>> rose: welcome to the program. tonight an clue conversation with the director of national intelligence, james clapper. >> major take away for me, after the snowden leaks, we do need to be, the intelligence community needs to be more transparent. my father was an army intelligence officer and i've been doing this a long too many, over 50 years so it's almost genetically an at this time cull >> rose: for the hour. >> rose: funding for "charlie rose" has been provided by: >> rose: additional funding provided by:

>> and by bloomberg, a provider of multimedia news and information services worldwide. captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> rose: james clapper is here. he is the director of national intelligence. he is responsible for grafting intelligence gathered by the 16 agencies that makes up the u.s. intelligence agency. the cia, fbi and nsa. he testified last week before the senate arms service committee on the worldwide threat to u.s. national security. i'm pleased to have him here at this table for the first time. welcome. >> thanks charlie. >> rose: we have much to talk about and i thank you for coming and sitting at the table. define for us, i did a little bit of that, exactly what the dni does. >> the position the dni grew out

of a recommetdction made after the 9/11 commission after the 9/11 attacks and that recommendation found it's way into law. the intelligence reform on terrorism prevention act which was signed into law by president bush on the 17th of december 2004 and my office stood up in 2005 so we're approaching our 10th anniversary. what basically happened there was to separate the position that formally was occupied by the trerkly of central intelligence agency as a second hat as director of central intelligence. the recommendation of the 9/11 commission which was documented in law was to separate those two positions. to have one person who would lead the entirety of the community as a full time proposition. so essentially the three duties are to be the senior but not exclusive certainly advisor on

intelligence and counterintelligence matters to the president. to manage what's called the nip national intelligence which encompasses all the resources, the money which i defend and aggregate to the congress each year for the entirety of the national intel swruns community. and of course to manage the enterprise. and my main objective and main theme has been in the four and-a-half years i've had the job is to integrate the community as much as possible. >> rose: you haven't done many interviews. >> no. >> rose: have you come to some new position and idea about after the snowden affair. >> not exactly. i do think that we in the intelligence community leadership in the community need to speak out more than we have. to counter the narrative somewhat that i think is, has been promulgated about the intelligence community. and so in the waning days of my

time here, acknowledging i serve at the pleasure of but assuming i finish the term of the administration, to use that time to perhaps be more public and speak out more about intelligence to the extent that we can. in fact, i think main take away for me after the snowden leaks was we do need, we in the intelligence community do need to be more transparent. now my father was an army intelligence officer and i've been doing this a long time, over 50 years. so it's almost genetically anti-ethical for me to be open and transparent but we need to be. >> rose: and it's important to communicate what. >> well i think it's important for the public and their elected representatives to understand what we do and why we do it. which is essentially bottom line

is to keep the country safe. >> rose: when you look at the narratives that are out there, i mean are there three our four ideas that you think need to be rebutted, and it's important that the point of view of national security from an intelligence perspective is understood. >> well i think the first thing is just for people to understand the nature of the world we live in today. >> rose: today in this world. >> exactly. and it's very turbulent, very unstable. and thereqlmhl are lots of potential threats to us out there, as i briefly outlined in my statement at the senate arms services committee. that we operate under a system of law and that we have heavy oversight to ensure compliance with that law. and most especially to ensure we don't infringe on the privacy of american citizens. so i think those would be the

three or four themes. >> rose: what has changed since the disclosure we have learned from edward snowden. >> one thing as changed, we have endure or enduring some serious compromises of our capability, particularly and regrettably to monitor, to track the activities of terrorists overseas and terrorism. >> rose: how did that work how does that -- >> well one of the, transparency is a two-edge sword. it is good certainly to the extent that we can explain what we do and why we do it,8l but our adversary ease go to school and that's particularly what happened particularly with the terrorists, al-qaeda. isil is very astute at learning from these revelations and applying what they've learned. they are extremely communication security and operation security conscious. so that has been a major impact. >> rose: so they know our

potential, they learned something about how to avoid that. >> exactly. >> rose: how much do we know about isil? >> well we know a lot. i think we understand obviously what their objectives seem to be. we i think have a reasonably good understanding of their leadership. >> rose: and where they are. >> well generally whereiv they are. we don't have 10 point locational data on them on a day-to-day basis certainly but we know generally where they are. >> rose: how much cooperation between iranian intelligence u.s. intelligence, russian intelligence, anybody who has identified them as a threat. >> we don't, well we cooperate with a lot of partners. the obviously the european partners. i was in europe recently and certainly in fact visited belgium and france and clearly they are very very concerned and we're looking for more ways to share more data share more

