♪ anchor: the top stories on al jazeera this hour. tanzania's president has died at age 61, africa's most prominent coronavirus skeptic had not been seen in public since february, and there was speculation about his health. the government says he died from heart failure. the vice president announced his death in a televised address. >> citizens, today on the state, march 17, 2021, we lost our leader, the president of

tanzania departed this life from heart complications and hospital. anchor: dutch prime minister has claimed victory. exit polls put his conservative party on calls to become the largest in the netherlands lower house. this has been europe's first major election since the coronavirus pandemic began. news from the pandemic. brazil has recorded its highest number of covid-19 infections since it began, another 2600 deaths were registered on wednesday with more than 90,000 infections. hospitals are close to full capacity. a man accused of attacking three massage parlors in atlanta has been charged with 80 counts of murder, six of the victims were women of asian descent. with that you're up with the have buns on al jazeera. the bottom line is next.

♪ steve: i am steve clemons i have a question. what is joe biden's strategic playbook against china in what is a look so much like trump's playbook? let's get to the bottom line. ♪ one of president joe biden's big campaign promises was that he was going to reverse the hostility towards china. two months into his presidency, biden has not reversed a single one of the former presidents policies, in fact he has doubled down. u.s. official still label the abuse of china's muslims as genocide, still condemn the crackdown in hong kong, still reject china's claims in the south china sea.

huawei is still on the u.s. medications chopping block. biden met in the first quad meeting with heads of government from india, australia and japan, but not china. this week he sent his two top officials. the carrot and the stick to visit several countries in asia, but again, not china. there will be a meeting with chinese officials later in alaska, but the message is clear. biden is building a grand contain china coalition. how is china taking this all in? today we are talking to deborah, involved in the inception with china in the wto, one of the china's -- founders of china strategic economic dialogue. today she is a ceo here in washington, she is also executive director of the paulson institute. and randy who served in the trump administration for indo pacific security affairs, the cofounder and chairman of the project 2049 institute which

works to advance u.s. interests in asia. thank you to both of you for talking with us today. let me start out with you, deborah. as we look at u.s./china relations. is china ifo, is a friend? to be collaborate? how do we get that mix? >> that is obviously a huge question. i think it is very important to think of this, not in military terms, but more businesslike terms. we also think of it as a zero-sum game. when you think in military terms, there was always a mill -- mentor and a loser. in the case with china, in some cases they are a competitor, in some cases we are aligning with them, and in some cases it is a little bit in between. it's like with investment banks, where one-day goldman sachs and j.p. morgan may be competing and another instance where they are cooperating. we need to set up a framework that can accommodate those different kinds of relationships.

steve: randy, we have had four years of the trump administration, you served, now we are at an inflection point. when it comes to these strategic questions, is the continuity between trump and biden? what is going to continue, what needs to be changed? >> i do think you'll see a lot more continuity than people might otherwise expect. one of the reasons is, i think the trump administration was actually representing continuity in a lot of ways, particular in my portfolio on the military and security side. president trump was certainly different, unorthodox, unconventional, whatever your term of art. and anyways, the free and open indo pacific policy at the department of defense was set on its course and trajectory in the obama administration, with the pivot of rebound to asia. i think our policies are being driven by china's growth, its behavior, the pressure they are putting on allies and friends, and we are responding to that.

i do think there will be continuity as there was more so than a lot of people realize. steve: i have looked at a lot of material that pla analysts have written about the united states, that see the last four years as one where the u.s. was very tough on its allies, skeptical of international institutions, on the trade front walk away from the things like the tpp. and in their eyes, they saw america in strategic contraction. that, therefore in their eyes justified what they were doing. how is that pla analysts wrong? >> at tickets more complicated than that. and the my ways, the u.s. was willing to stand up to china in the military sphere that other tribulations were not. with arms sales to taiwan.

there were pet issues of the president himself like burden sharing the probably sent mixed signals that led some chinese analyst to think we were in decline, or america first meant america only. i think it was more complicated than that. i think people see with the biden administration, real opportunities to try and right the ship. but they are not going to be welcome with open arms in all instances because their behavior needs to change. steve: i just mentioned that huawei is on the chopping block in the united states, this trade, technology, a lot of nonmilitary dimensions to the u.s./china relationship. there are big challenges out there on climate, a whole variety of fronts that these large transnational questions. how do you think the u.s. is situated today in either competing or collaborating with china on trade, on climate, on terrorism?

