>> rose: welcome to the program. tonight, a consideration of the iran nuclear negotiations in vienna austria with lyse lyse margaret brennan bret stephens and moose huse. >> the framework agreement they reached a few months ago in lieu san others were open to interpretation or misinterpretation. they don't drew kuwait agree on some of the key issues, whether inspections of non-military sites allowed under an additional protocol of the international atomic energy agency or the phasing of sanctions with responsibilities on both sides. so, yes, they would like a deal.

the seven days are not a deadline. they could possibly go over that deadline. >> rose: the iranian nuclear negotiations for the hour next. >> rose: funding for "charlie rose" has been provided by: additional funding provided by: >> and by bloomberg, a provider of multimedia news and information services worldwide. captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> rose: we look this evening at the continuing negotiations with iran. the united states and its negotiating partners announced tuesday they're extending the deadline for talks until july 7. american officials hope to reach

a final accord in time to submit to congress for a 30-day review period. the u.s. warned earlier this week the framework deal reached in switzerland in april must remain the basis for the agreement. the remarks come after p5+1 was rejected last week. margaret brennan is joining us, and lyse doucet chief international correspondent for the bbc, and from princeton university, hossein mousavian, iran's former chief spokesperson. margaret, tell me where things stand in terms of the negotiations and what do you say about this extension for a week? do we read into that that these two parties, the p5+1 as well as the iranians believe that within

a week they desperately want a deal and can make it happen? margaret? >> well, charlie top u.s. diplomat told me tonight they put the odds at greater than 60/40 in terms of leaning towards an actual deal but this is far from guarantees. as you say, the negotiators have given themselves almost exactly an extra week to try to put the fine print. they're literally working on the text and all of these additional technical annexes to try to figure out how to implement when they broadly agreed to back in april in switzerland. but i do say there's been a back and forth is iran backsliding? u.s. officials will say we're sticking to the broad outlines here but they're trying to find creative ways around some of the roads specifically about how much access the u.s. is asking for and that's going to be implemented by u.n. talks.

inspectors are going to search any suspected nuclear site and the sanctions will come in phases and it's the legalistic terms they're trying to iron out right now. >> lyse, what would you add to that in terms of where we are this moment. >> first i pick up on your turn of phrase saying do they desperately want an agreement. all sides, it pains to show they are not desperate for an agreement because that would look as the critics say they would do everything to have a deal. the mantra on all sides is a good deal. a good deal, it is still clear with this extension, they still have not reached the point of agreement that all sides can levy yenleave vienna with the deal. to use that well-worn phrase the devil is in the detail, the

framework agreement in lieu san had parts of it they knew they had to come back to. some parts are open to interpretation or misinterpretation. they don't quite agree on some of the issues, whether military inspection of nonmilitary sites allowed under the international atomic energy agency or sanctions with responsibilities on both sides. so yes they would like a deal. the seven days are not a deadline. they could possibly go over the deadline, but they would like to meet mainly an american and iranian negotiation now what they say is a real deadline before they have to go to congress for to have sight. >> rose: the reason i said they desperately want a deal is it seems to me that if you were

working this hard to try to harm out something it's because you really very much want this to happen. john kerry has been back and back. zarif went back to tehran in the last few days to make the case and to try to move it along. so if they're trying this hard, it would it seems to me that there is a great intensity to try to find a solution to these very difficult points. >> that's exactly the case, charlie. lyse, i know you want to jump in too. john kerry brought a physical therapist and two doctors with him. he literally got off his recovery bed to make it here because he is trying to close what could be a legacy-making deal for president obama but also have reverberations throughout the middle east. so great intensity you're exactly right, on finishing that, but it's sort of a game of chicken in some ways in terms of ironing out the details and no one wants to pull that curtain. >> someone came from having seen members of the iranian and

american declaration i said what was the mood? the person said the mood was this has to be done. never have they been so close to a deal. this would end a 12-year standoff over iran's nuclear program. this would be a truly historic negotiation achieved without firing a single bullet, without being a zero-sum game, which is unprecedented in the turbulent world in which we live. yes, margaret mentions how john kerry came on crutches, the chief scientist from iran came from having undergone two surgeries, and started the negotiations months ago in a wheelchair. it is both an historic negotiation but a hurricane hurricane great human effort. >> rose: mr. mousavian where do you think we are?

