>> rose: welcome to the program. tonight we continue our look at turkey with the foreign minister ahmet davutoglu. >> if a turkisheader or foreign minister speaks in tehran with an iranian counterpart, we can sak in a very friendly, frank manner as a neighbor. or in cairo we can speak with egyptians as one of them. in brussels we can speak as a european. in... again in brussels we speak as a member of nato. and these are not conflicting. therefore the potential of communication of turkey with many actors at the same time in an efficient manner is really unique for turkey. >> rose: we continue

exparticular ration of turkey with four keen an oners, ian bremmer, henri barkey of lehigh unersity, steven cook of the council on foreign relations and joining us from istanbul by phone, journalist and author andrew finkel. >> what we see unfolding in the middle east, particularly as they pertain to turkish relations with libya and turkey's relatns with syria is that the turks are as befuddled and confused as many others when it comes to the ab spring and that their vision of themselves as leaders of the region, of having influence, of playing a constructive role has come up against their interests. >> rose: more about turkey when we continue.

captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> rose: tonight we continue our focus on turkey. last night it was the prime minister. toght we have the foreign minister. we look at the country's foreign policy and the man who's at the center of it, ahmet davutoglu. he is considered the architect of the country's zero problems

with neighbors policy. his active diplomacy and deep economic commercial ties makes turkey the leading actor in the region and beyond. it's lifted visa requirements with iran, iraq, syria, rush and malaysia. turkey's diplomat cans talk to leaders from tehran to brussels, they also talk too hamas and hezbollah. some say the uprisings acrs the arab world have compromised turkey'snfluence in the region. i talked to the foreign minister about all of this in istanbul last week. how do you see turkey's future? >> you have to understand first the flow of the history. after the cold war there has been a fro says of reformation or restructuring of the world order. not the bipolar world order, more multilateral in political sense. in economic sense, not the capitalist socialists but more

global economics and the new economic order and in cultural sense the revival of the civilization, cultural values together with the global aspects. in that sense we have a geopolitical and geocultural transformation of the world order. and english transformation, certain countries have a potal role where these political, economic, cultural transformations are interlinking. when you lk at turkey, turkey's at the right central geographical position in the sense of geo yo political transformation from eastern europe in 1990s, now after 2000 and in the middle east in central asia and therefore in the last 20 years there has been a circle of instabity but at the same time in 1990s bosnian crisis, also a crisis,

macedonian crisis in balkans and transformation. later transformation in caw care ya, georgian revolution and in central egypt the transformation and now in the middle east. so all these are around turkey. and these regional transformations will be affected global politics like the war in iraq, now libya, et cetera. in economic sense we have an economic transformation and the global economic crisis. and turkey is, again, in such a position as a rising economic power to the... which will be playing an important role in economic architecture. but at a t same time, having an energy secretary and other trait flow, transportation, cultural sense we have a similar

significance of turkey in the sense of the multicultural, multiethnic, multireligious confrontations. in certain regions. so what is our role? the future of you are the economy? turkey wants to contribute to global peace and to contribute in a sense of lping the formation of the u.n. and therefore (inaudible) in the last two years. in economic sense we want to have... we want to contribute to the new economic architecture, financial architecture of the crisis therefore we are active. in cuural sense we want to help to the mutual understanding to alliance of civilizations as one of the co-chairs together with spain. >> rose: tell me what that is, the alliance of civilization? >> the alliance of civilization is a platform for (indible)

and now we have more than 120 countries and organizations inlved in this trying to ease the tension tween cultures and trying to help the cultures understand each other. similarly now in turkey, this week as you know, we are argue the a summit of the u.n. in order to response to the economic inequalities, poverty, ecological crisis, in this '49 countries of the u.n. this is turkish global contribution. before 20 years. 20 years ago turkey was not playing such at all. but now we can play a global role in all these fields. parallel toll this, we want to be more active. more even proactive. we hav turkey, bosnia, serbia trilateral mackisim in and we're

