>> rose: welcome to the program. this evening for the full hour we look at the iran nuclear deal. we begin with ben rhodes, deputy national security advisor to the president of the united states. >> iran getting a nuclear weapon is unacceptable. that's why we put the sanctions in place and got this deal. but the point is this deal is far more effective than military action in preventing them from getting a weapon. so time license, the estimates are a military strike could set their program back by a year, two years, three years. it would also frankly almost guarantee they would go underground and try to develop the weapon. this deal gets ten years limitations strictest, 15 years of limitations on stockpile. that alone is more time than a military option. diplomacy is less costly than a military action and more effective in preventing them from getting a nuclear weapon. >> rose: we conclude with

analysis from david sanger jeffrey goldberg, karim sadjadpour and congressman ed royce. >> it's a huge triumph for diplomacy in that three years ago these were two countries who didn't even talk to each other. now for the past year on and off, they have been sitting in the hotel rooms behind me, the coberg palace, spending more time with each other than john kerry has ever spent with any other diplomats in the world. so for the first time we have a real conversation underway between iran and the united states. what we don't know, charlie is whether or not that will translate into any kind of relationship that's broader than this nuclear deal. >> rose: the iran nuclear agreement for the hour next.

captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> rose: today, in vienna austria, the so-called p5+1 reached a landmark agreement with iran over its nuclear program, a tectonic shift in the dynamics of the middle east in exchange for nuclear activities, iran will get relief from sanctions while being allowed to continue the program for peaceful purposes. president obama praised the deal saying it achieved something decades of animosity has not -- a comprehensive, long-term deal

with iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. >> on such a tough issue it's important the american people and representatives in congress get a full opportunity to review the deal. after all, the details matter, and we've had some of the finest nuclear scientists in the world working through those details and we're dealing with a country, iran, that has been a sworn adversary of the united states for over 35 years. so i welcome a robust debate in congress on this issue, and i welcome scrutiny of the details of this agreement. >> rose: joining me from the white house is ben rhodes, president obama's deputy national security advisor for strategic communication. i am pleased to have him back on the program. ben, thank you, congratulations. >> good to be with you. we're making this a tradition. >> rose: yes indeed. let me begin with what you didn't get that you wanted in this agreement. the president said this is triumph or diplomacy.

what did you think you wanted that you didn't get? >> well, we got all the bottom lines from the lausanne framework, all the limitations we were seeking on the iranian nuclear program, all the inspections, transparency and verification measurers to make sure the deal sticks. i will say there was one tough issue at the end. the u.n. security council resolution that governs the deal that ensure the snapback of all sanctions if the iranians violate the deal is a ten-year resolution. that packaged together, all the nuclear sanctions that have to be suspended if iran complies with the international community's demand that its program be for peaceful purposes, there were conditions on ballistics and nuclear arms that had to be lifted. we wanted to preserve those as long as we could in the ten-year period and we have eight years restriction for ballistic missiles, five years with respect to arms embargo and

we'll continue to work to limit their activities in those spaces, and that again is the nature of this agreement. they get sanctions relief and in turn we get limitations to prevent them from getting nuclear weapon and verification measures. >> what is your hope and your expectation that we will be looking at so to 15 years from now? >> we know that 10 years from now iran will have converted fully its reactor so it can't produce weapons grade plutonium in iraq. it will not have centrifuges to allow to enrich uranium. in 15 years they will take 90% of stockpile out of the country and limit enrich meant to one facility and different pathways to weapons will be cut off.

those limitations last for ten years, the strictest but the important ones on stockpile last 15 years. that's in place and we know verification measurers are in place to see if they're violating the deal. what we don't know is how iran will evolve in those 15 years. the deal has to be good enough to stick and be worth doing. if iran is as bad as it is now with regard to nuclear activities. but we also know the deal makes it more likely iran will have an incentive to evolve in a different direction. we're not counting on that. >> rose: let me understand that, ben because a lot of people -- your critics suggest that after 10 to 15 years, the iranians will have a chance to go build a nuclear weapon that they want to do which they've given up the right to do in the initial agreement. >> well, charlie absolutely

not. there is a permanent prohibition from iran ever having a nuclear weapons program under their international obligations. if they try to weaponnize their peaceful program, they would be in violation and there is a permanent transparency and verification regime we didn't have before. the additional protocol of the i.a.e.a. will give inspectors permanent capability to look at locations inside iran if we believe they're up to a covert pathway to a nuclear weapon. so whoever's president after ten, 15, 25 years we'll still have that option to respond to anything we detect that we believe is in violation of that obligation. >> rose: it seems to me listening to the president this morning that a significant argument he makes is that the alternative, not having this great, will not deliver the goods in terms of preventing iran from keeping a nuclear weapon and secondly, the sanctions that are in place now