>> i think already both parties they have agreed with all measures with the nonproliferation treaty. there is no dispute left. with the npt the nonproliferation treaty, we have safeguard agreement additional protocol and arrangement code. iran has agreed to implement all. by this i mean iran would be committed at the maximum level of international rules and regulations on transparentsy measures. there is nothing beyond additional protocol. this is number one. number two iran has agreed to confidence-building measures, blocking pathway toward possibly diversion toward a nuclear

weapon. on heavy water iran agreed to have no reprocessing. if you have no reprocessing, it's impossible to make nuclear bomb from heavy water. iran has agreed to export spent fuel. if you are exporting your spent fuel, it's impossible to make nuclear bombs. moreover, iran has agreed to reduce plutonium from 10-kilogram heavy air to 1 kilogram which would be non-weapon-grade plutonium. therefore, all major measures assuring that iran would not make nuclear bombs from heavy water is a retreat. on enrichment, iran agreed to confidence-building measures on nondiversion of iranian enrichment facilities because

iran agreed to enrich below 5%. as long as you're enriching below 5% it's impossible to make nuclear bomb. iran has agreed to reduce 8,000-kilogram of stockpile enriched uranium to 300-kilogram. iran agreed not to have enrichment activities. ty would say all measures assuring iranian heavy water facility and enrichment facility would not direct toward -- all are agreed though all measurers are beyond npt and iran has agreed to measure beyond npt as good will and objective on non-diversion. the problem is with excessive demands far far beyond

additional protocol or npt. >> rose: you're opposed to the framework agreement? >> yes. i was listening to what mr. mousavian had to say but the reason iran is put to the additional tests is because iran has a lengthy record of deceiving the international community. fordow as president obama announced in new york several years ago was a secret facility until revealed by western intelligence sources and secret facilities before brought to light before the international community. the international atomic energy agency still can't get the iranians to come clean on what are called the possible military dimensions of their program. so the west is not conducting a nuclear negotiation with luxum luxumburg or korea or a country that we know is going to abide by the terms that it signs. it's conducting a negotiation with a regime that unfortunately

has an extraordinarily lengthy record of deceiving the international community irrespective of what's in the print of any agreement. >> rose: let me go back to you and margaret, lyse. what is the big hangup at this point? where is the conflict? >> two things, they're kind of interlinked and one is access. that's the main point. the ability of how much is to surge suspected nuclear sites or sites that could related in any way to nuclear development, and that's going to be carried out by u.n. inspectors under the i.a.e.a. so the u.s. has had the hard line reported about we want to search military sites as we've heard from diplomats. they say the united states does not allow inspectors into most of our nuclear weapon sites. we have restrictions on that a large part of that has to do with the sensitivity of material.

we recognize that and respect that is what the american diplomats say to you. we have a way around that and some of that is going to be that international inspectors would work under what mr. mousavian was gesturing to, the additional protocol and steps beyond. it's the technical term that has to do exactly with who searches what when and how. so that's a big hangup and what's decided there is going to influence how much relief comes when in terms of sanctions. when people use the term immediate sanctions release they're kind of kidding themselves. nothing is going to really be immediate here. this is going to be a very drawn-out, very sequenced almost very slow process when it comes to rewarding iran for following through a with compliance on what they say they're going to do which is to verify that they are not enriching beyond what they've agreed to and that they're not actually trying to build a nuclear weapon in any way.

so in terms of weapons involvement. the the united states and secretary kerry took a lot of flack a few days ago for saying, hey, the u.s. knows iran was trying to build a weapon and stopped, that was the national intelligence estimate back in early 2000. since then the u.s. has said we know what we think they were trying to do, we don't need them to come clean in terms of nat but we need them to speak to the united nations about perhaps where they are now in answering some outstanding questions there, and the reason that matters is that will equal sanction res leaf. >> picking up on what bret said which is a really important greent and this is trust. it's not just because there is no trust. the iranians don't trust the americans and the americans don't trust the iranians notwithstanding the historic nature of these negotiations could possibly begin to end a 30-year diplomatic deadlock, but there still is no trust which is why president obama was saying tonight, this is not an agreement based on trust. this is based on an agreement