information. we have a great partnerships in the middle east. you mentioned iran and russia. iran not so much, we don't -- >> rose: not at all. in this case there is a common enemy. >> we have a common enemy but we're not cooperating. >> rose: not any information, not anything. >> no. >> rose: just no conversations take place. >> none. >> rose: between. >> none. nada. >> rose: whether it's intelligence or military. >> in the case of russiaxllittle different. they, the russians have a terrorist threat in their country a that agree with the czechen and of late there seems to be more willingness to engage with us on sharing some information about common threats. >> rose: that came up at the time of the boston marathon bombings didn't it. >> it did, yes. >> rose: let me go back to someone i had a conversation with last night that said to me the following things and i want a security assessment from you.

said the two biggest threats to the united states right now come from the iranian negotiations, number one. and number two, what's happening in the ukraine. isil x they said is a much lessexistential. do you share that? would you put it that way. >> in my testimony the first thing i talked about were cyber threats. and the kind of pernicious way they are growing as threats to the united states. we had last year the two, the first two cases of cyber attacks actually occurring on u.s. soil. with las vegas casino attack about a year ago and of course the sony attack. >> rose: from the north koreans. >> perpetrated by the north koreans not long after i was there. so i did list cyber first. a variety of course is terrorist threats.

whether isil is an immediate existential threat to the united states probably not but it certainly poses a huge threat to interests overseas and to our allies. aspirationally they do pose a threat to the home lum. >> rose: we'll talk about all that but let me start with iran because of the speech, the prime minister of i real because of the negotiations are ongoing because the secretary of state has been speaking over the weekend about it. what can you tell us, what should the american people know about those negotiations. and is there a risk that the prime minister will disclose some of the ideas coming out of those negotiations that he may have been informed about that would damage the negotiations. >> well, i don't know what the prime minister of israel will say. i really don't know. my focus, the focus in the

intelligence community is our ability to verify if negotiations are successful and there is some agreement struck, our ability to monitor and verify that. and that will depend very heavily on i think intrusive and comprehensive surveillance and inspections by the iae, international atomic energy administration or agency. that will be a hugely important to us in our ability to verify. that for me in the intelligence community has got to be the focus. >> rose: if you don't have that it ought not be a deal if you have immediate intrusion in terms of a threat you may see developing or violation of the agreement. >> that's right. >> rose: that would be a threat to us. >> we would need the basic foundational information insight provided by those inspections

and survrillance abilities represented by the iaea and we would double check, verify with our own organic intelligence capabilities and that of our part knees i lisa. >> rose: is there a risk getting a bomb with the -- >> i think we in the israeli intelligence which are very good. i've had a long association with israeli intelligence for 30-35 years. they are very very competent, very professional. i think at the intelligence level where we have a very close relationship, we're pretty much on the same page with respect to our insight and knowledge of capabilities and what they height be in the future. >> rose: and when. >> and when. >> rose: so what's the difference? >> well what, policy makers say and do about it is a different

proposition. and i steadfastly try to stay out of the policy arena. >> rose: but in fact when they have a breakout and when they may reach a threshold point there is a general agreement. >> well, there are a lot of variations on a theme here because there are so many assumptions that one makes if which facilities are at work. there's a lot of very deep technical considerations you have to draw from sort of an industrial infrastructure stand point that have bearing on those judgments. i'll just say without going into specifics which i can't and won't, that we are prettyr much in the same ballpark. >> rose: it's been reported as you know that three the possibility of some agreement lasting 10-12 years that will have a built-in ability to

inspect. and limit the level of subterfuge development that could take place. and draw down of sanctions. >> what you're asking is very much in play right now, and is, i don't think there's any great benefit to my commenting on what the provisions of the agreement actually might take. or how long a period it would be. and again that's up to the negotiations. >> rose: i hear you and i'm not even quarreling with that. i would like to know in terms of what youd8 think is the >> the longer the better, obviously, would be my vote. and again, that's, you know, the actual length that's very much a matter for the negotiators. so i don't -- >> rose: some argue that a longer time may have in it the hope that there will be a change in regime in iran.