active in balkan affairs. we are very active in middle eastern issues. recently the arab spring we have enacted in order to help the process of change to a peaceful transformation in caucuses, south a a. so all these regional issues we want to contribute to political dialogue, economic interdependency and cultural interaction. >> rose:ome have sd that you believe in turkey exceptionalism and that you are the sort of philosopher of turkey greatness. >> (laughs) >> rose: is that fair? >> nibble my country's potential. if you say turkish greatness. but it doesn't mean that we are seeing us greater than other nations. >> rose: not superior? >> not spear superior at all. but our geography and historical background necessitates some sort of active foreignolic for example, the for a bosnian

issue, bosnian issue for a european or asian country is foreign policy. but in turkey, if there's a crys any sis in bosnia it's getting at a domestic issue because we have more boss knee yaks living in turkey than in disease. (inaudible) we have more albanians living in turkey than al baneia. again, balkan crisis. similarly, in turkey we have such close interaction with arabs, with kurdish population of the region. so we are all interactive. this is our history. we cannot ignore our history. therefore until we believe in responding this historical transformation in a reactive manner and... >> rose: how will you contribute proactively? >> in many issues like...

rose: take iran, as one. where yohave said that turkey, for example, i think the word you used was that turkey can speak critically to iran. >> yes. >> rose: how will you do that? >> it is interesting. i mean, have a regional charter, even multicontinental. if a turkish or foreign minisr speaks in tehran with an iranian counterpart we can speak in a very friendly frank, manner as a neighbor. or in cairo we can speak with egyptians as one of them. in brussels we can speak as a european. again in brussels we can sak as a member of nato. and these are not conflicting. therefore the potential of communication of turkey with many actors at the same time in an efficient manner is really unique for turkey. >> rose: is there a move to play

an expanding role in the islamic world? >> not... in general in the world yes. we are trying to increase... expand our role phenomenon global affairs, in regional affairs. for example, we have a tin american initiative. we opened two new embassies in latin america and our relations with brazil is getting (inaudible) and they are not missing countries. similarly, our zero problems with our neighbor we are as commanding with syria and iran and iraq as neighbors but we have eight other non-muslim neighbors, russia, ukraine, georgia, bulgaria, greece, romania. we are developg the same level of that withall of these neighbors. so our foreign policy is not rect to one region or group of a country. we want to ve same level of

intensive (inaudible) with all the countries, including muslim countries. >> rose: much has been made over the fact that you and your prime minister and you specifically, this notion of zero problems. you got lots of neighbors, no problems and that's the way we like it. the arab spring has presented what kind of dilemma for you are the economy? >> yeah, it is... it is a very important question. now we are dealing with this issue. in our region usually countries have good relations eitherle with masses or with the administration. >> rose: exactly. the officials or the administration. >> exactly. for example some russian countries he good relations with mubarak but they're not popular in the eyes of the egyptian people. or sometimes iran might be popular with some people in the region but not with the admistration. so it is changing. bu there's... in almost eight

years turkey had a success story in the sense of developing very good relations with the administrations. very friendly. >> rose: with mubarak, qaddafi, assad? >> not only with... especiay the neighbors. >> rose: t crown prince of... >> with the neighbors. the crown prince, king of saudi arabia monarchy of iraq and also with other neighbors. but at the same time we had excellent relations with the masses of these people, of these countries and the masses of these countries in the eyes of the mass of these countries we had a great level of populity. our prime minister in that sense had the same level of popularity in the street of damascus, cairo or beirut. >> rose: why was your prime minister and turkey popular with

those people that you just outlined? >> our prime minister and turkey's popular in the streets of skopje or... (inaudible) and even our prime minister was very popular in turkey and popar in israel before israel attacked gaza, before the time when we were negotiatingetween israel and syria we had good relations with israel and syria at the same time. so it's not because of this, it is more because of our policy regionally and principally under e policy. when there is an unjust, we raise our voice. >> rose: as you know, t criticism yohave heard is that in libya, for example, turkey was slow to speak out about qaddafi who was a friend of the administration. and now you're seeing the same thing in syria where hamas is

