>> welcome to the program. we begin this evening with a story from the white house in which the president announced that an american drone strike had killed two hostages, one an american and one an italian in january. the president expressed great sorrow. the story from the cbs evening news with scott pelley. >> the drone strike happened in january but it wasn't until april that the cia realized it had killed the two hostages. american aid worker warren weinstein and italian gee vano locorto. saul the safeguards president obama once promised would ensure to a near certainty no innocent civilians would be killed had failed. >> based on the intelligence that we had obtained at the time including hundreds of hours of surveillance we believed that is was an al qaeda compound that no civilians were present and that capturing these

terrorists was not possible. >> rose: those hundreds of hours never detected any sign of the hostages. but intelligence analysts did see evidence of a senior al qaeda op rattive. exactly who they did not know. that seemed to make it even more unlikely hostages were in the compound since there were no previous cases in which hostages had been held close to al qaeda leaders. it now appears the hostages were kept nearby as shields for the senior leader. who turned out to be an american named ahmed foruoq who once hamped a plan to hijack pakistani vessels and ram them into warner warships, five days later another drone strike killed another american again without the cia knowing it. this time it was adam gadan who played a leading role in al qaeda recruiting and propaganda videos. gadan had been indicted for treason and had a $1 million reward on his head. near gadan for farouq were considered senior enough to be on the cia's hit list.

but when asked if the president regretted killing them, white house spokesman john ernest had a se viferp el answer. >> no, those two individuals that you mentioned were leaders in al qaeda. >> rose: to talk about the drone strike and much more we are joined this evening by mike vickars set undersecretary of defense for intelligence and will be retiring on april 30th. >> well, it is a tragic recurrence, and in this particular case this was a legitimate al qaeda target. there was no evidence that any hostages or indeed even noncombatants were there. they were hidden. but that is still raises a number of questions about whether we did everything we could or should we change our procedures in the future to prevent this. >> my vickers for the hour next. funding for charlie rose is provided by the following:

>> rose: additional funding provided by: >> and by bloomberg, a provider of multimedia news and information services worldwide. captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> rose: michael vickers is here, he has served as undersecretary of defense for intelligence since 201 -- he has held that position longer than anyone in the department's history. vixers was the branch's first and only secretary of defense pore special operations low intensity capabilities. earlier this month he announced that on april 30th he will retire after nearly ho years of service. i am pleased to have him here at this table.

welcome. >> thank you. >> it's an honor and pleasure to meet you. >> it's a plesh-- pleasure to meet you. >> rose: i want to talk first about what the president said this morning when he announced the tragic and deadly mistake he said that happened with drones killing two hostages at the same time. and another mission three of them were killed, i think in the first mission and one or another mission killed by drones. two hostages and two americans who were associated with al qaeda. what questions should this raise for us? >> well, it is a tragic recurance, and in this particular case this was a legitimate al qaeda target. there was no evidence that any hostages, or indeed even noncombatants were there. they were hidden. but that's still raises a number of questions about whether we did everything we coz or should we change our procedures in the future to prevent this.

with these operations mistakes like this or collateral damage are fairly rare. they're very, very precise operations. detailed intelligence very careful policy review. there's fewer noncombatant casualties than any other air campaign but there still are some. you can't reduce it to zero and you just have to examine what you did and can you do better. >> rose: they said and the president said they followed every procedure that they were supposed to follow. >> that's correct. >> rose: what are those procedures? >> so there is detailed reviews of the intelligence to try to establish what we call near cinter. which means only those that you are targeting again whether a compound or an individual, is what you have and nothing else. and then then-- . >> rose: how do you establish that? >> through a variety of persistent intelligence from a variety of sources to make sure that that is

indeed,-- indeed the case, you have to look at things over time. you have to have multiple collaborating or confirming sources. but again that's why we use the term near certainty rather than certainty because there is still things you don't know. >> rose: is it necessary to have someone on the ground to identify specifics about the target? >> no, it is not. >> rose: who question-- up for review? >> again, it's a very important instrument in our war against al qaeda now the islamic state of iraq and the lavant. but the targeting procedures are subject to regular review. and this will in this case, i'm sure there will be what we call a red team to go back and examine everything we did in this case. and then how we might adapt our procedures. >> rose: give me some sense of how drones have been effective and how they are different and what debate there might be inside about the use of drones.