both sides are going to cheat which is why they've talked about unprecedented verification and this is what everyone talks about and what will be in the agreement, what the i.a.e.a. will be mandated to do. but as margaret was saying, there are a still a lot of details they're wrestling with. the sanctions they're wrestling with there's been so much controversy because tough supreme leader of iran saying we need all sanctions lifted immediately and that's not going to happen because there are different sanctions whether european sanctions, sanctions that can only be lifted by congress and united nations security council. the iranians thought about it, a lot of debate on iranian television and media saying just a minutics if the idea, is if you talk to the negotiators they say they understand there's going to be an implementation process which could take many months what, if for example we disable the reactor at iraq, the nuclear plant, and the americans decide we're actually going to

lift the sanctions then iran will be faced with developing a new reactor which will take a few years. so they're saying it should be sequential. you know we need -- we don't trust you either. so we've heard they're coming up with some creative mechanism because there is what it's all about, a creative formula whereby in a situation where there is no trust that the two of them can watch each other and make sure each is keeping their part of the deal and then move forward. i think we're both hearing they're making progress, but they are not there yet. >> yeah, i mean, charlie if you had to boil it down, it's how much do they give, how much do they get and how can both sides walk away saying they dominated without losing face. >> and can they do that within a week? >> it's possible. but, you know, what is negotiated here is not going to be a binding, legal accord. this is just a political agreement. it's still got to go to the united nations. it still has to work on the language. that's why secretary kerry was

meeting with russian former minister lavrov today. they're key to the process and the implementation, where this has to go to international sort of verification and then implementation. congress, that's the political aspect for the president of the united states but congress can't really kill this deal. they can impair it, they can hurt it, they can hurt the president's legacy, but they can't really stop at least a deal from being struck. >> once it's in black and white they can't say, oh we forgot this, can we change it, a deal is a deal, and that's white takes so long. it's the political capitol and has to go through the lawyers. it will take a while. >> rose: mr. mousavian do you have the same kind of divisions in iran between the ayatollah on one hand and perhaps the president on the other hand? >> actually, there is not much

differences between the supreme leader and president, but we have different fractions very powerfully opposing the deal like republicans in the congress, but charlie, i should say there is a big misinterp thighs of the ayatollah's statement. i read the text carefully. what he said he said implementation of iranian commitments should be synchronized with lifting sanctions. it means the process should be a step by step with proportionate resip case from each party. this is number one. number two, the issue of mistrust is completely correct. i have always said the mistrust is far, far beyond nuclear issue. however, when we are talking about weapons of mass destruction, we need to respect the fact after the second world

war, iran is the biggest victim of use of weapons of mass destruction. saddam hussein used chemical weapons. about 100,000 iranians were either killed or injured. unfortunately, the u.s. supported saddam hussein and provided material and technology for saddam hussein to use weapons of mass destruction killing and injuring 100,000 iranians. but what bret said, it is completely incorrect i'm sorry to say because all what bret said is about implementation of additional protocol. if you are a member of additional protocol, yes you have to declare, decide the building and the project. iran, when was building, iran was not the member of additional

protocol, when iran was building fordow, iran was not a member of additional protocol, if you're not a member of additional protocol and only safeguard agreement, which iran is a member and at that time was a member of safeguard agreement you need to just inform the i.a.e.a.180 days before introduction of gas centrifuges. you do not have to say i have this lot, this construction, these centrifuges. only 180 days before introduction of gas. therefore, we really should not mislead the public opinion with important technical issues. >> rose: bret? you know iran actually signed the additional protocol after the revelations of the first nuclear sites and then walked away from them and this is basically also part of the problem with the deal. again, it goes to the issue of

trust. is this a regime that the west can seriously trust getting very close to having a robust nuclear infrastructure that could build out nuclear weapons on very short order in the level that pakistan for example has and does the west feel comfortable with this regime doing so much to destabilize the region in syria with israel, in lebanon, in yemen. do we really want this regime to get so close to a nuclear weapon that we set off a chain, a cycle of nuclear proliferation in the region involving perhaps the saudis or the turks or the egyptians? one other thing that lyse and margaret was talking about was need of creativity in the deploim si especially in the late stages. i feel the need is for clarity. after the airplane framework agreement you saw clearly both sides had radically different interpretations of the textings

