>> you're watching al jazeera. our top stories, the u.k. prime minister warned the country's health service will be under considerable pressure in the coming weeks as omicron cases surge. elsewhere in europe, new restrictions are coming into effect in an effort to slow the spread. we have more from london on boris johnson's decision, which takes a more relaxed approach to restrictions. >> england is in kind of a system of measures called plan b , which doesn't amount to much more than wearing masks on

public transport and in shops and also working from home when you can. other parts of the u.k. have drawn much further than that. but england, with johnson in charge, chose a different path. it is a gamble you have to say was a risky one. >> india is starting a campaign to vaccinate teenagers against covid-19. this as omicron infections rise. several regions introduced restrictions, including a curfew in new delhi. houthi rebels see is a ship belonging to the united arab emirates. they say it was carrying military supplies. the vessel was taken during a -- near a yemeni port city. an agreement between jeffrey epstein and virginia giuffre has been made public. prince andrews lawyers say he could be released from liability. he denies the claims.

a fire at south africa's parliament building flared up again. it broke out on sunday at the back of the building complex housing the old assembly chamber. it has been badly damaged and parts of the roof have caved in. the cause is unknown. a man is due to appear in court on charges related to the blaze. sudan's military calling for an urgent new measure to deal with demonstrations following the resignation of the prime minister abdalla hamdok. hamdok wasn't able to form a government and said political deadlock threatens sudan's survival. pro-democracy groups say they are planning protests on tuesday. follow those stories on our website. i will be back in half an hour. next it is "inside story." stay with us. ♪

>> mali has postponed elections. the military says the democratic transition will take place for up to five years. what happens now and can regional leaders put the country back on the path to civilian rule? this is inside story. ♪ >> welcome to the program. mali was supposed to hold presidential and parliamentary elections next month, but the military led government pushed that back by up to five years. an army colonel, who staged two who --c coups, blames

insecurity. political parties condemned the delay and a regional block is threatening more sanctions on military leaders if a democratic transition doesn't happen soon. we will bring in our guests in a moment. first, this report. >> in downtown, malians are absorbing the news that elections may not happen for five years. opposition leaders say the decision is unacceptable. >> holding meetings to say they want to be in power for five years? i think this is anti-constitutional, anti-democratic and doesn't have legitimacy. >> this leader was sworn in following two military coups in less than a year. he said presidential elections

would be held. thursday, a conference charged with recommending an election timetable said the polls should be delayed by between six months and five years. supporters agree, now is not the time for elections. >> post-electoral crises are more dangerous than the situation today. we have seen genocides, blood baths across the world. i think we need colm to reassure the population here and elsewhere. the international community must understand the lesser evil is addressing the concerns of malians. >> analysts say the interim government brought some stability. >> the government is to a large extent a step ahead of everyone. you have to look at how they change things on the ground, incrementally. >> the west african regional

block is expected to discuss the situation next week. it imposed sanctions on officials and promised more if mali's leaders don't produce a plan for a democratic transition. >> hundred we get here? in 2012, tuareg separatists took over northern mali. in january 2013, former colonial power france sent in troops to remove the armed groups. after struggling for nine years, france announced it would end its operation early in 2022. protests against the former president began in june 2020. many accused him of failing to fix insecurity, corruption and the economy. military leaders took power two months later, forcing him to resign after seven years in office. the international community condemned the coup. a gentle leader -- junta leader

swore to return power to civilians. let's bring in our guests. joining us is the head of a program at the institute for security studies. in accra, director of research at a peacekeeping training center. joining us from copenhagen is a senior researcher on security and development at the danish institute for international studies. welcome to the program. thanks for joining us. i will begin with you. you say the -- you are not surprised by the postponement, but what is surprising is the boldness of proposing an up to five year delay, and what does that signal to you? >> as you said, the suggestion to postpone should not come as a

surprise for most stakeholders. we used to have unrealistic terms in the first place. by which the current transitional government, as opposed to the previous one, never adhered. a postponement would be suggested. it is not that surprising. what is, is the notion that this would go to five years. it should be noted that the prime minister has clarified, including to the national television, that these five years should be seen as a maximum timeframe. one question is, to what extent are these five years really what the government is aiming for, or , as opposed to what extent is it a posture for negotiations?

