all of the above. i mean, i think you look at a lot of experts who have looked at the issue and concluded if you took military action whether we or anybody else against the iranian nuclear program, you could certainly set it back by two or three years, whatever length of time people conclude.

but you'd also probably in the process drive the program underground, if the iranian leadership hadn't yet made a decision to weaponnize, it would probably reinforce or accelerate that kind of decision. then depending on the circumstance, you could also see a crumbling of what's been painstakingly built up the international coalition to support economic pressure and sanctions against iran, and this all at a tame, as you just said, charlie, when you have no shortage of instability in the region already. so you know, there could come a time if we're not able to reach this kind of agreement when there are lots of different circumstances you have to invidgesinviesage. but the best alternative is a strong negotiated agreement. >> charlie: do you think they would be prepared to do that at some point? >> its possible. >> charlie: it's a rational choice and they're certainly

prepared to make a rational choice. >> it's possible. it's not a certainty. there are a lot of gaps that need to be bridged between here and there but i think it's possible and well worth the effort. >> charlie: what do we know about the ayatollah? >> not a lot is the honest answer. i think he's, you know, someone who's always been suspicious of the united states and built his kind of world view toward the united states so it's difficult to consider a negotiated solution to the nuclear challenge when you have that kind of suspicion. >> charlie: does rouhani's opinion matter then? >> i think it does. the fact rouhani was elected president he was able to bring in a foreign minister from the view of iranian interest suggests there's some space there within which on the iranian side to test you could reach a negotiation. >> charlie: do you think they

chose him for some reason that someone could speak the language and communicate even though you wouldn't necessarily assume he would be a favorite of the supreme leader even though i heard he has some connection to the supreme leader? the supreme leader saved him when under pressure from the previous regime. >> the iranians are very tough. what they're interested in is the best possible deal. >> charlie: and so are you. right. and whether we can bridge that gap or not i just honestly don't know. but as i said, i think it's worth testing. >> charlie: what's the hardest thing to overcome to get it done? >> i think there are a number of issues and connected to one another. the issues of sanctions for the iranians have pushed hard for the meet lifting of sanctions at the front end and our point of view and the point of view of

our partners is logically you want to have a phased easing of sanctions over time in return for performance and i think that's, you know, an important challenge to try to overcome between negotiations. the issue of enrichment capacity and how do you get to the one-year breakout we've talked about. there are a lot of complicated issues with regard to verification because that has to be negotiated in a very painstaking way to make sure that we and the rest of the international community have for the i.a.e.a. the kind of access that they need to ensure that there aren't activities going on that run counter to any kind of an agreement. so it's a very complicated negotiation. but, you know, i think there's been some progress and that gives you hope, at least, that it might be possible to reach a conclusion. >> charlie: tell me about the rivalry between saudi arabia and iran and obviously it's two different branches of islam. obviously, two powers. one has -- and there's cultural

heritage and they are essentially enemies. or competitors. >> there's a sunni-shia, a persian-arab dimension that adds layer to layer to that competition. >> charlie: but is the competition to have the most infriewns in the region? >> yes, i think that's right. i think there's always been an iranian interest and a wider influence in the region. i think the saudis see that as threatening. true of our other partners in the gulf. so i think that kind of rivalry and set of tensions is going to be with us and the region for some time to come. however, the issue of nuclear question is resolved. >> charlie: do you believe there is a lot of difference between what the israelis see in terms of where the iranians are or is it simply how they measure

the threat to them? >> i think in terms of the analysis, you know, i think over the last few years and the very intensive consultations that have gone between the united states and israel, my impression has always been there's a fair amount of common understanding of where the iranian program is. there's obviously a difference of view and the prime minister has been very clear in public about what constitutes an acceptable threshold and i think the prime minister is made clear -- prime minister netanyahu -- that any enrichment program at all is seen by him at least as threatening. >> charlie: an imminent danger even? >> at least a potential danger. >> charlie: they have not made a decision to make a nuclear -- >> that's when i left my job in government, that was certainly the analysis of my colleagues. >> charlie: they had not made a decision? >> right. >> charlie: what does that mean? they're going to do everything