that they amounted to two different texts. what we need to do going forward is there is absolute clarity about what the requirements and penalties are should iran fail to meet the stipulations. if you don't do that's correct this ends up becoming certainly a recipe for greater mistrust but i think will also lead to situations which we will not be able to control and which will have consequences that we can't foresee. >> rose: lyse, they've come a long way, haven't they? since this began, the idea of where they are within reach of an agreement, it's remarkable they've come that far and the two things that always seem to stand out on the one hand was the degree and whether synchronization is the right word or not, thousand sanctions would be lifted, and secondly, the level of inspection. those two things seem to be more than anything else, although there's some concern, obviously, about how iran will be able to continue doing research so that

after 10 or 12-year period, however it may be, how fast they could move when the restrictions of the ten-year period were over. but seems to me they've come a long way and there is some optimism that they can get this done. >> it is extraordinary just how far they have come. if you compare the negotiations now to where they were more than a year ago before the administration of president rouhani came to power and remember going to the kazak city and would be in pains to say we are not meeting having talks with the americans, a painful slow pace nothing was agreed. since the new administration came to power there's been a whole new set of -- i wouldn't say spirit because that sounds too positive but a whole new

energy into these talks and all of the negotiation -- look at the photographs you see coming out. i was looking at some where they're all laughing around the table, which is not to say there is no laughing matter here, but there are personal relationships that have been built up. there's a whole new chemistry. in these kind of negotiations where you are talking sometimes for 14 hours a day, for weeks and weeks on end, john kerry has set records for the hours he has spent negotiating you have to find a way to get through it on a personal level and yes you mentioned all of those things. it would be impossible to go through all of them here. it takes years to go through them and we won't go through them all on this hour-program of yours, charlie, they've come to terps with trying to wrestle what is one of the big security challenges of our time and therefore, trying to curb iran's ability to develop the materials to produce a bomb. they call it the breakout time, that it is not less than a year

a year, that if they had any sense at all that iran was veering from its commitment, that it was pursue ago bomb. they have a year, they feel, that they can actually use what they call a snapback, that this is all built into the agreement. if things start going wrong they have a way to put it back and that is absolutely critical agreement. and look at the images coming out of iran of a new younger generation which not only does it want the sanctions, it wants to be part of the wired world, it wants to engage. there is a bigger question we haven't dealt with and bret mentioned it, is this going to embolden iran or actually lead us to an iran which would engage with the region? that's the next step. i think what the supporters and some of the critics would say is given this kind of a deal, if they reach it, that it actually removes the barrier, that iran can sit around the table and it will no longer be an enemy, it will be a rival and you can talk to iran, but all these huge

security problems that are now shattering the middle east. >> rose: you have followed john kerry. he's been as he was in the middle east negotiations, a bulldog, persistent showing a remarkable sense of endurance in pursuit of first the middle east peace, and the same thing here. take us inside the mind of john kerry, the point person for the united states. >> wow. (laughter) well charlie, i have to say you asked earlier -- you're going to get me in trouble charlie. (laughter) but i will say that, you know you asked if john kerry and the administration, perhaps, are too eager for a deal and the administration is really sensitive to that question and would tell you look, if we were eager, we would have brokered this thing a long time ago and gone home. i mean, these negotiators have been in this palace blind me for for, you know, a good month and haven't talked with their

families or seen them except over skype and the like. but the thing that is harder for them to defend against is the accusation that they are perhaps part of wishful thinking and that's something john kerry has been accused of quite often which is the ideal that something can be done about this, that if you just try hard enough, spend enough hours, push the diplomacy hard enough, you can come to and a agreement. this -- it's hard to think of when you compare this to middle east peace with the israelis and palestinians, it's harder to think of a more difficult question but on this diplomacy there are so many pieces that have to be aligned here because these are the world powers. these are the security council partners, and then you get germany in there and iran in there and you have so many layers that it is incredibly difficult. but it says a lot when you ask about john kerry and where his head is at his top advisors, as i said, will tell you it's about

