ñçñqñqñqñqññññ#ñ#wwñ?ñ? -we h. we had the information. we knew that japanese americans were not a threat to national security, but decided to incarcerate them anyways. -although president reagan acknowledged that the incarceration japanese americans was a mistake, he stopped short of calling it what it rely was: a scanl of epic proportions. -this mass incarceration really rested upon a foundation of intentional falsehoods.

-my grandmother once told me when she was incarcerated during world w ii for beins had her tearages fro old magazines and stuff them between the gapsn the floorboards of their barracks. her job was to try to keep the dust from getting insiem and all over everythin doubt she was very successl. [pensi music] we had the intelligence. we had the information. we knew that japanese americans were not a threat to national security but decided to incarcerate them anyways.

and because there are pallels between what was happening but decided tthen and now, is pretty scary. reporter 1: donald trump defending himself tonit, even comparing himself to fdr. reporter 2: demonstrators around the nation picket president trump's new order banning travelers from seven countries designated as having ties to terror. if you create fear and demonize an entire group, we saw what that led to, and we're starting to head in a very similar direction. [deep drum roll] [drum roll continues as jarring, chaotic music builds]

[mellow music] the first time i remember learning about incarceration was during my 11th grade . and i remember my history teacher was trying to weigh both sides: so, why it could be justified that it happened, and why it was viewed as problematic. and i think i was really frustrated because she didn't say it was wrong. i ink it makes me so sad because none of this was based on facts. it wasn't based on evidence. it wasn't based on logic or reas.

it was based on a political agenda, a very harmful and racist political agenda. seph: although president reagan acknowledged at the incarceration of japanese americans was a mistake, he stopped short of calling it what it really was: a scandal of epic proportions. mika: long ago, this school was once the headquarters of the western defense command. within these walls, lieutenant general john l. dewitt issued military orders that would imprison an entire racial group. but the seeds of t world war ii incarceration of japanese americans were sown long before 1942. [ominous music] -in 1882, the chinese exclusion act was passed, and it's the first federal law that excludes an entire racial group.

and it was passed because white labor, primarily in california, thought that chinese were presenting competition in the gold mines. once that exclusion act is passed, you see people are looking for another cheap labor source. and they just so happened to turn to the japanese. when the japanese came over to the west coast, they were essentially leasing and purchasing land that was unwanted by the white american population at the time, because they believed that it was land that was not good, it was not fertile, and that nothing could be grown there. but then you see the japanese get there, and they start creating really productive farms. it's become central california. and today, we're so used to seeing and thinking of central california as really fertile farmland, and it's the japanese who bring life to this land.

then the rest of the white american farming population realized that the japanese amamericans are so productive, and there is a lot of fear that japanese americans are gonna take over the central valley. the asiatic exclusion league forms in 1905. and so, anti-janese and anti-asian sentiment, in general, is growing. and as a result,n 1924, the us federal government passes the immigration act, which th effectively bans all asian immigration into the united states. joseph: while an-japanese sentiment grew, several key figures emerged who would wage a fierce bale over the fate of japanese americans. -john dewitt was an administrator. his career in the army had been as a supply officer, but he diligently worked his way up the chain of command so that by the late '30s, he was a lieutenant general.

he was pushing retirement age, and it was pretty clear that the post at the presidio was gonna be his last. -my stepfather got out olaw school really in the depths of the depression, clerked for a federal judge, and went into the justice department. and this was a time, of course, of the roosevelt administration. and many of the very, very bright and able young people who went into the justice department were very much motivated by the ideals of the new deal. -well, francis biddle came from a very aristocratic, privileged background. he was very new in the job, and he was very deferential, not only to president roosevelt, bualso to the other members of the cabinet who were more senior -dad was the first-named administrative assistant to any president. they only had three secretaries, very small staff. and he went over to the justice department in late 1941