>> so they have probably been our most important instrument, as i said against al qaeda particularly in areas outside of war zones where ach began stand, iraq iraq where there's lots of military instruments. for two reasons reason. one they combine persistence. they can stay over an area for a long period of time. so that allows you to develop a high degree of intelligence from multiple sources, both inherent in the platform but also from other sources. and then they are mated with very very precise weapons that we use on other aircraft. but the combination of that of being able to stare at something for a long time and then hit exactly what you want to hit and where and nothing else makes them a very unique instrument. so they-- they have played a very, very large role in our

war wars itself. not just al qaeda but supporting our troops isil but also iraq and afghanistan. and they are the-- really the intelligence and precision strike weapon that our commanders most often ask for, that they want to retain. >> you have served as i said longer in the job. you have served two presidents. you have really came to the attention of president bush when he asked you even though you weren't in government, to come and help him make decisions about the iraqi war. legend has it that you told the president you were not in favor of the surge. elise ened to you. he went ahead with the surge and thinks it was a success. and yet at the same time he took notice of you and wanted you to come back to government. >> yeah sometimes you know i think the-- the 23006 was

a major review of our iraq strategy. things were to the going well so the president and his key advisors were looking for advice from a variety of quarters, so i what i thought was most important at the time was making sure that we had a policy that could be handed off across that ultimately the iraqis would have to win the fight. these campaigns take a long period of time. and so that's really what i emphasized. the president did make a very gutsy decision too essentially bet his presidency on the surge. and operationly it was quite a success by the time the policy-- the administration's changed and they did achieve the objective of handing off iraq policy to the next administration. >> then was your advice wrong? >> i think yes in a sense. the number of things came together.

the-- what the surge did under the leadership of general petraeus was really bring security to baghdad. there were a number of things. big special operations campaign that was attacking al qaeda and iraq. our intelligence had gotten much better. we had the anbar awake-- awakening. critical, all those elements came together. the idea of sunnis in region turning against al qaeda. >> that was absolutely critical. all those things had to work together. but the buildup of forces, the additional forces really brought some security to baghdad. a combination of good tactics, as well things some modifications to get troops out to really protect the population and put some barriers. there is a lot of sectarian conflict and ethnic cleansing going on right before that. and that turned out to be the right strategy. >> rose: another time at which you gave crucial advice was when they were making decisions about al qaeda.

whether to send in special forces to do that. it is said that by in print that you convinced, along with others former secretary of defense robert -- robert gates to support that kind of action. >> again, that was a very difficult decision. because we didn't have certainty that bin laden was there and there are a lot of things that can go wrong with those operations. and you know secretary gates has a lot of experience in government. he was in the white house for our failed attempt to rescue the hostages in iran sos that was very much on their mind and i'm sure when our helicopter had a crash landing, he particularly had some special memories. >> rose: did you for a moment say oh my god, when that helicopter -- >> i took a breath for a second. but then when i saw our troops get right out of it and get back with business i say okay that part is over. and then the question is is he there. he was very very confident

in expressing my views that this operation, this is the right way to do the operation. and this could succeed and we just have magnificent troops magnificent commander doing it. i was quite confident in the intelligence and so that's the advice i gave to the secretary. but as you mentioned, there were others without gave that advice as well. and elise ened very carefully. and you know accepted our advice. >> rose: adam mccraven told me said to the president we can do this this is what we do. we get on a helicopter and we go somewhere. and we either capture or kill people and we come back. that's what we do. >> uh-huh. that's right. and they-- you know, they had done that many times in afghanistan and iraq. there were other missions that night in afghanistan that were also challenging. so the key question was was the intelligence right and as always the case things can go wrong. so when are you 200 miles into another country you know, you hope that

everything goes right. but there were-- meticulous planning for this. a lot of contingencies prepared. and admiral mccraven was just a fabulous commander and dear friend. >> rose: two other things before we talk about contemporary issues other than what the president said today. you are green barratt. >> i was. >> rose: did you-- beret. >> rose: did you take a nuclear weapon strapped to your back? >> well, no --. >> rose: what is it that you did that seemed so extraordinary? >> well, i don't know that it was extraordinary. but-- . >> rose: to strap a nuclear weapon to your back is not extraordinary? >> well so in the cold war you know, we had-- there was-- it was very very different period. >> rose: yeah. >> and so from the 1950s to the 1980s we had nuclear weapons of all sorts. so besides the ones that everybody knows that bombers or intercontinental missiles could do artillery shells a range of other things.

so some smaller ones could be used by special forces behind enemy lines in the event that you needed to do something that required a little more than regular explosives. this of course would have been a big decision as with any nuclear weapon for a president to make. and so you have to train with them to know how to operate them safely. you still have two-man rules for control for these things. and et cetera. but part of it is how to get it in. and so some of us had to learn to parachute with it. and so i got to do that a few times. >> rose: then there is the afghan war in which you and charlie wilson and others drove the soviet union out of afghanistan by supporting the mudge what dean. >> uh-huh -- mujahadeen. >> uh-huh. >> rose: how proud of are you of that in your career of in addition security?