>> well again, i'm not -- that's a policy issue, and we have not professed that we're prosprosyliting for regime change at all, that's clearly up to the iranian people. >> rose: there have also been reports of cyberattacks from iran and from the united states against iran and that there is point-counterpoint, point-counterpoint. is that true? >> well without stipulating countries, this is the nature of the cyber domain. it pervades so many aspects of our life, particularly in the united states but all over the world, and so, you're quite right about the point and counterpoint. we have probes and attacks and we as a counter try to question

de fend against them. >> rose: aren't we on the offensive as well? >> we will be in that mo mode for quite some time. >> rose: we are on the offensive also, i assume. >> i continue comment on that but i think we have a significant capability offensively if the policy judgment is made to exert it. >> rose: you mentioned earlier is that the biggest fear you have, in a sense? many people know when leon panetta testified before congress he said he thought the next pearl harbor might be a cyber thrust. >> he did say that. i think our general assessment is that as i called it characterized in my testimony likely a cyber arm -- armageddon isn't as likely as this insidious increase in the nature of the attacks.

and exemplified by the two attacks taken place on our soil last year. so that was another ratcheting up if you will and i think that's the nature of the threat rather than some massive pearl harbor or armageddon type attack. because only a nation state could do that, of that magnitude. and there's only a couple nation states. a clearly nation states, unlike non-station state entities while they have a larger capability also have vulnerabilities which of course we could -- >> rose: nation states -- >> yes. >> rose: china is one of them i would assume. >> china and russia. >> rose: those are the two that have the capability in terms of nation states to do it. >> most capable and most persuasive capability i think is represented in those two countries. >> rose: you went to north korea. you said that was in your bucket list to go to north korea. >> a lot of people think that

was kind of strange. well it stemmed from the fact i served from the republic of korea in the 80's. i was in the intelligence forces for korea in two years and got very involved and engaged and interested on the issues of the peninsula. and followed the developments there. so it was all this confessional objective, confessional goal i think if i had the chance to actually visit. and so i did. it was for me a remarkable experience. >> rose: it's an interesting experience because there are reports that there was like a 12-course meal between you and a north korean official. >> right. >> rose: and then you sent a bill to your part. >> right. >> rose: which was unusual to me. >> north korea doesn't like us too much but they like our money. >> rose: did you like their food. >> the dinner was actually, and

i sort of become a korean food aficionado i guess ever since i served there. and it was a wonderful meal. it just wasn't very enjoyable because i had a rather tense terse exchange with the director of what they call the general bureau. general kim who is characterized himself asio.counterpart and his organization basically represents an amalgam of intelligence and special operations. and so we had a pretty tense exchange during the course of the dinner. so it would have been more enjoyable had more relaxing conversation but that wasn't the nature. >> rose: did anything you see you saw or heard change your mind about their capabilities, their intent, their ambition. >> the one thing that struck me

was the two principal interoculars, the administered state security, i interacted with a lawyer in the evening and then the rgb director. their older than my generation and kind of fixed in their narratives. i did have occasion on the way out as we were departing to go out to our flight, i had about a 45 minute discussion with also a member of the state security but one who was of a younger generation. and the conversation with him was much more temperate. he had been to the south. asked me if i would be willing to come back to north korea which iq? certainly would if i had the chance. if there's hope or for change there, maybe it may be

generational, i don't know. >> rose: do you believe there's hope for change there. >> i don't, under the current regime, i think as i say , they are very committed to their narrative now. >> rose: and their narrative is? >> they're very anti-american. they're very much under siege and there's a siege mentality that prevails i think in north korea. as they look outward to the rest of the world, they see a lot of hostility, hostility from the south, hostility from us. >> rose: which is interesting to me because it is the intelligence trying to figure out not only facts but also the mind of leadership making decisions. it's clearly a role that you have to do. and so the question of how they see us as an enemy, do they appear to you to be rational decision makers. >> oh yes. >> rose: to do something stupid just out of misinformation. >> i think they're rational and

certainly in their way. when i served there, i will tell you it's still a concern of mine, i always worried about some event that became enrea, some incident along the limit line or some place like that would explode without being intended. but was unfortunate outgrowth of an untoward incident. that's the sort of thing that always worried me. >> rose: let me turn to ukraine because of that very same thing. it is said that by putin, the president of russia, when the overthrow took place, the leader of the then ukrainian government fled to russia. that he made a judgment that wasn't for him and b, that the west had something to do with it, especially the c.i.a. i've also read the chinese have

