>> rose: welcome to the program, tonight mike morell former deputy director of the cia his book is called "the great war of our time the cia's fight against terrorism from al qaeda to isis" >> three missions, right the cua carl c.e.o.. one is collecting secrets that people are trying to keep from us rate? >> rose: right. >> because they're doing stuff that is trying to underminus, right? the second is what i grew up doing, right all source analysis. putting all of this stuff together and telling the president how to think about the world. and the third is covert action. >> rose: mike morell for the hour, next. funding for charlie rose is provided by the following: >> rose: additional funding provided by:

>> and by bloomberg, a provider of multimedia news and information services worldwide. captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. mike morell is here, he is the cia's former deputy director and acting director. he retired from the agency in 2013 after 33 years of service, he has played a central role in some of the most pivotal events in recent history. he was with president bush on september 11th 12001 when terrorists attacked parker. he was also in the white house situation room on may 1st, to 11 the day bin laden was killed. he writes about his experiences and also about counterterrorism missions in a new book. the book is called the great war of our time the cia's fight against terrorism from al qaeda to isis. i am pleased to have mike morell back at this table. welcome. >> thank you charlie.

it is always great to be here. >> yeah. >> why the title the great war of over time? >> because i think in some ways this challenge we face against islamic extrial-- extreme imp ideology is in some way a akin to the cold war. and i call the great war for that reason am i also call it the great because of the time frame we're tacking about here. i believe that my children's generation and grandchildren's generation are still going to be fighting this fight. what is our goal containment if. >> i think our goal is to get to a place where this is no longer a military problem or a paramilitary problem it is a law enforcement problem. and i think when we move from the military parapill tear face to the law enforcement phase, we can say victory. >> how do we get there? >> we get there in two ways. and i talk about this in the chapter that lacks ahead. one way that we've talked about at this table before and that is that one of the real lessons learned in dealing with terrorists since 9/11 is that you have to keep the pressure on

them. when you have the pressure on them, you mick it very difficult for them to plan to train, to raise money to plot. when they have to worry about their own security they can do less damage. and so you got to-- that's what happens when you put the pressure on. as soon as you take the pressure off they rebuild they put things together again, and they do that very very quickly. so one lesson is the terrorists who already exist you got to keep the pressure on them all the time. the other part is something we do not do very well at all. and that is stop the production of new terrorists, right? we stop the radicallization process. and that is really tough to do, really tough to get your arms around. >> and where is that battlefield? >> that battlefield is is in the schools in muslim countries. it is in the mosques in muslim countries it is in the homes in muslim countries, right. >> rose: and on-line. >> and on-line and on-line.

i talk in the book about indonesia as being a place where-- that has had quite a bit of success in this regard. with programs in schools with programs to support programming on television an on the radio programs to support the arts. all with a passage of tolerance in religion. all with a message of looking at both sides of an issue. and one of the interesting facts is that the number of indonesians who have gone to fight in syrian and iraq for isis is less than the number that have gone from united states canada australia. it's remarkable for the largest muslim country in the world. >> rose: it makes them not lacking-- they're not seduced by the argument. >> one of the things they're doing in school when they talk about the palestinian problem they're talking about it they're providing the palestinian perspective which they always did but also providing the israeli perspective. so this is very important for these countries to get

their arms around. there is not a lot we can do about this as a country because we don't have a lot of credibility talking about these issues. >> so it requires an accelerated effort by mugs limb countries. >> yes. >> and by muslim leaders by presidents by prime ministers, by leading clerics. one of the places where this is starting to happen is president sisi in egypt is starting to talk about these issues with his public. really, really important. >> rose: and king abdul a in jordan has done this. >> yes. >> i want to talk about politics as well. let me stay with isis for a second watch. do we foe about the leadership and is it changing? because i read today that they-- that the leader of isis was injured in a strike. >> yes. >> rose: is has that been confirmed by the united states? >> i don't know if it's confirmed but you know one of the questions out there-- . >> rose: we on the know. >> one of the questions is is he alive or is he dead. i think if he were dead we

would all know it because they would stand up and announce it because they what pant to-- want to portray him as the draet martyr that is the model the precedent we have seen before with these groups so i think he's been injured. i don't know how seriously. you about i think he's been injured. this is a pretty tight knit leadership team. a lot of command and control. so taking out leadership here is really important because, because it's so small and so tight knit and such command and control you can do real damage. >> at what level do the former iraqi-- who work for saddal hussein. >> probably second-tier. >> when you turn to them in the he cutement and all this they are doing -- re-- recruitment and all this they are doing whose responsibility is it to fight that. what part of government should do that? >> so state department has an effort that's focused on this right. it has never been particularly well-funded. it has never been particularly well resourced.

you know, for a couple of good reasons. one is that you have to-- your first instinct, your first priority is to deal with the guys who are coming at you to kill you right? that has to be priority number one. and so the dealing with longer term radicalization always becomes a second priority. the other reason is as i said earlier, this is not something the united states can do on its own. i think the best we can hope for is to kind of is to kind of put out best practices and talk to arab leaders, offline president to president president to prime minister about what's working and what's not. and kind of organized effort in an informal way. >> rose: you seem to be in all that you write and all that i know from you increasingly alarmed about the possibility of a 9/11 kind of attack whatever variation it might be on the united states, of which i assume the ultimate attack would be some kind of dirty bomb or something.

