♪ >> this is aljazeera and these are the top stories. that's because a rush of the most significant threat to security. the lands was to boost its rapid reaction forces from 40,000 troops to 300,000. at least 16 people have been killed in a russian missile strike on a shopping mall in ukraine. it happened in the central city. dozens of others were injured. our correspondent has more from the capital, kyiv. reporter: emergency services say

they are still sifting through the burnt rubble, expecting potentially to find the charred remains of more people who were killed. we have also heard interesting information from the national security defense counsel of ukraine. they say that according to preliminary data, they believe that these attacks involved what they say were x-22 airbase cruise missiles fired from an aircraft. one hit a shopping mall and the other hit a city stadium. >> toxic gas has fallen from the green of a jordanian port, killing 12 people. at least 260 people were reported injured. people living nearby have been told to stay at home and keep their windows closed. a passenger train derailed in misery, killing three people and injuring dozens more. the amtrak service was traveling from los angeles to chicago and collided with a dump truck at a real crossing.

police in india have arrested the cofounder of a top fact checking website alt news. he has been a vocal critic of the government and has called out hate speech by the government and is accused of provoking religious outrage. and the indigenous movement that has led more than two weeks of protest in ecuador is new with the government to discuss possible solutions. earlier, indigenous leaders rejected a promise by the president to cut the price of petrol and diesel by $.10 a gallon. they said it was not enough to meet their demands. those are the headlines. after "inside story" more news. ♪

adrian: what could the g7 do to stop the war in ukraine? leaders of the world's biggest economies say that they're imposing more sanctions on moscow. but is that enough. and can the group remain united against vladimir putin? this is "inside story." ♪ hello. welcome to the program, i'm adrian finighan. four months of war in ukraine have exposed deep divisions in the global order. but the fighting is also highlighting and testing some of the oldest and strongest alliances the g7. the g7, a group of the world's seven largest economies is meeting this week in germany. sanctions by some of its members and counter sanctions from russia have disrupted everything

they have touched, from oil prices to supply chains to the price of bread on the other side of the world. under germany's presidency, the g7 is pushing for solutions to reduce the impact of the war on the global economy. well, g7 leaders issued a statement to remove any doubt about their commitment to kyiv, saying that they will continue to provide financial , humanitarian, military, and diplomatic support, and stand with ukraine for as long as it takes. they also announced targeted sanctions on those responsible for war crimes or exercising illegitimate authority in ukraine. the statement added that russia bears enormous responsibility for rising threats to global food security as a result of the conflict. china is also on the g7 summit agenda. $600 billion have been pledged to counter beijing's belt and road initiative and beijing has been quick to respond. >> china welcomes all

initiatives that promote global infrastructure. we believe that there is not any initiative aimed at replacing each other. what we oppose is to advance geopolitical calculations and smear the belt and road initiative in the name of promoting global infrastructure development. ♪ adrian: so, let's bring in o our guests for today's discussion. from berlin, we're joined by ulrich brueckner, professor of political science at stanford university in berlin. from washington, d.c., doug bandow, senior fellow at the cato institute. amd from oslo, glenn diesen, professor of international relations at the university of south-eastern norway. gentlemen, welcome to the program. ulrich, let's start with you. so g7 leaders will stand with ukraine for as long as it takes, -- as long as what takes? what is it that g7 leaders want. and how long is long? guest: well, all these questions have not been answered yet.

what we saw was a strong signal. and that is the symbolism of summits of that kind that sometimes feel a bit like 20th century, as if we are not having phone calls or zoom meetings. it is more like we send a signal, but we don't go into detail because everyone is affected differently from the sanctions, and everyone also has a different agenda or is more or less careful with all of the balances that need to be considered. adrian: doug, what do you make of it? how long is long, and what is it that g7 leaders actually want here? >> i don't think they even know. clearly perspectives differ in , the different capitals. countries are affected differently. they have different past relations with russia. they have a different, i think,

willingness to tolerate cost. in terms of where we are going, everyone would like to see russia to lose, but that doesn't necessarily mean a victory for ukraine. i think that is the biggest issue. is the emphasis going to be on trying to reach some kind of a ceasefire in peace or is the emphasis to help ukraine have some kind of a military victory ? on that, we don't know. those outcomes are very different. they have a very different implication for the cost and the length of time. adrian: glenn, victory for ukraine, humiliation for russia. what is it that g7 leaders are after? guest: well, that's kind of unclear because when i talk about victory for ukraine what does this mean? because at times, ukraine has expressed this interest in in reconquering all of donbas even taking back crimea. so this would entail an actual war with russia. and again, part of the russian motivation behind this is

