>> ♪ >> hello there. you're watching al jazeera. these are the headlines. the button defended u.s. the terry withdrawal from afghanistan as taliban gains more territory. the u.s. says this is a drawdown and not a retreat is budging to support the government from a distance. >> it is not just the afghan government. it is not just the united states. it is not just a broad swath of the international community that

recognizes there is no military solution to this conflict. the fact that the taliban continues to engage in doha and enter afghan dialogue is itself a reflection of the fact that the taliban understands that only through diplomacy can they garner any sort of legitimacy. >> a drone attack has hit the international airport in an iraqi city. explosives were trained at the u.s.-based but no casualties were reported. there have been more attacks on u.s. troops which russia blames on iranian backed militias. the kingdom of ethiopia says it supports the country's water rights but it started the second phase of filling the dam. lebanon is pleading for international help with the

caretaker prime minister warning the country is days away from a social explosion. he says help is urgently needed to prevent economic rowan. inflation is soaring as the currency hits new lows, putting thousands more people into poverty. canada is getting its first indigenous government general. she is an inuit from northern come -- quebec. tropical storm al set has been upgraded to a hurricane as it barrels toward florida. the national hurricane center is warning of damaging winds and heavy rain. it will make landfall wednesday. former u.s. police captain eric adams has won the primary vote for new york city mayor. he defeated catherine garcia in a poll. he is favored to win note -- the november election against the republican nominee. next is inside story. stay with us. ♪

they were close allies until recently. saudi arabia and the uae are in of that or from oil to politics. the two are on conflicting paths. what is behind the breakdown and what impact will it have on the region? this is inside story. ♪ gate d -- ♪ >> hello and welcome to the program. saudi arabia and the united arab emirates have been working for many years together. they have been close allies on

everything from military to economic matters but a recent dispute added opec plus meeting represented growing strains between the two. the mri t government projected a saudi led deal which expanded production. the uae lock the agreement calling and unfair and demanding an increase in its own production. saudi arabia's oil minister has rejected that request. oil-producing nations have been trying to stabilize the global market as it recovers from the worst periods of the pandemic. they cut output last year to increase falling prices. the saudi energy minister calls are compromised and rationality in what was seen against the push-up -- push back against the uae's refusal. they are looking for a way to balance the interests of producer and consumer countries and for market stability in general when shortages are

expected due to an increase in stockpiles. saudi arabia and the uae have differed on many issues in recent months. that mri t government -- -- while saudi arabia has taken the lead to end the blockade of cap tart despite reluctance from the uae, it did not join the uae and other arab nations in signing a peace dale with israel. it has amended rules on impulse -- imports from free zones and other gulf states. it has threatened to cut off multinationals if they do not relocate with the kingdom. it has bandit travel from the uae citing coronavirus concerns. let's bring in our guests joining us. a researcher and fellow for the sectarian proxies and decent

terror in his asian project in london. he is an assistant professor at king's college london. joining us from kuwait, a nonresident fellow at the carnegie middle east center. locum to you all. how would you describe relations between the uae and saudi arabia as they stand today? >> is a pleasure to be with you. the relations have always gone through and ever and a flow. the relationship has pete and climaxed at moments in which their interests align and they have diverged other times. what happened the past few days was not as surprising in terms of their interests diverging. we have seen a divergence in yemen and the apra smock -- app rochement.

this is part of i dam night -- dynamic relationship with ups and downs. >> they have diverged and we will get into the differences in a moment prude -- moment. their differences were not publicly discussed. how rare is this public disagreement over the issue of oil output? >> this public dispute speaks to the uae's self presumption of itself as a rising power in the region. it not only went ahead with its position but felt the need to lobby other opec producers to present or engage in its position. that -- although i state that -- let me tell you, there is common interest from both parties to ensure they maintain a united sense publicly and in terms of political issues. the divergences, whether on the economic sphere, will increase

in the future. as the competition enters a new phase with them scrambling for more output production. >> divergence, is it inevitable given your differing views? >> if you look at the period of the uae saudi relations over the last 50 years, it ebbs and flows. what is the reference point we compare this to -- this escalation we compare it to? if the reference point is the historic announcement of the strategic alliance in 2017 between the two, we are a low point -- at a low point. what is quite clear is the problem -- in this time around, which makes it different from other ebbs and flows -- is the fact that united arab emirates no longer see themselves as a state of saudi arabia or estate

that is existing in their shadows but one that has won a lot of confidence and we have seen it particularly during the trump era then becoming increasingly assertive. that means doing whatever they think is right in their national interests. that comes at the expense of saudi arabia and not -- we have seen that in the u oil -- oil domain and yemen and normalization with israel and a lot of those pressures are going on in the gulf's crisis. the iranians were not willing to yield to saudi efforts to reconcile with qatar. we see the emirati becoming increasingly assertive, seeing everything through a certain lens. the saudi's have realized that and that is putting a burden on that a relationship. >> let's dig in on the uae's energy minister said the uae has sacrificed the most and we can't make a new agreement.