as the assistant to the attorney general, which was the equivalent today of deputy attorney general. -the navy had primary jurisdiction over the so-called japanese american national security problem. it had completed a two-year study on the extent that the japanese american population might at all be dangerous. and just before the war broke out, the study was completed. peter: lieutenant commander kenneth ringle of the office of navaintelligence, who was in charge of surveilling the japanese-american community on the west coast, and was the most knowledgeable. "navy lieutenant ringle reported that the entire japanese problem has been magnified out of its true proportion, largely because of the physical characteristics of the people. it should be handled on the basis of the individual and not on a racial basi" mika: animosity towards japanese americans was reaching boilinpoint with news of imperial japanese aggression

spreading across asia. and then.... [explosion; tense music bursts forth] peter: frank knox, who was the secretary of navy at the time, had been told that there were japanese on oahu that had collaborated with, and in fact had known in advance, about the pearl harbor aack. "after pearl harbor, rumors and lies quickly gained traction as facts. headlines blared news of navy secretary frank knox's claim that japanese-american saboteurs were responsible for pearl harbor." now, this was then magnified 100-fold by the press on the west coast, had all these stories about, oh my god, there's this japanese fifth column. and the more lurid the stories, the more newspapers you sell. -at that time, the air was full of phony stories, all false.

there was no evidence of any sabotage by the japanese-american population or japanese-alien population. don: federal communications commission was the intelligence agency overseeing and monitoring the entire airwaves. the radio intelligence chief is a person by the namof george sterling. mika: to respond to general dewitt's growing concerns about potential sabotage, in january of 1942, george sterling was deployed to assist the staff of the western defense command. don: sterling says the general went on this long discourse, evently believing and convinced that there were japs with transmitters operating on the west coast. and sterling goes on that he's never seen a intelligence staff so hopeless to cope with radio transmissions. they're staffed by privates who can barely

read 10 words a minute. they take bearings on radio stations transmitting out of tokyo, and they call them shore-to-ship transmissions. they report these to the general, and the general, knowing no better, takes their word for it. joseph: after investigating over 700 reports of illicit signaling, general dewitt was informed that there was not a single case that involved japanese americans. [sweeping music] -i went out and talk to lieunant general dewitt. he wanted the civilian authorities, the department of justice, to intern more japanese aliens than we were interning. it was our view that really a minimum program was required. he did not, however, at that point in december, contemplate anything as large as removal of civilian population

from the west coast. -this general dewitt's desk. "i'm very doubtful that it would be common sense procedure to try and intern 117,000 japanese. an american citizen after all, is an american citizen. so, he didn't even believe in what he did. bill: dewitt is today considered synonymous with the internment of japanese americans during world war ii. the beginning, he was fairly reticent to do that. in stepped karl bendetsen. -karl bendetsen was sent from washington dc to assist general dewitt. mr. bendetsen claimed he knew the japanese mind. he grew up with japanese, so he knew how they thought. and he claimed to be sort of an expert. -he said that japanese americans are an enemy race.

and ile the second a third generation have "americanized," the racial strains are undiluted. so therefore, along the pacific coast are potentially 112,000 enemies of the united states. pehe maneuvered dett insen ways tt served his purpose. -when i first saw dewitt early in december, and that he want arpose wasfullcale evacuation.ong, i don't think it ever occurred to him that he would be lowed to give a military order which would say that all the states california and oron and washington are barred to american citizens of japanese ancestry as well as aliens. he didn't move in that direction until he learned by political events,

not military events, political events, that he would be supported in such an action. -white american farmers lead a lobbying effort for a rounding up and a removal of this population that they view as competition. -the farmer growers association was a very, very powerful political organization. they had very strong connections with the congressional delegation. -farm interests in california saw an opportunity to take the property and the lands of the japanese americans. -it was a perfect storm of opportunism for people who wanted to get rid of japanese americans. mika: "we're charged with wanting to get rid of the japs for selfish reasons. we might as well be honest. we do.... they caminto is valleto work, and they stayed to take er. anwe don'tant them back when the war ends either." james: dad certainly heard from congress in this debate,