>> obviously those are all huge issues. let's take technology to begin with. that is at the core of a lot of the tensions we have with china. part of the issue is a focus on how we ensure that our companies are the most innovative in the world, and what is in our interests. in doing that, part of it is, they need to be able to commercialize their technologies in the world's largest consumer market, and that is china. steve: month second. the world's largest consumer market is china. >> yes. steve: that's a punctuation point. >> it is, it will be unable for us to remain competitive without an ability to commercialize these technologies in china. we need to think very carefully about whatever national security policies are, in our focus on the national security issues around supply chains, and make sure that while we are very

protective of those that are core to national security, that we are not making the field so large that we are capturing technologies that in some instances can be provided by some of our competitors. steve: how to do that? i happen to be a fan of tiktok. that was one of the issues raised in the lesson administration with vulnerability around communications to chinese government sources. i understand part of that is, up to the national security law. every company is a potential threat. how do you balance that with the fact that we need access to their economy? your thoughts on that? >> those are two different issues. one outfit is, how do we allow chinese companies to operate i the united states? some of the issues that the chinese tech company face are some of the issues that our companies face. how do we protect data?

children's access to technology? some are unique to china, like tiktok, like we chat. had to protect data that is collected about the american consumer and not have it used in china, particularly if it is being collected in circles that perhaps, whether it is young military who are using tiktok and show where they might be, that is a vulnerability. steve: it's a serious issue. >> it is a serious issue. but i think there are also ways to protect that. one of the ways is to also start looking, at i think this goes to the larger issue of one of items strategies, is how we start to deal with like-minded democracies and creating rules around technology. this is one of the areas where the trade world really has fallen behind. this is one of the areas where the wto has not lived up to its mission, which is to reflect what today's world looks like. >> i think she is right,

particularly working with like-minded partners and fellow democracies. i think kurt campbell and the biden administration has used the term techno alliance among democracies. i think that is the right way to think about it. we need to think about both the defense and the offense. the defense, protecting technology, getting friends and allies to do the same, making sure supply chains are secure, and there is integrity in the critical supply change. also on the offensive side, we have to out innovate, maintain competitive edge. does bleed into one another. those part of our innovation economy are also benefiting from the china market. these blend into one another, so it requires a vigilance, requires a level of attention that is going to be challenging for any administration. steve: anything that america and its allies should be doing with response to hong kong? not only because of hong kong

but because of the inaction being read as china as a green flag? >> i think keeping pressure on ccp leadership, because of their actions on hong kong, and pressuring in a variety of ways including sanctions. i think the use of individual sanctions is potentially helpful. steve: the magnitsky act. >> taiwan is fundamentally different in some important ways. china exerts sovereignty over hong kong, they claim sovereignty over taiwan. but they do not control it, they do not run it. for the benefit of the people of taiwan there is 80 nautical miles of water in between. they run their own affairs, democracy. they probably set the global standard on hanley coronavirus. some people we could really learn from. taiwan has different advantages to be able to deal with pressure, but that's -- that is

not mean we step aside. we have obligations under the taiwan relations act that we try to implement faithfully and in short taiwan is able to continue to survive. steve: this week i interviewed the new japan ambassador to the united states. i asked him to talk about the tpp, and at the beginning of the process, he disagree with me on this, but i thought japan as a laggard. the most reluctant. now japan is sort of the leader, which the united states walked away from. china wants to be in the tpp, and china is cutting trade deals all over the world. where is the united states? i would claim our hand right -- are we playing our hand right? that's also a question of how you conduct foreign policy. i'll just tap on, in regards to hong kong, are you concerned