talking about leaving syria in part because they support the people in the street and not the people in the palace. >> the issue is in tunisia and egypt... in all these countries regarding the... these mass moments in arab spring, we had a policy of principle and the principle is we have been always in favor of the rights, demands, and aspirations of the people. >> rose: this was a dilemma for you, come on! >> yeah, but let me finish. this is the first principle we always implemented in libya, in syria, in egypt, in tunisia, everywhere. e second principle is we don't want... we want to have a peaceful transformation, not a transformation creating uest or civil confrontation. in tsz and egypt, the cracter of the (inaudible) and the fw

of this change was different than other countries and therefore we raised our voice. in libya, so from the first day prime minister erdogan declared that qaddafi the-- him directly-- that he should leave the power. >> rose: do you think turkey can be a model for the future as to how they might develop into a democratic pluralistic secular... >> of course, this is our experience. we cannot impose our experience on anyone. but other friendly nations from around the region they can get lesson out of this experience. but i can tell you that these autocratic regimes, they have three arguments to legitimize their status quo. one argument is they said that they have to have an autoatic strong regime because there's a fight against israel. and they aren a situation of war.

secondly they said that if they're... they change in the direction of democracy naudle). democracy neighboring... they turn their face to western powers and they said if we go and democracy comes, then islamic radicalismay come. but in the case of turkey, (inaible) democracy. >> rose: not produce chaos. >> andot produce radicalism. democracy produced stability, economic development d much more active foreign policy. >> rose: let me ask you this question that i often heard. your party came to power in 2002. it was called a seismic event. why was that? >> >> i can tell you in modern turkish history there were four

intensified restorations. one was in the early 19th century. the second was the establishment of turkish republic. the third the democracy after the second world war. after the cold war, there was reformation and restoration of the country. our party in last eight years achieved this restoration. restoration in the sense of political democratization. restoration the sensef economic developme. restoration in the sense of a much bigger role in international environments. so when our party came to power, there was an economic crisis, there was a problem of anti-democratic... mean policies coming from 1980s, 1990's.

and there was a problem of crisis around turkey. so our party was able to... our governments were able to change this and create a new restoration. that was the reason why it was seen as a seismic event? the sense of change in turkish politics. >> rose: some people-- and you've seen it many times-- ask where is turkey going with respecto where it was. is it becoming more... is it becoming more... looking more to the east. moving away from its western relationships? your prime minister says you still want to be part of the european uni and you have not in any way minimized your european connections. they worry about your support of hamas and hezbollah. th worry about the conflict with israel.

what do you say to those ople who raise those points that they have relations they have with turkey may be changing? >> rose: i think there is a wrong question here. there was a question before, who lost turkey. >> re: yes. >> it means those who are (inaudible) not part of the west. no, we are part of the western because we are a member of nato and we are, indeed, a way of the full membership of e.u.. so no country in nato can claim that they are more active in nato than turkey. rose: you have troops in afghanistan. >> yeah. turkish contribution in nato has increased tremendously everywhere. turkey'sn the forefront of nato's diplomacy. security policy. >> rose: so when you want to say... >> there is no change in the

sense of our orientation in nato or e.u. during our government, we have started negotiations with e.u.. so it means our orientations with e.u. and nato have increased. at the same time, our relationship with our neighborhood has increased. >> rose: a what's been the talyst for that? >> because we want to have a stable environment around us. turkey has suffered a t during cold war because of having bad relations with the neighbors, with soviet union, because of being in bulgaria, romania, because of being in different blocs with greece, because of being in... i mean ve some difficules in cyprus. so you want to have a safe, secure, stable, prosperous neighborhood. thereforwe have developed and even develop our (inaudible)

it's not a matter of havin rich... i think this is seeing that turkey's improving relations with iran or having some relations with hamas and as if it is a shift of access. nobody should forget that until 2008, until israel attacked gaza strip... gaza and destroyed the negotiations between israel and syria through turkey, the relation between turkey and israel was very good. therefore we had negotiations between israel... between israel and syria. but if a country acts against the peace or stability in our region, of course we react. and if iran (inaudible) we react them awell. our policy is a policy of stability, prosperity and political dialogue. >> rose: so what would you do if

