not only that, but the fact that once freed, a roman slave becomes a citizen. keach: in rome, freed slaves were often included in the family tombs of their former masters. while the lineage compounds of teotihuacan grew through kinship, roman households increased by adding slaves. in the process, the very definition of family changed. wallace-hadrill: for us the word family means people related by blood -- married couple, children. now, in the roman concept of the family, the slave is built in from the very first. the roman word familia actually means the slaves who belong to the household more easily than it means the family united by blood. and the more i look at the houses of pompeii,

the harder it becomes to populate them with modern nuclear families. instead there's a glorious mishmash -- people related by blood, slaves, and, also, freedmen who, ex-slaves, continue to live with their masters, dependents, lodgers of all sorts. for me what's important about daily life and about culture is that it's -- forms an enormously complex pattern which is influenced all the time by the big currents, the great swirling currents of big history out there -- conquests and wars... high politics. these aren't just things that affect the elite. they just don't affect the big history books, but they penetrate to a very banal level of daily life

which reforms itself all the time as history changes. keach: from the villas of the romans to the lineage compounds of teotihuacan to the thatched-roof huts of the maya, households have always been part of larger political and economic systems. household archaeology reveals that changes in politics and economics affect our choices about who we live with... the most personal decision of all. captioning by captionamerica, pittsburgh, pa.

funding for this program was provided by...

for more funding for is program was provided by the annenberg/cpb project this program has been edited in sequence. captioning is made possible by the annenberg/cpb project

from theirthplace of the united states constitution in philadelphia, "the war powers act and the constitution." can the presiden commit american troops without permission from cgress? there are 500 advisers. what are they doing there? where are they doing it? are they in airplanes, helicopters, on the ground? presidents just don't go charging with covert aid or anything else to make a few points. putting military personnel in that kind of situation,

the constitution mandates that congress be involved. that's clearly wrong. the president is commander in chief of the armed forces. without the right to deploy those forces, it's meaningless. the question is what are his powers as command in chief? do those powers include e power to wage war? apparently not. what would you advise if a courtrdered him to follow the war powers act? i'd say, "keep your troops there." they ought to face up to it, either approve it or disapprove it. the most awesome power a nation hol is its decision to make war. justice stewart, when the framers sat in this room to write this constition, what washe process they devised

for this nation to make war? the constitution provides only one route-- the u.s. cgress must declare war. they also ote a constitution which makes the president e commander in chief of the armed forces. they did so when the tempo of battle was much slower. today, the power of the presidency is far greater in r than it's ever been? it's greater than t drafters of the constitution ever dreamed of. they thought of the presidency as a relatively ak element of government. the president's role was simply to carry out the will of congress. thank you, justice stewart. desions about getting in and out of war

have plagued ery president since george washington. now, let's begin the case. moderator benno schmidt, dean of the columbia l school, sets up a hypothetical covert military operation which ultimately triggers the war powers act. admiral inman, as the director of the central intelligence agency, you have bn increasingly concerned with two nghboring countries in central america. you have reason to think one of them, sierra madre, is assisting some guerrillas operating in eldorado, a neighboring country. now, there's a large group of exiles from sierra madre who are living in eldorado. some of them approach your agents and ask for help from the united stat,

ultimately with the aim of bringing down theew government of sierra madre. how do you decide whether the united states will assist those exiles? the director of central intelligence, only in e rarest opportunity, would be the one to recommend the program to be undertaken. usuay while he's been reporting the difficulties, the secretary of state's been tryingo execute diplomacy, trng to get some established relationships. the point comes ulmately when the word comes back to the president that diplomacy isn't working. that's where the discussion would begin, not at the outset when someone says, "why don't we move in and support these good people?" secretary muie, if admiral inman is right,

would nondiplomatic approaches to this problem be warranted? covert approaches? assistance to the exiles? this area of the world, central america, is an unstable and volatile area. it is very difficult to pursue a clear-cut american objective and national security interest byhe kind of off-the-cuff casual involvement in the purposes of a disde gurilla group in one of these countes. general scowcroft, is covert action really an available policy option for the government, given the degree of openness that prevails in an open society? if it is succussful, if it does not become an issue of public debate, it h the advantage that

the united states' overt actions are concealed. that sometimes facilitates our interest and a resotion of the issue, if the united states is not perceived as the primary actor. concealed from whom? concealed from e rld at large, in other words,ble. the impression that th is a locally generated insurrection, rathther than the great power of the united states applying pressure on a small power. psychologically, you have an advantage in using covert action. mr. president, if you've heard your advisers' opinions, you see anything built into our constitutional process that lims your hand in diding follow a poli of covert assistance?

