folly: the battle in sudan rages on. mediation efforts and ceasefires have so far failed. can regional powers that back the rival sides bring enough pressure to stop the fighting, or is their involvement only complicating peace efforts? this is "inside story." ♪ folly: hello, and welcome to the program. i'm folly bah thibault. fighting in sudan between forces loyal to two generals is threatening to turn into a

prolonged conflict. violence erupted in khartoum a week ago. that followed weeks of power struggles between army chief abdel f. burhan and his deputy muhammad hamdan dagalo, known as hemeti, the commander of the rapid support forces or rsf. so far, hundreds of people have been killed in thousands injured. it's led to thousands more fleeing the capital khartoum for neighboring chad. many of them fear this may be the beginning of a much wider conflict. now, outside forces are complicating the situation with both sides receiving support from regional and global powers. we'll get to our guests in a moment. but first, this report. reporter: from chaos to calm. intense street battles have thrown sudan's capital into turmoil in the past few days. its streets are emptying, as thousands of people flee khartoum. the conflict is driven by a power struggle between sudan's

army, led by abdel fatah al-burhan, and the rapid support forces, a paramilitary group under muhammad hamdan dagalo, also known as hemeti. the two generals have been jostling for control of the country's economy and its military. that has torn up plans for return to civilian rule. >> this destruction and sound of gunfire did not leave room for happiness that our beloved people deserve. we are very sad for this pain, but there's still hope that together we will pass this crisis and come out of it more united and strong. one army, one nation. reporter: sudan's strategic location on the red sea and its access to the nile river and vast gold reserves have long been coveted by other powers, leading to both sides being backed by outside forces. hemeti accuses egypt of

colluding with burhan and sending fighter jets and soldiers to help the sudanese military. egypt has denied the allegations and said its forces were in sudan for a joint military exercise. hemeti has close ties with saudi arabia, the uae, and libya. and libyan warlord khalifa haftar has reportedly sent military supplies to the rapid support forces, which he denies. the russian mercenary organization, wagner group, has also been accused of plundering sudan's gold resources to bankroll its operations in ukraine. >> we don't have yet information that it has been actively engaged in conflict, but it is of course, in no way it can be denied that it has been somehow behind the hemeti organization and trying to protect that rsf's

-- protect the rsf's dominations in sudan's politics. reporter: israel is involved, too. its foreign minister has been engaging with burhan on normalizing ties between the two countries in recent years. a prolonged conflict would also disrupt plans by uae companies to build ports, as well as china's investments in sudan. any escalation would have regional implications, threatening nearby states like south sudan that export oil through its northern neighbor. there would also be a risk of rising numbers of refugees fleeing across borders, causing more instability. and for sudan itself, the longer the conflict goes on, the bigger the risk of it widening and the greater the suffering of its people. felix n., for "inside story." ♪ folly: well, let's now bring in our guests for today's "inside

story." joining us from cairo is mat nashed, who's a journalist and analyst covering the middle east and north africa region. in khartoum, sudan, kholood khair, founding director at confluence advisory, a sudan-based think tank. she's also host of spotlight 249 on capital fm sudan. and in montreal, canada is khalid medani, associate professor and chair of the african studies program at mcgill university. khalid is also author of many political and economic publications on sudan. a warm welcome to you all. thank you for joining us. kholood in khartoum, let me start with you, if i can. i understand that you've been coordinating safe passage for people to leave khartoum. can you tell us first about the current situation on the ground, are people able to leave, and if they are, where are they heading to? >> well, it's quite a difficult, gut-wrenching decision to make whether to stay or to go. there are risks, considerable risks to both. some people have made the calculation that it's better to

stay and wait for a better sort of exit, a more secure exit, and others have decided that it's too dangerous for them to stay, and so many are heading southwards towards medanist street. but what we've just heard in the past few hours is that medini street has seen some clashes between the paramilitary rsf and the sudan armed forces and has been taken over by the paramilitary forces, which makes it difficult for people to traverse, mostly because of experiences of others of passing checkpoints by the paramilitary forces, that people have experienced looting and people have experienced being shot at and being sent back. so that is no longer as much of a viable option. folly: have people been able to leave the country and head to chad or other neighboring countries? >> well, khartoum is bang smack in the middle of sudan, and so it's very difficult to get to any of sudan's borders.