might very well unravel. is that a correct assessment of what the president is saying? >> that's exactly right, charlie. the sanctions on the nuclear issue built up over the last several years to bite was meant to get them to the table and get this deal. the notion that the iranians would give up their nuclear weapons per suit just because of sanctions not born out by the fact they have not capitulated under the pressure of sanctions. they have continued to pursue the program. what they have done is come to the table and make the deal, which meets the bottom line. in a world with no deal, first of all they would get up to the threshold of pursuing a nuclear weapon and we would be left with a choice of whether or not to use military action or whether or not to accept their ability to obtain a nuclear weapon. that's the choice the president is aiming to prevent. if we walk away from the deal, the international unity that held together the sanctions regime would very likely unravel because the rest of the world invested in this deal, they were

in the sanctions regime to get the deal done. >> rose: what role did the russians play? >> a constructive role. it was interesting. they did not let our differences over ukraine spill over into this negotiation. they were very strong with us on the nuclear-related and verification issues. the p5+1 unity made the difference in getting the iranians to make key concessions. the russians did however, take the side of iranians with respect to provisions on arms embargo and ballistic missiles and we worked hard to ensure those would stay in place eight years for ballistic missiles and five years for the arms. >> rose: i was intrigued the iranians didn't bring up the arms embargo until late in the game. why did they hold back? >> we knew it would come down to a discussion on those issues. they have been raising sanctions relief generally throughout this and taking the position sanctions had to come off at the

beginning. fact of the matter is we were able to design sanctions relief in a variety of other places. so for instance the notion they would not get the relief immediately, they would have to complete nuclear steps first then sanctions relief. but the last detail that was ironed out is how long within the ten year u.n. security council resolution we are able to maintain the ballistics missile and arms embargo provisions of the nuclear related sanctions. we knew they were in a position they would come off right away and that was a tough issue in the last several days. >> rose: the energy commissioner said he wanted to restrict the amount of research and development they could do but my understanding is there is a limit on how much you could restrict and they can go forward with research and development to technological improvement to centrifuges and the like. >> well, he very much focused on this negotiation. what we wanted to make sure is, number one they are not enriching uranium with their

advanced centrifuges in the first ten years. so they're taking out all second generation centrifuges. in the i.r.6s and i.r.8s, they aren't allowed to enrich uranium in the first ten years preventing them to make quick transition to centrifuges in the last ten years. and the last ten years they do more r&d while we have the inspection unit watching to make sure it's peaceful. that's important so they couldn't be advancing r&d capability in the ten-year period when we essentially wanted to roll back the program. >> rose: as you know, there are many people who are opposed and i suppose the administration is too, to a lot of iran's activities with terrorist groups and others in its region. some hoped that you could tie this down and that conduct to this agreement. why couldn't you? >> well, this agreement was always about the nuclear

program, and we're making the judgment that iran with a nuclear weapon will be far more dangerous in all those activities than they are today. a nuclear emblah for hezbollah would be the worst outcome. so it's worth it to set aside issues in this negotiation to make sure they're prevented from getting a nuclear weapon. we'll still have the concerns. even on tissue of articles, even when the arms embargo is suspended in five years if they comply with a deal, we have our own restrictions on iranian activities. we have international sanctions that will stay in place. for instance, they will be prohibited from shipping arms to hezbollah or houthis so we'll maintain sanctions on ballistic missmissiles, support of terrorism and human rights issues. >> rose: the argument is made you have not pressured iranians on some of the activities

because you were too anxious to get a nuclear deal. >> no, we have pressured them on this, charlie. we've continued to designate and ratchet up sanctions on our support for terrorism. the summit we had with the gulf countries at camp david was about interdiction of weapons systems, cyber defenses for friends and partners the ability to develop special forces capabilities. we want to make sure our partners are working with us to counterthreat of terrorism in the region, of course,izecies, and any iranian activity in the region. so we'll stay focused on the issues while implementing the nuclear deal and make it safer removing the nuclear umbrella in iran's activities. >> rose: suppose the i.a.e.a. have reason to believe there are activities going on at a military installation in