>> how is this viewed in mali itself? >> the opinions are very mixed. an important element i think is that these suggestions don't come from nowhere. the men in government organize what really wasn't a conference, as was mentioned, but a consultation process that involved thousands of people across the country. it ended up with this suggestion. this process lends the proposition of extension some level of apparent popular legitimacy. this makes it much harder for external actors to simply discard it. in the current context. >> apologies, let me bring in our other guests. that is an important point you raise. as she was just saying, the

decision was backed by national consultation process. do you think it will make it difficult for bodies to question it? >> i think he lost the plot from the word go. for several reasons. the coup took place, it was misunderstood. the shifting forces, the power correlations, that is number one. number two, there is a changing politics of mali itself in the sub-region and the external actors, the new leaders could go to for support. so the set of tools in the toolbox is becoming limited every day. for me, this has not come as a

surprise. i think to suppose that people would basically go back after an election, when those that are pushing for change themselves have disturbing skeletons in the cupboard. >> one sanctions -- for sanctions, will it followthrough? will sanctions make a difference? >> sanctions will make a difference -- will not make a difference because the range of sanctions that are available will not be effective. it is not going to prevent the he of state and these people from getting medical help, freezing their bank accounts, preventing them from traveling, preventing their kids from going to school. these minimal superficial things

don't attack the problem. the problem is that the old political elites have lost ground in the corrupt, abusive, disrespectful, and these new leaders are using language that appeals to the people. the decision for the five years is solely a bargaining chip, an opening for the positions they will eventually come to see. getting to that point, the quality of the negotiations have to be on the table. i think right from when this series of coups started [indiscernible] >> what is your take and how do you see this postponement? >> i agree with my colleague that this might not be very surprising, and it also seems like the junta has achieved constructing a lot of the

gravestones of constitutional orders that allow them to operate freely because the international coalition led by the european forces is in a dilemma. they are so deeply engaged. the logic behind the european contingent is also that the european security depends on the security in these african states. that means it is difficult at this point to actually make any solid sanctions against this. so that way, they have sort of gained a strategic upperhand as far as i see it. what i think is surprising is, to what extent have there been other actors? which they have announced, that have made some sort of guarantee to security or guarantee for backing the junta if they go to

forward with the plan. it has been contested by several political already's. >> who are you referring to when you say other actors? ask particularly the rumors around a group's engagement, but also russia's engagement. russia is not an illegitimate partner. the problem for europe is, europe has quite a lot of different interests in other regions, as well. so you're and france also does not necessarily approve of russian influence in the region. what is problematic in that is that these external actors end up being engaged for other reasons than peace and stability. they are there to protect their own geopolitical strategic interests, and that to me seems quite dangerous. what we also see is that there

is a lot of populist speak and a lot of disinformation campaign. but all of that december termination -- disinformation is about french interests. it is not only produced by russia itself. we must not forget how much actually popular discontent there is. >> we will talk about the french involvement as well as the russian involvement in a moment. first, one question to you. the military is blaming continuing insecurity in northern mali as one of the reasons for this postponement. does this security situation, in parts of the country, actually allow for the government to hold elections at this point? >> the simple answer would be no. but the security situation right

now is extremely difficult on the ground. state representatives are estimated to be actually present in about a third of the country. it is difficult to hold elections. but this is not the only reason. and perhaps even not the main reason for the postponement. another important element is the appetite for change which this government is essentially promising to provide if given more time. the point of the election, after the pandemic, it is still vivid among public opinion. there is a feeling that back then, there was an empty promise that they would be rushed into elections that didn't change

anything. seven years later, we are still in the situation. so this appetite, or this eagerness for change, is also what the transitional government is promising. that i think is important to mention. along with the notion of having a five years extension, they have proposed a more specific timeline for the various reforms, which are fundamental reforms that people are asking for an previous elected elites, as well as their international partners, failed to deliver. >> which or who -- we were touching on this a moment ago but what country would have given its blessing for the postponement? surely this isn't a decision that the military could come to, could decide for themselves, is it?