>> extraordinarily proud in a sense that it was really the job of a lifetime. i was a fairly young man at the time. >> rose: about 32 or 3. >> in my early --. i had come out of the special forces into the central intelligence agency. and it was a remarkble time. and i was-- i had great bosses. i was given opportunity to develop a strategy that worked. well so it was-- there was-- the war was in its fifts year at that point. like a lot of insurgencys you know insurgents were getting wary. but there was also-- because of charlie wilson and others, there was a buildup of resources and so it caused a review of strategy about was this the right amount and should we just continue to see this as something that would impose costs on the sof yets but there was really no chance of winning. you know, the soviets up to that point when they had occupied an area they did

it successfully. and so that was the general believe, that there was no chance of winning. policy turned in early 1985. president reagan signed on a famous national security decision directive that i had a role in in drafting from cia's point of view. and it was to drive the soft yet-- soviets out of afghanistan by all means possible. we added more resources. we changed a lot of the weapons we provided. we provided training. did a lot of things differently or new and within 12 months the soviets started looking for the exit sign. both sides essentially escalated. >> rose: because the mujahadeen could chute helicopter out of the sky. >> the cull principle ating was the american surface-to-air missile -- portable surface missile but there are were a bunch of other things too.

and gorbachev-- gorbachev had come in march of 85. he escalated at the same time as we did. and we prevailed. >> rose: what is the greatest threat to our national security? >> it depends really on the time frame you're looking at. so the first point is that since i began my career in this business as a special forces soldier in 197 , i have never seen as many challenges to our national security. >> rose: at the same time. >> at the same time that are likely to be enduring and are difficult problemsment and a number of other leaders, jim clapper our director of national intelligence has said the same thing so it is's not novel to me. fundamentally there are three challenges to the world order. this is a period of unprecedented instablts and transition from one world to another. and so in europe as you mentioned, you have a resurgent or re-- russia

conducting aggression in ukraine but its ultimate aim is to refashion the european order in some ways pore favorable to its interests. and gain control more of the area's around its periphery. >> rose: and is it your judgement that they had a plan to do this, or after what happened in ukraine and seeing that the leader of ukraine, because of protests was forced to flee to moscow, putin said wait a minute let's going on here? >> it's both. it's exactly that. some of it is opportunity reacting toian cove i've -- yanakovich sudden ouster from their point of view. but also part of a broader strategic-- . >> rose: was it unexpected from your point of view. >> yes, honestly. he was clearly on the ropes but that he would give up that day, that is always a hard problem in intelligence and that was honestly a

surprise. a very pleasant surprise. >> rose: the russian leader thinks that it was not a surprise, that in fact america's hand was in it. >> well, that's what he thinks but it's not accurate. >> rose: not accurate. >> it's not accurate. and then the second challenge to the world order is really first and foremost in the middle east by sunni extremists who really want to remake the whole place. but the middle east is also beset by sectarian conflict proxy wars regional power rivalries. across a number of states to state system under a lot of pressure. the states are collapsing. but also being reordered in some way. and then-- . >> rose: has libyan been a good example. >> libya being an example. more ungoverned areas. syria as well big parts of syria. yemen now big parts, as well. but then in east asia you have the rise of china. great event for the maybe the most significant event of the 2 1s century as we

look back. great for the chinese people in terms of lifting many of them out of poverty. great for the global economy. but history teaches us that when you have rising powers and in an international system you have to manage it carefully. so those three challenges occurring simultaneously are the big strategic problems. >> rose: since russia, sunni extremism and china. >> and other factors that bring instability to the middle east and competition. but sunni extremism in terms of reordering. then if you look at just near and present dangers what do i worry about every night, it's terrorist attack on the united states or a cyberattack on the united states. so those are the clear and present dangers. but not necessarily the longer term strategic geo political. so that's why i was saying it depends kind of on your time frame which one will be more significant when we