they can to have the possibility if they make a decision to get there as fast as possible? >> it could be and, you know, whatever your analysis right now the only sensible assumption for policy cold-bloodedly is you have to assume at some point someone might make that decision whether they made it now or not. >> charlie: you want to restrain their ability. >> and deter them from ever trying to come to that conclusion. >> charlie: what do you say to this question -- you're sitting with an iranian and he says, you have nuclear weapons. the the israelis have nuclear weapons. they're not even a signatory to the agreement. nonproliferation agreement. you are. why shouldn't we have nuclear weapons? >> i think, you know, it's an argument of self-interest for iran that -- >> charlie: you have to make it a self-interest. it's not in your interest to have them? >> yes because ultimately, in any government and the years i have been a diplomat that's

what you appeal to. the down sides far outweigh the up sides. you look at the international pressure built against iran, the president's absolute determination to make sure iran doesn't acquire a nuclear weapon and that carries obvious risks for any iranian leadership who tried to move down that road. >> charlie: they would say, look, it's our decision, it's our country. we're not threatening anybody. we just want a nuclear weapon like you do and we reject your idea that it's not in our self interest. we happen to believe it's in our self interest, end of story. >> the iranian leadership professed it's not interested in acquire ago nuclear weapon. so that's what their professed position is. as a starting point for policy you've got to assume at some point some people might try to make a different decision. >> charlie: didn't secretary powell once ask you to write a memo about the risk of insiding

iran? >> of iraq. >> charlie: of iraq. yeah. >> charlie: and what did you tell the secretary? >> well, some of my colleagues ryan crocker and a couple of other colleagues who did most of the work on this but, you know, secretary powell at the time, like the rest of us, was quite concerned about what the possible consequences could be. in diplomacy and state craft you have to think of second and third order consequences. so he asked us to write this about 8:00 one evening and we were on page 14 of single-spaced paper and he said time's up and he conveyed it to the white house as an expression of concern about all the different kinds of things that could go wrong. if anything it was an argument for trying to make sure we had a lot of company on the takeoff of -- >> charlie: here's my question -- does that mean there was a serious debate about the

wisdom of invading iraq? the fact he had you and ryan crocker, two of our best diplomats, do a hard-headed analysis of the risk of the advisability of invading iraq, seems to me somebody was making the arguments that this was the wrong policy and these are the risks but what you hear of conventional wisdom in some quarters is that never took place, the idea of a real debate within the bush administration never took place. >> well, i can only speak to my experience, and there was certainly a debate about how to go about this kind of a challenge and to try to think through carefully all the different consequences. you know and i have to admit, i reread that paper a couple of years ago. we got it about half right and half wrong too. so i'm not trying to suggest we have a monopoly. >> charlie: the point would be some would make an argument, and i don't want to do that right now, though i like the

idea of looking at history, the argument would seem to me to be made by many that that was part of the falsie of the program of -- fallacy of the program of the policy to invade iraq there was no sense of what happens after you invade. >> yeah, that's clear. in dealing with a society as complicated as iraq that once you take the lid off and saddam hussein with all his infinite brutality and oppressiveness kept the lid on society which had a lot of sectarian passions -- >> charlie: as we have seen. yeah. so it's an argument when you think about trying to contribute to those kind of changes in other societies of thinking about so what's the alternative? what comes after, which is a much harder question to address sometimes. >> charlie: and clearly we saw it there. we saw it in the arab spring. >> we did. that doesn't sometimes make the choices any easier because

sometimes you have to act to avoid some humanitarian disaster, at least that's what drives the policy. but it's easy to underestimate the unintended consequences of some of those kinds of actions. >> charlie: to underestimate it. >> yes. >> charlie: so the president, what is it you understand the president's policy to be because of the lessons of iraq and afghanistan? >> just more general? >> charlie: yes. i think it's an argument -- it's not an argument against military dimension of, you know, dealing with some of the challenges that we see in the middle east because lots of problems won't have a purely military solution, but they will have a military dmerntion but it's an air -- dimension but it's an argument of thinking clearly about those questions. what comes after, secting means to ends what's a really vital interest to the united states what are situations in which american leadership will be absolutely indispensable if we mobilize others to act, but what can we expect others to do.