violation of this agreement what are your rights to go inspect that? >> well, first of all, charlie we'll be better able to inspect that or to detect that because we will be looking at their entire uranium supply chain, the raw materials the reprocessing, the centrifuge production. the point being if we see diversion of materials to a site, we want to inspect it. if we have suspicions about the site, we go to i.a.e.a. seek an inspection to the site. if the iranians object to the inspection, we can overrule them. if we and the europeans decide the inspections should go forward, that is more votes on the joint commission set up to implement this deal than the russians, chinese and irannians. even if the russians and chinese agree with the iranians, we can overrule them, and either the inspection goes forward or iran is in violation of the deal and the sanctions snap back into place. >> rose: there is considerable belief the iranians could have nuclear capacity within three months as they stand now and

this would move it to a year. tell us exactly what that means as you see it. >> when people talk about breakout time, charlie, there are really two questions. one is how long does it take to require enough fissile material, the raw materials for one nuclear weapon? underneath this deal, foregoing the ability to have weapons grade plutonium, take that off the table. you're talking ten years. given the limitations on the type around number of centrifuges operating and stockpiles in the country, the breakout time to get enough fissile material for one weapon will go from two to three months to at least a year. there's a second breakout timeline which is how long does it take to build a device, a weapon to put that fissile material into and we assess that at at least a year and they tonight have a current weaponization program. they have one in the past that will be inspected because of this deal. >> rose: i think the president insisted this morning that if everything else fails, the

military option is on the table and he is prepared to use it. >> well, absolutely. iran getting a nuclear weapon is unacceptable. that's why we put the sanctions in place and got this deal. but the point is this deal is far more effective than military action in preventing them from getting a weapon. so we talk about time lines. the estimates are a military strike could get their program back by a year two years three years. it would almost guarantee they would go underground and try to develop the weapon. this gets ten years of limitations strictest, 15 years on stockpile. that alone is far more time than you would ever get through a military option. the diplomacy is both less costly than a military action but more effective in preventing them from getting a nuclear weapon. >> rose: and you have to go to congress to get this done. the president does have a veto that would be very hard to overrule, but tell me what it is that you see in the team that the white house sees as the most difficult challenge in convincing congress this is a good deal.

>> well, charlie, nobody in congress trusts iran. that's what we hear time and again. our point is going to be this deal has nothing to do with trust. the whole point of the deal to get the verification regime in place. we'll walk them through chapter and verse, all the inspections that we have at the declared nuclear sites, all the inspections we have at the entire nuclear supply chain and the ability to look and see what we need to see when we need to inside iran. the alternative, as you point out, are far worse. this deal intert than iran being able to advance their program unconstrained. this deal intert than another war in the middle east. lastly, charlie, if congress votes to kill this deal, not only will they be killing a deal but frankly put at risk the international sanctions regime, because it depends on international cooperation from the very nations invested in this deal with us. >> rose: how will you convince prime minister netanyahu that this is a deal that does not endanger israel's national

security? >> well, i don't think we'll convince prime minister netanyahu. we believe this is good for israel's security because it prevents iran from getting a nuclear weapon, from having the nuclear umbrella for hezbollah. but netanyahu said the deal in 2013 was a mistake. it has worked. many people are arguing even in israel to keep that deal in place. what we would say to people including congress is let's see how the deal goes, if the ierpians meet the commitments. many of the things iran has to do they have to do at the beginning to have the deal -- get rid of stockpile take out centrifuges, convert the reactor. why would we stop this from happening? let's give it several months to see if iran cooperates. they have to do that before they get sanctions relief. so there is not any cost in seeing if iran lives up to the commitment. >> rose: ben rhodes, i assume you were up late last night.

thank you for coming. pleasure to have you. ben rhodes, deputy national security advisor to the president of the united states. >> thanks, charlie. >> rose: stay with us. >> rose: we continue our coverage over the landmark negotiation between the united states and iran. joining me from vienna, david sanger, who has been with us during all these negotiations. he is national security correspondent for the "new york times." from washington ed royce republican congressman from california, convened the first congressional hearing this morning to review the deal. and from washington, karim sadjadpour, a senior associate at the carnegie endowment. and finally from washington jeff goldberg, national correspondent for the atlantic magazine. i am pleased to have all of them on this historic day. david, i go back to you first because you have been our guide from vienna and new york and washington, trying to understand this. take us through the final day leading to this agreement. >> well, charlie we all thought