i haven't seen y president, regardless of political affiliation, who precipitously wantto thrust the unitestates into a quagmire where for subsntive or political reans our country might get in troub. presidents just don't go charging witcovert aid or anything else to make a few points. now, i suspect that if you look upon covert aid as a specific tool of the implementation of a well thought out foreign policy decision that relates to the national security of the united states, you can justify covert action. you have to go through that process. mr. president, just as a guess, how many persons in the executive branch-- we'll leave congress out--

how many within the executive branch uld informed about this type of measure? the members of the national security council would know, and that depends upon the presint-- anywheres from 6 to 12 or thereabouts, depending on how many staff people are present. that is the hard core, other than the people who would develop the covert aid plan and who would be e responsible rties in the implementation, if iwere arod. admiral inman, how many people? probably a minimumf 30 in thexecutive branch. you now have by law anby executive order a requement that the president actually reach a finding. to prepare that finding,

there will ba gathing of representatives from state, justice, defense, nsc. the attorney general must rule that it is in ct within the law. now, mr. president, how much are your policy options limited by the diflty of keeping this kind matter confidential? one major justification for covert action is that it will not be in the public domain. if you start out with the assumption that for one reason or another, it's going to be in every newspaper, forget it. several years ago, congress became more deeply involved. theystablished intellence committee other committees beside armed services and appropriations began to pick, look, expose, and publish

informion abou intelligence activities. the press didn't even havto work hard to get highly classified, needo-know information. it was just out there in the marketplace. it's gotten better. they finally admitted their wickedness and straightened out their problem. senator hatc is the president right that the proliferation ofnformation about covert operations now makes it very difficult, not close timpossible? many members of the hill learn thr intellence information from the major newspapers, it does get out. it's very difficult to contain. part of the problem is it has been broadened. that's not necessarily bad. admiral inma

where there is a broad, bipartisan poly consensus that it is in the interest of the country, there are no leaks. it doesn't become a matter of public record can i add something? i thk there are very few areas today that are as volatile as the covert operation area. members of congress like to substitute themselves for the executive branch and make decisions. on the presint and ese top people may have access to all the important information. representative brademas, do you share the senator's view that the president has the responsibility? no, i don' for several reasons. i member theriumph of the cia and bay of pigs. therefe, i'd be someat skeptical about the judgments that have been reached by some of the president's aisers.

you approach his judgment with no presumption that he knows more or better? correct. i would remember vietnam and chile. i'd remember marcos inhe phillipines. i'd remember a number of positions taken. i'd be willing to listen. i wouldn't instantly jump to the judgment that the president was right. the record of the last 20, 25 years was a very uneven one. it's wng for members of congress, with limited time and information-- until they do have the information, they suldn'tubstitute themselves for the president, who has the information, and make these decisions ahead of the time when they should make them-- their ultimate power is to go to the press?

the ultimate power is to go to your colleagues, go to the president, work through your intelligence committees. if that fails, there are alternatives. i agree that the president and his counselors must have crucial judgment. inhe iranian ste crisis, the present was netiating over period of many months with iran's governmental leaders rather than with the religious leaders who held the defacto power. the executive branch is not always up on the facts. genel scowcroft. what we've seen is a real dilemma. in many cases, covert action is the most effective way to accomplish foreign policy objectives. but it is only effective if it remains covert.

the broader you can go in the legislative branch, the more support perhaps you caget for an action. yet, the broader you get, the more chances you will defeat your very purpose, which is keeping it covert. mr. wicker, you've heard the description of the dilemma. is it just a pragmatic policy dilemma, does it suggest that there's something fundamentally inconsistent about covert action and our system of government? there is an essential fundamental conflict within an open system like ours. it goeto general scowcroft's phrase that we need "plaible deniability." that's a nice way of saying you need to be able to lie your way out of this. a government engaging in covert activities

taking upon itself the inherent necessity that to keep those activities covert, it's going thave to lie repeatedly. there is a corrosive effect in that that's not good in an open society, ase from political difficulties you get into on specific cases. senator dodd, do you share mr. wier's general feeling that the constitutionaprocess is just inconsistent with this kind of policy? absolutely we forget that a oup of people decided that the system wasn't necessarily to be efficient. they decided that our means were our ends. how weid things was what we set this vernment up for. if you begin a process which dees that, then we have total aborted the process that was started here.