>> right. so i am concerned about an attack in the homeland tomorrow. >> why are you more concerned? what is it that makes you see a rising fear of that attack? >> a couple of reasons rightment one is one is what's happened so the most significant threat today to our homeland comes not from isis but it comes from al qaeda in the arabiya peninsula, al qaeda in yemen. >> because they focus on us. >> we talked about that before. because they focus on it because they have this particularly highly skilled bomb maker who can make bombs that can be hidden in things, right. so they're the biggest threat today. and what's happening in yemen is giving them greater room to maneuver. we're having a harder time collecting intelligence. we're having a harder time denying them safe haven. we're having a harder time taking them off the battlefield. we're still conducting drone operations in yemen. >> that is a good thing as far as you are concerned. >> that is a good thing as far as i'm concern. and we can come back and

talk about that if you want. but by virtue of the civil warnd way, the chaos under way in yemen they will gain strength, right. and they have the capability today, i believe to bring down an airliner give them some more room, and they could have the capability to do something more significant. isis right isis today doesn't have the capability to conduct a significant attack here. they can motivate people. they can direct small scale attacks. but given time they'll be able to do something larger here. and you know, if you look at what's happening in iraq right we've taken back about 25% of the territory that they took when they did their blitzkrieg across iraq. so we're having some success in iraq. we should feel good about that. >> we took back tikrit. >> we took back tikrit but we've had virtually no success in syria in taking back if i territory. and so what's happening is you're having progress in

iraq. no progress in syria. you have a hammer in iraq but no anvil in syria. so as you put increased pressure on these guys in iraq they're going to come back across the border and go into syria. and unless you have a plan to deal with them in syria they're going to have safe haven there, where they will get stronger. >> so what's the plan. >> the plan at the moment is to train moderate opposition fighters, right to train and equip them to take on isis and then take on assad right, but we're having a very difficult time finding moderate opposition guys to actually train. and even if we could find them, we could not train them in my view in the numbers that we would need to train them by. >> so what do we do? >> i don't have an answer to that. >> that's the questionment right, because the air strikes only take you so far. right? and the air strikes stop in advance. they strengthen a ground

force as you're going in and trying to take back territory. but air strikes by themselves can't take back territory. you have to have a ground force. we have that in iraq right in the way of the iraqi troops and shi'a militia trained by the iranians. we don't have that in syria. >> i want to talk pore about saudi arabia later and changes there. but one reflection of the change in leadership from the new king new crown prince and new deputy crown prince, seeming to be a more aggressive military posture. you saw it in yemen. and you see it in terms of how they view the conflict with iran. my question is what are they prepared to do in syria to build up moderate forces to take on isis and the assad see assad removed. >> so they've been focused on that for quite some time right. they were providing funding large amounts of funding and some arms to the moderate

opposition in syria. >> and how about to islamists. >> it wasn't enough. the saudis no. others, yes. but the saudi's no. what happened in syria is really that big chunks of the moderate opposition left the moderate opposition to go fight for al-nusra largely and isis why because they were being effective against assad. and the moderate opposition itself was not. so they-- they, a bunch of guys stood up and said i'm going to go fight for somebody that's making a difference. >> rose: so they went to al-nusra. >> so the moderate opposition got smaller and smaller and smaller and smaller. >> rose: when i talk to american officials you hear more the word al-nusra than i have ever heard it before in talking about syria. >> uh-huh. >> rose: is that part of the reason? cuz they are having effectiveness against assad and therefore -- >> yes, yes. >> rose: and they're growing in strength because of that. >> they're growing in strength. and they are-- they're concerning to me because they are aligned with al

qaeda in pakistan. and because they have this group that is focused on external attacks. that's connected in some way back to yemen and getting sophisticated explosives. so that's a very serious group. and the stronger you know back to my 9/11 condition the stronger al-nusra gets and the more they think about external attacks, the more comfortable they get the more dangerous they are to us here in the homeland. >> i want to connect this in the development of isis and al-nusra to the arab spring. what you write about in this book is an indictment of the cia's failure-- well, let me finish. failure to appreciate how the arab spring would play itself out. and you are-- they were optimistic that some how this might be a wedge in the battle against terrorism. >> yes. >> okay. >> and then it didn't work out that way. >> right. >> because isis al-nusra and others, al qaeda saw an opening. >> right. >> rose: at the time of the

arab spring. >> right. >> rose: and in a sense turned it into some say the arab winter, including you and you think the cia should have been able to see that yes? >> so yes but let me say a few things okay. so yes the arab spring was a huge boon to al qaeda and i've actually titled that chapter the al qaeda spring right. we had two two analytic calls, right, to make. one analytic call was on the arab spring itself. and there we did well strategically and not so well tactically. what did we do well strategically. for a number of years our analysts were telling policymakers in this administration and the previous administration that pressures are building in arab societies for change. that that citizens in those countries are concerned about where their countries are going. they're conditioned that their children are not going to have a better future.

