out power to thousands of homes. ♪ >> the u.s. has set a new global record when more than one million new covid-19 cases registered in one day. the jump is due in part to delays in reporting over the new year weekend. the u.s. has seen an average of 480,000 daily infectious over the past week. >> 35 million people not vaccinated. and let me be absolutely clear. we have in hand all the vaccines

we need to get every american fully vaccinated, including a booster shot. there is no excuse. no excuse for anyone being unvaccinated. this continues to be a pandemic of the unvaccinated. so we have got to make more progress. host: the u.k. has recorded more than 200,000 daily coronavirus cases for the first time. prime minister boris johnson says they will be no new rejections for now but warned of challenging weeks ahead. there is a second chinese city put into a total lockdown after reports of new coronavirus cases. restrictions are similar to those imposed for the past two weeks in an industrial hub. south korea's military says the north has fired an unidentified projectile. it happened on their east coast. last week him jungle in vowed to continue building up his country's military capabilities.

a court in canada has ordered iran to pay $84 million to the families of those killed in the downing of a plane in 2022. iran's military shut down -- shot down a plane carrying -- and killed everyone on board. many on board were canadian citizens or had residency in canada. iran's air defenses had been on high alert days after the u.s. assassinated their top general. the main suspect in the killing of the haitian president jovenel moise has appeared in u.s. federal court for the first time. the 43-year-old was extradited from panama. ♪

>> how would the military in sudan do with the unrest? the resignation of the prime minister and growing public anger have thrown the country further into uncertainty. could a new power-sharing deal be the way out? this is inside story. ♪ >> hello and welcome to the program. sudan is again in pluto turmoil following the resignation of prime minister abdalla hamdok. it comes less than two months after he was reinstated under a deal with the military. the senior military leader is calling for an urgent caretaker government and new measures to deal with the demonstrations. pro-democracy groups say the military should stay out of government, and they are planning more protests. a political deadlock between all

sides has left the country unable to transition from dictatorship to democracy, since the ousting of their longtime ruler in 2019. during a speech, hamdok said more talks were needed for all parties to reach agreement. >> we needed a roundtable for the vision of the country to come to an agreement. i tried to spare my country disaster. recently i met with all the civilian and military officials of the transitional council to address these issues. after, i decided to return to you what you have entrusted in me, and resign the position of prime minister. host: let's look at how this started. three years ago an uprising in sudan forced the government from office. it began in december 2018 with protests over the rising cost of living. it soon evolved into calls for an end to president bashir's 30 year rule. that led to him being overthrown

by the military in april of 2019. a power-sharing agreement was signed in august that year. abdalla hamdok was appointed prime minister. in february, he announced a cabinet reshuffle in the face of major street protests against fuel and bridge shortages. then last october, the military declared a state of emergency, dissolving the interim government and arresting civilian leaders. since then, thousands of people have demonstrated, and dozens have been killed by security forces. it is time to bring in our guests. in nairobi, a political commentator and managing partner at inside strategy partners. in somerville, executive director at world peace foundation. and in doha, a lawyer and legal commentator. a very warm welcome to you all.

is abdalla hamdok's resignation any surprise to you? >> it is not. and despite all the headlines, i would describe it as probably the most consequential irrelevant event in sudan's history. it is irrelevant because hamdok, as far as the people on the street are concerned, really lost his political relevance the minute he went rogue and signed that agreement with rohan on november 21. it is irrelevant also because it has been weeks in the making, so it is not a surprise to anyone. yet at the same time, this could prove to be a fairly consequential event. mainly for the international community, which was content to move on from sudan after the november 21 agreement, and may be for the few remaining steps. what this does is it removes the last remitting fig leaf from the october 25 coup, and it shows it for what it really is, a full-fledged military regime

now. and that, in efefect, forces the international community to refocus and sudan, which might be a good thing for the impasse that is happening. and as far as the pro-democracy movement, although they have moved on beyond hamdok, i think the political vacuum that his departure creates does create an impetus for them to move faster to try to present an alternative, to try to unify their front, and prove to the world and to the rest of the sudanese population that they are able to unite and present a credible alternative. so that is why it is simultaneously relevant and irrelevant at the same time. host: we will talk later about the potential role of the international community going forward, but i want to cross over to niobium -- two nairobi. where does this leave the military and their plans?