have all three to deal with. >> rose: i would add to that i would suggest the proliferation of nuclear weapons. >> it is. so weapons of mass destruction in general and their associated delivery systems. and particularly states that might use them in some way is another factor as well. complicating things in those regions, particularly in the middle east but also in the korean peninsula that we worry about as well. and it's not just limited to nuclear weapons down the road you may have advanced biological capabilities. >> rose: is that big. >> i think it is in the long run just because of the revolution and biotechnology is going to make so much possible mostly good but also some dark sides to it as well. and so something people need to pay attention to much like cyberweapons are an offshoot of a tremendous revolution and information technology that benefits us enormously. >> rose: one said maybe robert gates that the thing they fear the most was

somehow a nuclear weapon falling in the hands of a terrorist. >> sure. that's the nightmare scenario because you have an actor willing to use it. a nilist in some respects with a dangerous weapon. >> rose: give me a scenario. >> it would generally be an inside job where a state that had access to that kind of capability then made that available to a terrorist group through infiltration that then would be the danger. i mean-- . >> rose: do they steal it? >> they would steal it. then the question is once it's out of the barn, then you can recover it quickly enough. it becomes a challenging problem. >> rose: and do they have a means of delivering i assume would be an issue too. >> it would be like any terrorist operation, it would be a smuggling effort. and so can you get it from where you stole it from to where you want to employ it. and you know that depends on the range. >> rose: are we safe from

that in terms of-- if that happens, say someone steals a nuclear weapon from pakistan or north korea or-- how would they get it to the united states? and would they come through the ports in some way? >> well that would-- . >> rose: what is the most vulnerable place we are. >> we have spent a lot of effort in the last couple of decades trying to shore up our ability. i can't go into great detail in that. but again, the challenge for a group like that would be how do i get it from where i acquired it to the united states. >> rose: iran. >> uh-huh. do you feel good about the tentative agreement that we have in terms of reducing sanctions over a period of time in terms of putting-- a ceiling on their centrifuges. >> rose: so the iranians for some time have developed a series of capabilities so that they could get close to a threshold that if they ever made the decision to have a nuclear cap ability

that they could in short order, that they would have the records of components of enriched uranium that they then could further enrich to turn it from loewen riched to weapons grade delivery systems, the technology to make the weapon and the delivery system, et cetera in fairly short order. and some of those time lines could be as short as a few months to go from the loewen riched uranium to highly enriched. >> rose: so where are they now? >> so in any event what this-- well, they made strides as they built their capacity and acquired material that they could have done this in a couple of months. >> rose: could have done what in a couple of months? >> go from the low-- one component of a system. and what this agreement does then is extend that time line through inspections through removement of material, through reductions of capacity. and one of our great diplomats who retired a year

ago, ambassador bill burns. >> rose: here at the table. >> really has outlined this of why you know this may not be the perfect deal but it does extend that time line which is something we care about, and impose-- . >> rose: so you agree with the conclusions. >> yes i agree with bill's conclusions. and now that doesn't mean that you know, as you said, there's also big benefits in having an intrusive inspection regime to prevent-- to insurance that they're complying with it. that's always been a benefit of arms control. and so that would work in our favor too. whether it modified ron's behavior enough in terms of the mischief they make around the region separate from the nuclear deal you know we certainly hope that's the case as they rejoin the international community. >> rose: do you think they're interested in that? >> right now they're

sponsoring proxy wars in a number of areas in syria in yemen, supporting the iraqi government others well. and so is we'll see. i mean i certainly hope that's the case but-- . >> rose: but there's no evidence of that now. >> there's no evidence that they're backing off from those other strategicals rights now. >> what is the connection between the nuclear agreement and the reduction of their support of groups like hezbollah? do we hope that they will change their behavior if this may be a first step in terms of a constructive relationship with iran? >> well, that would certainly be the strategic-- a strategic goal in the long run. they have had a 30 plus year relationship with hezbollah. and so they're unlikely to abandon that completely. it really is a two-sided issue. you know on the one hand

if a state has nuclear weapons, generally it feels more immune from attack and therefore it can do other things. support these proxy wars for example, with more freedom of action than they otherwise might have. you know, on the other hand the more that they have benefits from the system the they may moderate their foreign policy behavior if they're going to jeopardize, get sanctions back on them or something else. the reduction of sanctions will also give them more resources that they could deploy. so it really depends on really their strategic outlook and their behavior and what they feel they have at stake. >> rose: if you look at the deal that has been done we get interpretations on the one hand by secretary query and a very different sperption from what cho mainee seems to say-- khameni