. nato expansionism. this increasing amount of american weapons systems close to the border. if russia would pull out, obviously those weapons would keep pouring in. so i am not sure how that picture would be even possible, i think russia would fight this all the way to the end. so i just don't see clearly how victory has been conceptualized here. also, it is unclear how even in a stalemate is going to result in any kind of a diplomatic solution, because, again, the fear from moscow then would be that the west will take advantage of a temporary peace agreement to merely rearm ukraine and keep pushing nato so . so it is a lot of big statements but without any clear opera racialization. what this would actually mean.

adrian: ulrich, they put on this united front as you say they made this strong statement of support for ukraine. but what is actually going on behind closed doors, do you think? how long can their unity last given the economic consequences of the war? guest: that is what i meant by the different balances that need to be considered. in my humble understanding of what has been the motivation or the objectives, they clearly don't understand how putin ticks. there was a calculation that the west is post-heroic not willing to fight a war, not taking a risk. we don't believe in anything. we are nihilist, we are secular . so as wimps as we are, it would be easy to go in and to achieve objectives that make no sense in terminology, like de-nazification. so, what we have now is a united

west, a much stronger native, an even extended nato. a -- a much stronger nato. an even extended nato. a stronger investment in rapid intervention forces. basically the opposite of what putin tried to achieve. but what we also have is a situation in which all the different leaders face different domestic pressures. some struggle more with inflation. some are more dependent on imports. some are weaker than others. when we look at the internal discussion about what is their price to pay for expressing solidarity or what can a leader push through -- if for example we look at macron, his position was stronger before his elementary elections a few days ago -- all of this is something that needs to be taken into consideration. adrian: doug, who's leading the g7 right now? chancellor scholz is hosting the meeting. at who is in the driving seat as

far as policy is concerned? is the u.s. at the moment taking a back seat and following the rest or is it actually leading , do you think, at least in terms of the war in ukraine? guest: in terms of the war, i think the u.s. broadly speaking has driven the process. the u.s. has contributed substantially more in terms of money and weapons. it has the advantage of having the real military you know that the minutes nato. frankly, the country that most european countries have cheerfully cheap ridden on for decades. there is an element of which the u.s. has a natural leadership role there. but it matters a lot to have other european countries indicate that they are prepared to do more. and we see that even a country like turkey can throw a spanner in the works over the issue of bringing in finland and sweden for its own purposes. so, there is leadership, but there is no domination. what we see going forward -- as

indicated, macron has his own domestic issues. certainly germany. a complicated political situation three-party government , a bearing siificant energy costs. evening the u.s., the politics is not going to be easy. outside of washington, support for a deep commitment to ukraine is not necessarily that strong i . i talked to my nonpolitical friends and their asking, why 40 billion dollars when that is a lot more than europe has done? why $40 billion when we have a trillion dollar deficit? and we see the republican party 's increasing willingness to ask questions about this. it is going to be a difficult process going forward. nothing is guaranteed. adrian: glenn, the the european union while represented at this this summit, the g7 itself does not represent all european nations. how does the rest of europe minus the u.k., france and italy ,, view the war in ukraine?

guest: i guess europe is very split in many ways. the western european countries are more cautious, while the countries like poland and the baltic states, they're more hawkish, more aligned with the united states and the u.k on this matter. so i would say that initially, i think we have had a lot of unity because of this invasion by russia taking everyone by surprise, and the common shark. which was why you have this common interest in balancing this, an adversary. but i believe a lot of this unity was faced on the premise that nato would have a victory over russia or ukraine supported by nato. but i think what you will see is not just a split between the u.s. and the european union, but within europe as well. more of these divisions displaying themselves now that the conflict is not going our way. because again russia is winning , now on the battlefield and the sanctions have backfired

terribly on the europeans. so it becomes more reasonable to have more divisions within the g7. for example, i made an argument that the u.s. and the u.k. would probably like to see this war going for a while because it has many good objectives for the us -- for the u.s. it imposes bloc discipline within the west which the u.s. has not been previously able to achieve. the u.s. has been able to get the europeans to decouple from russian energy and economy which they did not doing the past. we also see that the u.s. can now extend this european divorce to china. so ukraine will be a bulwark against russia for the foreseeable future. the u.s. has this opportunity of making ukraine afghanistan for the russians. so it has many opportunities for the u.s.. that is what i mean. there is a split because for the europeans, there is a much higher cost and incentive to push them to this war. they are paying a higher price.