that this agreement would be put together days ago, and they got hung up, oddly enough, on some issues that really had nothing to do with the nuclear program. it had more to do with the arms embargo, which was imposed on iran starting back in 2006, when the first sanctions were put on iran, and the idea was to force them into negotiations by imposing a ban on their import of conventional arms and ballistic missiles. well, the iranians stuck with the position, this is a nuclear-related sanction, so if we sign a deal, this comes off. and the american and european position was, no, we want to extend this to keep you from behaving badly throughout the region. and that really was the standoff for the better part of the last four or five days. in the end, it was resolved with something that will probably

leave no one very happy. the ballistic missile ban stays on for eight years. the conventional weapons for five. both of those could end earlier if the i.a.e.a. comes to a determination that iran is not pursuing weapons and has a completely peaceful program. >> rose: david, is this somehow in some way a triumph for diplomacy and a lot of credit belongs, regardless of how you make a final assessment of john kerry and javad zarif? >> a huge triumph for diplomacy in that three years ago these two countries didn't talk to each orthoand, for the last year, they have been spending more time with each other in this hotel than john kerry has spent with any other set of diplomats in the world. so for the first time we actually have a real conversation underway between iran and the united states. what we don't know, charlie, is

whether or not that will translate into any kind of a relationship that's broader than this nuclear deal. and there is a lot of reasons to suggest that the iranians, at least for a while, are going to take a big time out try to placate the hard liners, the iranian revolutionary guard corps, perhaps by taking some of the sanctioned money that's released and allowing them to spend that on arms, on other activities, on their new cyber core, anything other than nuclear to show they can exert their power around the globe. i think that's the biggest problem president obama will run into. a lot of the critics of the agreement you've heard today have actually been talking about iran's non-nuclear activity. >> rose: we talked to ben rhodes about that earlier in this program. jeff, no one's interviewed this president more, had more conversations about foreign policy than you have. he believes, it is said, this is

a crowning achievement of his foreign and international efforts in the world as president. how do you assess this? what credit does he deserve and what likelihood does it have, in your judgment? >> well, it's an interesting question. one of the things, when i interviewed him in may one of the things that struck me that he said was that he understands that this is on him, that, if in 20 years -- and he used the number 20, which is very interesting, which is well after the agreement would expire -- if 20 years from now if iran has a nuclear weapon he knows it's a blot on his record. so one of the things i've derived from this is he is much more of a gambler than some people think he is. he is willing to risk his reputation. he is willing in a more serious way to risk u.s. national security and the security of u.s. allies in the region on this deal. i mean, it is quite an achievement.

i would say this -- some of the pressure came off of him in the last few weeks to get this deal because of the gay marriage decision, because obamacare out of the supreme court the trade pa cs that were passed, i think they were in the white house worried about legacy issues. after that momentous week, you recall, they became a little less worried and i have a feeling -- and dave can talk about this a little bit, i don't know -- but i i have a feeling they tightened up slightly on the iranians in vienna because there seemed to be less internal pressure to get a deal at all costs. obviously, the next 60 days will be tumultuous because there are a lot of people in washington and elsewhere who believe that the deal is fatally weak. but i do think that you have to credit him with carrying through

a very dicey and very kind of high-wire act here. >> rose: david anything to that? >> charlie, on that point, jeff makes exactly the right point that what i heard from secretary kerry's staff and also from president obama's staff was that, on many occasions, he, in the past week, said take the extra time don rush this. you know, if you go past the limits in the congressional legislation and they get 60 days of review, that's fine better to have a better deal. and i think in his own staff and the president's own staff believes that came from exactly that string of victories that jeff described. and the big question is, in the end, did that result in a significantly different deal? i'm not sure it did but it certainly got rid of some of the perception that he and secretary kerry wanted this too much. >> rose: before i go to congressman royce, among both of you, do you have any sense of who won and lost here? or is that a question that's not

even -- you're able to ascertain because you don't know how it's going to play out? >> charlie, i would say in eight to ten years we might know who won or lost. clearly, short-term loser here -- and this is an important point, it's got to be made -- short-term loser here, the people of syria who are oppressed by a government supported by iran, as david pointed out. the islamic revolutionary guard corps and proxies in syria lebanon and elsewhere will see a windfall and be able to spend money they didn't have to do the nefarious things they continue to do. so you can look at the hardliners as short-term winners. but i would also say -- and this is a somewhat controversial view in israel -- i would say israel could conceivably be a winner here because the president and his allies have managed to