>> let me tell you. they have looked at the geopolitical situation. they have seen the changes. they have decided to tread very deftly. it started in russia. they have the links. we are seeing a resurgence of russia with an aggressive foreign end of -- and economic policy. we are seeing the world now group in central africa and elsewhere, and here lies the discomfort, the sheer hypocrisy of those who are saying it is not here. almost every western european country talking about the role of the russians. >> the russians do say russian trainers are in the country as

part of a bilateral agreement between mali and russia. that is what they say. >> a bilateral agreement means they are invited. >> what is russia doing? has it stepped into fill this security gap when france announced it would be withdrawing its troops? >> russia has always been around. don't forget, russia has grown out of the old soviet union and the soviet union was a major player, like china on this continent, through the 1950's. so these old relationships that are being giving -- given new clothing. a number of analysts don't want to misconstrue the analysis. the significance is that where the international community to feel, how will they see this? what leverage can we have?

will this cascade into other countries where similar difficulties within the political, economic and social elites are creating the distance for instability. getting mali right is important. unfortunately, i think the way most people are looking at it is wrong. russia isn't a problem. certainly, we need to look at the protests. people who have been marginalized, youth, who fell victim, how they are voicing it. >> would you like to add onto what we are hearing? >> i would like -- i think it is an important point raised, this thing of, even 10 years ago nobody imagined this kind of

insurgency, and we have seen the speed and the x split -- the exclamation -- the acceleration through which violence, not only committed by jihadist groups but also by all kinds of self-defense militias that in the vacuum of security provision by government forces is able to thrive on violence and also we see how security forces are also producing violence in itself. it is important that this whole construction of this has only been at jihadists. it points to so many deep lying problems of security provision for ordinary citizens in the region, which is not limited to mali. the kind of impunity that is seen, and the kind of diplomatic

death lock is very worrying. i think what we need to understand is that these foreign interventions are not occupying forces. they are interventions by invitation. that means they rely on the nation to cooperate and invite them into the territory. but that also gives a lot of leverage to these kinds of governments. however, now functioning they may be. what we say in the academic is that these partner states are the states in the region, they are able to tame interventions. that means they are completely able to use all these foreign investments for pursuing their own interests. i think that is something we need to take into consideration

if this idea that wcan construct security in this region, we forget the actors on the ground with political -- >> let me bring you in. over in germany, we are hearing the parliamentary commission for the armed forces of the german army should evaluate its role in mali and consider ending military operations. the french military is in the process of winding down operations in the country. are these moves welcome by mali ans? >> the posture international actors are taking generally is appreciated in different ways bymali -- by malians. there is concern, but it is not what the postponement of the electoral timelines -- >> it's not. we are looking at the context of

the security situation in the country. >> of course. i would like to get back to one thing you said earlier, which was this question of whether or not authorities could have taken this decision on their own, i thought this was one of the mistakes the international community has been making from the get-go, to demise the agency -- minimize the agency of national authorities because they emanate from there. and for other reasons. one thing we have seen repeatedly is the ability of these governments to shift the tables, to shift power dynamics and essentially create leeway for negotiations for themselves and essentially at the end of

the day, get what they want. this kind of minimizing indicates they should be treated as junior implements. which i would not encourage participant -- perpetuating. >> would you like to respond from what we heard? we have a few minutes left. what do you think will happen next? how will this play out? >> i think i agree. these consistent, strategic make calculations -- miscalculations, it is false. what we are going to see in the next couple months is seeking to regain the initiative. they have limited tools to play with. i am guessing that we will look at a compromise solution that

looks like 2.5-3 yes the transition process. within that period, they have to get the extra must violence under control, which is most impossible. the violence is spreading. but mali is a touchy point. the international community and the malians will resolve this problem and that will indicate how stable the country will be in 2022. >> last words for you, what do you think will happen next? how will this play out? >> i also see this continued diplomatic game between these different doctors. i also see perhaps the five years was an optimistic bit and perhaps a negotiated settlement within a time rate of 2-3 years. it could be what we are heading for. probably the european

interventions, we will have to accept that. i also see that we are not withdrawing from the set help. the french are reorganizing troops, so it is more of a training and assist mission. but also wanted distance where we will see more drones, more highly technological engagement but not necessarily less investment in the region. >> thank you so much for joining us. thanks so much for your time. thank you for watching. you can see the program again any time by visiting our website. you can go to our facebook page. you can join the conversation on twitter. for myself and the team, thanks for watching and goodbye for now.

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