iran was providing weapons to hamas which were using those in a counrproductive way? would u oppose tha would you urge iran not to support hamas in that way? >> we have been urging iran for... on many issues including (inaudible) issue or including even middle eastern peace process and other issues. but important, what is the constitution? the solution is a peace in the region and of occupation in palestine. israel should accept (inaudible) middle eastern peace process based on 1967 borders and there should be sustainle peace in the gion. >> rose: and you believe it's a positive step that the palestinians have begun to find some way for fatah and hamas to be togethering? >> yes. this is very positive they will open dialogue in cairo to be with egyptian friends and we

have agreement between hamas and (inaudible) now we have one palestinian authority. that's good for the security of israel as well. one palestinian alternative, united pestinian authority would mean a reliable counterpart for a negotiation. that would meanestructuring of palestinian state. and we would support this. international mmunity should support this bause that's the way to achieve peace in the region. otherwise, a divided palestine willontinue to be a source of instability and also a source of problem between palestinians and israel. >> rose: so if, in fact, you are the question all the power and all of the intent that you have suggested so far wanted to play a positive role, why don't you resume the relationship you had with israel so that you can be a peacemaker between israel and the palestinians. you had that role.

>> we in... until 2008, as i said, we had very good relations. but regarding to resume bad relations with israel you should no forget that israel killed nine civilians in international waters. eight of them are tkish citizens, one is american citizen. in international waters 72 miles away from israel. and we n't question about any other iue but we can talk on this. but nobody can kill our citizens in international waters. if israel accepts this mistake and apologizes and compensates for, next day we will resume all the... >> rose: so where does that stand? i mean, you've had some conversationwith the trade minier from israel. where does it stand in an effort to get past...

rose: our question is very simple. in eastern mediterranean, in country has the right to kill civilians in international waters. our citizens we killed so we... if were friends then friends should apologize. but israel must know that all countries are accountable for international law. until and unless israel accepts this, we can not have normal relations. how can we accept killing civilians in international waters? therefore its up to the israelisnd i told them later in negotiations if they apologize and compensate for this they have no problem. but if they don't apologize and compensate-- assuming that they have the rht to kill civilians

in ternational waters-- then there will be no order. there will be no international law in the mediterranean. >> what's the relationship with the united states today? >> very good. excellent. in all issues we are coordinating in a very efficient manner. prime minister erdogan has gular contacts with president obama. my contacts and consultation with secretary clinton is excellent. we have having telephone calls or meetings in international... >> rose: how is president obama seen in this region? >> he was seen when he was... as a (inaudible) in the sense that he's focused on middle eastern peace. he's... his message in turkey when he came to ankara, in cairo in several international

regarding american attitudes vis-a-vis multilateralism. a new policy in the united states. these are very well perceived and still the prestige of president obama is very gh and i think the main thing for president obama is a big chance not only for amerins but for the air force looking for a new global order. >> rose: so who is the rival for turkey to be the dominant power in the region? >> weon't see rivals. we havewo categories of states: friends and potential friends. >> re: (laughs and so israel is a potential friend? >> israel has been friend but ma the mistake when they accept that mistake they will continue to be our friend. >> prime minister ahmet davutoglu, i thank you for this

time. >> thank you, thank you very much. >> rose: joining me now, a group of people who know turkey's economy, rise, potential and challenges. ian bremmer of your eurasia group, henri barkey, steven cook of the council on foreign relations and from istanbul by phone, journalist and author andrew finkel. henri, i begin with you. tell me where you think turkey is today. what is its economy, obviously is among the best in the world. it's growing. it has an extraordinary series of things that it can offer. how do you see its place? >> there's no question that turkey has done vy, very well and the issue here is whether they connect and the's a way in which turkey has become a statistical power, especially the middle east and is now finding that it's... its

expansion is limited by the arab spri, by the limitations of the regimes in the arab world and its finding that it's cyr ree problems policy with its nehbors is backfiring because that zero problems with neighbors is really a zero problems with the regimes. and the regimes are in great... threat especially in syria and how syria emerges from this crisis will have a major impact in turkey because syria represented the model for which turkey was expanding into the region and billed essentially a regional... almost a hegemonic role. but economically turkeyooks ve good at t moment. and it has displayed itself in a position where it export it is