something to do with that judgment. >> well they again, people get too caught up in their narratives. i think the russians know exactly what they're doing about narratives that they put out versus what they know to be the fact. >> rose: tell me what that difference is. >> well, i think the in the case of ukraine, as you alluded, when yanukovych basically left very suddenly without any warning on the 22nd of february of last year, and of course given that putin's world view, he saw this as yet another revolution which he believedder talked himself -jby the united states which it wasn't. and you have to understand his mind set about ukraine, the

crimea for example and what a terrible disaster it was when the soviet union collapsed and putin is somewhat of a throw back to improve this era, the great russia empire, maybe throw back to the tsars. so the number one foreign policy objective for russia and putin is dominance of the former soviet space. and most especially ukraine which they refer to as little russia. >> rose: and other places where russian language has a prominent plqrprominence within certain countries. >> they have a very expansive official definition of a russian citizen which is any russian speaker. >> rose: do you believe that putin is responding to that and this has been essentially a response and a sort of got himself involved in this and did certain things was the strategy

to take over the crimea. and it's not been well thought out but simply a case of someone who is now operating in terms of perception and power. >> well, there's debate about was this part of his grand strategy all along or was it opportunistic particularly after yanukovych vacated. >> rose: what do you say. >> i think a combination of the two. it was very opportunityistic after yanukovych left. that was a surprise to putin as much as anyone. i think then, though he saw an opportunity first to take back from his vantage crimea which he did. wasn't all that heard since he already had about 18,000 military people there in the first place and a lot of bases. and then of course capitalized on the separatists movement in

the two eastern blocks of the ukraine. and so there's an opportunity presented itself to a much like georgia. a former soviet space where he could exert more influence and more leverage. >> rose: and so what would you tell his intent is now? >> i think the intent is to i think he would like to end the fighting, the compat. >> rose: between the government and the separatists. >> i mean the damage that's being done to that area, you know, that's potentially another huge financial drain on russia just like crimea is. so i think from both hugh a humanitarian perspective he would like to stop the fighting. this is a debate between them and the separatists but they would like that area in question

reasonably whole as possible. which means i think at some point going after the port which would give them the land bridge to the crimea as well as access to=the sea. that hasn't happened yet. i don't think they'll do it immediately but i do think to answer your question though, that he is reaching a point where he would like to stop the act of combat. >> rose: are we prepared to stop him from making that link? >> well, that's again a policy issue. i won't venture into that as to what else we might do to thwart through by the russians and the separatists. >> rose: no question about what we'll do with the country. >> there's a different situation. that's why i think you know the baltics is a little different

proposition. there is article 5. i do think the russians recognize that and respect it. that's a different proposition. >> rose: you have said in your testimony that we should arm the ukrainians. >> i said first i need to again emphasize that this is a personal perspective not it's not company policy certainly. it's under consideration but. and i do think it has for me it has more to do with bolstering the resolve of the ukrainians and the assurance that we're withpñ them. i was recently in kiev myself about a month ago. and when you're there, are however briefly, you can't help but be struck by the intensity of this issue for ukraines. >> rose: when you say we should arm them, what do you mean. >> without going to specifics here -- >> rose: to defend themselves --

>> so-called lethal defensive weapons. >> rose: should we match whatever the russians are doing for the separatists. >> i'm not going to go there. that again is a policy call. i think it would be, that's a tall order. even if we wanted to do that because the russians are right next door, they have considerable military equipment and military depots there, so they can send what they want to a lot of stuff into the ukraine. tank per tank or abc per abc is pretty hard to match. >> rose: are you worried about putin's response if we armed them. >> i do. i tried to make that point. again that's why that's a difficult judgment to make about whether or not we should arm the ukrainians because i do think it would invoke a very negative reaction. in fact the russians have been very public about it. they may not just restrict their reactions to ukraine only.