curtail the iranian nuclear program. if this deal works, the program will be curtailed. the israelis believe justifiably, they are in iranian gun sights that iran has bad intentions toward israel so that's one winner. i know you're talking about maybe in terms of political players, obama kerry zarif but i think you can see clear provincialprovisional winners. >> rose: congressman royce give me your assessment and what has been put in context as has been said earlier. >> well, charlie, one point i would make is the pentagon you saw secretary of defense ash carter, express real concerns last week. it wasn't understood you -- it wasn't understood until the end of this process that all of a sudden tissue of lifting the

arms embargo which also means lifting the embargo long-term on the i.c.b.m. program that iran maintains, as general carter said, you know, the i. stands for "intercontinental" ballistic missile, meaning it can fly from iran to the united states. the fact that russia weighed in at the 11th hour to support iran so that russia in the future eight years from now can transfer technology, help give their assistance, and they will be paid handsomely for it, but give their assistance for developing an i.c.b.m. capability, that could be a real threat to the u.s. homeland. this is one of the things that the pentagon obviously raised as an issue. the other big issue is that we thought at the outset that there was going to be 24-hour inspections, you know, maybe the right to go anywhere anytime, and now we find it's going to be 24 days, and then we get into an

adjudication process in which we have to ask permission of iran, and then probably work with china and russia to really have that access. this is what undercut us on the nuclear agreement we had with north korea, this inspection issue or lack of ability really, to inspect and this would be a concern, i think, we're raising at this point as we try to get into the details of this process. >> rose: but because of the president and the way the veto was written, does that enhance the president's chances of getting this -- >> i'm not sure. it's going to depend. remember, we had 367 members of congress, that's 84% of the members in the house write or co-write a letter to the president, and that letter asked that four things be achieved in this agreement -- the right to go anywhere at anytime on the inspections and that they be instantaneous, the fact that we

lift the sanctions at the end of the agreement rather than beginning, that it be multiple decades wrath than ten years and that the i.a.e.a. have their 12 questions answered when it comes to the previous bomb work, which they have 1,000 pages of documents showing iran cheated on that in the past and worked on the program. that is the baseline. so we'll get a copy of these 180 pages, but the fact that 84% of the house signed on to that letter and the fact that those nourish shoes were -- nourish shoes were not -- those four issues were not met will be a concern in the congress. >> rose: what do you say to that karim? >> in the country we are very conflicted on this deal. on the one hand after a decade and a half in iraq and afghanistan, everyone really wanted to resolve this issue

peacefully and diplomatically. on the other hand, i think there remains tremendous skepticism about the iranian regime and its fidelity to this deal. i know a lot of people including henry kissinger believes iran is compromising as a result of the sanctions and if we remove the sanctions a year or two from now, will they remain faithful to the deal? so i think, you know, it's a conflicting moment for the united states, but i do believe that we have to look at it in the context of where we are as a country, after a decade and a half of the conflicts in the middle east, i think president obama has had a mandate to both avert an iranian bomb and avert bombing >> rose: the president argued he couldn't hold the sanctions together. >> i think that's probably right. at the same time, the way the sanction are set up, it basically forces companies and countries around the world to make a simple choice -- do you

want to do business with united states or iran? so the vast majority of companies in countries, that's a pretty easy choice. but it was also, i think, the robustness, the success of the sanctions regime, i think, was due to the fact that people saw how president obama and secretary kerry had made these unprecedented overtures to tehran, which iran, under the presidency, had resipcated. so i think if it looked like the united states was being unreasonable, intransient and not willing to engage in diploma circumstances i think it's probably right countries like china and russia would have peeled off on the sanctions. >> congressman royce does the president have an argument when he says look, the alternative is worse than more likely that they will get the bomb, or somebody will give the bomb to them? >> i understand the argument the

president made but remember this is an administration who opposed our attempt to impose these sanctions on iran in the first place, arguing they would not be successful. when the sanctions were imposed and frankly imploding gradually the economy in iran, at this point the story line changed and the legislation -- the bipartisan legislation that i and elliott ingle prepared in the last session where we passed it out 400 to 20, working with treasure, in the past with treasury officials, we mutt together legislation that would really give the ayatollah the choice between economic collapse or compromise on the nuclear program, the point i would make is the administration decided to have senator reed hold that and not bring it up even when we had overwhelming support. we went in with that leverage

and we're coming out of that negotiation with real concerns from the pentagon and from those who have looked at the past practice. you know as one of the experts said, it's in the iranian dna to cheat, and now they have been able to put in place a whole series of processes which will take us, you know, 24 days to get through, and then an adjudication process which could take us months in case where is they are accused of cheating or moving equipment around and doing testing. >> rose: but, david sanger, could the administration have made that deal and said to the iranians, it's either ratcheting up the sanctions until you collapse, or you sign on to a deal? >> you know, i don't think so, charlie. i think the most convincing argument that the president makes here is that the sanctions drove iran to the bargaining table, but it didn't stop them from enriching uranium.