but there are occasions when the united states may need recourse to the possibility of covert action in order to protect its interests. let's lo at the last 30 years where covert activity has been used. it has caused more difficults than it has resolved. guatemala in '54, the bay of pigs, the allende case, the attempts to assassinate castro. we got ourselves into trouble time after time because we utilized this vehicle. if it makes sense to overthrow the government of sierra madre, we should have thcourage to come before the congress for help. if your cause isn't just, proceeding this way is looking for trole. you'll create more problems.

you have cited from your point view what appear to bfailures in the execution of covert activities. therefore, you say that covert activity is not a good tool for our government. we had some obvious failures, but this is not a juvenile operation. this is the big league, the big league. it involves, some people think, the national security of the united states. and you have to ta some risk. you ha to gamble a little bit. when you add up all the successeand failures through five or six presidents, i believe the scorecard's pretty good. the scorecard has not been enhanced by a lot of public disclosure about what was going on only when mistakes were made.

representative mikulski, can congress provide an adequate oversight function if you or the vast majority of the members e left in the dark? all members of congress have a national security clearance. the people who sit on the permanent select committee on intelligence exercise that on a daily basis. if i wanted to go to that committee and go through files or hearings they've had, i would have access to it. what happens if you strongly disapprove this policy? how can congress work its will over t president? again, i would have two prerogatives-- one, a legislative one through the budget process to cut off funds for covert aid. the other would be public opinion.

i do share the feengs of my colleague from utah. you really shouldn't go running to the press like a leaky sieve when it is matters of national security and when you could be jeopardizing the lives of many innocent people. we're talking about a covert assistance program that has not yet been instituted. i wouldn't kill it through the press. we would ask the speaker of the house to let the president know we didn't like it, we were prepared to fight it, and let's end it. justice stewart, let's discuss the war powers act. with the congress declaring war and the president executing it, doesn't the war powers act muddy the waters? well, arguably it does

becae that war powers act provides that the president may commit troops abroad or anywhere into conflict. if after 60 or 90 days congress does nothing, then the troops must be thdrawn. the congress, by joint resolution, can approve the action of the president and approve continuation of the troops. the founding fathers in this room, e drafters, said congress will declare war. w there's almost permission for the president to get us into that and the congress to pull us back. the president is commander in chief. there's a built-in conflict. mr. president, may i move along to a different kind of problem in the separation of powers--

military policy? on advice from your national security adviser, the secretary of state, others, suppose you have concluded that a fairly substantial group of american military personnel ought to be dispatched to eldorado, the ally of the united states that's eaged in th gurilla insuency. let's suppose you think 500 military advisers. now, is that a decision the constitution gives you the responsibilityor making, or does congress have the last word on it? who decis on that kind of an issue? it would, in the current situation, be a decision of the president of the united states.

congress cou and, if it was controversial, would have a means of acting for or against the decision. the way it would be done is that on the appropriation bill, either for the department of defense, foreign aid, or state department, it would simply say, "none of the funds appropriated herein "can be utilized for the training "of military forces in... eldorado. .eldorado." they could broaden it on the appropriations bill. "no funds appropriated "in this appropriations bill or any other can be utilized for this purpose." is that unconstitutional interference with your power as commander in chief? no, i think that's a very constitutional,

proper decision of the congress because congress is given the authority to raise money for the army of the united states. if congress has the power to raise it, they can take it away. but until congress takes some step through the appropriations process affirmatively to disapprove, you think you have the power? i do, under the terms as i understood when you laid out the question-- no hostilities, no imminence of war, et cetera. senator dodd, supposing a faly large number of advisers are sent to eldorado and some u.s. advisers are shot and kille

at that point, do you think the president still s the constitutional authity on his own to commit the united states to that military enterprise without first getting approval ocongre? he must get congress' approval. the constitution mandates it. did he need prior approval? i would argue he did. we know a guerrilla war is going on. we're sending 400 military people into a hostile environment. seems that at that particular juncture, you'd be hard pressed to argue that the constitution doesn't demand that the shared responsibility of the legislative and executive branch be invoked. congress should be included. are his hands tied before congress acts? i don't think they're tied. it's doing what the constitution mandates.