seems to say about the deal some that expected because they are speaking to different audiences. >> in iran's case you have domestic policy considerations. >> rose: well, here too. >> yes, but some of this is bargaining. you know once you get the framework agreement and you get a new 90 day clock, what really counts is you get close to the end of the clock as we saw with the framework agreement. you know negotiators are going to say all kinds of things to try to strengthen their position early on. and but i believe the supreme leader of iran certainly is interested in getting sanctions lifted. >> rose: could they delay themselves too a bomb? the fear is that somehow never's negotiating their way into a possession of a nuclear weapon. >> well, again it's been an objective for them to have the company ability to develop one. but they haven't chosen to do that at this point. because presumably because of fear of the consequences. >> rose: okay, but help me

understand. what does that mean the capability. because we have this consideration about centrifuges that will give you enriched uranium up to 5%, say. >> yeah. >> rose: but not up to 90 which is what they need. and looking at today's circumstances, three months away to get it up to 90. but when you say they have the capability. >> well so again so, what they have tried to do you know, to have a deliverable system, you have to have a delivery system or effective weapon system. you have to have the material. you have to have the weapons. take the material and make -- and put it in-- . >> rose: the weaponization. >> put it in a good design that it will actually work and you have confidence that it will work. you have to then make that and have confidence that it will survive when you put it on a missile, for example. and of course you have to develop the missile as well. all those parts have to work together. what the iranians have been doing over time is to try to develop each of these components to varying degrees to be closer to if they

ever made a decision to have a deliverable weapon that they could keep that time as short as possible but not actually do it. so right what you have is a number of incomplete parts some further along than others, but all of them inches forward. and the goal of trying to get them together. what the nuclear agreement would do would push one of those back further. and therefore extend the time line of the whole system. >> rose: push back the material. >> the material part of it. the material available the capacity to do it quickly as well. >> rose: do we believe they have missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons? >> they certainly have missiles with the range. again, the challenge is not just having the missile but having a weapon that fits in the missile and then can survive. >> rose: let me turn to russia. >> uh-huh. >> rose: we mentioned hugh crane.

so-- ukraine. so what do they want? >> so they do not want a ukraine that goes to the west, that joins nato that is fully economically integrated into the west. and that also i believe that might provide an example for what russia ought to do. which is have a democratic government have better integration with the west be bellicose, and so i think a fundamental concern of a lot of leaders like putin and kim jung-un is the personal survival, the survival of themselves in power and the regimes they have. so to some extent ukraine moving to the west is a threat to that. and they have historical interests there, as well. so their goal is to keep it in their orbit.

>> rose: do we stop putin if he decides he wants to go beyond ukraine? >> well, you know anything on his periphery he enjoys proximity and manages. any time you have geographical advantages exactly. and any time you get into any conflict whether it's proxy war or conventional war, whatever it is the relative degree of interest in it also matters. you know, so for instance vietnam war. vital interest to the north vietnamese. certainly a big interest of ours. but not something that we would just sacrifice indefinitely or pay any price for. and so you have to look at it through that length. that said you know, as you mentioned earlier, a democratic and economically prosperous ukraine or any other country in the world

is a core american value if that's what people determine that they want and they ought to have that right to do that. >> rose: henry kissinger an others have sat at the chair you sit in and suggested that, you know we have to recognize that russia has a historic interest in ukraine. >> uh-huh. >> rose: you know. and that we shouldn't necessarily expect that not to be and that some understanding has to come that ukrainians need a democracy. and ukrainians need to make their own future. >> uh-huh. >> rose: and not be dictated by somebody else. >> right. >> rose: but at the same time, there are historic fears of influence. >> right. so if you combine the traditional real,-- realist thinking about fears of influence with certainly 21st century 20th century i would argue as well, liberal democratic values about self-determination of

peoples, then you have to reconcile those two ideas sometimes. and that's why the questions about security policy of a state versus its political structure or economic integration may differ. so finland during the cold war, there is a famous phrase, finlandization they were largely in the west but they had a foreign policy that-- . >> rose: was essentially neutral. >> that essentially didn't irritate their neighbor. and is you know states that live in neighbors hoods like that sometimes have to make those choices. but without sacrificing the core principleses. >> does the united states government consider is a putin an entirely rational person? and not necessarily to use mesianic in terms of how he feels about mother russia? >> well, i will just offer my own-- . >> rose: an intelligence question. >> i will offer my own views