>> and they were fueled by the fact that social media told them what was going on the rest of the world. >> absolutely. >> rose: and there was no they said to themselves, i have a bad place here i'm in a bad place, why am i doing better and participating. >> absolutely. they were getting more and more frustrated. we were covering all that and reporting on it, so in a strategic sense we got that call right right. we didn't call the turning point, right. we didn't say,-- not that it was possible to call tunesia some guy sets himself on fair and starts this whole thing. but it what was possible in my mind was to say mr. president, the pressures are rising to unprecedented levels. we're really concerned about what is going to happen over the next six months to 12 months. we didn't do that. so yes, strategically we called it. i would say no tactically we missed the arab spring okay. once the arab spring start, the analysts said we think this is going to spread like wildfire so they got that call right. once the arab spring started we made another call.

and this was the one you referred to. we said we think this is going to undercut al qaeda. and we think it's going to undercut al qaeda because this will undercut their narrative that violence is necessary for political change. >> why didn't it? >> because and we were wrong about that. because the arab spring had created two dynamics that benefitted al qaeda. the first dynamic was it made countries unwilling to take on extremists inside their borders. giving you the best example is egypt under morsi. so my counterparts in egypt that i worked with for years still have the capabilities to deal with extremists inside egypt but they didn't feel like they had the political top cover. and so they eased off. what happened, al qaeda came back to egypt for the first time in 25 years very very

quickly. >> rose: in the person as al qaeda not the muslim brotherhood. >> as al qaeda. an they're still there. largely in the sinai today so they still haven't gotten rid of them that is how hard it is. but the other dynamic was it actually reduced the capabilities of countries to take on extremists inside their border. the best example of that is libya. so under cad avi with his intelligence service, his security service, he was very effective at dealing with extremists inside his border. when his government fell and those institutions fell apart, there was no capability any more to deal. so the arab spring was a boon to al qaeda because it reduced either the willingness or the capability of countries to deal with extremist-- extremism. now the one difference i would have over the call we made is i don't think it would have made any difference had we made the right call. i didn't think it would have made any difference had we

said mr. president we think the arab spring is going to be a boon for al qaeda. the outcome would have been exactly the same so we got the call wrong but the consequences, not that significant in my view. >> there is a feeling in some quarters in the middle east that we are less relevant today and have less capacity to influence events. >> yeah, so i think we have all the capacity we need. there is a strong feeling among our allies in the middle east that we are not showing the necessary leadership, that we're not using capacity that we have. >> rose: these are mostly sunni countries. >> these are arab sunni countries this is what everybody is talking about in terms of king salman not coming to camp david. is he sending a message right. but all of those countries all of those countries are scared to death of eye

rab-- iran. they are much more worried about iran than they are about isis or qool al qaeda. they believe they can deal with isis and al qaeda effectively just a matter of time. they're much more worried about irn over the long-term. they think-- they see charlie, they see iran as a strategic threat to them. >> rose: so what is the threat they see? >> they see which is which i agree with they see the iranians wanting to dominate the region. they see iranians, they see iran as wanting to the hedge mondayic power in the middle east. they see iran as wanting to reestablish the percent empire. they see iran as trying to overthrow. they see iran as trying to overthrow them. you know. >> rose: are they? is iran trying to overthrow the royal family in saudi arabia. >> exactly what we saw in yemen, right. they backed the-- and overthrew the hati government the iranians provide support to shi'a-- shi'a

militant groups in bahrain. >> rose: and the saudis supported the government if bahrain. >> and they provide support to shi'a insurgent groups in the eastern processes of saudi a yab-- arabia. >> rose: what is wrong with i ran wanting to exert-- exert its influence. >> two things. one is you really have to remember, i think that islamic extremism and islamic terrorism started in iran. really began in iran. >> rose: but it's mostly sunni now. >> it's mostly sunni now but believe me there are shi'a there are shi'a terrorist groups and hezbollah is at the top of the list. and hezbollah wouldn't exist without iranian support. so. >> rose: but hezbollah is more than just a terrorist group too. they are part of the government, engaged in education. >> social, blah blah blah. >> rose: blah, blah, blah makes them more affective. >> but they have a social they have a military terrorist wing correct? >> right. >> and it was utilized well in syria. >> but iran has-- . >> rose: right? >> yes. >> but iran has this has

this same kind of view in some ways not as harsh right, but the same kind of view as oom quitea in terms of a religious dominated government right sharia law dominated society. very very similar. and then the second, and you can't forget this right it is iranian government policy for israel to be wiped off the face of the planet. that is their stated policy. >> rose: sworn policy. >> sworn policy by the supreme leader himself. and you know that is not in our interest. >> and they can't-- i mean when you look at the nuclear negotiations, do you believe that part of that for example negotiation is the fact that if in fact we can reach an agreement there that it can build a more confidence in iran to be a greater part of the community of nations and be less aggressive in terms of trying to influence regimes