rest of europend the united states, et cetera, but also to reons in africa and the middle east the trajectory is a positive one. next question is going to be the elections in turkey and what happens in terms of 2 kurdish question and that's a big problem. >> rose: let me turn the arab spring, steven. turkey and therab spring, how do you assess that performance so far? >> so far the performance is not very good. the arab spring has presented a whole series of challenges f turkey and i has really shtered the myth of the new turkey... new turkish foreign policy. the whole idea behind the foreign minister and prime minister ed wan's outrio de janeiro to the foreign world was that as turks, as pious muslims, they knew the region better than anybody else an they have been severely critical of the united states and otherings in the region because they somehow had

a better touch, feel, insight into the region. what we see unfilding in the middle east, particularly as they came to turkish relatis with libya and syria is that the turks are as befuddled and confused as many otherings when it comes to the arab spring and that their vision of themselves as leaders of the region, of having influence and playing a constructive role has come up against their interests. and their interests were wrapped up in moammar qaddafi's libya and assad's sia. it was easy for erdogan to call for hosni mubarak to go. there were... have not been good relations between ankara and cairo. ankara does not have extensive economic interests in egypt but it does have extensive interests inoth bya andyrias well as in syria and particular a certain amount of prestige

invested in the assad regime. >> rose: okay but... go aad. >> just to wrap up, in essence thturks have looked not as masters of the region but as i said befuddled and mall adroit in dealing with the demandsover millions of arabs who live in more open and free societies. >> in other words some have suggested they're on the wrong side of history in certain instances. >> that's precisely the case. after all, a.k.p. is supposed to be this democratic muslim society but nevertheless they've lined up essentially-- at least in the beginning-- with qaddafi and dragged their feet on libya and theyeep looking for solutions in sere war that include assad himself just as he is, in fact, using tanks to shell residential neighborhoods in cities in syria. >> there's been this pro sdwlaex the arab spring a butch of dominos that are going to continue to fall in the middle east in the same they when you had the orange and rose revolutions in the former s.u.v. that was going to sweep away

authoritarian regimes from that part of the world. it hasn't happened. >> rose: they didn't become democrats. >> precisely. and i think you're going to see most of the dictatorss in the region and the middle east are going to still be the dictateors. the point steven just made that i agree is that the turks are actually showing some inconsistent any a policy that they've made historically, which is that on the one hand they really want to be this model of the secular democratic state that has an islamic people across the region. on the other hand they want to build their economic ties. they've been incredibly success at building their economic interests across the region. so across the middle east turkish soap operas are popular. everyone wants to be a tourist in turkey. the most exciting investment story is iraq. turkish companies are better positioned for white goods, construction and energy than

anyone else in the region. those are fantastic things going in turkey's favor but there's no question that to do business in this part of the world you're continuing to support a bunch of regimes that aren't particularly democratic. i suspect most of those regimes are still going to be there in a couple of years but the turks aren't going to look quite so attractive as the model given that they're going to have to make some compromises that look like rial poll teak. >> rose: henri, what do you think? >> i aee withim that they are well positioned and they've done very well and grow to iraq you see turkish goods are all over the police. but there is a backlash. in lya, for instance, people demonstrated against the turkish consulate, that burned the tushish flag which is one of the reasons why the turks had to change policy. now on syria we have to be a little bit honest. it's not clear to us that we in

the united states want bashar to go. there's a by that which turky and the united states... actually ed wan and president obama are working in tandem trying to figure out a soft transition in syria. because clearly syria is different than egypt and tunisia because the potential for a blood path is huge and without a visa picy there will be tens of thousands of syrians trying to cross into turkey and the turks are very, very worried about that. >> rose: andrew, talk about the idea of turkey and what might happen in syria with bashar, assad obviously being aggressive about trying to shut down the rebellion. >> well, i think the point about turkey is that it's there for the long term. these countries with which it has borders so when you say turkey is the big economy of this region and it's calculating on the long term so in the short term, yes, these are difficult countries to read. these difficult situations to make your marker and do you

support assad now and will he be... turkey is no cleverer than any other country in being able to read these situations. but i think what turkey is banking on, literally, is that it is the big economy in the region. that as theseountries become more democratic they will consume more and they will buy services more and they will buy these services from turkey. so i think turkey is not looking in the short term, two years, three years, but in the long term. yes, it will benefit from events in the middle east. >> rose: let me move from syria to israel. so the relationship between turkey and israel, the prime minister and foreign minister, said to me unless israel apologizings and unless they've offered compensation and is prepared to change the embargo that there will be no relationship. is that changing? >> well, certainly at election time it's not going to change. >> rose: right, exactly. >> there is going to be an election here in june.