with the trade deals china is cutting with other countries? >> you are actually right. china has been very active when it comes to trade. they have in the last two years completed the world's largest regional trade agreement, which was with a number of allies including japan and korea. they are negotiating a free-trade agreement with new zealand. they have started a free-trade agreement with japan and korea. they concluded a major investment agreement last year with the europeans, and they just launched a customs union with eastern europe, and they are claiming that they are going to start a free-trade agreement with gulf countries. steve: is there anything in the u.s. column? >> nothing in the u.s. column. we are still working for the u.s. trade representative to be confirmed. trade is not at the top of the agenda, that the administration is looking at their assessment of chinese policy, we have not heard the trade is going to play a major role. there is no discussion at the moment about the u.s. joining or

returning to the tpp. and it's a shame. if we are going to wait to do all of this through the wto, we are going to do any for a long time. the wto, all would agree needs major reform. steve: how do you respond to that? part of playing with a full deck is the security dimension. seem to have sideload, play the security card at some levels, but not play the economic or trade one. is that smart? >> that's a problem. active the trump administration, one of my criticisms even though i served in it was coming out of the gates strong on the military, base defense budgets, and one of the first actions was pulling out of the tpp. even worse we did a repeal and not a replace. we said we would do bilateral trade agreements and it lacked for years. on the positive side, they worked with congress on the build act and looked at creative ways to be an enabler for u.s.

foreign investment in critical regions like southeast asia. that is coming online in getting underway. delete of u.s. economic policy has been our private investment overseas. i am more optimistic there than on the trade globalization. the politics have been decimated on both sides of the aisle. steve: vladimir putin has been out there saying that the nation that controls ai will control the future. when you look at 5g, which has been such a contentious battle already between the united states and some parts of the world over huawei and its 5g. 5g in a way is a holding place to talk about data, quantum computing, talk about artificial intelligence. that whole realm is just a strategic leap technologically in some ways, and china plays a big role. is the united states doing enough in that area?

that's partly industrial policy, partly commercial innovation. are we doing enough to match what the chinese are doing? >> my sense is we are a little bit slow out of the gate. steve: that's a big statement. >> you're saying that as former pentagon official, you are worried. i'm also encouraged that we are focusing on the challenge, and we are thinking about what we need to do to be more competitive in this spa. we are understanding what the chinese are doing at a more sophisticated level. in terms of building the emerging technologies out, chinese are doing quite well. but it comes to application and building systems, at a lot less clear. they may have a bit of a head start on the r&d. when it comes to applications, i'm still confident we can maintain a competitive edge. steve: you know this world well. i'd be interested to know what

you think about this. the way randy described it, appears as peers. >> i totally agree with randy, but i would add on the commercial front, i do think they are starting to compete with us. for the chinese have been smart is climate. climate is identified as a big area of potential cooperation, whereas i think it is good to be an area of conflict. a core of what we're looking at on climate is technology. if you look at cleantech, whether it's batteriesto, new energy vehicles, they leapfrogged on these and are exporting them abroad. we are going to be competing in these areas. they are taking us on directly in industries where we have dominated,ot just now competing in china, but in the

middle east, latin america for these products. i do think we need to have a very good focus on how we support our innovative industries, ai we are ahead, and how we help them commercialize, and how we find a way to make sure that for applications that are not a threat to national security, we can commercialize them in china. steve: you are confident, optimistic. >> i'm optimistic that i believe that the u.s. can outcompete china, if our industries are given that opportunity. steve: i'm just interested in how biden sees the president versus how he sees biden. >> these are great questions. the second part purse -- the second part first.