on that. people yes, i think he is a very calculating strategist. in that sense quite rational. he also has rather ambitious goals in terms of restoring russian strength as a great power. restoring its influence. recreating as much of the space of the former soviet union as he possibly can. and so that fact presents a challenge to the eurakian order in that those countries are independent now and are free to choose their own destinies so, that makes him in a sense a revolutionary leader or state, even if it's rational. it's still dangerous. >> he seems to have popular support. >> he does have popular support at home right all

though that could change. >> what would change that sanctioned? >> certainly the russian economy has suffered from decline in oil prices from sanctions. and the long-term prospects are pretty grim if they don't modernize, if they're not integrated with the rest of the world. >> and if they don't have an economy that is not dependent on one thing. >> nod depent end on one thing, exactly. >> what is the threat of isil? >> isil grew out of al qaeda and iraq it was an al qaeda franchise. it had been knocked down through the iraq war about 90%. so its strength decreased by 90%. >> and they had gotten their leader. >> right, multiple leaders had been taken as well between the period of 2006. you're referring to al czar carry, but then there were others as well through 2010

before the current leader. and but what saved them, essentially, it's always hard to drive these groups down to zero or completely take them apart is the syrian of war so, a lot of the leadership had-- some of the alliances that they made with former bathists and others were already in syria and the syrians opened up a lot of space for them. and then the combination of disenchantment with sunni population and iraq then allowed them-- . >> rose: the sunni population in iraq was disenchanted with the shi'a government. >> particularly as time want on. from the period of the uprising to 2014 when they really did their attacks across iraq. >> rose: what happened with the coming of the syrian civil war? >> so they were able to

number one attract recruits in syria. syria has more foreign feithers going into it against the assad regime than ever went into iraq against u.s. forces and the iraqi government there. >> it includes al nous ra includes isil includes -- >> well, if you just looked at it in terms of you know as i said the rate of flow is two to three times. if you just look at it in quantitative terms. but it's from 90 some countries from all over the world. european. >> rose: the fighters. >> the fighters come from everywhere. and they will join whatever group is there. but it tends to be more the extremeist groups. >> rose: so why did isil become so strong in syria? >> so they again they-- were in an area where the regime didn't have a lot of control historically and then they were able to build up their forces with a lot of these recruits.

and then peel off other opposition groups to them and the combination has got them quite big so, they have increased their size between syria and iraq by many many many fold from what they were three four years ago. >> rose: how have they been able to do that partly because of social media partly because of -- >> yes, social media is a way to attract a lot but also battlefield victories and joining their size. >> did they have great help from former saddam hussein generals who-- and colonels who -- >> they did. >> who never made their peace with what happened because the shi'a win control. >> they did. but also you know the first thing they did when they went back into iraq was in the western iraq the area of the uprising anbar and that took some time. that took some months to actually you know took back some cities that we fought very hard for fallujah and others.

but then they really had a blitzkrieg in the north. iraqi security forces collapsed in the wake of them. and part of that was sunni disenchantment. it wasn't-- you ask yourself the question how do 2,000 3,000 filers take over a large swathe of territory against a much bigger army. it's because the army disintegrates and because the population is pretty alienated. and you know and that's how you get that big force multiplyer. >> so they fled from mosul. >> they went essentially where their line of advance stopped was essentially where the sectarian bundries as it started shifting from sunni to shiite. >> rose: then they became less. >> then they became less cap ability-- capable-- capable,. and again if you look at al qaeda and iraq's history with their brutal tactics and governance which isil does in spades the population is tired of them

already. it's a question of when they can do something about it. it took some years for the uprising to occur the last time. >> rose: when will that be? >> well, i hope it's soon. you know again-- . >> rose: how will you make it-- how will you-- . >> what will happen to make that as soon as possible. >> so one the attacks against ice ill the air campaign that are you doing to increase forces is a fair amount. >> rose: has limited possibility, limited potential though does if not? without ground force. >> in the end it is not going to be dereceived on its own that's right. but it shapes the battlefield and then the buildup of ground forces to retake these areas, but then to make it stick, you have to have good governance. otherwise you are back where you were. >> rose: do we have that now? >> we're working. >> rose: well, i mean. >> they have it-- the iraqi prime minister was just here and he was probably at the pentagon. >> yeah. >> rose: he surely was at the white house. >> right. >> rose: and he surely was at the congress.