of course, sudan borders many countries, and you said earlier that i was helping people to find safe passage. everyone is doing that. there are whatsapp groups that have been set up. sort of twitter sites, spaces that have been set up. people are calling each other using most importantly local resistance committees, who know the streets really well. and it's just a case of, at this point, almost russian roulette, whether you make it through or not. folly: kholood, we are discussing today on "inside story" the foreign component to the confrontation. are you aware on the ground in sudan of any direct or indirect involvement by regional countries in the current fighting? we've heard reports of libyan warlord khalifa haftar perhaps sending military support to the paramilitary rsf, reports of egypt sending support to the army. what is the extent of outside involvement in the current fighting? >> well, those of us who have

access to the intel, who still have access to the intel, have been keeping up with the reporting on what's going on in sudan. and increasingly, people are unsurprised by the fact that sudan's neighbors would get involved, for several reasons. one, there's a history of some of these actors, particularly egypt, favoring south and the united emirates, sort of having working relationships with both the armed forces and the parliamentary forces, but favoring the paramilitary forces. so there is an awareness that this is happening. by now, one would have expected that supplies particularly for the paramilitary force would be dwindling, but that doesn't seem to be the case. so it does track with reporting that there is external engagement. folly: all right, mat in cairo, let me come to you. tell us more about the foreign component to the current fighting, who supports whom and to what end, what are some of these regional powers wanting to get out of sudan? >> yeah, i think the fault lines right now look increasingly clear, right, and they're not so

different i think than the fault lines that predated the fighting as well. as kholood alluded to. sunni armed forces have always been favored and outright supported and then coordinated with by egypt, and this dates back to a very, very long history, it predates the current leadership in egypt right now. and as a result of that, i think egypt obviously has a number of strategic interests that they feel is quite existential for them, and that's on one side that they would like to secure that. i mean, most notably with the grand ethiopian renaissance dam and obviously egypt and sunni armed forces coordinated with a number of military drills in order to kind of flex their muscles to ethiopia in the past. and i think there's also the economic side that egypt has benefited from a number of kind of cheap produce and trade, but with both armies controlling significant amounts of their

domestic economies, that partnership has become a lifeline for egypt as well, considering it's a very difficult economic situation right now. so that's on that side. egypt also of course has more of a ideological or i would say long-standing partnership it also just has this view of security in a conventional sense actually where it views that the guarantors of security have to come through military men and military institutions. on the other side, very quickly, hemati is being supported. still there was partners in providing gold mines. there was obviously the mercenaries that were sent to yemen accordingly. so it's no surprise that obviously the emirates are supporting hemeti in this fight

diplomatically. and then reportedly militarily as well. just to conclude very quickly there's the ideological prism in the way that the emirates view security which i think is very different than how the egyptians use security. most people understand why egyptians are doing this, but for the emirates, i think there's quite a very fundamental fear i think for them of obviously the remnants of bashir's islamist loyalists, particularly, there was reports of pressure from the emirates to try to reign the constituency in, but seems more and more reportedly that he is being pressured from them within. neither actor regardless of how they view security interests for

the emirates obviously it doesn't want this ripple effect of political islam in any way. but neither of them want a civilian democratic movement, and as a result of the two groups they backed up. folly: we'll get to that. we'll get to that in a moment. i just want to bring khalid into the conversation and ask you about your thoughts about why some of these regional powers are involved in this conflict and how you think their involvement a country like egypt, saudi arabia, or the uae as mat mentioned, how does it complicate the conflict? >> it complicates it greatly, not only in terms of finding an eventual settlement, ceasefire, and then hopefully to return to discussions in terms of overseeing a civilian democratic regime, but also these are two generals that really are thriving on the financial support that they're receiving from the uae on the part of hemeti and of course with respect to nu -- respect burhamo

the logistical and financial support from egypt. but i did want to emphasize that overall, it complicates it because of where sudan is geographically, in addition to the financial patronage, we have the red sea area. sudan is extremely strategically placed. and so if we look at it in a kind of a larger way, what we see over the last year since the revolution of 2019 is a scramble over building a naval base in the port of sudan and that is something that the uae cares deeply about. they've already invested $6 billion i believe estimated to build the naval base in port sudan. we have russia of course interested in it as well. the united states has conducted military exercises with the uae. and we also have china that's interested in that region. so that part of the story is crucial because it gives us a long-term understanding of why sudan is so important. in addition to that, it's important to understand that there are extreme financial investments on the part of saudi arabia and the uae. in addition to the logistic and financial support. folly: let me ask you about

about that. the uae and saudi arabia are the financiers of the sudanese army and the rsf, the rapid support forces, who as mat said, lent them fighters for the war in yemen. but now that the war in yemen is winding down, it seems, do you think these two sides can get the generals to listen, khalid? >> i do. yes. i think that's a very important point. i do think that since saudi arabia has sought an exit option in yemen, and that the uae obviously of course has admired -- has mired itself in yemen and that proved unsuccessful, i think that most people acknowledge that at this point there are changing calculations on the part of the united arab emirates. they no longer have that kind of interest. in other words, hemeti no longer serves the role that he served so well for them in yemen. and also of course in libya when they also supported him against alongside them in libya. i think that calculation means that there is a possibility that the uae would put pressure on