in the region? >> so it's a great question. you have to-- i think you have to go back and look at why do the iranians want a nuclear weapons capability or a nuclear weapon, right. some people say capability. some people say they want a weapon. >> and they say they don't. >> they say they don't at all. >> against their religion. >> then explain to me all the defense you know all the work you've done on nuclear weaponization right? there is two reasons. one is because they believe that we, the united states of america wants to overthrow the clerical regime and wants to overthrow this particular supreme leader that we want to see full-fledged democracy in iran right. >> rose: do we? >> no, we don't. >> rose: we don't want to see full-fledged. >> we do want to see a change in the behavior of the government. >> we want to see a change in behavior. >> rose: how do we think we get that would be the question. >> so i think, i think if you could convince them that you don't want to do those things that you could in

part effect their thinking about how they need to defend themselves. but there's another reason they want a weapon or cap ability for a weapon. which is as a tool to be this hegimoni:power. and this desire to be the power in the middle east is not something that this supreme leader just cooked up, right this goes way back in iranian history the shaw, this is the way the shaw thought this is rooted deeply in iranian society in iranian history. this goes way back right. and that is to the going to change overnight. >> were we prepared to give nuclear technology to the shaw? >> i don't -- i don't know the history charlie. >> rose: but i think there is some evidence we were -- >> i just don't know. >> but we viewed him. >> as our friend. >> rose: as our friend someone we would support in there. >> right. >> right. >> looking at that so now in terms of the parties the's clearly a conflict

it's clearly a conflict in which most of the sunnis that have in the-- supported in some cases isis because they thought isis was the enemy of sheer government sunni supported isis because of that. is that changing on the ground? >>? an bar province, for example, in places where it's going to be crucial to defeating isis? >> so i think there's on the part of the iraqis there is some distance here right between the iraqis and the other sunni stateds. -- states. in the case of the iraqis they're willing to allow the iranians to help wherever they can help. and iranians quite frackly has been very very effective at taking on isis. and but i think right as saudi arabia as the united arab emirates, as jordan, as

they all look at this right when they look at iraq they don't like the fact that the iranians are making a difference so they're not willing to give the iranians a short term win here in order to deal with isis. they would like the iranians out of iraq and no part of this right. because they're more worried about iran than ice is and al qaeda. >> some of the emirate countries and saudi people said they would be perfectly happy if the israeli was destroy their nuclear capabilities. >> yes. >> rose: i'm sure you have heard that when you travel around that region. >> yes, why? because the if the israeli does it then their people would be in the streets protesting against israel. if we do it their people would be in the streets protesting against us. the leadership of those countries would much prefer the protests to be against israel rather than the united states. >> rose: let me talk about history too. first of all before i leave this, do you share in the judgement of these arab nations we've been talking about, saudi arabia, the

emirates, and some others that they are concerned about the president and his intent and his will against iran and against terrorist forces. >> there is a-- . >> rose: are they prepared to criticize the president is what i'm saying. >> i'm to the going to criticize him because i don't know enough to. but what i was going to say is there is a perception in the middle east this i do know. there is a perception in the middle east. and the reason i'm to the going to criticize it because i don't know whether the perception is true. there is a perception in the middle east that the president has a view that iran may be a more natural long-term partner for the unites states in the middle east than the sunni arab countries. >> rose: a perception that this president believes that. >> a perception in the region that this president believes that. now the reason i'm not going

to criticize him. >> rose: you don't know whether he believes it or not. >> i never heard him say that. i never heard him say that when i was working for him. >> rose: you have had anybody in the government say that? >> not too me. >> rose: so no one in the government has said to you we're more interested in a long-term relationship with iran. >> correct. >> rose: but you're saying that the sunni-- saudi arabia and jordan and others believe that. >> there is concern there. >> rose: they believe it. >> yes, yes. >> rose: now is there-- is that part of the reason that king salman is not coming to the summit here? >> so i think we just have to be a little bit careful right. because he told secretary kerry he was coming. and then he decided he want coming. so i think we have to be a little careful that this is an official snub. we may learn in a few days that there are other reasons health reasons, perhaps. >> rose: in if you say that i suggest that-- my assumption would be that people in the region have suggested that, health reasos. >> possibly. it's possible. >> rose: because of his age and because of health experience. >> correct. but i would say that there

are deep concerns right in saudi arabia about the united states's willingness to stand up to everything the iranians are doing. so whether or not it's an intentional snub i don't think is as relevant as understanding the way the saudis are thinking about this. >> rose: i have heard people say that the saudis are as bad as iran is. >> i don't believe that right. saudi arabia does not practice terrorism as a tool of state craft. saudi arabia does not support international terrorist groups. saudi arabia does not want to wipe israel off the face of the planet. >> rose: there's no-- there's no-- you accept that is what their policy is because they say that the iranians to wipe israel off the face of the earth. >> and, and because they conduct terrorism against israel themselves the ircg force, they are a covert