>> right. >> rose: and i talked to him before he left. >> yes and every u.s. leader is given the same passage -- message about the importance of, you know inclusiveness and sharing. >> and needing sport. >> and needing sport exactly right. >> where are the ground troops going to come interest? >> part of it is-- . >> rose: it's racki army. >> the iraqi pardon meee is the main element responsive to the state. you also have these militias that have been stood up for the defense of baghdad. >> rose: shi'a militias. >> that's right. >> rose: now what is the role of iraq? i mean iran? >> iran has been supporting those militias. and they had an offensive that did not succeed against tikrit and then the coalition actually was successful. >> rose: explain that to me. they had an offensive that did not succeed in tikrit. i thought they were part of the effort to drive isil out of tikrit, that militia supported by the iranians

had helped drive out isil in tikrit. that that was a success for them and then later american air strikes came in coalition air strikes to buttress their effort. >> more or less. but-- . >> rose: where am i less? >> they have supported these militia. they were originally doing it on their own. they did not succeed. you know there is this perception that we cooperate with the iranians we don't. >> what does that mean we don't. we don't cooperate at all. >> we don't share intelligence. >> nothing. >> who gives it to us the iraqis. >> as i said we have a pretty capable intelligence community that collects things and our commanders have a lot of tools at their disposal. >> and russia. >> so the iranian lead offensive didn't succeed in tikritment it couldn't take tikrit so iranian went to

the coalition an said could you help us do this and the coalition did support it and it was successful. so then to your points where there members of the militia forces with the iraqi army yes, but under the control of the government of iraq supported by -- >> the prime minister of iraq said to me that iranian -- there is a difference in the american advisors and the iranian advisors. the iranian advisors are on the front line and the american advisors are not. what are iranian advisors doing on the front line? >> trying to move their troops. >> their troops. >> they are the troops that are supporting. >> the troops they are supporting are the shi'a militias. >> so the iranian advisors are on the front lines attic rit advising the shi'a militias. >> yes, but they weren't successful and we were is what i would say. and the prime minister knows that. >> rose: and we were successful because we provided a kind of air strikes that turned the tide of the battle. >> yes. that enabled the iraqi

security forces under the control of the prime minister to achieve his end. >> rose: let me turn to syria. also in the last month i was in syria to see a saad talk to him. >> uh-huh. >> rose: he very much wants to say to america we need to work together on this because we can stop isil and i have the syrian army and i hope you have changed your mind about everthrowing me for the time being so we can focus on isil. >> uh-huh. >> rose: what do you say to that? >> i would say that he has again a policy matter, i will just give you the perspective of various regional actors and my own. he has lost legitimacy to govern by the brutal way he has done that. and you know he's benefitted as his father did from minority rule over a

broader population sunnies particularly but other groups as well and their needs to be a political transition. it's hard to see how you can put syria back together in any form. or get after the terrorism problem, ultimately or bring it to a conclusion without a government that really has legitimacy and the support of its population. >> so you can't bring it to a conclusion without a government that has the support of its population. >> right, so if you look at-- even if you just focused on for example the multifaceted terrorist problem we have there, isil al qaeda puts other extremist groups potentially forming coalitions with them or supporting them, at the end of the day just as you mentioned in previous, you have to have ground forces to control the territory. you have to have a ground

force in syria that shares those aims. and also then you know is not-- is able to control the territory at some point. and the syrian reg i am can't do that. >> who is winning the war on the ground. >> it's a stalemate right now. >> it's a very destructive war in terms of humanitarian crisis, is enormous. >> 3 million people at least. >> millions, even more displaced people both internally then to neighboring countries conditions are horrendous it's hard to get aid to people. so the regime periodically has games the opposition has games. but it's basically a stalemate. >> one of the great historic questions is whether we should have struck rather than making a deal and come up with weapons. >> there are other policymakers and as you said historians look on that come to what ever judgements

they want. i think there have been benefits in getting the chemical weapons out. and i also think it's part of a much broader context than that specific decision. had there been a limited strike over the conventional weapons syria would not be fundamentally different. the strategic choices that we have about whether we have a-- which our coalition partners care greatly b whether we have an opposition that is actually capable of bringing about a political transition in syria is really the more fundamental question. >> do we-- not yetment but again. >> do you think it's possible that you can? >> i till think it's possible, yes. >> can you build a moderate force. >> yes, again you know if you look at the-- get

their-- a lot of terrorists there that we have to deal with. and we are but to get to a stable successful outcome you're going to have to have a strong moderate opposition that then becomes a transition government that you can work with. and if you look at the afghan program in the 80s it took us seven years before or-- six to seven years before we turned the tide. we're in year four of syria and you know so that i think is really the fundamental question is can we build that opposition. without fueling terrorists and achieve our aims. >> how ironic is that some of the people that you know and supported in afghanistan some from the hakani group turned out to be bitter enemies of the united