there's other thing they could do elsewhere in the world as a reaction to it. >> rose: henry kissinger sat where you are and made this point early on. you need to give putin a way out if he's gone farther than he has and that would be kind of political negotiations about this and you seem to be saying i think he wants that because this may have gone either have been more costly and gone too far. >> well, im" say that, that's impressionistic. i think from all i see and read that i do believe that he would like to find a way to end the hostilities and combat and definite and destruction. in the end these things have to be settled i think diplomatically. that's really the only way to resolve it. >> rose: many argue that's the only way to stop the killing in syria as well. >> well that's true and ultimately we're not going to kill our way out of that either

that has to be dealt with diplomatically. >> rose: the russians are participating. >> they have a big stake in syria. they've been long time supporters of the syrians and assad. they have to be part of this, no question. >> rose: does it look like from your impression that's the only way to stop it is to have some cease-fire and then some negotiated agreement as to what the future of syria should look like and whether it should include assad or not. >> the opposition somehow has to play in that. and that's a diplomatic challenge, no question. >> rose: what interests me about iran is fighting isis in iraq. reports i've read about the iraqi army going towards crete

is that iraqi militia are significantly involved, as much if not more than the iraqi army, supported by in some cases from iran. >> right. it's a very complex situation there. and you're rate. we have the iraqi security forces that form and constituted the iraqi army, police forces etcetera. you have the militias ask they're all variations on the scene there. some six or eight principal shiia malicious. and this is frankly a challenge for prime minister abadi and how to sort of marshall these resources in a coherent way acknowledging that their primary challenge right now is getting

rid of isil and recovering. >> rose: most of these issue are shi'a. >> they are. >> rose: and unless you do something with the sunni support from isil. >> that is very true. that's a key factor for the need of inclusiveness of the sunni and the sunni tribes. we have done a lot to try to prevail upon the iraqi government and abadi personally to draw the non-isil sunni tribes into this because ultimately they will have to be involved particularly in northern iraq which is, you know, predominantly sunni. >> rose: this is interesting because of what you have said. i mean many people look at tikrit and think it's the first step to

take mosul and has the advantage to do that. >> if you look at the map, basically it's a stream of cities which have some strategic significance. there's a lot of open empty space there in iraq. so if iraq is going to recover those captured areas, then this is came of the st=they've got to march up as they move north. >> rose: one of the criticisms of our intelligence effort as you well know from questions in congress has been why didn't we know more about the development of isil. you have responded by saying when the iraqi troops fled mosul refused, didn't want to night and isil was able to move in. you can't measure you said the will of an armed force. >> right. and thank you for correctly quoting me. that's exactly what i said. that we reported with isil's fighting prow rest and capabilities and we also reported robustly in our

intelligence community products all of the deficiencies and short falls that iraqi security forces. what we didn't foresee and certainly i didn't foresee is that over night, literally over night, four and-a-half divisions or so of iraqi security forces would literally melt away. i will say getting back to my war which is southeast asia, we've never been real good at predicting will to night. >> rose: that would be another example. >> exactly. and we profoundly overestimated the ability of the iraqi security force, the iraqi army in desert storm, i was chief of air force intelligence then. and we over estimated their capability to resist the armed invasion. that's a subjective judgmental assessment to make and it's hard. >> rose: the true assessment. there's much talk about the

attack on postal and most -- mostal and too much was said about the attack. what can you tell me about the >> it will take, the conventional wisdom on retaking or capturing an urban environment, which mosul is, a city of over a million people. the force ratio is ten to one. moreover iraqi stream forces are not terribly proficient in urban warfare. that will take some time to train up. so the combination of raising the force sufficient to do it and as well training them such that you'd have confidence that they could retake mosul, that's

a big challenge. and i just think that will take time to develop that capability. >> can you teach them to have the will to fight. >> that's a key question, and i don't know whether you thank you we can, we the united states can instill in the iraqis or any other foreign military force the will to fight. now the will to fight i think)o ultimately stems from the loyalty to the government, to a cause of their own. and i don't know that we can impose that on the iraqis or anyone else. so we'll have to make and that's a judgment we'll have to make. and that's why what the abadi government does that's so critical to including the sunnis in this fight. because without them it would be

very very problematic. >> rose: that was the reason you had a change in baghdad from maliki to abadi. >> well, that's, i mean they did through their own mechanisms remanipulated. but yes. abadi, i think he understands the challenge and the need to include the sunnis. but that poses a challenge for them of his open shi'a background. so he has critics among the shi'as. if he's seen to be too inclusive of the sunnis. so he's got a real balancing act. >> rose: and he has a voice. >> he still has a voice and still there and is still active. >> rose: an so what's the situation today. >> well i think right now in iraq we've actually achieved a lot.