action force and they support hezbollah and hezbollah stated reason for existence is for israel to go away. so you know putting both of those things together, they not only say the words but they actually-- . >> rose: and hamas as well. >> an hamas as well. >> rose: so egypt how is egypt doing now under sysy. >> i think-- under sisi. >> i think it is doing better under sisi than president morsi. i think president morsi was taking the country to ruin. so i believe what the egyptian military did and what president sisi did was-- was for the good of the future of egypt. >> rose: and what is their relationship with them? >> you know, i think we're over now the fact that he conducted a coup essentially, although nobody would call it that that is what he did. >> it is real politic isn't it. >> yup. i think we're over that now. i think we're again providing the egyptians with all the support we were providing them before and i think that's very important. >> rose: let me go back and talk about you and the cia. 33 years ago.

>> yes. >> rose: 33 years. >> 33 years, yes. >> rose: you joined when? >> i joined in 1980 right out of college rr why? >>-- . >> rose: why? >> james bonds or something. >> no, no no nothing like that, charlie. i wanted to go to grad school, get a ph.d in economics and teach. that's what i wanted to do. i had a professor who i think did some work for the agency. i never found out. he died early in life so i was never early to find out. he encouraged me to send a resume send an application. and i did. i was this middle class kid from ohio. i had never been to our nation's capitol so when the cia invited me down to interviews. >> rose: why did they invite you. >> i got on their focus some how. and so when they invited me down, i said-- i said i've never been there. they're going to fly me down on their dime i'm going to go see our nation's capitol and i will say no to a job offer and i'm going to go to grad school. >> rose: and i went-- . >> rose: you were 20 -- >> i was 21 years old at that point. i went and i was blown away

by the mission. >> rose: what was the mission. >> keep the country saturday. i was blown away by the cap abilities. collection capabilities covert action capabilities analytic capabilities. and i was blown away by the people i met. and i was also-- i was also quite reassured. they said you know this grad school thing. >> rose: yeah. >> we'll take care of that. you know you come here and do well and we'll send you back to school and they did. and i never looked back. it's a good thing. >> rose: they were treating you like they were an nfl team and you were a hot ohio state quarterback. >> i wish i was a ohio state quarterback. >> rose: you could never have imagined that you would do what every cia analyst would like to do brief the president of the united states every day. you're the guy that comes to the most powerful person in the world and says this is what we know. >> rate. >> rose: and this is what we learned overnight. >> right. >> rose: and we know this because we have op rattives all over the world. we know this because we

listen all over the world and we know this because we have one of the most sophisticated analyst call organizations around. >> right. >> rose: that was the-- and part of the reason you wanted to write this book is to tell us that? >> uh-huh. so i wrote this book for three reasons, charlie. one reason was i'm deeply conditioned about the risk that the country continues to face from terrorists and i wanted to tell that story. i wanted americans to understand all of that. two is i wrote the become because there are many myths out there about the cia. now we're getting to what you are talking about here. you know, one myth is that we're all powerful right that we can discover any secret, we can stop any plot that we're james bond. another myth is that you know, we are incapable of doing anything right, we mess up anything that he with put our hands on. it's kind of the maxwell smart view of us.

sometimes "the new york times" view of us. and then the third is that we're a rogue agency. that we're out there doing all this stuff without any oversight from the white house, without any oversight from the congress, the jason bourne myth, none of that is true. none of that is true, right. what the agency is. >> rose: is? >> incredibly dedicated people working extremly hard that gets many many things right, and some things wrong like any organization. >> rose: does. >> rose: getting wrong is one thing doing things that perhaps would not be within sort of the american value system is another thing you know we've all seen the histories of the cia and we've seen the involvement in overthrow and all of that including iran. >> uh-huh. >> rose: overthrown by the cia. >> right, right. >> but that was charlie-- . >> rose: should i be doing that is my question should the cua be overthrowing governments. >> three missions, right, at

the cia charlie. one is checking secrets that people are trying to keep from us, right. because they're doing stuff that is trying to underminus, right. the second is what i grew up doing all source analysis putting all of this stuff together and telling the president how to think about the world. and the third is covert action, right doing those kind of things you're talking about. and many of the things that you and i talked about at this table, right are covert action. >> rose: there is acceptable and unacceptable covert action is there a line between what is acceptable and not acceptable in covert action? >> so i think the line -- so we only do covert action when the president of the united states signs a piece of paper called a finding and tells us to do it. >> rose: says that you can assassinate somebody.r9fñ >> there is a span on a sass-- ban on assassination. >> so the president signs a piece of paper and tells us exactly what to do right so that is not cia's decision to do that. that is the president of the united states's decision right.