>> as he pointed out, hamdok is just, his tenure represents a phase in the revolution. it is not in any way the sum total of revolution. the pro-democracy movement was there before and will remain after his resignation. and so this is now sort of entering a new phase of the revolution. one where the pro-democracy movement is unencumbered by discussions around whether hamdok should be given a chance to make good on some promises, or whether he should not. that conversation is now moot. the much more important conversation is how do we ensure that the army goes back into the barracks and leaves political and economic life are good. and on the military side they now have to contend the new calculation both internationally but also domestically. the more they double down, and they have been doing so, the more they become the clear

overarching enemy without anyone being able to put the burden. hamdok is no longer there to blame as part of the government structure. they are the government unequivocally. what that means is backers will be unable to support them in the same way because of the risk that arises from the level of repression we are seeing. host: why did abdalla hamdok accept this deal in the first place? i mean, he was under house arrest, but did he truly believe it would work? was it ever going to work? >> it was always going to be an extremely long shot, and i think he was under extreme duress. he was very isolated. and the key failing was that he negotiated really on his own. he did not bring in the full democracy movement. so he was isolated from the

beginning. i think he had two clear motivations. both were honorable. one was to see if he could prevent further bloodshed. and that did not work out because the democracy movement did not accept his compromised proposals. and the second was he sees more clearly than anybody the economic precipice over which sedan is going. -- sudan is going. and he really hoped he would be able to engineer enough of economic bailout to prevent the worst from happening. he never had the political base, the political support in order to be able to leverage concessions out of the military, the concessions that would have been necessary for his position to be workable. and over the weeks, it became clearly unworkable. if there was a surprise, the

only surprise was that he held on for as long as he did before he quit. host: i mean, the deal was that announced last month was going to be an independent technocratic cabinet under military oversight. was there ever going to be acceptable to the people? >> absolutely not. i think that is demonstrated by the continuing demonstrations on the streets. the very cursory reading of that document on november 21 will tell you it was just creating a facility in -- a civilian facade for military rule. every paragraph was echoing the statement he made on the day of the coup. and he was given increased powers if i recall correctly, article four of that agreement gave the sovereignty council full oversight over all executive functions. so hamdok's hands would have been very tied. even if he wanted to do good, he would not have been able to.

and i think he realized that, albeit a bit late. host: some critics of hamdok have suggested this not only lift the veil on the november packed, but shows even over the past two years that the real political will to make a full transition to democracy. what is your take? >> that is fairly accurate on the military side. they have been shown to be bad faith actors when it comes to a lot of these agreements. including the constitutional declaration of 2019. one of the reasons the declaration itself obtained -- contained a coup clause which allowed them to take over of things were not going to plan. of course that is a very ambiguous statement and it gives them the kind of latitude they have been enjoying since 2019. some people commented this is

the military buying time. and now we are seeing this reconsolidation of the islamic military project. and now we are seeing appointments to the security sector, appointments to the legal sector as well as the new emboldening powers of the security services. as well as the other myriad security advantageous polities towards the security sector. what that means is effectively the past two years have been this sort of experiment for the military to see to what extent they could use civilians as a fig leaf. that did not work so well the past two years. of course there were a lot of challenges they faced, particularly around federal governance, the unions law, etc., but the events just prior to the coup and of course subsequent to that really prove that the military was never really in this for the

democratic transformation, which is unsurprising for anyone who has been watching. host: in his televised speech, mr. hamdok said the country was at a dangerous turning point that threatens its whole survival. do you agree with that sentiment? >> i do not think he is exaggerating. i think that what we have at the moment is a regime in power that is in some ways a very familiar one. in some ways we are familiar with military dictatorships. that put on the clothing, the appearance of nationalism, of standing up, saving the nation. but in this case, one of the defining features of this regime is the extent to which it has penetrated the economy, and especially rural society. it is militarized much of the sector and the rural sector as

well, especially through the number two in the regime, the general and his rapid support forces who are the defacto governing power in many of those areas. the depths of this kleptocratic control and the entanglement of this kleptocratic system in the region with egypt and the gulf states, etc., means that this is actually a different regionalized form of military government that will be harder to uproot. i think this is really what abdalla hamdok, as a conventional economist you had a vision of sudan resuming as a developmental trajectory, is saying. he's saying i cannot find a way back to the economic and social stabilization of sudan. we are in the grip of this

monstrous transboundary military kleptocratic system. host: i mean, that's a very dim, grim picture for the future. if in fact, what we have is a situation where the last two years of transition to full democracy has not been that at all, then how painful is the next weeks and months going to be for this protest movement, who are unrelenting in their desire to seek a transition to a full democracy? >> i think that is a real challenge. we have the full determination of the youth on the street to go on with their protests and regain the freedom that they have fought for for years. and we have the generals who are refusing to give up power. so it's the classic unstoppable force facing the immovable object. but if we read the landscape we

see that sudan has been ungovernable for literally over the last two months since they have taken over, and the demonstrations have only increased. and i think with the departure of prime minister hamdok, the internal pressure will be coupled by increasing international pressure, and the military won't be able to continue the bloodshed that they have started before, for fear of increased international pressure. so they will be faced of a menu of three options. the first is a negotiated exit where they step down and leave the country. and then the second is the possibility of an internal coup within the armed forces. and third is an armed confrontation, some type of civil war. and i think we all prefer the first option, and i think the increased pressure on the

military will hopefully yield that outcome and that is why we urgently hope that the international community will regain his focus on sudan and try and avert options two and three that could bring a lot of bloodshed. host: how do you think the military is going to respond to abdalla hamdok's resignation, and do you think they will follow through on this promise for elections in, what, july 2023 i believe was the date? >> to answer the first question, i think they were initially worried about his departure. the reason they brought him back on november 21 was so they could gain access to the international financing. obviously that has not materialized because the international community gives tacit approval to the generals, and it has not backed that up financially, which i think is a good thing. in the middle of that negotiation they realized he -- that the money is not coming,