you might here a campaign bus go by with the jingles of some of the political parties while i'm talking. they seem to go by everybody five minutes from where i'm talking. the prime minister's stand on israel, the tough turn he's taken, the pro-palestinian, the pro-gaza stance he's taken, it's been very popular electorally so we're not going to see a major change in that. but at the same time you have to remember that trade between turkey and israel continues. there's a military relation, a strategic relation, things haven't eroded entirely. this is not... there have been previous low points in turkey turkish i israeli relations. the '80s when turkey was under martial law was a desperate time and that improved so this relation shipp go up and down. >> rose: steven, what about israel? >> well, i think relationship has fundamentally changed. as andrew pointed out, prime

minister erdogan mints political gold by taking a tougher stand on israel and not only does it help him domestically but it does raise his profile. ere is a significant amount of turkish soft power throughout the world but ultimately i think the relationship between israel and turkey has fundamentally changed. you will not go back to the kind of strategic relationship that blossomed in the mid-1990s. in the extent that t turks have sought a eateand more influential role in the arab world, necessarily their relationship with the israelis has cooled. >> the turks did not know that there was going to be a revolution in tunisia. nobody did. so we shouldn't pillory them for that. but i have to tell you in terms of being ahead of the curve strategically, the turks taking a tough tack on israel seems to be pretty foresightful because the rest of the region is clearly moving more in that

direction. you see the egyptians brokering a deal between hamas and fatah. >> rose: and turkey being supportive of that deal. >> absolutely. you see they're going to recognize the new palestinian state. as you see more democratization in the middle east, nex will be running for offices will play the israeli, the anti-israeli card because it plays with being more legitimate and reflecting the arab street and even countries that aren't democratic going to use to that to show that they care about what people think. the turks are out in front of that. the turks are out in front and p.m. erdogan is out in front in terms of going... tacking away from europe. right before the financial crisis hits it was clear to the turks were never wanted by the europeans but the turks moved away first and they still have big economic ties but from a geopolitical perspective i would

say he's anticipated this reasonably well. into >> ian makes the point that erdogan had some foresighhere. maybe, maybe not. i think he was more interested in his domestic political calculations. but two the extent that egypt is moving in a direction that reflects to some degree turkish foreign policy over the last few years, that will necessarily diminish turkey's leadership role in the region. arabs will lk increasingl cairo should the egyptians continue on this path of diverging from the mubarak period and diverging from the united states and israel. arabs will look to cairo. the natural place for regional leadership rather than ankara. so it may, in fact, be the case that erdogan had foresight here but it hasn't bought him anything now that we are in a much-changed region. >> when we say turkey has moved away from europe, well, certainly europe has moved away from turkey. turkey's... it's not terribly popular to negotiate european expression with france and

germany at the moment which are countries which are clearly opposed to european entry. but the prestige which turkey enjoys in the middle east and north aver a comes from its close relationship with europe. and turkey has not sacrificed that. yes, it's going take time and the wheels of european entry are going to move very, very, very slowly indeed and they are probably only going to move in one direction and that is forward. it's difficult for europe to cancel turkey's application, that isn't going to happen. no single party or force within turkey is going to remove itself with the negotiating table. and i think turkey understands that its peres nej the world depends on its ability to be acceptable to europe and to continue with that european vocation and it may not be the government's highest priority but it certainly is a priority. >> rose: that's my understanding too. but try all this together,

