>> this is al jazeera. these are your top stories. at least 60 people killed in a bomb attack in afghanistan during friday prayers at a mosque. it is the deadliest attack since u.s. troops pulled out of the end of the -- at the end of august. the brazil health ministries as the country has surpassed 600,000 deaths from covid-19, the second to do so after the u.s. the government has been criticized for mismanaging the outbreak.

we have more. monica: president jair bolsonaro makes a point of not wearing a mask when he can, of saying he will not be vaccinated, but numbers are decreasing because vaccination has been accelerated, despite the government's policies, and speeches, and doing everything to deny the severity of this disease. but still, the vaccines have been rolling out, and this has reduced the rate of infection. >> at least six people shot dead at an immigration detention center in libya. many others escape. video posted online chose those who broke out running through the streets of tripoli. the u.s. and mexico have promised to increase cooperation to reduce migration and violence as part of a major new security agreement. u.s. secretary of state antony blinken has been in mexico to

hammer out details. google has welcomed a deal agreed by 136 countries to impose a minimum tax rate of 15% on corporations. it is aimed at deterring business giants from declaring profits in low tax territories even the clients might be elsewhere. their agreement has been criticized in developing nations that want the tax rate to be higher. the nobel peace prices has awarded to journalists. the committee chairwoman commended them for their fearlessness. those are your headlines. coming up next, "inside story." ♪

>> a dispute between paris and ance, and mercenaries are expected to replace friends soldiers. what are the risks. this is "inside story." ♪ >> hello. welcome to "inside story." i adrian finighan -- i am adrian finighan. a spat with france has threatened the mali region of south africa. france was accused of abandonment for deciding to reduce its military presence. french president met wilma krohn called the comments unacceptable and later disparaged the molly

and government. on tuesday, the molly and ambassador -- the molly ambassador -- the mali was summoned. tensions were high after reports that mali was a talks to hire russian mercenaries for security. reporter: the new situation puts -- >> line puts --the new situation puts mali at fa to complete, -- at a fait accompli. adrian: president macron said the mali prime minister said something shameful. the mali was born of two clues. he said the government has zero credibility. why has france, a former

colonial power in mali, been fighting there for eight years? the crisis began 2012 with an armed uprising by separatists in the north. that created unrest that led to al qaeda and isis fighters spreading out across the sahel. france began a mission to rid mali of rebels and that extended across the sahel. neighboring countries have struggled to contain armed groups and in july, france announced it would draw down his presence of 5000 soldiers and ended separation early in 2022. -- and it's operation in 2022. mali has faced criticism for reports that it has recruited 1000 russian mercenaries. the soldiers prior have reportedly operated in ukraine and syria. french officials warned mali

leaders that the group is likely to further destabilize security pretty group has 2000 contractors and central african republic. they have been accused of rights abuses and exploitation there. ♪ let's bring in our guests for today's discussion. fabrice pothier's chief strategy officer at rasmussen global. ovigwe eguegu is a security analyst at afripolitika. and at washington dc, we are joined by andrew lebovich, a policy fellow at the european council of relations. good to have you, gentlemen. let's start with you, andrew. president macron says the mali government has zero credibility. is he right, and what is his reasoning for saying something so controversial so publicly? andrew: this comes from a lot of frustration not just in france,

about the behavior of mali's transitional government that the fact they have signaled multiple times, especially recently, that they are likely planning to extend the transitional period past what the international community agreed to. i don't think it is fair to say they have no credibility, but certainly there is frustration in the region and international community about the transitional government, and what they are actually doing, particularly amid reports of negotiations with russian mercenaries in the country. adrian: fabrice, why is france reducing its military presence in the region? fabrice: simply because it is not sustainable. we have 5000 french forces deployed in the region. the death toll in financially, it is not sustainable.

in terms of containing the jihadist threat, there has to be a decision. clearly, president macron has made some decision towards a progressive resolve. to go back to your question, he is also in a difficult position. i think that is why he is increasing pressure on the regional government. -- governments. he needs those governments to be more reliable in order to take over for what the defense forces are doing. adrian: is he doing that by accusing mali's government of having zero credibility? andrew: i think he is reminding them that their security is largely dependent on the france presence -- french presence. and the withdrawal from afghanistan was a shocking case for everybody, the french because if you leave too fast

and you will have a complete collapse, but also for regional governments dispensed -- who depend to a large extent on foreign forces like the french. regional and french leaders are depending on each other. i think macron is trying to play hardball here. adrian: french troops were warmly welcomed in mali in 2013 when militants were threatening to seize control of the whole country. mali's government is unhappy with the drawdown, or at least the way in which the drawdown has been announced. how do the people though in mali feel about french troops? they have not brought peace and stability to the region at all, have they? ovigwe: no. when we talk about french