we've substantially reducedb territory that isil holds. physical territory. the kurds have been great in resisting in that part of iraqi. so the combination of the iraqi security forces coupled with coalition air power and our advice and assistance and the training we're doing i think has brought about not just a stalemate but i think in many cases which you don't hear much about, some reversals. that the isil suffered. kobani which is in syria there's huge losses there in syria brought about by the combination of the forces in

kobani as well as coalition air strikes. >> rose: it has also been reported it's a destination. there's been eliminations -- >> let's true.awe've taken out several of their key leaders. however they account for that. bear in mind isil leadership traces its origins from al-qaeda in iraq. so they know us, they have long experience with the united states, so one of their teachers if you will and attributes is they put out strategic, the leadership puts out strategic guidance which is done on a decentralized basis. so they account for losses. they plan on it. so they've got, they work their bench. and so yes we've had some successes taking out a lot of their leadership but they have replacements. >> rose: some argue we still haven't eliminated al-qaeda after all these years. it's a multilong time project. >> the al-qaeda core or senior

leadership in pakistan has been decimated. but we've had of course the emergence of the franchises, if you will. and of course isil has made a lot out of the sort of provinces i guess of their caliphate in places like libya and egypt and southwest asia. and so we're going to have i think just a steady state of these terrorist groups that will emerge starting first i think most interested in local issues, regional issues. but in some cases, you know, threatening the homeland. aqap which we don't talk as much about anymore is still a serious threat to the homeland. >> rose: let me talk about an aspect of this that bothers many people.

it is quote home grown. we're now learning the identitjw of the man that's been called the jihadi john. >> this is really the threat for us in this country and it certainly is in europe and that is where through very skillful successful, very skillful and sophisticated use of social media, particularly isil were very slick about this. envokeing whatever emotions that it takes to infect people who become home grown extremists. this is the issue we're learning most about in our homeland. and it's very difficult to detect from using classical intelligence, if you will, to detect these people.

this is the issue in europe. in the case of the charlie hebdo attackers. apparently one of them at least had been to yemen,çr some three years before. and had a encounter with an iraqi and that was enough to infuse them with the jihadi message. >> rose: then came back and laid low for a while. >> exactly. and they were known characters to french security officials. >> rose: and was the man identified, emwazi i think his name was. he was -- >> i will point out an irony here charlie. i've been on the receiving end of virtually all the post event critique of the investigations to include 9/11 and since.

i do find some irony in lot of all the other fault in the world the last two years the common theme of every one of those critiques is the government should have been more intrusive. it was true of 9/11 it was true of the christmas bomber, it was true with fort hood and the boston marathon. >> rose: the government should have been more intrusive. and that meant to you what. >> well it means we're supposed to do more intensive surveillance of people who live in this contree whether they're citizens or u.s. persons. there's a lot of criticisms about spying on -- >> rose: the irony is theywant you in terms of those specific instances there's a call for troops and yet the response to edward snowden disclosures is intrusive. >> exactly. >> rose: how will that be settled. >> well it won't. there's no silver bullet here. there is a balance between you

know protection of national security and protection of civil liberties and privacy. and so if there were some way whereof we could just find the needles without having to bother not with one haystack but hundreds and hundreds of haystacks to find those nefarious needles that would be great. right now we can't do that so we do our utmost to make sure we don't infringe unnecessarily and certainly illegally because there are very stringent laws about this. >> tools and you need to be more intrusive. >> i'm not suggesting that at all. the intelligence community will do the best we can with the tools we need and the resources we have which are going down by the way. >> rose: do you have the tools and the resources now to do the job that we expect you to do with respect to -- >> we will do our best.

i would just note that we have kind of a perfect storm here which i've spoken publicly about and certainly on the hill with the snowden leaks which have done damage to our capabilities. the conscious judgments we've made to reduce certain collection activities. and you compound that with the cuts we've taken in intelligence. by the way intelligence did not get a pass from sequestration. unless something's done we revert to sequestration in 2016 and we will take yet more cuts. >> rose: you're talking about homeland security and all of that. >> oh yes. that's an example of why sometimes people ask me, what keeps you awake at night. i worry about the dysfunction in washington. that does keep me awake at night. >> rose: what do you mean by that? >> well, i think having furloughs and shut downs and having part of the national security apparatus held hostage

like this, it's only the department of homeland security. but that has impact on the rest certainly the rest of the intelligence community, because everyone sees that. and so i worry about the impact on morale and keeping the great people we brought on in the intelligence community since 9/11. so it's an enterprise responsibility i feel i have to protect, defend the intelligence community as an enterprise. >> rose: it sounds like you stay up at night to do a job to protect national security and you're worried whether you have the resources to do"x it. >> not only the resources and impacts that has on capabilities, i also worry about morale of the work force and retaining the superb cadre of people we have