henri, the sense that some-- and it may be a small number-- may look at the israeli situation and may look at the role turkey wants to play, its relationship with iran and syria. and they look at the difficulties of the european union effort and they say turkey is moving east. is that... does that argument have legs? >> no, this argument has absolutely no legs. turkey is not moving east. i mean, let's talk for one moment. the biggest mistake supreme made in turkey and europe and certainly in the united states is to assume that turkey was on the edge of entering the eupean union whereas we need to look at this as a 20 to 25-year process. turkey has a long, long way to go in ter of satisfying european conditions. it has a major kurdish problem that it hasn't tackled yet and

europeans will not take them in. that doesn't mean 20 years from now turkey will not get in. turkey, i think, will make all the changes. but when you look at it as a 20-year process, it makes it much more acceptable, understandable, that these things will move slowly. in the meantime, ifyou're turkey, why should you put all your eggs into the european basket in terms of trade, etc. turkey's an expanding economy, it needs export markets so it will seek those export markets wherever they are whether in america or africa or the middle east. the turkish pie is expanding economically. still doing enormous amount of business with europe so if it's not 52% of turkish exports and 50% now, it doesn't mean much. but that expert pie has... export pie has expanded very rapidly. so what turkey's doing is an old foreign policynd that makes sense.

it's the 16th largest economy in the world. it is a power to contend with just like with brazil or india or other countries. it wants to make a mark. >> rose: my impression is it doesn't necessarily want to move east or west, it wants to move up and play an increasing role... >> that's a very good way of putting it. >> rose: let me turn to this question of journalists, andrew and you look at the number of reporters that are in jail. what is it going on and why isn't that, in a sense... why aren't they sensitive to the fact that that detracts from the regime from a government that wants to play an increasing role until the world. >> it's a very complicated situation. turkey sees itself as demilitarizing and this government is committed to getting the military out of politics. >> rose: and succeeding at that a little bit, too, aren't say in >> they are indeed, 10% of the officer class is actually in jail at the moment on trial for trying to overthrow the government. when i say officer class,

colonels and generals which is a big fear. then there's the retired ones. this conspiracy trial is going ahead. but i think what's happening, of course, is as the military becomes less powerful, as the old guard... as the old establishment is becoming less powerful, of course the gornment becomes more powerful and of course this is natural in a democracy. the government should be powerful, the government should have its say over the military. it's making people uneasy and why is it making people uneasy in because turkey has a constitution. (inaudible) military. and that military basically allows for the institutions of the state to have areat control and say over what was happening in society so when you say there are journalists in jail, well, there have always been journalists in jail. journalists have always had pressure and come into trouble in turkey. i've been working 2450er years and i come under pressure and trouble so i know what i'm

talking about. >> rose: in fact, you've been fired. >> well, more than once. but it happened about two weeks ago. that's exactly right. so basically what turkey knows is that it has to disarm this constitution. the constitution gives too much power to the states, of course when you get power it's really quite difficult to give it up so it's a bit... this government... it's a bit like "the lord of the rings". it's got the ring and it knows it better throw hit in the fire but it's tempting to slip it on its finger and behave in a more powerful and autocratic way and i think this is the dilemma of turkey today. this is the dilemma of the prime minister today who now aspires to turn turkey into a presidential system. will this mean he'll accrue more powers? have a very powerful execive? is this the best thing? so what turkey doesn't have is a balance of power domestically and this we desperately need to

establish. >> rose: speak to erdogan, this prime minister who is this guy? >> well,er swan a brilliant politician. he is the you would mat turkish politician who can play to the street. he has outsmaed every single e of his compitors and wl likely continue to do so as we move toward the june 12 election. he is extraordinarily charismatic and has mastered not just his own party but certainly mastered the turkish political arena and has benefited from the facthat the turkish armed forces whichas previously seen as all powerful has made one misstep after another since the justice and development party came to power. i think what we're seeing in turkey is turkey is in that midpoint of a transition away from that quasi-or semiauthoritarian political syem under this military constitution that, as andrew

pointed out, was bequeathed to the turks in 1982. and it's unclear which direction it's going to grow. turkey could end up a liberal democracy or an ill liberal democracy. if the turks don't throw that ring intthe fire and erdogan continues to accumulate power and continues... there continues to be problems th the government and freedom of exession, freedom of the press and so on and so for you can very well see erdogan presiding over a presidential system and a... rather than a liberal decracy which everybody was so hopeful for when turkey finally received the official invitation to begin negotiations for european union membership and it may transform itself into an ill liberal democracy. >> rose: that's what they say. we are liberal, secular, we are, in fact, a government in in a position that's growin that has the relationships in order to play a pivotal role.