>> rose: somebody must have proposed it to the president. >> so there are-- . >> rose: this is what we would like to do but we know we have to have your approval. >> there are two ways, i talk about this in the become. there are two ways that covert action comes about. one is the cia proposes it best example of that is as we've talked about at this table a couple of times enhanced interrogation technique. the cia came forward and said we think we need do-to-do this or americans need to die. that was a cia proposed-- covert action. the other way it gets it happens is senior white house officials the president, the national security advisor the deputy national security advisor proposed the covert action. and it's happened both way in our history. but no matter who proposes it it goes through a rigorous process of policy review legal review a presidential decision with a signature on a piece of paper and congressional oversight so unusually both

committees and congress all members but sometimes not all membersing sometimes just the leadership on something particularly sensitive. so that is not the cia doing something, charlie that is america doing something. and you know somebody asked me the other day, charlie if you wanted -- >> if there was water boarding and controversial things that took place on the invasion against iraq if it was done it was america doing it. >> somebody asked me the other day what is the one thing you want people to know about enhanced interrogation techniques. and i said i want people to know that it was america's program. cia proposed it and carried it out. but the president approved it, the justice department said it was legal the national security team approved it. senior members of congress from both parties approved it. that's america's program now let's have a conversation about it. >> has that conversation been had? >> i don't think so. because, because the truth about the program isn't out

there, right. the report of senate democrats as i talk about in the book. >> rose: as we talked about this. >> as we talked about at this table, and i actually give examples very specific examples if the book where it's wrong, right. is a deeply flawed document. i wish there was-- there were a document that lays out the history and then lets have a conversation about it particularly about the morality question. >> how much you can tell us about postings that you had. you were an analyst. but you also served overseas. >> right. so i had two postings overseas and charlie, i can't tell you where either one was. just the rules that we live by. >> okay. i should say this become has been vetted by the via. >> yes t has. >> what did they take out? >> so they took out a number of things. charlie, anybody-- . >> rose: what did they take out. what kinds of things did they take out. because you wouldn't put something in there that you thought was exposing a secret. >> so i think i know you know charlie where the line is between classified and unclassified.

>> yeah. >> but there were a handful of things where the cia said to me michael, he with didn't want to you say that am and i would say why because it wouldn't be in there if i thought it was classified. and i would say why and they would say for these reasons. and i would say oh, i agree with you. i will take it out. >> rose: but did you sometimes say i disagree with you and i couldn't take it out. >> yes, and i won many of those arguments as well. >> rose: you convinced them. >> they yes, anybody who thinks hi it easy because i was a former deputy directer only needs to be told that it took longer for the cia to review it than it took me to write it. >> rose: we will talk a little bit about seymour hirsch today came out with a piece in the london paper saying all kinds of things. you read half of it you said these are all lies. >> right. >> rose: some of the things he said is that the pakistanis knew where osama bin laden was. we have asked that question often and we said he couldn't have been there if they didn't know. do you believe they didn't know? >> i believe they did not know. i talk about that in the book. is it possible charlie

that somebody in the isi that is the pakistani cia that the isi detachment in a badabad knew, that is absolutely possible. >> rose: is it possible that he could have been there and somebody knew. >> it's possible but unlikely. >> exactly. >> right, right. but that doesn't mean that the pakistani government knew, right as an institution. i done believe that. i don't believe anybody in the senior leadership knew. >> rose: do you believe they wanted to know? do you believe that they would have said if he -- >> i believe they didn't want to know. >> rose: so there you go they did not-- deny ability. >> every time the pakistanies talked to us about bin laden they said he's in afghanistan. every time we talked to the afghans they said he is in pakistan. right. >> rose: and mullah omar is where now? >> i believe mullah omar is somewhere in that pakistan-afghanistan, you know-- area.

but there is no doubt in my mind, no doubt in my mind bus i talked to them, that the pakistanis were deeply embarrassed by what happened. >> rose: let me just take you-- the truth is that the president sent you overthere because they were up set about the violation of their sovereignty and embarrassed about the fact that he was there and they claimed they didn't know. >> absolutely. they were embarrassed by the fact that we found him when he was in a prominent pakistani city in a city with their version of west point. so the intelligence guys were embarrassed. and then the military guys were embarrassed by allowing a foreign military to fly hundreds of miles into their territory, land on the ground and they have no idea what's going on. >> rose: didn't they have some planes that went into the air. >> only at the very end. by that time it was too late. >> too late. >> rose: so when you went over there, did you talk to the chief of staff of the hill tear. >> i first talked to general -- and we sat in his residence and we-- . >> rose: he was head of intelligence. >> so and you know.