60/40. it's far from guaranteed but they're determined to see it through. he had pretty significant surgery and a pretty significant injury having a bone broken in three places and, as i said, he's brought physicians with him. he's here because it is such a key mission and he's determined to see this through because not only with this be legacy-making for the president but also nobel prize winning issue for the secretary of state, not only for him but iran's chief diplomat, and that's what people speculate, right? but i don't think that is necessarily meaning this is a foregone conclusion. this is a really hard bargain. >> rose: mr. middle schools moose i'm coming to you in a moment but bret i want to come to you as a critic of this administration's negotiating tactics and strategy and consequences. do you believe they wanted too much? >> yes, i do. i mean i think look, i think the president sees this as his nixon to china moment and

therefore, correspondingly secretary kerry sees this as his kissinger to china moment and this is a tempting analogy. >> rose: and testify they're successful, it would be. >> this is why it will not be. let me explain for one second -- >> rose: if they could get iran to give up any nuclear ambitions that would be a huge thing. >> if iran might give up the nuclear ambitions iran can be in a bigger sense be brought out from the cold, and that was part of the china game in the early 1970s to raise or lift the bamboo curtain, bring china into the modern world and, of course, it was very successful, maybe more successful than some people might wish, but there are basic differences between china in the early 1970s and iran today. the chinese desperately wanted an agreement with the west because they felt profoundly threatened by the soviet union. china had been ravaged by the

cultural revolution and the chinese made confident, took confidence voting measures, you mean the same as ping-pong game between the american and the chinese players. look at what the iranians are doing. they're seasoned cargo ships in the strait. their fellow reporter is on trumped-up espionage charges that should be dropped and he should be freed immediately as a precondition to the deal they're ampling the houthis. i think the iranians think they are playing against a weak administration, desperate for a deal they're winning on most regional fronts and that winning this nuclear negotiation is part of that. so i don't see this deal moderating iran's behavior like the negotiations moderating china's 40 years ago i see it embolding them and that's my opposition. >> rose: mr. mousavian, you can speak better than anyone at the table ability what iranian ambitions might be and long-term goals are and how this deal, if

successful, might change behavior and have a larger impact on the relationship between iran and the world including the united states. i believe we cannot resolve all differences and an mosties and hostilities between iran and the u.s., about many many different issues from the israeli peace processes, human rights, terrorism, only through nuclear deal. it is really unrealistic to imagine we can resolve everything through just nuclear. on the nuclear, we need to be realistic. iran and the world powers, they have already agreed the criteria for a deal and confidence building would be only nonproliferation treaty which there is no more dispute left. about every measures, we see nonproliferation treaty. charlie, we should have in mind, all differences remain today is

about measures beyond international rules and regulations. but i would say a nonproliferation, we also need to be really sincere and transparent, look at the realty. israel is the only country in the middle east with about 400 nuclear bombs. no other country has a nuclear bomb in the list. the u.s. has established a strategic relation with india, pakistan israel, which they have not accepted the nonproliferation treaty and they have hundreds of nuclear bombs, and the u.s. is putting all pressures, sanctions, coercions against iran, which does not have even one single nuclear bomb. therefore, here is the very clear double standard. however, attend i believe direct talks between iran and the u.s. would bring a huge change to many many issues in

the region. for after 35 years, we have foreign ministers negotiating one of the major differences. they are almost 90% done. they are very close to a final deal. if they can resolve the nuclear dispute within the framework of national rules and regulations then i believe iran and the u.s. would be able to open dialogue on regional issues. iran and the u.s., they have many many commonalities. stability in afghanistan is the commonality between iran and the u.s. what's why iran and the u.s. for ten years have supported the same government in afghanistan. the stability in iraq is commonality between iran and the u.s. that's why, after 2003, the fall of saddam, practically iran and the u.s., they have supported the same governmentl in baghdad. fighting i.s.i.s., fighting extremism is the commonality

between iran and the u.s. practically the u.s. is leading the air strike and, on the ground, iran is leading the strike against i.s.i.s. therefore, i believe we have too much commonalities, common interests. the only way is diplomacy. the nuclear only should be resolved with same nuclear proliferation treaty. we need to continue direct talks between iran and the u.s. to add first. the other differences, to utilize, realize the issues of common interests. >> rose: let me just ask one mple question of you, and ank you for that. ery iranian that i have talked always says -- whether former esidents or the foreign minister -- say iran does not want a nuclear weapon we do not want a nuclear weapon. it's almost a man travment why