brought in particularly since 9/11. >> rose: can i just go back to iran for a second. is there any information that iranians are involved in the iraqis in the fight against isis. >> yes, they are. in an advisory capacity. they brought in a large amounts of weaponry. they fly uav's over iran so yes, they have a very robust commitment to the fight against isil in iraq. >> rose: which leads me to other questions. we also have advisors in iraq. >> we do. who is my nephew. >> rose: your nephew is in the army. >> yes. >> rose: does that constitute boots on the ground to you? >> well, i think the, i mean boots on the ground is i think generally considered combat forces.

combat formations, not to train, advise and assist they're there now to conduct. >> rose: is it your judgment that we need boots on the ground to defeat isil in iraq and syria. >> probably somebody's boots on the grounds but not necessarily ours. >> rose: when we look at the engagement on the ground there and all the factors that may go into it, how much will the air power be. >> it will be and has been quite significant. and particularly in syria, as long as we don't have ground forces there so it's going to be extremely important there. so it shows the progression of our ability to use air power and the tremendous impact of isr intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. i can't help but think myself,

my war, southeast asia and went to vietnam what capabilities we had then and what capabilities today, there's no comparison it's night and day. >> rose: some people have suggested that syria will be more difficult and you have suggested and others have -- >> in the case of iraq, wep hdave an embassy there, we have presence and we can operate there and we don't have any of that in syria. plus when you compound that with the complexities of the situation in syria, there are hundreds and hundreds of these opposition groups who, you know -- >> rose: most are extreme -- >> that's another complexly. >> rose: some of them is so called moderate -- >> right now the extremists as we would characterize them probably have among the opposition probably have the upper hand on lesser fronts for example.

very capable fighting organization and have achieved vict -- victories i you have the fighting among the opposition groups and in turn with the regime. and you'll have marriages, tactical marriages of convenience sometimes where the extreme oppositions and moderate oppositions will team up to fight the regime. so it's a very very complex situation overlaid with iranians and support of the russians, hezbollah etcetera. >> rose: so what do we do. >> well again as we said before i think in the end, the only way this will be resolved isñç through negotiation and diplomacy. i don't see any other way to resolve it. >> rose: at one point our stated goal was to see assad leave. >> it still is. >> rose: there are people in the government who spoke out and

said our priority has changed an urgency and immediacy of dealing. >> the immediate priority of course is isil. but i think our long term objective through some means would be for assad to lose. >> rose: let me ask a question about iran. some fear that they believe that ayatollah is trying to negotiate his way and through this agreement he can get to the possibility, the ability to make a weapon. >> well i think what his objective here is first is to security relief from sanctions. that's a -- he would like an agreement that recognizes their right to engage in some nuclear activity. and probably at least on a threshold basis to give themselves an option in the

future, actually to build a nuclear weapon which right now they do not have. >> rose: they don't have a nuclear weapon and they don't have a commitment to make a nuclear weapon. >> when you say they, i think those, i mean they have their own camps, the hard-liners and all that in iran kind of like we do. so there's obviously some i'm sure would be advocates for having a nuclear weapon. but our assessment is there's one person to make that decision and there's one person that's the supreme leader and at this point he's not made a decision to obtain a nuclear weapon. >> rose: he wants to eliminate the sanctions and make that a condition of the agreement believing the agreement somehow will not eliminate the possibility of

having a weapon. >> they will maintain the expertise and capability in all the realms it takes for these. they have expertise now. it's a political decision for them, not that they don't have the technical wherewithal or the technical competence because they do. >> rose: right now. >> right now. >> rose: the only thing they're worried about would be what level of enrichment and the monitoring that will be substantiated as part of an agreement so they would know to break out and build a nuclear weapon. it's always been the intelligence community's assessment in they do that they would do it covertly. whether they overtly in front of us in facilities we know and are

monitored. if they were to do that that stretches the time out which they could actually build a nuclear weapon. >> rose: we worry about a covert? >> we do. that's a big challenge for us and the united states intelligence community is to ensure they don't or if they do we detect the covert facility. >> rose: it's a pleasure having you at this table. >> thank you for having me. >> rose: james clapper for the hour. see you next time. for early episodes visit us on-line at pbs.org and charlierose.com. captioning sponsored by rose communications captioned by media access group at wgbh access.wgbh.org

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