so it's a lot of those dimensions and strategy are important. >> charlie: and a general question, bear with me. the idea of syria and the red line and without debating that, is there essential in diplomacy people have to know that if you say you're going to do something you do it? >> yeah, i think it's -- you know words matter and, so, when you take positions, you've got to be careful about it. now, in that case i think you can make a pretty credible argument that, you know the proximate concern, which was a syrian chemical weapons program, was dealt with successfully in another way. >> charlie: even people like prime minister netanyahu made the point and was opposed to it at the time, but the saudis -- it's interesting to me because so many of our allies took offense and fear of the decision not to go ahead, notwithstanding

the russian deal, but saying there's a bigger lesson here. you're going to have people question your willingness to engage. >> no, i understand the question that gets asked, but i would say, in that case, i think the outcome that was produced largely through john kerry's effort and working with the russians and others was a successful one from the point of view of u.s. policy because you remove the syrian chemical weapons program and look at i.s.i.l's gains over the course of the last couple of years and had there been a chemical weapons stockpile there vulnerable -- >> charlie: they would have access. >> perhaps. >> charlie: assad might not be in power if hezbollah hadn't doubled down. it's really possible he was on the run. >> right. >> charlie: two things happened -- hezbollah doubled down and the united states and others were not able to find the way to enlarge and support a moderate force in syria.

>> yeah i mean the assad regime proved good at one thing, which is oppressing its own people and holding on to power. there was a moment in the winter of 2012-2013 where they we want back on their heels and, you know, the situation on the ground was shifting against the assad regime. and just as you said charlie hezbollah doubled down and intervene in a significant way in syria, pushed back moderate opposition gains at the time and i think after that moment, you know, the assad regime was able to tighten its grip. >> charlie: do you see that moment when it's uphappening? >> it's always -- >> charlie: it's a tough call. it's hard. >> charlie: if you had pushed more -- even then if you had pushed more and he had been toppled, your worry is what follows him. >> that's a huge question. i think people would be kidding themselves if they assume that in syria there would be a neat or easy answer to that question. i continue to believe that a transition of leadership away

from assad is essential for syria, the people of syria and for the region, but, you know it's a lot easier said than done. >> charlie: and there's the ukraine. >> there is. >> charlie: you were ambassador to russia. >> yes. >> charlie: what a great country, so rich in cultural heritage, yet some people look at it today and see all kinds of violations of independence and rights and all those issues, and they see a russian leader that seems at least motivated by the collapse of the soviet union though his driving force may not be to restore it but to do something else. how far is he willing to go, in your judgment from having been in russia and having known him? >> you know, my years in russia have been a long exercise in humility about my powers of prediction or analysis about russia or putin. >> charlie: because he surprises you? >> yes, he's an agile tactics

and he's shown nat in ukraine. but i think the thing to remember about russia is he's playing over the long term a relatively weak strategic end. russia's had the potential to diversify, it has a smart population, but it hasn't done it. corruption is eating away at the rising middle class in russia. demography is a huge challenge. when you think in the huge expanse to have the earth that runs from the euro mountains across siberia to the far east there are only about 30 million or 40 million russians sitting on the periodic table of element and looking along the border of a billion of chinese so russia's got a lot of challenges before it. in ukraine we've seen the most significant challenge to the european order since the cold war and it's important to work with the european partners to produce steady counterpressure against russia, to do everything we can to help ukrainians

rebuild. in many ways, the best antidote to what putin can do is toe show ukraine can climb out of the hole its in and become over time and it's going to take a lot of time, a more successful democracy and economy. >> charlie: and henry kissinger's sate you've sat and you respect each other both students of foreign policy, and said we have to recognize that russia does have an interest in ukraine and a history in ukraine, and i assume we do. >> yeah. >> charlie: how do you recognize that in terms of the solution to the future of ukraine? is it simply they have a democracy and choose where they want to go or do you do more to sort of tailor your impact to create a circumstance so that that element of russia-ukraine will be stabilized?