we have a right to negotiate that. does he have a point when he says we have a sovereign right to could negotiate that? >> absolutely. it is quite clear the emiratis, having increase their outpour --- output, have a right to renegotiate. how will they negotiate? that has changed. they used to be --they are trying to find common ground and be diplomatic and compromising and pragmatic. being assertive means they bring everything in of zero-sum fashion which means negotiations are hard and being far -- fought in the public domain. the emi knowr how to play the information environmenta in their favor. tis >> do you think either side is willing to back down when it comes to the opec plus issue? >> good day to you and your

guests. i think in the spirit of divergence, my analysis and thoughts won't diverge much from what the esteemed guests have said. i would like to mimic or reinforce this notion of leadership and zero-sum fashion sovereignty. that kind of leads very well to answering your question because i don't see saudi arabia or the saudi oil minister trying to negotiate or concede anything. it seems to me a standoff. it doesn't have to be this way. it is a zero-sum fashion. it seems a perception, the zero-sum fashion --a common perception. it doesn't have to be this way

but that is how some states view things. it will be very interesting to see who will try just concede first. this is a projection of power so i don't see saudi arabia standing down. it is also part of this uae projection of leadership of this new region. projection of leadership of a new region and to be more assertive. itwhat's is interesting is the next decisions regarding the oil output, etc., is actually something about how they identify themselves. and how particularly the uae will identify itself. if at identifies itself as a new regal -- regional heavyweight, it sis going to receive costs

with regard to its identity that it can no longer claim it is an up and coming heavyweight. it will be interesting to see how they frame what the next decisions will be. >> i know you have also said this specific spat is economically driven because both countries have economic motives. these are two countries that have built up a reservoir of strategic alignment. why is economic competition intensifying among them now? >> this is a good question. i think one has to look at this in the broad scheme of things. i mean, as i mentioned, it is quite important to understand this is not just an economic issue. it is an issue of position analogy. we are positioning ourselves in

this region. particularly the uae. we are trying to find themselves in this region. it is not simply an economic issue. as the guest previously mentioned, it is policies in yemen and normalization with israel and attempts to get others to normalize with israel. that is very important. this is -- this speaks to the competition the uae is trying to , of course, compete in but also trying to come out with better outcomes. that just economically but strategically, as well. >> let's look at the other issues in more detail. saudi arabia suspended all plates -- flights from the uae.

the official line was the suspension was due to the coronavirus pandemic and the spread of the new strain. the timing of it is quite interesting because that happened hours after the uae blocked the saudi deal to ease oil cuts. what do you make of it timing? is there something behind it? what is your response to the official line coming out of saudi arabia on that? >> as to why the geocode street -- there is a geostrategic context but let's stay in the economic domain. this is part of saudi arabia trying to diversify its wealth and this whole policy of diversification. saudi arabia is one that cannot, in the form of compromise with the uae and it comes to relocating the headquarters and attracting foreign investment. saudi arabia needs to complete -- compete harshly with the emirates and that is what is going on. saudi arabia announced they want to launch a new airline so they are trying to reassert itself as a potential competitor to qatar

airways in the emirates. we have the opec element to it. let us not forget there is an issue with the pandemic and the way the error -- emirates have pushed away in fighting the pandemic which is about collaborating with china on the vaccine and using the vaccine widely within the uae and the vaccine has not been effective. there is a good point to be made to say let's limit the influx of emiratis into the kingdom because there is an issue with the delta variant that is widely spread in the uae. the uae is seen as a reckless country because of their high infection rates and the delta variant being widely spread and the vaccine program being inefficient. this is not just political. there are important underlying issues when it comes to fighting the pandemic. >> better than safe.

another issue. sticking with the economy is saudi arabia has recently amended rules on imports from other gulf countries that would affect goods made in free zones. they are a major driver of the economy. what do you make of that move? >> again, like she said, there are a host of reasons behind that but it is not a reactic thing in relationship to the opec spat. there competing in a tight region where the economy rains tight in they need to prove themselves in the post oil era. they will amass all types of tools. the uae, saudi arabia, and other gulf states that assure they can thrive in such a scenario. bringing in elimination on free trade zones speak to that element. you need to have some kind of protection. in terms of preferential treatment for opec countries, a

free-trade zone -- and if you go into details, you look at that capping it at 20 -- 24% local workforce. it is going to consider local if it is lower. that serves a wider narrative and a backdrop in which they need to realize they are working toward the same goal. saudi arabia might be miles behind in terms of where the uae and the public is in terms of economic appetite and diversification.. , though, is not meant to thrive on its own. it is expected to see competition. the saudi deal was one of many we will see moving forward and it does not fail undercuts. the political strategic

relationship they handle throughout. i want to comment also on where we stand in terms of the uae with the opec spat. regardless of what happens, whether they reach a compromise or but heads, the uae has made a mark. it has won through by putting out that position. the onus is on saudi arabia to reassert their leadership and to show this has not been. if you allow for such a thing to go ahead unheated, that means that more lack of coordination will take on and it will not be beneficial. >> let's look at the political issues. take a look at yemen for us. we know the two countries intervene side-by-side. yemen opposes the hofis.