congressman royce is absolutely correct. the president did oppose some of the increases in the sanctions but every time the sanctions increased, while the iranians were willing to come negotiate, they were, until this process began, they were actually increasing the number of centrifuges that hay had in place. remember, there was a moment early in the bush administration -- i was covering president bush for the times as white house correspondent -- when people thought it was a crisis because the iranians had 200 or 300 centrifuges. they now have 19,000. so he had to get off this particular track. i wanted to go back to a question you asked earlier about who won and lost this over the longer period of time. as jeff said, it is way too early to tell that, and it may take years to be able to figure it out. but, you know, i wrote in the times this morning that, if you think back to nixon's opening to china, if you would ask the same

question then, you had many people who were opposing the opening, but almost all of the issues that we worry about with china today are completely different than the ones we were discussing when china was opened or the first overtures were made in 1971 and '72, and i suspect it's probably the same for iran that the issues that we're going to be worried about a decade or two decades now from iran may be very different from the nuclear one. >> rose: jeff, talk to me about benjamin netanyahu and how he might react and what this means in the region. will syria therefore, be more stabilized because they will get more money and the like from either hezbollah or from the iranians? will we see more activity in yemen? >> well, yeah, the netanyahu question is a fat nateing question, and there is a mystery to me that why a prime minister

who was so effective early on in concentrating the attention of the world and of the obama administration on the iranian nuclear threat -- and credit where credit's due he really focused people on the threat, and the threat of an israeli strike obviously helped president obama get the rest of the world behind sanctions. so he had a very effective run. and now he -- by being completely rejectionist, by rejecting the idea of a deal, not certain particulars within a deal, he has shut himself out of the coming debate, to a large degree. i mean, he will be lobbying. he's already expressed in very harsh terms his feelings about this deal, but he will not be able and has not been able to influence the negotiations in the way that you think he might want to. he's so overwrought about it that wrong the president is

listening to him. certainly the europeans aren't listening to him. so it's a very interesting bifurcation, the effect of netanyahu and the completely ineffective netanyahu. on the larger question, you know, this is one of the huge questions, i think, you know, we have to assume, to a certain degree, that the assad regime will get bolstered, or at least greater stability, or greater instability, we'll see how they're fight with i.s.i.s. and some of the other sunni extremist groups go. one could argue that assad was slipping and that i.s.i.s. and other groups were ascending and maybe some money coming in will help them, i don't know. obviously, it's not only the iranian money that might influence these conflicts it's iranian lejet massey that also has a lot of sunni arabs worried that iran is on the march across the region. that doesn't affect israel the

way it does in the gulf states and syria. but to be fair and to be fair to the president, i don't think he's overly pollyanna-ish about iran becoming a good neighbor to some of these countries anytime soon. i think he has a long-term wish that they will change and maybe this will set in motion a virtuous cycle but i think in the short term the big question everyone in the region halls is how hard will president obama push back against iranian adventurism, once this deal becomes reality, assuming it becomes ratified by the congress. that, to me, is the big 3 question. the biggest question of all is what the next president of the united states does. there is this idea of snapback that you could put sanctions in place. the real snapback to me is who the 45th president will be and how tolerance for iranian adventurism. >> rose: will this be a huge issue in republican-democrat politics, do you think? >> i think a lot depends on the

examinations over the next 60 days and the conclusions we reach. but i will say the conduct of the iranian regime itself could be an issue. this weekend we had the annual parade and rouhani was marching in the parade and he was interviewed as the crowd behind him were chanting "death to america" and the placards being carried translated to "death to israel." in the middle of the interview, he says "the future looks very bright in terms of this negotiation." the question is, will this negotiation really change the conduct of that regime? a lot of this, what we see in the ensuing weeks and months as iran is emboldened, the question is going to be what does that encourage them to do with respect to their agitation against israel as they call for death to israel and transfer 100,000 precision guidance systems -- this is the latest