are we going through this? why wouldn't you say we don't want a nuclear weapon and, so, let's do everything we can to prove to you that we don't want a nuclear weapon. >> exactly this is what iran, charlie, already has done. iran has accepted already everything at the maximum level. there is nothing internationally more than what iran has already accepted. second iran has accepted many, many measures beyond npt, like capping enrichment at 5%, like having no reprocessing, like exporting spent fuel. no other country member of npt has accepted such limits iran has accepted. therefore, iranians already have shown good will and, in practice, they have shown they are really serious. but let me bring you to one very

important, historical issue to believe why iran is not after nuclear bomb. when iranians, they were bombed by saddam by chemical weapons when 100,000 iranians were either killed or injured during war0 to 1988 the iranian military went to khomeini and asked him to reciprocate with chemical weapon. at that time the supreme leader said resip rough case with -- resip case with weapons of mass destruction is wrong because based on islam, we believe all weapons of mass destruction are forbidden. i would say charlie if a nation nearing war is attacked by chemical weapons unfortunately the u.s. supported, but iran did not reciprocate with the chemical weapons. this is the best proof and the

best objective guarantees to believe this nation is not after weapons of mass destruction. >> rose: i assure you that bret stephens is sitting here listening to what you say and say, if that's true, why then, so much absence of transparency and hidden sites that were only discovered later and only confirmed after they had been discovered? >> well, you are right, charlie. i said that time iran was member of safeguard agreement. based on this agreement, you have to informant i.a.e.a. only when you want to introduce gas centrifuges. you don't need to incure the i.a.e.a. before. if you are member of international protocol you need to inform from day one. this is something everyone should know that iran did not hide, iran did not -- iran was not legally obliged to inform everything from the day one. however, iran today, has

accepted everything at the maximum level of transparency, at the maximum level of npt and i.a.e.a. regulations, and there is no suspicions for the p5+1 about today's iranian nuclear program and about the future. the p.n.b. which bret mentioned are issues related to the 1980s. they are issues related to past, not about the current nuclear program. >> rose: let me give bret a chance. >> look, secretary kerry and i disagree about all kinds of things, but one area where i think we agree completely is that iran has sought to develop nuclear weapons, and the quantity of information available on that score is remarkable. all of this doesn't come from sort of shady sources. all of this comes from the international atomic energy agency at a very extensive

public report on this in 2011, i'm told what's in the confidential demain is vastly more extensive, and it would help if the iranians would come clean, for instance, meeting their commitments to the i.a.e.a., which the director repeatedly complains -- >> rose: one of the articles, and lyse and margaret can help me understand but i'm told one of the arguments made and insisted on by the americans where it stands i don't know, is the iranians release a full explanation of all of their prior behavior and prior nuclear activities. is that correct? >> that's one of the more difficult questions. the i.a.e.a., which is the international agency that bret just referenced, has a lot of outstanding questions it wants answered about what iran has done in the past. what's being negotiated in the building bind me is how to stop development in the future, how to free things for ten years -- freeze things for ten years and

what to do after that time period. one way around this u.s. negotiators have sort of gestured to is that those international inspectors could perhaps, question scientists using so-called managed access which is a very technical term and very specific meaning but basically limiting the access of inspectors but still allowing them some to verify why iran has any kind of nuclear development going on after this point. but the united states of america and their intelligence agencies concluded that ierp stop trying to build a weapon or weapons program as of 2003. they continue to enrich but believe the weapons development specifically stopped years ago. this is what americans diplomats would tell you. they had a covert program enrichment that's really raised concerns, really raised issues but that is why you had those difficult statements from secretary kerry that officials

tried to walk back a few weeks ago saying when he said he know what they did in the past, we're worried about their future, we don't want that coming clean, as bret said it's not so much coming clean they're not asking that because that basically would be too difficult for iran to do in the negotiations. but they want some questions and some form of the answer here. >> one of the things, the number i think is 18, they have a list of 18 scientists that they want to question about the past programs, but what iran is saying, this seems to be a very important issue for iran, they're saying, listen in the past we gave you names of sign tills and they were killed. >> rose: exactly. the case of two scientists were killed. they're saying they cannot give you the names of scientists because that would enter public documents and lives would be at risk. that at least is their argument. but the iranians are saying there's supposed to be a ten-year ban on severe limits on iran's research and development program, the question happens what happens in year eleven, and