putting military personnel in tt kind of situation, the constitution mandates that congress be involved. that's clearly wrong. the president is commander in chief of the armed forces. without the right to deploy those forces, it's meaningless. congress has specific authority to declare war. and this is a different circumstance from that mandated policy that was given to the congress by the drafters t constitution. if they want to declare war, that's a different ballgame. senator muskie, where do you stand on this debate between president ford and senator dodd? the question isn't what the constitution requires, but that given the purpose of the war powers act,

that it might be wise to rept the action taken. there would be a debate as to whether the war powers act requires it, d if so, is it constitutional? mr. president, you probably would ve reported this, war powers act or not. in five instances during my time in the white hse, we had situations arise where people could have argued that the war powers act was applicable. now, we never admitted that the war powers act was involved, but we did go through what senator muskie says-- a full consultation, disclosure, the whole ball of wax. suppose congress is in recess or it's easter? in one of e instances in my administration,

we made a massive effort to go through the notification and consultive process. we found several members in greece, several in the people's republic of china. we had a very difficult time finding the members of congress who were away from the capital for understandable and very proper reasons. senator muskie, i want to move to the part of the act that has bite in this sort of situation. that is, what happens if congress does nothing? the act assumes or provides that in that situation, the president has to withdraw the troops after a 60-day period. only if the troops have been introduced into a situation where hostilities are imminent.

it's only in that imnent hostiliti language that the 60-day clause arises. do you agree with senator dodd that the introduction of american troops into hostilities occurs when advisers are sent into a guerrilla war? there's no question that in our history, presidtsave used their powe as commander in chief to deploy troops in what might be described as war-threatening situations. in that kind of a situation, the constitutionality of the war powers resolution is most sharply focused. war-threatening situation can ripen, obviously, into an actual war or a situation requiring the esident, the congress to decide whether we're involved in war, or oug to be or ought not to be.

on the other hand, introducing troops into that kind of a situation is a way of avoiding or deterring war. presidents have done that. representati mikulski, are you with senator dodd or the president? i'm with senator dodd. it's the whole issue of imminent hostilities. there are 500 advisers. what are they doing there? where are they doing it? are they in airplanes, helicopters,n the ground if someone is shooting at eldorado military and we're standing side-by-side with walkie-talkies advising them how to fight, it's pretty darn sure somebody will be shot. already, somebody's been shot. in my mind, our troops are in a hostile environment and in imminent danger.

you think, in this circumstance, if congress does nothing, the president must bring them home after 60 days? the war wers act is not automaticay triggered by the opinions of senator dodd and myself. the president has to trigger the war powers act. let's assume for thpurpose of argument that thear powers act is applicable in this situation. let's assume that. i can understand that congress has one of two oions which arvery forthright, very proper if you assume the law's constitutional and applicable. number one, they can approve the trps being there and can authorize their extension. or they can, by a majority vote, force the president to withdraw. what i don't understand, ani think it's indefensible,

is the lack of courage by the pvision that says, "if nothing is done by congress, then congress orders the president to withdr the forces." now that's a lack of, i think, intestinal fortitude. they ought to face up to it one way or another, approve it or disapprove it. for them to sit back and do nothing and get the same result is inexcusable and indefensible. representative brademas, what do you think about the president's statement? can you tie his hands by inaction? yes, i think we can. there's a presumption on the part of the president that his action is correct. there is built into the statute a degree of skepticism.

otherwise, the constraints represented by the war powers resolution would not have been written in. it's my understanding that the possibility thatongress can exercise a veto on the president's action by passing a joint resolution, a two-house resolution, requiring the troops be withdrawn, has been cllengeas to its constitutionality. professor cox, the constitution gives congress the power to declare war, yet gives the president the power as commander in chief and, by implication, the power to substantial manage our foreign relations. do you agree with the president or representative brademas about his power if congress does nothing? i would think that because e constitution leaves a large, gray aa

between the power of congress and the president, it could pperly be filled by legislation. and i would agree with representative brademas that as a matter of wisdom, it's entirelproper to say we don't continue hostilities, don't continue to do what's war unless the more representative voice of the american people is for it. the president, lacking that backing up, is going to get into trouble. mr. wattenberg, what do you think about the war powers act? i agree with president ford. i were an adviser to the president, i would advise the president to get on television and tell the people what's going on. since world war ii, america's basigeopolitical advantage

over the soviet union has been that we've not been threatened contiguously. the soviet union has. here is a threat, and the congress is a do-nothing congress-- stick with the process question. the presidenhas immense toolin that process to force congress to act. professor cox? i think it needs to be recognized that, at some point, a line must be drawn beyond which the president can't go in committing us to a war without affirmative action from cgress. suppose he declares war on the soviet union, saying the congress hasn't disapproved this so i have power to do that. no president would claim he had quite that power. then the question becomes, "what is enough of a making war