intervention in west africa and mali, you need context. [indiscernible] it is a little bit different, different enough to see that people wanted the state to still be together and functioning. because of the decision, now what you have is very lackluster results on the ground, jihadism is growing in mali, and with recent protests on the streets, many malians are content with regards to the french presence. and there were protests against the former president and in

those protests, you could tell the discontent on the streets of mali. it comes down to the lackluster results from the intervention. on the streets, that discontent has gone into the decision-making core doors of mali. adrian: as france's intervention been a failure? andrew: i don't think we can talk about it as a failure because it is impossible to know what the situation would be if french forces weren't in the country. we can say definitively that the security situation is not better. the influence of jihadi groups has spread. in various parts of the country, there has been a breakdown of community relations and a rise of self-defense militias, and an increase in the power of communal militias.

in that regard, things are not better. i don't think it is necessarily a failure of france alone, in part because france is the lead actor from the international community, but there is a significant other presence including the u.n. peacekeeping force, capacity assistance building and others. so it is not the right framing, but the security situation certainly continues to get worse, not just in mali, but across the region. adrian: fabrice, go back to what ovigwe was saying a few minutes ago, that some people in mali would be pleased to keep the backup of the french troops. but with some prefer a negotiated settlement with the militants to achieve peace to the negotiations? france has refused to negotiate, it is something it won't countenance.

fabrice: i can't speak for the local population but if you look at current conflicts, you come to the point where you have to bring in other groups into a government negotiation. now, the question is whether french diplomacy as in doing this work, to have elements from the rebel groups and whether the local government itself is willing to embrace that. when you look at afghanistan and the regional position for france like the u.s. in the case of afghanistan will mean that the rebels will gain some ground and ultimately take over the country. so i think they need to come to a settlement at some point. adrian: ovigwe, are there elements within the rebel groups that could be brought into some

national conciliation and with the current regime in bamako allow that? ovigwe: yes, i agree. looking at the mali context, you have a central government that is struggling to unite the country. most of the militias, not all of them are ideological driven. some share the new discontent towards the state because of other issues not related to terrorism or ideological machinations. it is very important going forward that we have to recognize the importance of dialogue. i don't think france should decide whether they should be dialogue in mali or not.

that means the prerogative of malians whether there should be dialogue or not. and in the previous government, there was movement to see how the country unites with political leaders, religious leaders, and they think mali should move away from conflict and go back toward moves towards dialogue. whether france wants dialogue in mali, i don't think that should be defined and mali should move toward dialogue. adrian: muddying the waters is the presence of potential russian mercenaries in mali. will they succeed where the forces serving there now have failed? and what of the stakes of such actors in a highly-volatile

region? andrew: there a a number of risks because first of all, france and other partners have made clear they see a potential russian mercenaries presence as incompatible with their own presence and operations in mali. but beyond that, first of all, we don't have much information about what the outlines of a potential deal would be, what a potential deployment of russian mercenaries might look like, but looking at the track record in libya, mozambique, central african republic, we see not only that these forces have not always been particularly effective, but they have been quite brutal in many ways in their treatment of civilians. i don't think there is any indication that even a large diplomat of russian mercenaries would be able to somehow fix the problems in mali in ways that the international deployments have not, in partnership with mali forces pre-problems are

elsewhere. it is not a question of more or less effective military forces. and there is not an indication that we can see that russian military forces would be more effective or better suited to dealing with the very complicated threats in mali. adrian: fabrice, the british foreign office described the waggoner group as a driver of conflict for its own interests. is it right? where does this relationship come from? does mali have historical links or an ongoing relationship with russia? fabrice: i think this description is pretty accurate. if you look at the track record of the wagner group in ukraine or libya, there is more violence, especially on the civilian population. we should not forget that. they often back the strongman,

which is not always in the interest of stability in those regions. and they have often actually produced a radicalization or polarization of the conflict, as we saw in syria. i agree with the british prime minister's description. they are not just businessmen investing in those mercenaries, but what they give to the russian government and vladimir putin is a token into a bigger game and a diplomatic seat at the table. this is what we have seen in libya where now, you have to count russia, you can't address the different grievances of different groups without russia helping. this is what putin is doing. so, for a minimum price would lots of deniability, he can gain a seat at the top table with the big powers. that is what their strategy is because like you said, i don't