>> turkey's still an emerging market. so, for example, when you have unitary rule and you don't have a coalition government in turkey historically, you actually get much greater market returns and the reason is because there's still a great deal of institution building that is expected, policy making on the political and economic reform side that is necessary and steven completely right. we don't know as that reform process continues whether or not that's going to become more liberal or illbill ral because it reflects a population that has many different aspirations for where they want to go. there's a big fight still in turkey going on. the military that certainly has been able to sideline to a great degree but the industrialists are a different thing. so often in the united states and europe and in davos you hear all these folks saying erdogan is going and the a.k. party is going to tear down turkey. it's going to turn down those that historically were very cosmopolitan and had great

connections with the west and corporations and governments and the media and speng english very fluently. r very concerned about this transition and that they're going to have a harder time dominating the economic and political space tae t way they used to. they're worried about that and that has an impact on the future of turkey. >> rose: henri, it seems we may have come to the question. which way turkey? that may be the most important question we have raised. >> well, i think i'm optimistic actually than steven argued a little bit. the reason is after this coming election i don't have promise that there will be a new constitution. there will be discussion farce new constitution. he wants to have a presidential system and a lot of people in turkey want to to make the turkish trux a democratic one, a liberal one, one that protects individuals and not just state. and there's an enormous amount of pent-up energy and demand for that. so my guess is that the turkish

civil society has come a long way. that they will be le to push in the correct direction. it may not be t ideal constitution but i will alsoay that i am not completely convinced that erdogan will be ainge able to change the turkish constitution to make it a presidential system. there's a great deal of opposition to the presidential system within his own party as well and in fact he purged a lot of his m.p.s with that in mind. he wanted to get rid of people who might not vote yes for a esidential system and replaced them with more reliable people. so he may get his comeuppance if yowant on the question of the litical system. he may still become president but not the president of a presidential system but president of a parliamentary system which is very different. but turkey is in a transition and i think all the indicators are on the positive side.

there will be bumps and the judicial system has to be changed. talking about the journalists. the way to think about the judicial system-- and i'll stop here-- is the tush irk judicial system is to justice what military music is to music. it has a semblance of justice but it's not the rule of law. and until that is changed you're not going to have democracy in turkey and so i... that's why with the newconstitution i'm actuallyuite hopeful that they will achieve that. >> where are the democratic safeguards in turkish society it used to be that the military was in this perverse way safeguarding the integrity of the revolution of the political system of turkey's commitment towards westernization. that was obviously not a way of guaranteeing the future of a trillion dollar economy. so you get rid of the military and what do you put in its place? well, one option was to put europe in its place. so you replace the tutelage of the military with brussels, with

brussels... there's this wonderful panacea for many european governments. european countries by forcing them do the things that their public opinion doesn't accept. for years that was the case where turkey engaged in a process of reform under the assistance of europe but that european force is weakening. so what's the next thing? well, the next thing has to be turkish society itself. it has to be my neighbors, the view from my window, the people who just won't accept an undemocratic society. and i think that sentiment is solidifying and building in turkey. the turkey of today very different from the turkey that i first met when i came here. it's a turkey with... whether you have environmentalist groups civil society groups where people just won't put up with what they put up with in the past and i think this is... it's the turks themselves that have to control their own governments. >> rose: andrew, thank you so

much for joining us. a pleasure to have you on this program and we look forward to turkey, what everyone needs to know, which will be coming out in january, published by the oxford university press. so thank you again. >> my pleasure. >> rose: ian bremmer, eurasia group, steven cook, andrew finkel joins us from istanbul and henri barkey for the carnegie endowment for international peace. captioning sponsored by rose communications captioned by media access group at wgbh access.wgbh.org