"to be something that the president doest have power to do except defensively?" it would seem that thats the kind of line which has to be worked out in practice and by legislation. the war powers act attempts to draw that line. it could be drawn at different places, but it should prevail as expression of about where the line should be struck. mr. buchen, if you were president ford's attorney general and wee apprching the 60-day cut0ff, what's your legal advice about withdrawing the troops? he's not bound to withdraw the troops. if the president has the authority under the constitution to send the troops there in the first place-- and he does, provided he consulted with them--

how can congress deprive him or alter his constitutional powers by n acting at all, which is what professor cox and john brademas said and senator dodd said. it doesn't make sense. that's relying on the act to get the president power, then cut off theecond half of the act when it restricts the president. you can't have it both ways. the act said, "we're only confirming power "that the president had even if we hadn't passed the statute," namely, his power under the constitution. you've no business referring to the act if you're relying on the constitution. we don't. we say we consult with congress. we don't have the authority only because we consulted them. the challenge is, thout the statute,

whether he does have power to commit our troops to a hostile situation. the congressmen would say it, and i'd agree, that he doesn't. mr. barrett, on the issue joined between mr. buchen and professor cox, can congress by its inaction force him to withdraw the troops after 60 days? i believe it cannot. by then, the press would have reported a great deal about the situation. the nature of its reporting and its "choosing sides" between the antagonists in sierra madre and eldorado would also affect the outcome. the situation would not conclude purely because of the process. the atmospherics contributed by the press would also have an effect.

on the war powers act question, you're with mr. buchen. yes. mr. wick? i opposed the war powers act when it passed. even thoh i syathize with that viewpoint as it came out of the war in vietnam, it seemed that act would wind up doing prisely what it's been doing in the current situation in lebanon. congress has given president reagan approval to keep troops there for 18 months. they did it because e oops were alrey there. when the president acts as commander in chief, what's congress going to do, tell the president to take them out? i don't think so. the president's saying he's commander in chief. he can't have 535 secretaries ofefense, 535 secretaries of state,

and 535 directors of the central intelligence agency. so we passed legislation that gave him the flexibility to exercise his prerogatives as commander in chief, at the same time to act where american lives are threatened, as in the evacuation in southeast asia. but we want to be kept informed because we pay the bills and because if after 60 days, the conflict's not over, they either get out or we act affirmatively to extend them. anything beyond 60 days really then constitutes another kind of defense issue. but what recourse is available to you? you've heard the legal advice that mr. buchen as attorney general would give. "keep thtroops in after 60ays."

"that part of the war powers act is not binding." we'd have two tools. one, a joint resolution calling upon the president to remove those advisers. two, we would have the power through the appropriations process to stop the funds for the advisers. if both those avenues are closed to u or there are obstacles... how did they get closed? your colleagues aren't anxious to take a position. then congress has worked its will. if there isn't a majority, under our system of government, congress has, in effect, agreed with the president. there's still professor cox's point that we aren't supposed to go to war until congress has affirmatively declared war. and there's been no affirmate support. yes, just one further point.

the powers of the president as commander in chief are invoked. the question is what are his powers as commander in chief? is it power to wage war? apparently not. it doesn't add to the argument that he stands on his powers as commander in chief. if congress won't cut off appropriations, the only sanction is for some young man to refuse to go and bring a suit to the courts. i'm pleased that tom wicker and i share the same view vis-a-vis the war powers act. i believe there are times in our country's history when because the president had the unfettered capability to act promptly,

or at least any potential adversaries were apprehensive or fearful that the president of the united states might act that way, peace... peace has been maintained. and when you hamstring the president, en you constrict him and the opposition or the aggressor knows it, >xuó"@@ap ha ito proceed to start a war. that's what we don't want. senator dodd. in the 19th century, most presidents were very respectful of the shared responsibility of congress in this area. it was theodore roosevelt on up the gulf of tonkin where the thrust changed dramatically. presidents wilson, theodore roosevelt, anothers created a variety of hostile situations as a result of taking that precipitous action.

president jefferson, in tripoli, sought the approval of congress before he would engage the barbary pirates. it seems to me that the act is self-defeating. it eisions the president being able to take some limited military actions to clear up a situation. the 60-day provision gives any enemy notice that if he holds out, he could be successful. whatever good is envisioned is negated by the impression it gives the opponent to hold off. senator hatch, let's suppose that there is no resolution of this debate. the president sticks to his position. he's refused to abide by the war powers act. is it appropriate in that circumstance to go tohe cous seeking a resolution?