they don't want an afghanistan on their continent. their weapons stores have been depleted from all of these transfers to ukraine. the sanctions are hurting the europeans much more not just this temporary energy crisis and high inflation, but will also see that european industries will no longer be competitive on international markets as all of this cheap russian energy and metals are now exported to asia. so the production cost will therefore increase dramatically in europe and overall the europeans become more and more dependent on the u.s. as a result. these e.u. goals of strategic autonomy will now collapse so i think you will see more push now from, for example, the germans, the italians, and the french, to have some more diplomacy for to sit down with the russians. you saw this on display now with the three leaders from italy, germany and france, asking to start negotiations with russia. meanwhile, thereafter you have johnson coming from the u.k., saying this is not the right time for peace, americans sending heavier weapons. i think that as the conflict continues to go the wrong way for us, i think these divisions

within the west stand to become more and more obvious. adrian: ulrich, how long before the european electorate begins to demand that their governments ease the sanctions and pull back on this war? are people in europe prepared to endure a winter of power cuts or rationed energy supplies? will it come to that? guest: well, if things continue like this, there is no other way than to risk not only industry, but also heating, or having other means to show that we are a part of this war. not as a party in the war but we are more affected, for more than the united states. that it is very difficult to predict, because we don't have one european electorate. we have very different conditions in each and every member state. we also have different communication techniques by the more or less popular leaders that also play a role until there is something like a change of power within european union

member states. at this point, of course, german politicians would love to see diplomatic solutions for this. but public opinion is still very strongly in support for actions of solidarity towards ukraine. and olaf scholz or emmanuel macron, at this point in time, they don't have much to fear. adrian: dog, i just want to give you an opportunity to respond to what he was saying about the u.s. perhaps liking to keep this war going for the moment. then i want to ask you, would the g20 be as solid in its support for ukraine and condemnation of russia as g7 is? guest: the broader you go e less support you find for the u.s.-european position. of the top 10 population countries in the world only one

is taking this position, america. very notably, not only china, but india, have resisted. indian purchases of russian oil have skyrocketed very dramatically. you go beyond that, you look at brazil, south africa and indonesia, these are countries that have not jumped on the sanctions bandwagon. there is a lot of reasons for that. the global south is much more cynical about european and american rule-based order except projections of morality. the u.s. believes in a rule-based order except when it doesn't and then it invades countries and occupies them even if it's against international law, and it kills a lot of people. president biden is talking about human rights and about to make a trip to saudi arabia to beg the saudis, who've killed hundreds of thousands of people in yemen, to provide more oil, so the u.s. can sanction russia. the problem is that those kinds of inconsistenes really play out in other countries whose

view is much more cynical. they don't likely aggression, russia is clearly in the wrong, but they are more skeptical of following leadership that they frankly aren't quite so happy indonesia inviting russia about. and the potential of indonesia inviting russia indonesia inviting russia to the g20 meeting adds quite a complication. exactly how that would play out if it happens, i think would be difficult for everyone involved. adrian: glenn, while the g7 understandably sees the war in ukraine as critical to global security, what about the rest of the world? how supportive of the g7's position are asian, african, latin american countries. to what extent do many countries, while sympathetic towards ukraine, simply have to put their own citizens first ? guest: that kind of shows with the numbers, who has joint heir with the sanctions. it is pretty much restricted to nato. the rest of the world has not really joined in on the sanctions. i would agree with the.

it doesn't mean they support the russian invasion of ukraine, by any means. i think most countries would condemn this. however, where there seems to be a consensus about condemning it, there is not much interest in dishing it, because not that s many see a moral authority of the west. they seem more dubious interests behind this in terms of knocking out the key -- as opposed to standing up for democracy. it's also more recognition around the world that even though this is russia's fault for invading, nato officially provoked this to a great extent. you hear this around the world and you know, not just sometimes inside nato, as one with turkey, now saying the same thing.