they started opposing different sides in the south. how much of their differences in yemen contribute to the situation? >> this speaks to the fact that we shouldn't be surprised about this current disagreement or impasse right now because if we look at the yemenis sphere, you can see the divergence happening there for years. what i think that sphere and others have shown it is not just the lack of compatibility but the limits in which the uae relationship with saudi can flourish, that there are limitations to this, that there is this partnership is not -- it is not completely serving domestic agendas or both

agendasof saudi arabia and the uae. i think the yemenis sphere is one out of many. i particularly focus on saudi foreign policy toward israel. what i've seen from the abraham reports is that that was the point that made me very convinced this is the limit between the saudi uae partnership, that here is a step, crossing the rubicon, that fundamentally undermined it the arab peace initiative, which is the saudi peace initiative, based on it. moreover, it kind of pushed forward -- it didn't obstruct -- u.s. pressure to make israeli

flights fly over saudi airspace. we are starting to see a limit. that is one angle to look at it. hence why, to carry on from that, it's best to overcome this looking at it in the gcc perspective in that all have to pool the resources and look at their goals not in a zero-sum fashion. look at it as a win-win fashion. that is going to take a lot. >> now that you mention the abraham accords, to what extent did the signing of those accords between the uae and israel contribute to this? some people raise their eyebrows of saudi arabia when this deal took place. >> this goes to the same issue. we didn't mention the relationship in washington or to washington.

i think it is important to bear in mind saudi arabia and the uae competing for the same space in washington on both sides of the aisle. with trump gone and giving a less than fair approach to the middle east policy, they'd uae and saudi would get away with many things. they knew this would change when biting came in. they knew they would have to change their position and posture and in that respect, they are both competing with the kind of support from the u.s. president in a zero-sum fashion. we have seen from that side of things, the emma rathi's are trying to distance themselves from the saudi's. the element of america in this is important because the abraham accords with the way for the errani's to buy credit in washington. the saudi saw it is buying credit at their expense because there was a lot of leverage being put on the saudi's to normalize and that was not just by kushner. many of the inner circle were

looking at this as a way of the varieties putting pressure on him and saying maybe the saudi's can do it. there was pressure on saudi arabia at the level -- a level were saudi's could not make concessions without being too costly. it was probably not the right decision to go forward with normalization. that was an important element of competing in the information space. looking good in the eyes of washington. it sees -- seems they have tried to dissociate themselves from saudi arabia, leaving them to bear the burden of the conflict and leaving the emiratis with the freedom to maneuver without occurring costs -- incurring costs. >> complete the thought. >> in israel, the emirati had no consideration for their strategic ally and went forward without trying to find a common as it does position. >> what about the agreement that ended the qtatar blockade?

how did that play a role in this? >> emiratis have seen the abraham accords as a way they can gain favor with both sides of the aisle in the u.s. and reason to undercut a pan arab initiative that has been on the table for some time, as mentioned. go to the other side. a saudi. attempt. i made a twist. facilitated by kuwait in the u.s.. it was a saudi approach to make sure the him another one side of there being statesmanlike, that they can overcome differences, that they can reunite the golf together, but you know what is striking, if you compare what happened with the gcc and the

current uae-saudi conflict/dispute, is there is a commonality in which there isn't much regard for governance structures. we have a clear charter which was not adhered to. when the resolution took place, guess what? there is another counsel that has been out there since 2017. you would think these issues would be resolved with different mechanisms in place. >> i knew you wanted to jump in. at the last word is for you. how will this play out? will it escalate or will they learn to live with these differences? >> one thing i wanted to say is the zero-sum perception and log ic is not just constrained within the gcc but actually part of a middle east phenomenon that has taken place.

that is one thing i was itching to say. in regards to how i see this playing out, it is important to think about framing and in which frame we should look at this. if you're going to look at this in a frame of antagonism or conflict, to understand the saudi-uae relations, this will very much overlook the commonalities that saudi and uae have. it will be very inaccurate. if we look at this in a way of competition, this is part of relations and part of this nromal -- normal residue of competition and it could be strong competition. that could encompass other areas where they can actually cooperate and acknowledge where they can actually agree. they do fundamentally agree on many things. this is starting to see an intensification of the competition of identity and

geopolitical and economic issues. >> thank you so much. we thank you for joining us. thanks for watching. you can see the program any time by visiting our website, aljazeera.com. go to facebook.com/ajinsidestory for more. thanks for watching. goodbye for now. ♪

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