and he understood the pressure they were under. because he knew that they were in the business of getting elected and that they were gonna be in trouble. bill: the congressional delegations of all three of the west coast states were in favor of doing something to curb this potential fifth column. but probably the most outspoken advocate of internment was don: when e war broke out,ey itave a platform forwarren. policians to build their caers. so, earl warren ran for governor on the slogan that the japs must go. james: dad would point out to his children, "don't think you know it all." you're a big believer in the liberal court of earl warren. you should know. he was on the wrong side of this. he was a politician then, and he had high ambition. -a budding politician with great ambitions, without principles

is a dangerous cbination. -warren had put together using records from local counties in the federal census bureau and other sources of exactly where japanese americans were living. narrator: houses and hotels occupied almost exclusively by japanese were within a stone's throw of a naval air base, shipyards, oil wells. japanese farmers were living close to vital aircraft plants. peter: but farms had been there long before the plants were constructed or the bases were set up. but warren did say to dewitt and other members of the war department that this might be evidence that there's some collective conspiracy among the japanese.

between these two sides:r: n the justice department people, the war department people. they had a final showdown where attorney general biddle had a eting in his living room. this was the last chance they had to derail this push. henrstimson, the secret, was the elder statesman of the cabinet. he'd also served in the cabinet under president wilson. so, he spanned both world war i and worlwar ii. and the assistant war secretary john mccloy had a legal career that was rlly outstanding. he'd worked his way up and become a very prominent wall street lawyer.

-on the 17th, they were still battling. but stimson and mccloy went to the white house and said, "we need this" to president roosevelt. and that message was delivered to francis biddle. that was not known by mr. ennis and mr. rowe, my dad, and they were just stunned at that meeting at biddle's house. the executive order draft was whipped out at the meeting: "here's the order." and the first reaction dad had is laughing. "are you kidding? how could you write this? are you nuts?" and then just being furious, and then to being dumbfounded. dad said, "and then the realization hit me that francis has been quiet, ed is being a terrier, and i'm stunned

that this executive order has been decided on." -and i was told ennis when i talked with him years ago, driving back from biddle's house, he literally was in tears. he was devastated that this internment was going to happen. don: on february 19th, 1942, president roosevelt signs executive order 9066. congress then follows up with public law 503. general dewitt begins issuing military orders governing a civilian population. and the first of those that japanese americans could not leave the states of washington, oregon, california, and arizona. and within three weeks later, dewitt issued another proclamation saying japanese americans could not remain in thesetates.

only way that people could comply wh public law 503 was to report to a military detention facility. put it simply, japanese americans lost their freedom incrementally. what began as a race-based curfew ultimately culminated as a race-based imprisonment. [melancholy music]

-my eat-grandmother was e principal of the kinmon gakuen, which is the japase school here. and it was also one of the locations that the buses came to pick people up to take them off to camp. so, that's where they boarded the bus. we went back to tule lake as a family, where three of my grandparents were incarcerated, and i stood at the site. at that moment, the only thing that i could think about was my grandfather.

he was the same age that i was when i was there, which was 19 years old. and it just hurt because that was my flesh and blood that was there. -my grandfather is second generation japanese-american. he was kibei. so, kibei is a special classification. he received education in japan. so, i found out a lot later that he was kind of viewed as more threatening and more suspicious durinthe war. these stories weren't really talked about in my own family. what i had in my family was a lot of anger and hurt. [melancholy music fades away] don: there are three gentlemen who, each on their own made stands of conscience. peter: min was the first person to bring a chaenge

to any of the military orders. min had decided to get himself arrested for curfew violation. he went downtown in portland after the curfew hour and walked around the streets trying to find a police officer. -ii got tired of walkingrs, up and down 3rd avenue, so i did approach a police officer. i asked the officer t. -i was confronted with certain values that i held high, the various principles of american citizenship. if i were to go along with the order, i would have to kind of restructure all of those values, so i decided to disobey the law. -when the evacuation notice came, i was 21 then. when you're at that age, you have a girlfriend, and she was more important to me than anything else. peter: after the internment had taken place and there were

resistors, the aclu board ordered their chapters in those cities not to support those challenges. but the branches in seattle and in san francisco directly defied them, and they provided lawyers. -their tris were very fast and very simple, consisting of, "are you japanesamerican? did you violate public law03? and if so, y're guilty." each of these three gentlemen decided to appeal their convictions. these cases ultimately wound their way up to the us supreme court. gordon hirabayashi and min yasui's case was heard in 1943, and the court heard the constitutionality of the curfew. but in 1944, fred's case was mass deprivation of your freedom. the government defended against the challenges of these the litigants on two grounds.