>> well, i think the bottom line is russians don't get to make ukraine's sovereign choices for them any more than we should be forcing ukrainians to make choices about how they associate themselves. i think you clearly see an interest in ukraine in some form of association with the european union, around they see that as offering a lot of economic opportunity. >> charlie: but in doing that, are they -- do they want to give the back to have the hand to russia or have some other kind of -- >> not necessarily on the economic side. without being pollyannaish about it -- and i know recent circumstances make it hard to think in these terms -- but it's entirely conceivable a ukraine that has more of a connection to the eu would be a benefit to russia as well because the ukrainian-russia connection will be important for a long time to come. it's not impossible to find the balance but a lot of the sense has been loss in the crisis over the last year. >> charlie: are you frustrated

to be a diplomat when you don't think the other person can think rationally? >> sometimes, but you don't get to do everything rationally sometimes. one of the starting points for sensible diplomacy is understanding the the way in which it's your counterpart on the other side of the table or another country in society sort of thinks about things. you don't have to accept that or indulge it but you have to understand them. >> charlie: you have to understand their interests. >> you do. >> charlie: how you address their self-interests. >> you do. i fall prey to it myself that americans always think it's about us. it's not. it's not about the middle east and the arab spring and what's come sense then and not even true in russia or ukraine. you don't have to accept or indulge it but you have to understand the perspective others are bringing to the table. >> charlie: the first question they always ask to the other person is what do you want? once you understand that, you can deal with the rationality and the possibility of some

variation of that. >> right. but, of course, you always have to understand what you want. >> charlie: because that's the next thing. >> if you go into any negotiation and you here not absolutely certain -- >> charlie: and they have to understand. >> because otherwise they'll figure it out for you and that's not a good way to negotiate. >> charlie: the thing that interested me about foreign policy as well is how you have to try to make sure that you avoid the mistake that explodes. i'm thinking about 1914. but the idea that there is something that you don't see that has the potential of inflaming everything. >> it's true, and that's where communication becomes so important and that's, you know, as much as the world has changed in the 33 years since i came into the foreign service, there's still no substitute for people communicating with other people. edward r. murrow, the great cbs giant, in the u.s. information

agency and the kennedy administration once said to a group of young diplomats said the most important link in the international communications change is the last three feet one person talking to the other. that's the essence of diplomacy. >> charlie: i said to rich at the end of the four years he was deputy secretary of state what's the most important thing you've learned. this is a man with experience with casper wineburg as you know better than i do. he said i didn't fully appreciate the human dimension of it, the person-to-person aspect, how crucial it was to be there and to see somebody and talk to them and look them in the eye so that they understand truly your seriousness of purpose as well as your preparedness for a negotiation. >> it's one of the many things i agree with. there's no substitute for that.

the world is different. there are a lot more players on the international landscape, non-governmental players. information flows at an infinitely faster pace and much greater volume than the early 1980s. >> charlie: social media wasn't a factor. >> wasn't, it is now. but the human interaction still matters a lot. >> charlie: what's been the most interesting part of your career? what would you say was the most -- >> i have been really lucky. i mean i had a great run over those 33 years. i mean, you know, from the very early stages of it when i worked for secretary baker, i was the deputy head of the policy planning staff, and it was a moment, kind of an intersection of really interesting historical developments, the end of the cold war, collapseo the soviet union, madrid, german reunification, an intersection of those moments. 1988 to 1993 and high quality people who worked as a team.