news -- into the hands of hezbollah, will they give hezbollah an order to fire those? this will be the reason why the prime minister of israel would be distraught, and increasingly it's one of the reasons why i think ash carter, the secretary of defense, is beginning to show concern about this comment on the part of iran that they want to mass produce i.c.b.m.s. >> rose: karim tell me what the reaction has been in iran. early reports is they're exuberant about the deal. >> charlie, one of the paradoxes of iran is it's one of the most pro american society in the region and one of the most anti-american regimes in the region. as we've seen, dancing on the streets, tremendous displays of exuberance, people are very happy, and i think it shows the iranian people want to be south korea, not north korea, but, you know, we need to

distinguish between the population and the regime, and i think even within the regime there's conflict between hard line forces led by the supreme leader who are very wary of the united states and, you know, resistance against the united states has been their long-time organizing principle. i don't envision that will change. the supreme leader is 76 years old. i don't think you will abandon your life-long principles at age 76. on the other hand, the deal i think, will certainly boost president rouhani and especially foreign minister zarif and these kind of more moderate factions in tehran, they want to put the country's national interest before revolutionary ideology. but we'll have to see how this plays out. i think over the long term, there's a valid hope that it will strengthen these forces in moderation, but as jeff and david have said there is a valid fear that in the short

term, it's going to enrich the revolutionary guards and the regime may actually champ down internally to send a signal to people who don't think our external flexibility means internal weakness. >> rose: david, back to this principle issue of inspection does this inspection process give the united states and i.a.e.a. all that it needs to determine where there are stealth projects if they exist and, secondly to gain the access to everything it needs to have access to? >> charlie, it doesn't give them everything they need, and it doesn't give all of it when they need it. but it's all comparative. just as the president said, you have to compare having the deal versus the cost of not having the deal, you have to consider having the inspection regime versus the old inspection regime.

this is not the first time the i.a.e.a. has had trouble dealing with iran. this set of questions to resolve about their potential past military activity this list has been sitting around since 2005 or 2006. they have had many places they wanted to go visit and it took years before they could get to the impasse that resulted in going to the u.n. security council that resulted in the sanctions and the set of talks. so while congressman royce is right, 24 days sounds a lot worse than 24 hours, it also sounds a whole lot better than five or six years. so the question is, can you maintain the momemtum? and if there was a lesson from the north korea example, it's that you can strike a deal and fall down on on the implementation, not go press them to the wall, not create a crisis when there is a violation, and that's what happened with north korea, and

they ended up with, you know, three nuclear tests. >> so i think the trick here is going to be not only what the iranians do, but how well does the united states and the next administration keep pressing to actually implement this deal. it's going to need a separate coordinator for implementation and it's going to need a lot of pressure to keep it going. >> rose: david what happened to that issue that the united states kept raising you know, about they had to come forward with all the evidence of the past behavior? >> very good question charlie, because the answers to that today were a little bit vague. this morning, the head of the i.a.e.a. signed an agreement with minister solahay, who is the minister of atomic energy, the atomic energy organization and the one who has been negotiating with energy secretary moniz and the essence of the deal was, by the end of the year they're supposed to

have resolved all dozen questions about what it was that iran was doing in the past. it strikes me as a big stretch that they will be able to answer all those questions and it's still not clear, for example whether they're going to be allowed to interview many of the scientists including who was supposed to be the head of the program. so that's all in limbo. one thing the administration did get in the end, charlie, though, was specific wording in the agreement that bars iran from doing the kind of experiments on warheads and deadnators and so -- detonators and so forth involved in the past action. so will be interest to see if that sticks as well. >> rose: jeff, you know the president. what tools does he have and how confident is he that he can make or sell the deal, or does he rest a bit comfortably in the language of the veto? >> i don't think they're resting comfortably.

i would say this, i have been thinking a lot and making a lot of calls about chuck schumer democrat of new york, who is a pivotal figure in this going forward. obviously, presumptive senate majority leader if the democrats take back the senate. also very hawkish on iran, very big supporter of israel, obviously, and, you know it just -- i have been thinking this through and it seems to me unlikely that schumer would work against the signature foreign policy goal of a president from his party. a lot of people have their eye on schumer, as schumer goes, a whole bunch of senators go, perhaps, and i just find it implausible that the republicans will be able to break off a sufficient number of democrats to override a presidential veto.