think russia has historically some extensive interests in that part of the world, but it buys itself a seat for a low cost. adrian: what impact with the presence of russian person areas have on the regional military partnership between mali and its neighbors to tackle the militants? niger's foreign minister said the agreement will collapse if russian mercenaries are on the ground in mali. is he right? fabrice: no, i don't think he is right. the immediate impact in mali is regime security. that is very come a very important. if we are looking at a government junta, a military was assassinated long ago and that attack set up a consensus that there is no security. with wagner, in the central

african republic, week have seen they can provide regional security assistance and in a broader regional context, chadians have spoken against wagner and foreign interference as they call it. chad's concert comes from the fact that when the former president was killed in april, chadians came out and said the militia the president was fighting would have to be taken on by wagner. that concern by chad was that this group is already in the central african republic. but we have to look at why mali itself wants to bring in wagner. it comes from the fact that mali

not only has the sovereign right to choose who it partners with, but also was to see if there are other options to solve the problem. i don't think they can solve the problem, the problems in mali are very complex. adrian: the regime might feel more secure with them in the country. but there are going to be enough of them to replace the current number of wrench troops there. would the mali of mali feel any more secure if the russian mercenaries were there? ovigwe: it wouldn't matter whether people would feel secure, it would be whether they are able to deliver on what the objectives are. if it is to expand the territorial integrity of mali, that would definitely improve confidence.

but the risk here is, nobody knows how france is going to respond during the withdrawal. it might lead to complications in the regional response because mali said they did not consult with regional countries in the lead up to this agreement. so this is a problem that is regional. the lack of coordination we have seen, we have to find ways for better coordination. adrian: should neighboring countries be nervous at the prospect of russian mercenaries operating nearby, or potentially on their territory, in the case of niger or burkina faso? andrew: there is some reason to be concerned, given the way the wagner group has behaved in

other countries and given there is reasonable concern about the impact potentially on fomenting the insurgency further, given the behavior of the sources in other conflicts. i also think part of this is that in the regional countries, there has been a long process of trying to put into place, not always easily or effectively, different international cooperation frameworks for resolving conflict in the sahel. and any rapid change in that or a departure of the international community from mali, could benefit regional countries, especially niger but also disrupt a lot of the networks that are in place. and that would prove quite complicated to navigate. adrian: less than two minutes if you can answer this question, and it is a big question -- what needs to happen to bring peace and stability to the sahel

region? andrew: that is not a question you can answer in two minutes. and if i knew, i think i would have said so. there does need to be a much more persistent focus on the needs of civilians, the needs of the sahel communities, and the politics. these are not military solutions, economic solutions to these conflicts. ultimately, many of these conflict are political and have to be dealt with through a political lens, through political processes that are inclusive, where the international community can support regional and local initiatives. that is how we can start to get on a better path in the region. adrian: fabrice, coming back to you saying russia is getting a seat at the table relatively cheaply, what are the political and security costs to europe from all of this, from what is going on in the sahel region?

fabrice: the obvious cost is to have a potential terror threat on european territory. even though that threat has been remote lately, which can be regarded as one of the successes of the french intervention, the other cost we see almost every day on the tv screens is, by not having a stable government, by not having control borders, you have a significant illegal migration flow from the sahel to europe which politically is very controversial, and plays in a very toxic way into domestic political debate. france is going to vote for a new president year.

these are immediate costs. however, continuing on the same basis as now has also got costs in terms of the human cost, the death toll of french soldiers, and also the expense. the basic line we have to walk here is to do less, but not do nothing. adrian: time is tight here -- is this something the military government in mali can solve, or is it something that is when to have to wait until there was a civilian-led government? ovigwe: the security situation in mali is so dire, we can't make it an issue of democracy or not democracy. something has to be done today, not tomorrow, immediately. what i expect mali to do his work more closely with regional governments. i know the dynamic is different now, but we have to look a real

regional response, that is truly regional, not a french-led response, but one that expands to include all the players in the region. for instance, why is niger not part of the coalition to combat terrorism on the continent? mali can solve this problem, but we need to do better to coordinate with neighbors. adrian: we are out of time. thank you very much indeed for being with us, fabrice pothier, ovigwe eguegu, and andrew lebovich. thank you for watching. you can see the program again any time by going to the website, al jazeera.com. for further discussion, jonah set facebook.com -- join us at

facebook.com/a.j.. for me, adrian finighan, and the team here, thanks for watching. i will see you. ♪

■■

♪ >> it is a project that started in 2007. it was created to celebrate the life and promote her ideas that related to walk