i learned a lot. i was a very junior diplomat but i learned a lot about how to think and act strategically. >> charlie: what did you learn? >> you know, the importance of -- >> charlie: some of the things we have been talking about. >> a lot of the things we have been talking about. how to seize moments. baker, after having put a great deal of effort into developing the coalition that achieved victory in desert storm saw a moment to move ahead to the madrid peace conference and make progress on the israeli-arab issue. there were a lot of skeptics at the time. outside his office in houston h he has a wall filled with cartoons, all deeply skeptical about the first eight to have the the nine trips he took to the middle east before madrid. persistence was really important. he kept at it. >> charlie: he spoke at this table about the idea of he went to syria -- i think the number was, like, 14 -- he went 14

times and al-assad said, no, we're not going to get in your coalition respect to stopping saddam hussein, no, no, no. next trip, no, no, no. finally, it was yes. >> mm-hmm. and he -- baker i really admired the way he steadily narrowed down people's choices for them and stripped away the arguments and the pretext. he did it with prime minister shamir, with the palestinians, and he was able to produce something in madrid few thought possible when he made the first of the nine trips. i thought that was really admirable. >> charlie: he also had one of the most qualities a secretary of state can have, the sheer knowledge that he has the president's ear and that he is the best political friend of the president. >> that's extraordinarily important but a lot of other

qualities, too. hillary clinton shared this in a lot of ways that both hillary clinton and baker, no one was better prepared than them when they walked into a room, and that's important in not just a negotiation but any diplomatic interaction and both had the ability to think strategically as well. to those are the qualities that make for good secretaries of state. john kerry demonstrated that as well and like baker demonstrated the persistence so important in diplomacy getting caught trying to solve a problem. >> charlie: who was the author of the tidbit to china? >> president obama, hillary clinton had a lot to do with it as well, in the sense you saw it in the first trip she took overseas was to asia, the first secretary to do that in half a century. >> charlie: the first trip the

president made was to asia. >> yes. >> charlie: or the first state dinner was to asia. >> and i think they both understood the significance of asia as the kind of center of gravity in the international system, you know, as far as i can see in the 21st century. >> charlie: asia is the center of gravity -- >> there was use of the term pivot at the outset and there was a certain amount of pivot envy in europe, too. and the middle east has the nasty habit of reminding us we don't get to neglect it either. so any american administration will have to look in a lot of different directions, but i think it was logical in 2009 at the beginning of the administration and built off the last administration to rebalance and reprioritize our approach to asia. >> charlie: as you well know the p.m.prime minister of israel is coming to speak before congress

and i've talked about that controversy and most recently with susan rice. what are the consequences of that? >> i've long believed like lots of other americans the u.s.-israeli relationship is extremely important. it's important to both people in our countries. one of the sources of its strength has been the reality it's not been a partisan issue. i think the strength of that relationship is especially important that in a moment when the middle east is in such disarray and filled with instability. so in a way the invitation to speak to kong was organized was unfortunate. >> charlie: didn't go through the white house. >> and there wasn't the kind of coordination in all my experience over the years you would have and i think that's unfortunate. it doesn't diminish the importance of the relationship but doesn't help. >> charlie: and -- ant they're engaged in a political campaign in israel.

>> and the timing of it makes it complicated. >> charlie: did john kerry make progress with the step forward on the israeli-palestinian issue? >> he has and worked hard at it. >> charlie: clearly worked hard at it. >> and i think he's right to work hard at it. a lot of people looked at the demonstrators a few years ago and didn't see a lot of banners criticizing israel or supporting palestinian rights and concluded maybe the issue doesn't matter so much anymore. i think it still matters for palestinians, for israel's security, for a lot of people across the region, and the united states whether we like it or not has i think a unique role to play in the diplomacy of that issue and, so, i think -- >> charlie: what else our role? >> it's to try to see if we can work with both parties, israel and palestinians as well as key arab players and others around the world to see if we can come up with a process that produces