he even heard the same from the pope. this seems to be a large consensus in russia. that nato provoked this. necessarily have invaded for russia shouldn'tnecessarily have invaded for that reason, but you have this economic interests behind it. european economies have been very competitive because we had access to all of this cheap russian energy metals. now russia is diverting their entire economy towards the east and preparing themselves for a permanent divorce with europe. asian countries will become much more competitive as russia is offering discounts to asia for their oil and gas. i think they will look after their own interests and not get involved in what is effectively a european conflict, a 30-year-old proxy war between nato and russia which has now spilled in and began to destroy ukraine. adrian: ulrich, has the g7 signaled clearly enough that it

understands the gravity of the global community crisis -- global commodity price crisis and other economic shocks linked to the war? and that they will take realistic steps to address them? guest: well, the question is, what would realistic steps be? and what has been said before, that repeating the russian myth of nato is threatening russia doesn't make it any more credible. nato has no appetite to be involved in a military conflict with the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world. that makes no sense. what threatened russia was the economic prosperity west of russia. we compare ukraine and poland and poland became four times richer by joining anti-ukraine the european union, and if the anti-ukraine would do the same thing, that would undermine the credibility of an authoritarian

regime in moscow. so if the west would give in we and say actually we didn't , expect it to be so expensive and it also has externalities on the rest of the world, we stop the sanctions, what would be the situation on the ground? we could possibly find something like a frozen conflict but then both sides would try as much as they can to strike back and to win the upper hand. that is not the end of the conflict. there is no military solution in this conflict, it needs to be more than giving in of one or the other side. this would only, in my understanding, be a solution if other heavyweights like china would step in and do their contribution to stop it doug the . adrian: doug, the g7 statement said that the group will foster coordinated initiatives that promote global food security.

to what extent should that, along with the rising price of fuel and commodities, be their number one priority at least in terms of maintaining support for the war in the rest of the world ? guest: there are obvious humanitarian reasons to do it. set the war aside. the lack of exports, particularly from ukraine in terms of grain, are posing an extraordinary hardship on poor countries that are least able to deal with it. it's not clear exactly what the west can do. there have been proposals to try to forcibly open ports of ukraine in the black sea. that would require, number one, cooperation from turkey, which is not, in my mind, likely. second, that would be a potential caps off -- a potential casus bellai. the longer this goes on, the re dangerous i think it gets. russia, this is a vital interest

for russia. this is an existential interest. it's not for the west. i think that russia and putin are quite willing to risk and spend a lot more and along the way, ukraine is the primary victim. i mean, the world bank figures the economy will be cut roughly in half, millions of people have fled the country, cities are being reduced to ruin. so the longer we go, the more dangerous. the russians, i mean the danger of a new use of nuclear weapons is one of the most. people assume it will not happen. there is some much at stake. and certainly the issue of food is huge. i don't how we solve that absent ending the war. unless one is willing to forcibly try and open the black sea and get the green out. the question is otherwise, is the west prepared to share its

resources, to accept higher food prices at the time of raging inflation? i don't thk the biden administration would, for all of its humanitarian rhetoric, -- the democrats face a potential disaster in november by-elections to kind of raise prices further to appear to be giving away american product. i think europe faces the same difficulty with energy prices. adrian: a quick answer,, doug bearing in mind what was saying that about russia being pushed into a corner, are the sanctions against russia working? are they having the desired effect? guest: well, they are having some effect. main goal was to destroy the the west'smain goal was to destroy the russian economy financial system and the ruble. however, the pain of sanctions will come later. i think the worst of the sanctions is yet to come for russia. that being said, the point of

sanctions is to change political behavior. i don't see russia changing its policies because for russia, this is an existential threat. nato expansion towards the border. it has said for more than 20 years that it is an existential threat. so they're not going to give up because of some economic problems. so they will probably continue to fight this to the end and only exacerbating the conflict. so it depends how you define effectiveness of sanctions. adrian: all right gentlemen. we're out of time. many thanks indeed for being with us today, ulrich brueckner, doug bandow, and glenn diesen. and thank you for watching. don't forget, you can see the program again anytime by visiting our website aljazeera.com. for further discussion, join us at our facebook page facebook.com/ajinsidestory. , you can also join the conversation on twitter. our handle is at @ajinsidestory. from me, adrian finighan, and the team here in doha, thanks for watching. i'll see you again. bye for now. ♪

w?

bonnie: a pelmenitsa is a round piece of kitchen equipment with 37 hexagons all in a honeycomb pattern, and you use it to make pelmeni. it's really efficient because before then, you'd have to shape them each my hand. my parents immigrated with their pelmenitsa, so they clearly thought it was important enough to, like, add to their cargo, which was limited. pelmeni originated in siberia. you would form them by hand, and you would throw them out the window into the snow, and they would freeze. as refrigeti