the phrase used by iranians say our scientists can't stop thinking, they have to keep developing, and we continue want to be pushed so far backward in what they describe as civilian nuclear program to be used for peaceful purposes. these are the details they're discussing, highly scientific and depolitical. >> rose: i have one final question. bret, you wanted to object to something. >> the 2007 national intelligence estimates to which margaret referred claiming iran abandoned nuclear programs is largely repudiated by the i.a.e.a. and the american intelligence community. the problem with getting bogged down in the technical details is we are getting away from the nature of the iranian regime. i would say to mr. mousavian that if iran really wants to build confidence on the nature of its program, free people like

the imprisoned candidates from the 2009 elections, open up their -- >> rose: who are under house arrest. >> who are under house arrest six years after the fact. make it clear that iran is a country that is interested in a new direction. the reason these negotiations are so guilt charlie, is we're -- are so difficult is we are not negotiating with belgium. we are negotiating with a country with an extensive track record of not being a peace-loving nation. >> rose: you negotiate with your adversaries, not your friends. >> i understand that but if this regime wants to build confidence, it can start with domestic measures at home which would empower the very iranian people mr. mousavian supposedly sympathizes with. >> rose: mr. mousavian answer that before my final question. >> look bret, let's imagine iranians would come to the negotiation table. when you say iran should have

their issues not related to nuclear, then let's imagine iranians would come to the negotiation table and tell john kerry look, you made a coo against iran in 2003 and removed a democratically elected leader and installed a dictator, corrupted for 25 years. you've always supported corrupted leaders. which one of your allies are democratic or human rights or all your principles and values you are talking about human rights? which one of your allies, like saudi arabia, are really committed to these values? if iranians come and tell americans, look, you have assassinated our nuclear scientists, then what's going to happen? you know, we cannot resolve all

issues of differences and 35 years' mistrust only through one nuclear negotiation. when we are talking about nuclear, the criteria for confidence-building measure is international rules and regulations which is npt which iran has accepted everything within npt. if you are going to bring all other issues, we'll not get anywhere. >> rose: a couple of points. number one, when the reaper came to vienna, he is ally ac ba, the significance he's there. >> yes. the chief nuclear scientist in the united states is earnest muniz and he and the top nuclear

scientist in iran say they have a great rapport. >> rose: i think they're at m.i.t. together. >> rather than looking at the bigger picture. yes, they were both m.i.t. trained. they say they weren't undergrads but had the same men for wirps really interesting and bonded on that. so some of the technical elements in the negotiations, having him here could make a difference. >> interesting, charlie all eyes were on is zarik when he came back. he came back and brought the chief scientists who had been through two operations. it was critical he be here because he's the chief scientific brain for the iranian side of the negotiations. number two, he brought the brother of rouhani who is close

to the foreign minister but also the brother of the president so political cover. and finally he brought his wife and he has a close relationship with his life, and they said he must be really here to make a deal because he brought his wife. he has science, politics and his family three key ingredients if there's a deal to be done. >> rose: so there is this question -- often the president will say, you know, think about the alternative. so if these talks fail really fail, so they're not just kicking the ball the can down the road they agree that they will never agree. what is the consequences consequences of that failure to come to an agreement? mr. mousavian? >> i believe the consequences would be extremely negative. look charlie the middle east practically is at the verge of collapse. iran is if not the most stable

powerful country in the middle east, is at least the key member. the u.s. is the most influential foreign country in the middle east. therefore, if it did collapse, imagine these two regional international powers are going to go to a greater confrontation. politically, economically militarily, covertly intelligence, then you can imagine with such a shaky region what's going to happen. therefore, i believe we have only one choice diplomacy to resolve the nuclear through international rules and regulations, to continue negotiation between iran and the u.s. for peace stability in the region. >> rose: lyse you traveled as an international correspondent with the bbc. we see you everywhere. give us a sense of how closely

the world is watching and what are the ramifications of a failure. >> i think the failure is resonate on a number of levels, first on the level of diplomacy. never has the middle east seen so many punishing conflicts with which we can see no solution in site and no political solution. so therefore, you have one, where there is a fighting chance that diplomacy can work and not onlyaare negotiators exhausted, if this doesn't work, they will go home and say we exhausted the diplomacy, we did everything we could and will have to say, sorry no negotiated solutions. so all options are back on the table including military and we know there are countries who believe the best way forward is a military option to deal with iran. secondly, we ask this question repeatedly, what will be the consequence of iran being brought into the international fold, at least when it comes to its nuclear program, a deal on