i think they look at biden with some confusion, and are about to have some expectation stashed. i did a lot of track one and track to work after i left the administration, and the chinese were very hopeful for a reset, or a return to normal. they were hopeful that trump administration was an aberration. it may have been an aberration in rhetoric and tone, but i think again, the roots of u.s./china strategic competition are more foundational. the american public has very negative using china. the congress is very activist on china. i think they are going to be dealing with a united states this going to take tougher stances across-the-board, even though they are doing with a very different leader on our side, a very experienced hand, having served as vice president and in the senate foreign relations committee as chair, how biden and the u.s. now look at the president, i think he's revealed quite a bit over the last few years, everything from

his domestic moves and political most to make himself president for life, but also his ambitions in t region. a few sicko -- a few years ago we heard about asians for asians. that seems to be acted out a lot more in their assertive behavior. there is a pretty clear understanding of where xi jinping wants to go. >> i completely agree. i think one of the areas where the democrats and republicans to come together, maybe the only area, is on china. looks like we're going to see a significant number of bills, which is in some ways going to force the administration to determine if it is following foreign policy, arc if it is going to be ahead of them. for the chinese, i do think they were looking for a reset.

they are not going to see that because everything we are seen coming out of biden is very similar, at least in the issues they have identified as trump. the remedies i'm sure will be very different. steve: let me push you a little further. i agree that the puffery and the posture and the statements of concern about china reach across party aisles. where i don't see consensus is on the strategy of what to do. particularly when it comes to muscling up on strategies. looking at what you do on returning the united states back to this innovation powerhouse that really drove what we saw in silicon valley, biotech, etc. china has now appeared there. part of the question is you see diminishing investment and increasing investment by our

rivals. is that a key part, mi wrong? >> that's the difference between the congress and administration. every congressman has their issue that they are focused on, whether it's delisting, stopping chinese students from studying in the lattice dates -- united states. the administration needs to be ahead of where the congress is in putting together a strategy, across all of these issues, whether it's what is the role of students studying in the u.s.. if you look at artificial intelligence, for example, the majority of foreign workers who are in u.s. firms, usa are firms are chinese. they are part of the reasons we are so successful at artificial intelligence. do we continue to keep this open to them as a market for studying and working?

these are fundamental questions i think the administration is faced with. steve: randy, i will give you a minute to answer a tough question. we have not talked about north korea, we have talked a little bit about climate. i have china saying do you want our help? here's what the costs are going to be. what is your prognosis on whether we are going to get any credible support from china on north korea, the transnational global nuclear threat. as you look at that do have any optimism? >> unfortunately, not much. north korea is important enough to the chinese, in the korean peninsula is important enough that we should not have to be bidding for their cooperation. i suspect it is really more interest driven they are trying to see if they can exact a price from us for coming to the table, but our experience is over the last several administrations have been pretty mixed. willing to come to the table but

think about outcomes differently, priorities differently. by the time the trump administration closed, it was not only a lack of cooperation, the chinese were basically enabling north korean illegal or shipping to evade sanctions. it was enabling the north koreans, making those challenges much harder. i think it is worth continuing to work with them on it. any outcome that is achieved through diplomacy has to involve the chinese, but it is going to be a slog. steve: i love we are not finishing this show on a false positive note. i want to thank you both of my veteran china experts. the former pentagon and state officials for asia, thank you both for being with us today. so once the bottom line? remember dr. strange? he is the magical superhero that can reverse time.

the china policy, may be joe biden is trying to be dr. strange. 20 years ago america wanted to seduce china and change its core character by bring it into the world trade organization and create influence of dollars of new wealth. america consciously shifted jobs and manufacturing to china, making a lot of chinese rich, but also hollowing out america's middle class. now china realizes that with great wealth comes great power and it can push countries around. the only problem is now, americas:. ring. ring. hello. we want our jobs back. that also wants china to stay within the lines and respect america's dominance. good luck with that. fighting can try and reverse time, but that strategy hardly ever works. what could actually work is if the united states would reinvest in itself, investing in science, education, and to structure. a smart industrial policy for the future. when america used to do that it

did not have to worry about china or any other competition. that is the bottom line. ♪ ñ■?■??xcññ

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