the kind of two-state solution that lots of people talked about. >> charlie: there are two ideas always on the table. some people argue that you cannot have an israeli-palestinian agreement without the united states involvement. others will argue, which is not necessarily contrary to that, you can never have an israeli-palestinian peaceful existence that doesn't start with a two -- the two parties coming together on something. they have to want it and want it badly and understand the consequences of not having it. the united states can't fly over and tell them why it's in their best interest. >> the simple answer is yes, both parts are true. you're right there's no substitute for leaderships and peoples in the region seeing the importance of moving in that direction, but i think the united states has an important role to play and helping to encourage that. >> charlie: do you have any optimism that that's going to be a possible outcome? >> i still hope it will just

because i'm so convinced that you know, a two-state solution is in the best interest -- >> charlie: but do you see a two-state solution slipping away? >> i think it is starting to slip away. i don't think it's slipped away, but i think as each year goes past and more and more issues kind of coroad the atmosphere between israelis and palestinians in the wider region, it gets harder and harder and i think that's a real shame because i think, you know, producing that kind of a solution isn't going to solve all the problems in the middle east. you know the arab spring exposed lots of other problems in the arab world that don't have much to do with the palestinian issue. but i do think for israelis and palestinians, it's by far the best outcome and i think the alternative are going to undermine both -- >> charlie: and what's the biggest impediment to that happening? >> well, i think you need to have a sense of urgency. you need to have leadership -- >> charlie: john kerry had that. the parties might not have.

>> the parties have to demonstrate it to make it possible and you need leadership to take advantage of that moment of urgency. >> charlie: do we have that now? >> i don't know. we'll have to see. but there again the passage of time doesn't help. >> charlie: with all the consequences for a one-state solution which is not a solution, they would argue because israel doesn't want to be put in that position some would argue it's not a place that -- you know, at the same time, one of the principle arguments made by the prime minister is this notion of a jewish state. >> but i think it's very difficult when you look at the forces of demography and the reality that, you know, arabs being a majority in the land from the jordan river to the mediterranean, you look at forces of technology that even though israel has enhanced its security in recent years, it's hard to predict what new

technology will produce in terms of threats to israel and ideology. a region that's more and more radicalized as well. all those create a sense of urgency about trying to seize the moment before us and make progress on that issue. >> charlie: clearly all other problems are not because of the failure to of israel and palestinians to reach an agreement but as long as it's there it's a problem in the region. >> it is and it's a problem in terms of israel's long-term security too because without a two-state solution, you know, you end up with a lot of difficult challenges to deal with long-term occupation which isn't healthy for any society. >> charlie: yeah. and i find in terms of the israeli leaders i have interviewed, there is an awareness of that. occupation is not a healthy thing for the psyche of a country. >> no, it can be just as corrosive for israelis as for palestinians. >> charlie: when you left the foreign service a place you'd

spent over 30 years, tid you say goodbye or did you say i'm going to go over here and do this for a while and maybe i'll see you back, maybe i won't? >> no i had a wonderful run as a diplomat. i'm very proud of the colleagues i served with over the years and, you know the country that i've served but i'm excited about -- >> charlie: but supposed you had been a deputy secretary of state -- this is a scenario -- >> yeah. >> charlie: -- and suppose somebody who had been secretary of state had become president and says, well, i had a great deputy secretary of state, he would be a perfect secretary of state -- >> i was really lucky, in the 33 years i had in the foreign service and i'm lucky to be at the carnegie endowment now. >> charlie: succeed ago great woman. >> jessica did a wonderful job as head of carnegie and i'll do my best not to strew it up. >> charlie: thank you. thank you. >> charlie: thank you for joining us. see you next time. for more about this and earlier

episodes, visit us online at pbs.org and charlierose.com. captioning sponsored by rose communications captioned by media access group at wgbh access.wgbh.org

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