the nuclear program? the jury is still out in terms of how iran will behave in the region if there is a deal, but i think people are really clear. i've not heard a single person saying the opposite of if they don't give a deal then i think the instability in the middle east will have another. the supreme leader has always been suspicious of the united states. that will be further deepened and will be in what is already a combustible mix in which iran is a key player take iraq syria, lebanon, iran is a key and growing player. so therefore, i think the idea is it gets them around the table to discuss some of these issues rather than fighting it out. >> rose: bretd? with respect to mousavian, iran is the greatest instability in the middle east and you have to ask the people attacked by

questions, the people in yemen attacked by the militias, the shia organizations in iraq. we have r we learn from the taliban iran is a major region of instability and fear and if the deal were to fail and fail for good reasons then at least american allies in the middle east whether arab allies or the israelis, would take comfort in knowing that this president, after all, does have some red lines. so it would help us. now, it's true that we would have to walk away from this phase of diplomacy, but it's wrong to say, charlie, that we would then have -- the only other option we would have is war. we are now essentially in an accommodationist phase of diplomacy. we would return to a coarsive phase of diplomacy. that's also part of the diplomatic playbook and now maybe the iranians will recognize they have to take this administration flankly a little more seriously than in the past. right now one gets the feeling

that the iranians feel they can walk all over both mr. kerry and obama because those two gentlemen are desperate for a legacy-making foreign policy achievement. >> rose: we end with you margaret, with what the stakes are, and the consequences of success and failure. >> i just wanted to say when it comes to the repercussions of the deal, we have to underline that the resistance and the skepticism and the hostility among the gulf states including saudi arabia has not been mitigated by the camp david meeting and there is a danger of proliferation. there is a risk this will increase tension between the sunni power houses and iran which is the main shia powerhouse in sectarian terms and that's one of the main fault lines in the region now. >> rose: margaret. it's an important point. the gulf states have been quieter in their opposition for

the deal. doesn't mean they're for it. they're waiting to see the final tack which is arabs say which is different position than the israelis which is what bret was saying is maybe you come back another day and have a stronger hand maybe renegotiate with a different president in office. what does this mean? i think you've got both sides continuing to push because both sides really want it. the iranians need it, the americans would like it and the world community would really like to try to negotiate this through. but this what the obama administration officials will tell you is a transaction. they don't think it will be transformational burks what they will tell you and not on the record is everyone is hoping this does something to change the balance of power in the middle east and that perhaps there is a new face a long-term bet that perhaps iran would look different in ten years when its nuclear programs become unfrozen attend of this, that perhaps the leadership, that perhaps the

young generation that's more pro american would have more power and be more empowered. the critics will tell you look, you're unlocking a bunch of cash, 100 billion if you get the sanctions relief and maybe giving a lifeline to a regime that really shouldn't remain in power, the conservatives there. it is totally unclear and so fascinating to watch this diplomacy play out because we really won't know the answer to the questions for years to come even if they can make that july 7th deadline, charlie and i don't know. i don't know if they'll get there, but i think there's a good chance of it. >> rose: i may have to come back to you. margaret, thank you so much great to have you here. at least you know we welcome you and want you here whenever you have time to join us. it's a great pleasure to have you. hossein mousavian, thank you for your perspective you've brought to this conversation. thank you very much from princeton. >> thank you very much charlie.

>> rose: thank you, bret. thank you. >> rose: thank you for joining us. see you next time. for more about this program and earlier episodes, visit us online at pbs.org and charlierose.com.

>> rose: on tomorrow's pbs "newshour" i'm exploring the

report" with tyler mathisen and sue herera. in the books, the first half of 2015 is history. a number of new highs settled along the way. but were those records deceptive? on the brink, hopes for a last-minute greek debt deal were dashed leaving a lot of unanswered questions about what happened next. shedding pounds general electric is remaking itself and it's not wasting any time. all of that and more on "nightly bu for tuesday, june 30th. >> good evening, everyone. and welcome. the first half of 2 is in the books and the first half of the year was designed by low growth l low gas pr lower interest rates.