so i think right now they think that they've got this. but, you know, remember syria 2013, that was tumultuous, and things shift, and if details come out about this plan in the coming days that really don't fit well with people anything's possible. >> rose: does that include karim, that the iranian regime may change, notwithstanding that the ayatollah's entire life has been built on the idea that the united states was very much opposed to the revolution, very much opposed to having iran become a kind of power that i wanted to be and would take any steps necessary to stop them, that's his belief. is any of that likely to change? i asked rhodes this evening what is their expectation of the iranians? do they simply believe that after ten to 15 years they will

lose their interest or the wisdom or not wisdom of having a nuclear weapon? >> well, charlie, i think the longer one studies the middle east the less one is likely to make forecasts about it. it's imminently unpredictable. but the question that came up about china and david sanger, you and david talked about that, the case of china and mao zedong, mao reached the conclusion that the fear of the soviet union necessitated one with the united states and he decided to make the strategic shift. i haven't seen signs from iran's supreme leader that he's decided to make the strategic shift after 36 years of enmity to gradually embarring on normalization with the united states. the u.s. and iran have common adversaries and i.s.i.s. is one

of them. in years past there has been tactical cooperation between the u.s. and iran whether al quaida or the taliban. but as far as we know, to some extent, the inner warrickings of the iranian regime are a black box, but just based on the public statements, i haven't seen any signs that they are prepared to embark on that strategic shift. but, you know, the supreme leader is 76 years old. he's not going to be around forever, and i think his hard line views are very much the minority in iran. >> rose: but who's with him? well, that's the thing. he has a monopoly of coercion, and that he's the commander-in-chief of the revolutionary guards. he appoints their senior commanders, and i think it's a relationship which is -- it's a symbiotic relationship. it's politically expedient for the supreme leader and it's been

economically expedient for the revolutionary guards. they have been greatly enriched as a result of this. but, you know, i think that it's difficult when you have, you know, demographics in iran in which three-quarters of the population were born after the revolution, it's going to be difficult to continue to keep the country isolated. >> rose: jeffrey could you argue that -- i asked this earlier, that this deal wouldn't have happened with john kerry that somehow his personality, his persistence his desire to be an historic figure, all of that added to the likelihood of pulling this off? >> i don't want to engage in psychoanalysis -- >> rose: oh, why not? i don't know why not. right? i'm not running for anything. you know, the guy is unbelievable. he took all of that energy that was pent up and frustrated over

the middle east peace process where he was cornered and he threw it into this, he did this with a broken leg. he is -- this is putting aside whether or not, you know, he negotiated a deal that was too weak from the american perspective, put aside those issues. i mean, there is a quality of this guy that is just unbelievable and, you know, i don't want to speculate is he motivated by a nobel prize or x y or z. i think since his vietnam experience he's believed strongly in diplomacy, that there have to be non-military ways of solving problems and i think he brings that sincerity to it. but, again, whether or not you agree with the methodology or his thinking you have to sort of sit back and watch this guy who's not a young guy with a kind of awe. >> rose: congressman one last quick question for you, if this

works, it's an his historic agreement? >> yes, but so was the north korean framework agreement, that was historic, but it failed and the same individuals who worked on that agreement -- wendy sherman, i remember some of our debates on the time, i was on the committee, and i remember the views of john kerry at that time, they were wrong and north korea obtained a nuclear weapon as a result. so there's a lot consequential about this and that's what congress will have to look into. >> rose: i'm going to be here. i can't wait. all this is intriguing to me, including, david thanking you and also i suspect there are thousands of stories still not told. >> we're going to learn a lot about what happened back here in the coberg that we don't know and i'm sure it's a pretty fascinating tale. a lot of that centers as jeff was suggesting, on secretary kerry. this was the longest we've ever seen a secretary of state stay

in one city outside the united states working on one project in decades. >> rose: i said historic figure not no bell aspirant. >> don't be surprised if you see that. >> rose: i wouldn't be surprised in all kinds of rewards are offered and if it doesn't, history will be unkind. pleasure having you all. >> thank you charlie. >> rose: see you next time. for more about this program and earlier episodes visit us online at pbs.org and charlierose.com.

>> rose: on the next charlie rose, a conversation with warren buffet, bill gates and melinda gates about philanthropy in 2015. >> philanthropy is proven even though it's a small part even of

the u.s. economy it's been a very innovative part where people show new pilot programs that influence a lot of other activities. >> rose: tomorrow's pbs "newshour", miles o'brien and newo risen's first batch of photos of pluto. captioning by vitac,

underwritten by fireman's fund every single bite, need it to be -- >> twinkies in there. >> it's like a great big hug. >> about as spicy as i can handle it. my parents put chili powder in my baby food. >> just a lot of chillin