>> what did he say. >> so for the first few minutes, we looked at each other and nobody said anything. >> yeah is and then we kind of both laughed. i few him very with. i had interacted with him a number of times before then. so we were friendly with each other. finally we both laughed and finally he said do you understand what you have done to us? in terms of embarrassing us right. and i said yes. but do you understand we had no choice. do you understand that? multiple presidents said if we find him we're going to come get him right. do you understand that? and we worked through it, right. and we-- you know after an hour discussion, we had a very productive discussion. and then he took me to see general say we -- talk at all about the bin laden raid just the future-- how we move forward in the relationship. >> rose: he's no longer in

government. >> neither one of them are. >> rose: what is the most serious critique of yourself? >> i will just give you an example. i don't know what the most serious one is. >> rose: give me an example. >> you know, i got in trouble. i got in trouble politically when i went with susan rice to meet with senator mccain senator graham and snor-- sche went to meet with them when they were criticizing her. and they were threatening to block her nomination to be secretary of state. and i went with her at the request of the white house to just do one thing. >> rose: your job then was? >> my job was to simply show them-- . >> rose: you were the deputy director. >> i was the acting director at the time. >> rose: this was after petraeus. >> after dave left. i was asked to do one thing and one thing only. i was asked to show them that what was in the cia talking points had a basis

in what we were writing in the president's daily brief what we were writing in our classified publications that is correct was my job. what i say in the book is i should have never gone to that meeting. i should have said no to the white house. >> rose: you also say the cia has no business writing talking points. that's not a big thing. >> well, it is because you put yourself in the middle of these -- >> of huge political fight. >> and we have no business there. we are a nonpartisan a political organization whose objectivity is absolutely critical to its success. and we just put ourselves in trouble when we do things like write talking points or go to political meetings on the hill. >> rose: what is the highlight of your career? >> briefing the president? >> or i will give you some choices here. brofing its president being there on 9/11 being in the situation room when you realize you-- all the effort by the cia and defense department and everybody else, to bring down osama

bin laden. >> yeah, so i think you know, i worked very closely with president bush. i think the world of him. i worked very closely with president obama. i think the world of him. so the highlight of my career is when those two things came together. and they caming to after the bin laden raid. nd they came together two weeks after the bin laden raid when president obama asked me to fly to dallas and brief president bush on the bin laden operation. i took with me the lead analyst and i took with me the lead military operator and we briefed the president for two hours. >> rose: this briefing took place. >> in dallas after the bin laden raid, a briefing for president bush. on everything on the intelligence side and everything on the operational side. and he was like a kid in a candy store. >> rose: wanted to know everything. >> wanted to know everything.

and. >> rose: because he lived with it. >> at the end of those, at the end of those -- >> yes, he lived it he will live it every day for the rest of his liefer. at the end of that two-hour briefing, he gave me one of his commander in chief coins he gave me one and shook my hand and you know i felt closure for the first time since i was with him on 9/11 in a sense. and you know maybe he did too. but that moment, you know which brought together both 9/11 with president bush and may 1st with president obama i think that was the highlight. >> rose: did anybody really seriously in the administration believe that there was a connection between al qaeda and saddam hussein? >> so i don't know. so i don't-- i can't get inside their head. >> rose: dic chaney suggested that perhaps he -- >> yeah, he did he did. but one of the things i don't do in the book is i don't-- you know, i say what people did an what people said but i don't try to analyze why they did it. >> rose: or their motivation. >> their motivation that's really hard. one of the things i learned as an analyst is that is

very dangerous doing that. i don't know what he was thinking. but i think that i'm speculating now. i think that dic chaney, i think that dic chaney feared there was a connection. i think he feared there was a connection. you know, there is this idea of the 1% right there say 1% chance we have to act right. i think he feared theres with a connection. >> rose: did you think there was a connection? >> you know, there was-- there was-- as i talk about in the book, as i talk about in the book, there was this time when we thought that a mohammad ata might have met with an iraqi intelligence in prague. >> rose: the leader that went into the world trade center. >> the lead hijacker on 9/11 the organizer of the whole thing here of the plot here. you know we thought we found a connection. and we had to run that down. so at that moment yeah, we thought there might be a connection. but by the time we worked through all of that. >> rose: you didn't. >> we didn't we didn't.

>> rose: but did dic chaney ever say -- >> i done think the vice president has ever stood up and said there was no connection. you know, one of the things i want to say charlie, is that i do critique a few people, in addition to myself, right. i critique-- . >> rose: are you trying to say you critique or are you talking about ben-- benghazi and talking points am i would say i was there and i dreamed up this idea of doing this and it turned out to be silly and stupid. >> i have plenty of those. >> rose: or worse. >> i was part of the analysis that this was going to happen. and it didn't happen, this this and this happened. >> i was part of the team. i was part of the team charlie, that said that the japanese economy was going to continue to grow at a rapid way. >> rose: in the 90s. >> and they were going to take over the world right. and boom right. the stock market hit 45,000 and goes to 15 right.

so this is a great question this is something we actually monitor. so every judgement every judgement that we give the president of the united states and the president's daily brief, we look at a year later and say were we right? were we wrong? or don't we know yet. and we're right about 70% of the time. and 30% of the time we're either wrong or we don't know if we're right or wrong yet. that is not a bad batting average on very very difficult issues. >> rose: you have said george bush was smart, very smart. handled decision-making well. you said that barack obama was very very smart was vigorous in trying to get every opinion on the table. but you think fear you fear he took too long to make decision. >> so i think there-- there are kind of the polar opposites of each other right. both smart president bush great gut instinct, i think on intel against an policy.