states. people you know. >> uh-huh. >> well, there are a number of -- fortunately, i have friends in the afghan government that were former commanders as well. but it is a certainly an irony and it's one of the interesting things having participated in that period to come back in a different role and -- >> trying to kill each other. >> trying to kill each other. >> and then you were trying to drive the russians out together. >> right. right. >> rose: and out of that group, osama bin laden. >> yes now one of the series of things had to happen in of afghanistan after the russians leferts to bring about al qaeda using it as a big sanctuary. taliban had to come they to invite him in, et cetera. but i think as former secretary gates has said

you know, we, one of the big mistakes we paid after the cold war was not staying engaged if that region. >> i think that was the last message of carl-year wilson wasn't it sm. >> it was, it was indeed. >> sour's leaving, april 30th. >> uh-huh. >> private citizen. >> i will be a private citizen. >> and will you write a book? >> i might. i'm going to do some speaking and writing and some different things. >> and if you had to give on may 1st a last lecture about your experience within the intelligence communities, what would you want to say other than it's vital role? >> it does play a vital role in a lot of ways. sometimes it provides extraordinarily high leverage options like afghanistan in the 1980s. and others today that really protect our national security. it really is our nation's first line of defense. and if you look at the situation today where we have so many diverse challenges wide array of

challenges and they're very serious once then the important intelligence is arguably more important than it has been in several decades. >> rose: different today? >> it is different. >> rose: how is it different? >> because it evolves based on technology t evolves based on the problems we have. it is a very different community in terms of capabilities today than what i knew, it's far more int sgrated. one agency doesn't really do everything. >> and terrorism has made strange bedfellows. >> and terrorism has certainly been job one for the intelligence community since, and continues to be. >> rose: and then there is yemen, what is going to happen in yemen where you have got iran and saudi arabia on very different sides and saudi arabia -- >> and a serious terrorist problem and probably the most dangerous al qaeda franchise in yemen. >> because they are prepared to attack the united states or some other reason?

>> because they are trying to attack the united states and they have probably the most advanced capabilities to do so. >> rose: in terms of the bombing capacity. >> in terms of bombing capacity. >> the leading bomb maker in the terrorist world is in yemen. >> the leading bomb make certificate in yemen yes. >> tell me why you can't get him? >> we're trying awful hard. >> i know you are. >> it took awhile to get osama bin laden. >> what does that mean trying awfully hard it means trying to figure out a way to get access? to find him? >> it means for a variety of reasons what we say in the counterterrorism world is we finds, we then fix to where we can keep track of him when we have him. and then we finish. either capture or kill whatever is feasible. you know we always try to do capture. sometimes it's not feasible. >> rose: where are you on this question about what intelligence we learned from interrogations at guantanamo

and other places lead to bin laden in combination with other intelligence. >> so i think through you know some of the analysis is made clear by cia, we did get intelligence from those programs that helped us understand al qaeda. that lead to a number of disruptions and including played a role in the path to osama bin laden. >> played a role in the path to bin laden. >> well helped us identify really focus in on certain aspects of the courier that would lead us to him. now whether you could have got that through some other means, whether the strategic downsides of that program outweighed the intelligence benefits that's for others to judge.

but i think there was very valuable intelligence that came out of that. >> rose: thank you for coming. >> my pleasure. >> rose: much success to you. >> thank you. >> rose: thank you for joining us, see you next time. >> for more about this program and earlier episodes bring visit us on-line at pbs.org and charlie rose.com. captioning sponsored by rose communications captioned by media access group at wgbh access.wgbh.org

>> rose: additional funding provided by: >> and by bloomberg, a provider of multimedia news and information services worldwide. >> on tomorrow's pbs newshour best selling author jon ca cawer an his new book on campu

this is "nighlty business re" with tyler mathisen and sue herera. 15 years in the making the nasdaq closes topping the.com era high and reports could set the tone for tomorrow. >> message to the market what caterpillar, and procte biggest global companies are saying about the health of the world ec why this earnings season is turning out to be a big one for small caps. all of that and more tonight on "nighlty business re" for this thursday april the 23rd. good evening, everybody and welcome. i'm bill g tonight for tyler mathisen. >> and i'm sue herera. the nasdaq closed at an all-time high. we'll have more on