i think mr. buchen's point comes into effect there. if the congress has it within its power to act positively, then the congress has that obligation to go forward. congress can cut off the appropriations. assuming that we exercised some form of affirmative action to sp the president's actions, if we go to court, should the court decide this issue or assert the political qution doctrine saying it's a political question between two separated powers? think the court should assert the political question doctrine because you have two conflicting provisions of the constitution. article i, section 8 gives congress the power to declare war anraise and pport armies. article ii, section 2

gives the president power as commander in chief. it's a situation where the congress' only real power is to assert itself with regard to public opinion and try politically to bring the forces in the couny against at the president is doing. the system should work that way, rather thahave unelected judges come into the process to determine these matters and inject themselves into a political process they are least equipped to resolve. let's see about that. judge wallace? suppose i, as a soldier, seek to challenge the president's power to send me to eldorado. how should a federal district judge respond to that kind of a judicial challenge to the president's power? very carefully. we're lking about

a separation of powers question. in this type of question, the soluon is not always the court's. it's frequently being worked out between the other branches. they know the constitution. i'd have a tendency to let the political process go its own way. then i, the soldier, go to eldorado until congress finally acts to pull me out. how do you decide to intervene? you look at the constitution and determine what your role is in the three separate branches. you've got sort of a conflict. you've got the power delegated specifically to congress to declare war. you've got power delegated specifically to the president to be chief of the armed services. am i going to eldorado or not?

judge adams, what's your reaction? i think it is a conventional political question. i feel sorry for the man going into hostilities. even if they're clear? but i'm still not sure the courts are the right agency of government to resolve a dispute between congress and the executive. the rights of manythers are deeply involved. there's power presidentord's argument. in the past, we would have lost many people had the president not been able to act promptly. the president is in charge foreign policy, he is the commander in chief. he can't declare war, but he may have the power to make war. it's interesting that the declaration of war clause originally was written to "make" war.

that was changed to "declare" war. the reason was there would be times when the country's chief executive officer woulha to get involved in hostilities that were not of a war nature. sending troops to the caribbean may be one instance. but some judge like myself, appointed for life, without any military qualifications, should n make this awesome decision. mr. president? if the highest court, for example, were to decide that ts young man had the right in this case, you could have a never-ending proliferation where proper young men would be challenging their requirement to serve. and pretty soon, every federal district judge around the country would be making this political decision.

i just don't think that's the way to run t show. mr. buchen, as the president's attorney general, you advised him that the requirement of the war powers act that he withdraw the troops after 60 days is an unconstitutional assertion of power by congrs. it's an arrogation of his proper executive power. what would be ur advice if a court ordered him to follow the war powers act? i would te him to keep the troops there, assuming there's reason to do that. congress hasn't said he can't. they just haven't acted. you've only had a court of law say he has to widraw the troops. i'd say, "forget it. keep your troops there."

in the final analysis, the president's power, you believe, is superior not only to the inaction of congress, but also to the action of courts. right. i would try to persuade phil buchen not to take that position. i feel he's right, but we can't defy the courts. you asked a legal position. why can't you defy the courts? because of what it does to the system. our system of government is predicated on resct for the law. noeven the president is above the law. e supreme court is the final arbiter. you'd be challenging the whole system. it's a narrow question. i'd agree with arlen on the overall issue. but your legal advice would be this is an arrogation of power by the court,

an unconstitutional interfence with the executive power, he shouldn't have to abide by it legally. right. mr. president, would you... as strongly as believe the war powers act is unconstitutional, impractical, and inhibits the president in maintaining peace, if the court of highest jurisdiction made a decision, as wrong as i'd think it was, i would, i believe, abide by that decision, even though-- what's so special about courts? they're not even elect. this s the way our system works. they make their share of mistakes. they have before, they will in the future. this would be a serious error by the court

to make that decision.

so i have every reason not tannenberg media

♪ provided by: narrator: welcome to destinos: an introduction to spanish. as you watch our story unfold, remember-- don't try to understand every word while the characters speak in conversational spanish. listen and try to understand as best you can. ( se aclara la voz ) iah! alfredo. buenos días. buenos días, raquel. ¿qué tal pasó su primera noche en madrid? estupendamente, gracias. mire, aquí le traigo su cartera. you should use the context and the characters' actions to get the general idea of what's being said. un momento. ( suspira ) alfredo, yo sé que ud. me hizo un gran favor al encontrar mi cartera, pero...