on that japanese americans were committing acts of espionage and sabotages repoed by general dewitt's staff. and then secondly, that japanese americans were so ethnically different that you couldn't trust them. the difficulty of the government's position at that time is not a single japanese american was ever accused of espionage or sabotage, let alone convicted. and so basically, they were trying to justify the arrests of these three individuals for violating public law 503. but at t same time, they were trying to justify the entire program. -they had no evidence in the supreme court. there was nothing to indicate thathey were disloyal. they needed to g some formation in the supreme crt to allow tm to rule in favor of the government upholding the exclusion an the curfew progrs. so, at devolved on bendetsen and dewitt

to produ a finaleport. don: and the government throughout this process were saying, "the reason why we couldn't hold loyalty oaths to individual determinations is because we didn't have time to do it. it was an emergency. these people posed a danger. we had to act immediately." dale: the original dewitt report written by bendetsen was essentially racist, saying that, well, the reason that we're doing this exclusion and imprisonment of japanese americans is it's impossible to tell the loyal from the disloyal. it's impossible to separate the "sheeps from the goats." when john mccloy saw this report, he was incensed. he says, "we can't argue this in the supreme court. you've got to change it." aiko: mccloy had objected to so many points, bendetsen said, "don't worry 'cause we only printed 10 copies." dale: well, they changed that around 180 degrees to one

that was patently racist, that you can't tell the loyal. from the disloyal, to one that's more palatable: oh, we just didn't have time. -john j. mccloy ordered the original final report and all the copies returned and burned. aiko: i saw a memorandum from theodore j. smith warrant officer junior grade that said, "i have witnessed the destruction of the dewitt report." and it turned out they could not find one copy, the 10th copy. and nobody seemed to worry about it much. [suspenseful music] peter: edward ennis, who had lost the btle over evacuation, was in charge of preparing the government's brief to the supreme court when the korematsu case came before it. don: ennis is looking to confirm and iorporate

the facts of dewitt, that japanese americans were engaging in espionage and botage. and so, he begins to call up these reports, thinking that he's going to incorporate this evidence within the government's brief. and in srching for the evidence, he finds the opposite: that there is no evidence. among the documents he found was the office of naval intelligence report. they not only say that japanese americans pose no danger, but it actually recommends against this rounding up that happened. he writes to the solicitor general of the united states, a guy by the name of charles fahy. -the solicitor general is the nation's chief representative to the united states supreme court. the licitor general speaks not just for the president, but also for the congress of the united states. don: and ennis says, "it occurs to me that if we don'tisclose

the contents of the navy report to the court, that we are engaging in the suppression of evidence." -a lawyer who prepares a brief has a responsibility not to knowingly certify anything, not to say anything that you know to be false. and in the real world, there ardifferent degrees, differing degrees to which lawyers take that seriously. he took it very seriously. dale: in that dett report, you dot find a specific facts showing japanese americans are disloyal. instead, what you have is a bunch of suggestions. -that japanese americans were monitoring our critical infrastructure, monitoring our troop movement, and somehow signaling through mirrors and shortwave radio signals to japanese submarines that were right off of the coast. there was only one problem with that story: it was completely made up.

don: ennis writes to the fbi director, j. edgar hoover, and basically says, what about these reports by dewitt of illicit signaling by japanese americans? and j. edgar hoover writes back, "we've investigated every single claim of shore-to-ship radio transmissions, and we could find no evidence on which prosecution would lie." peter: ennis got in touch with james lawrence fly, who was the chairman of the federal communications commission. he prepared reports, which they sent to ennis, which concluded that there was no substance to any charge that japanese americans had committed acts of espionage or sabotage. -we had that investigated by both the federal bureau of investigation and by the federal communications commission.