very quick to make decisions. right, some people say too quick. >> rose: one too quick and one too slow. >> and president obama wants to be really thorough ask a lot of conditions be want everybody's opinions people say he's too slow right. there's advantages to moving quickly and advantages to waiting too long. so i don't want to-- i don't want to crit sides one or the other. you know, you are who you are, right and your strengths. >> rose: how about dic chaney. >> you know deeply deeply committed to the national security of the united states. you know, one of the-- if you watch if you watch cable news right, and you watch these politicians go after each other on cable news you know, one of the impressions you get is that there are politicians and decision makers who don't really care about the country and have their own you know their own interest at stake. there is not a single person that i worked with, not a

single senior person i worked with in the bush administration, or in the obama administration who did not care deeply about the country, its national security, and protecting that national security. they had different views on how to do it. but their objective was wholly-- . >> rose: that seems to me mike, to be, of course they should be. i hope we don't have anybody working in government who is not interested in protecting the national interest of government that seems to me to go with being an american. >> but there are people out there, right who believe otherwise about barack obama. or there are people out there-- . >> rose: and they say it. >> and they say it and they're wrong. and they're wrong. >> rose: but i believe that too. about, if you -- >> but my point is-- . >> rose: you may make mistakes. you may be serious mistakes and you may have values that work against whatever they may be. >> right. >> rose: but i mean i think you care about them doing the right thing. >> yes. >> rose: national security.

>> yes. >> right? >> yes. >> you met no one in high officials of government. >> i have never met anyone who puts their own, without puts their own interest their own political interest above in addition security. >> rose: how old are you? >> i'm 56. >> rose: so when will you serve in government again? >> so somebody asked me is this an audition right. and my answer was look i criticize republicans on benghazi, i crit size democrats on interrogation tech-- techniques and myself on a handful of situations it's not an audition. >> rose: you have a very good life now a wonderful wife and children. >> and i come on your show all the time. >> rose: you come on my show all the time. some people are wondering. they do, you do. because at the same -- said to me, you know you will find that mike morell is your favorite guest because there is a reason he was considered he was the best briefer that ever handled that job because he understands how to assemble a lot of material speak

clearly and precisely in a way you can understand it. and that's why. but my point is you're 56 years old. you have a wealth of experience, you deeply care about the country. i would argue that you probably think that the period in the cia was the highlight of your life outside of your family. >> yes. >> rose: that's a powerful pool to pull. >> yes. >> and i'll tell you right two things. number one the country has never faced as many national security issues as we face today. i think in the history of the country, an just in terms of sheer numbers. and then the second, the second thing is those issues all of them are intelligence issues meaning you can't understand them. you can't make policy. you can't carry out that policy without first rate intelligence, right. anybody can give you an opinion about who is up and who is down in the chinese communist party. but not just anybody can tell you where the iranian

nuclear program is or where north korean missile system program is right. that requires intelligence. so it's very, very, very important to the future of the country, i understand that, right. and that means you have to have an intelligence agency that is the best that can possibly be and gets the resources it needs and leadership it needs. >> rose: an intelligence is in your judgement two things. one, it's gathering information and analyzing information. >> yes. >> rose: but when you go to the president, you simply present information. you do not make recommendations. >> so you do-- if you do it right, right f you do it right, here is what you do. you say mr. president here's what i know and here's how i know it. so he can judge the credibility of it right himself. here's what i think about it this is the analysis, here is what i think about it and here's why i think that. and by the way here's how confident i am in that. and then you step away

right. and you let the policy discussion happen. and while the policy discussion happens your job as an intelligence officer is to keep them true to the facts. when they start drifting off from the facts you bring them back to the facts and back to the reality. occasionally you will get asked by a president so what should i do about this. when you get asked that question, you say mr. president it's not my job to be a policymaker but you asked so here is what i think. but you never offer that until asked. >> rose: the book is called the great war of our time cia's fight against terrorism from al qidza to isis t is also the story of mike morell and his life in the cia. it's a pleasure to you have here. congratulations on this book. >> chau thank you, charlie. >> rose: mike morell for the hour, thank you for joining us. i will work on my voice for next time. see you tomorrow. for more about this program and earlier episodes visit us yen line at cbs.org and charlierose.com.

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♪ this is "nightly business report." >> saudi snub. the new king s he won't attend a white house summit as global investors keep a close eye on the u.s./saudi relationships. long connected by oil and security. bold prediction. why opec says we could be in for a decade of cheap oil. and record breaker. will an art auction make history tonight. all that and more this evening on "nightly business report" for monday may 11th. good evening, everyone. and welcome, i'm tyler mathisen sue is on assignment tonight. stocks fell after monday's big rally. more on that in a moment. we begin tonight with hotspots all across the globe.