and now with his resignation it most certainly isn't. we've heard certain names for a replacement including the former minister of finance, but no one wants to sit on this poisoned chalice, because any prime minister put in place now will be seen to be an accomplice to the murders and the killings and detentions, etc. so they are going to have a very difficult time finding a pm. in any case, they are not the body constitutionally. it's not appointed. it is parliament, which of course has not been formed. they will find a very difficult time to make it stick, even if they do find anyone. as for the elections, elections in 2023 only benefit the generals, the only benefit the islamist movement, which is still very much in the background. i think everyone will see through early elections, egypt-style, as a theater of

democracy rather than the genuine commitment to it. i don't think there will get anywhere with early elections by way of convincing people domestically and internationally. it's too soon anyway for any of the political parties to commit to an electoral process only six months from now. host: will the international community, do you think, increase its engagement, increase its pressure on the military as a result of this resignation? what can or might it do? >> up to now, the international response led by the united states with europe in tow over the last few months has been extremely feeble. they have very strong cards in their hands because of the financial dependence of sudan, on debt relief, and on multinational international assistance. but those cards have really not been played at all effectively. what we have seen, particularly

from washington, is that policy in the whole of the horn of africa has, under the trump administration was essentially desolate -- delegated to israel, egypt, saudi arabia, and the uae. they were given a free hand to do whatever they wanted in sudan, ethiopia, and somalia. and the biden administration has not pulled that back. and essentially, the calculation as i see it of the generals is that they have their friends in egypt. egypt is very clearly behind them. israel, through the extension of the abraham accords, is dealing directly with the generals. they have no interest in democracies. and the saudi's and the morales -- now they are patching up their

differences with other regions like qatar and turkey, that are also not in favor of democracy. and these states have enormous lobbying power in european capitals and in the u.s. they are sold arms, etc., etc. we know the influence they have. so what they are counting on is that they ultimately will see out any pressure for democratization from western nations because they have this solid backing in their region. at the moment, washington, london, paris, brussels, are doing almost nothing to disabuse them of this conception. host: do you agree with that assessment in terms of international allegiances, the geopolitical powers at play here? >> yes and no. it's pretty clear that sudan is in a difficult neighborhood, so to speak. and i think part of the problem is that the pro-democracy camp did a horrible job presented

their case while in power. they completely gave up relationships to further cement the perception that the pro-democracy camp is a threat to the interests of those regional allies. i think there is a path where the pro-democracy camp can present his case and can present the reality that, one, sudan is ungovernable for military leaders, and that the long-term stability of sudan will not happen without the street getting what it wants, and without that, there will be significant ramifications for the region, which will be part of the national security of both regional players. so i think there is an argument to be made for the u.s., europe, and definitely the regional

allies, that their long-term interest is actually, even if they don't agree with the concept of democracy, but they have a vested interest in a stable sudan, and a democratic sudan will be stable, economically stable, where they can talk about food security and regional security, and we can have the same conversations. i think other players might be a little different. israel, russia and others might be more occult to win -- more difficult to win over, but european allies can be brought forward. and i think the possibility of american sanctions on the coup l eaders, which is being tabled now in congress, might change it significantly. if those individuals become toxic and become a liability for the regional allies, i think we

will see pressure on those individuals to step aside and call for a new military leadership that is more willing to heed the calls of the street. host: what is your take? what, if any, pressure might make the military back track, hand over to a full civilian government now? if you do think it is possible, will there be internal pressure from the protest movement, external pressure from the international community, or both? >> certainly both. we can bank on internal pressure from the pro-democracy movement. what has not been as dependable is international pressure. for the military, their main constituency is not a domestic one. all the different generals, also, however, have different countries they rely on in a patron, client sort of relationship. so when we say that generals are

more linked to, or more engaged with the reason, that is not necessarily a monolith. there are individual relationships going on as well. to give the hamdok administration their due, they did realize the military banked so heavily on the regional players, so they did try and make overtures to these countries, in particular saudi arabia. and we did see some net impact of that in the way that saudi arabia in relation to egypt, israel, and a uae responded to the coup. but of course that is meaningless unless it actually translates into meaningful pressure, transformative pressure on the generals, and that will really only come about if there is a concerted shift away from sudan being seen as a security -- through a security lens rather than through a

foreign policy lens, where partnerships can be cultivated. so what we have right now is pressure that is needed essentially from the west on these regional powers that isn't really having the impact. and that's due to a global shift of the influence of western countries, particularly u.s., after the disastrous trump policy of outsourcing policies to the gulf. host: which is a whole other program itself. thank you to all of our guests for joining us on the program. and thank you for watching. you can to the program any time again by visiting our website, and our facebook page. you can also join the conversation on twitter. our handle is @ajinsidestory. bye-bye for now. ♪

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