hemeti or rather withdraw any kind of support. i do believe that hemeti's desperation's from his part and calculations have very much to do with the fact that he has lost the kind of external patronage that he wanted or kind of enjoyed in the past, nor has he been able to get the kind of support from ethiopia that he was counting on. folly: right. kholood, let me come to you on this, as we've heard from both mat and khalid. there are a lot of players and outside forces in this conflict, which means a lot of would-be mediators from egypt, of course, the uae, saudi arabia, the russians, even the chinese to some extent, as you heard, how do you think this complicates the solution to to ending the fighting and which of these mediators do you think stands a chance at convincing the generals to stop the fighting? >> well, it complicates it massively.

the fact that you have these different actors who have different interests in sudan, but also in the region. so for example, the reporting that general hafta in libya is sending troops to support hemeti then the parliamentary forces, whereas the egyptians are sending aerial support and other types of support to the sudan armed forces on the other side, whereas in libya, they're on the same side as the egyptians, and so there's a bit of a sort of chaotic scene here and it makes it very unpredictable. which interests will win out in which sort of geography. i think when it comes to mediators, it's not a case of choosing one over the other. folly: but who has the most leverage right now? >> that's exactly the point. the leverage is required and not no one, not even those who have leverage have put leverage on the table, which is why we have had three consecutive failed ceasefires. but the egyptians have been able to secure enough of the ceasefire to land their plane and pick up their soldiers and

leave. the emirati said that they have helped the egyptians do that and secure those reassurances. so clearly there are avenues for a ceasefire. the issue is that all of these actors need to work together. they need to be in lockstep with each other, including all the p5 and russia, china, and the u.s. and others, and we haven't seen that happening. we've seen a very fragmented international response. folly: okay, mat, you mentioned earlier that it is not in the interest of the saudis or the emiratis to have a civilian-led government in sudan. why is that, and does that mean that these two countries cannot mediate in this conflict? >> well, let me clarify my statement by saying i don't think it's the interests of pro-democracy groups, genuine ones in sudan to have "civilian led," which i think is just a euphemism fulfilled partnerships of military personalities that de facto control the state with civilian faces. so i think we need to use the same terminology that we would use for any western democracy, it's either a civilian one or

it's a military controlled one. and so, i don't think regional players are interested at all in a civilian democracy and that's just not exclusive to sudan. i don't think that they're interested in civilian rule anywhere throughout the region, because i think any example of that -- but particularly one perhaps in egypt's case that's so close to it neighborly has ripple effects that can then obviously encourage a number of other people to envision a different life for themselves as well. and so, absolutely, i think this is what i mean. i think despite the conventional view of security from egypt and the ideological more view of security from the emirates, both of them fear a domino effect accordingly that can threaten their interests and the security of their regimes when they see any kind of democratic example that erupts anywhere. and sudan in many ways is actually a democratic example, just maybe not in the sense of the blueprint of the quote unquote nation state, but the spirit of democracy is very much

thriving there. and then a lot of the things that kholood mentioned in terms of how these resistance companies are assisting civilians, that's indicative of how that spirit of democracy and credibility of actors that are rallying for one another is still existing even out of the war. folly: all right khalid, your thoughts about this? what are these regional powers including the emirates and saudi arabia, egypt even, what are they more interested in right now, a stable sudan or progress towards establishing a democratic government? >> well, without question, i agree with your guest 100% they're interested in a stable sudan, but the important question that raised itself as we say is can there be a stable sudan with one of these generals taking over? and i think that the answer is the categorical no. i think what the depth of this crisis, what it has demonstrated even on the part of egypt, uae, and saudi arabia is that a military government in sudan is not capable actually of

delivering stability. and here we turn to the united states, which i think is important, including the congress that asked for sanctions against these generals for the united states for good or bad. but the position is that there is no possibility for stability for sudan in the region, which is even more important to them, without returning to some form of civilian government. folly: do you think enough international pressure has been applied by the u.s.? >> absolutely not. in fact, there are americans in congress who are complaining and criticizing the biden administration, however as the crisis deepens, and americans -- and citizens are not even taken out of sudan except staff, i think the criticism in washington is emerging. and unfortunately the depth of the crisis and it's how it's -- and how it's going to threaten the region is pushing the biden administration to try to find an option here. and this has happened in the past. there is always the possibility

the united states can actually put pressure particularly on saudi arabia and the uae, because actually they were part and parcel of helping to oversee the framework agreement that did not go through. that's key. the final aspect that i'd like to mention is egypt. egypt is absolutely not interested in a transition to the civilian government, but egypt is making calculation from my miscalculation from my perspective in the sense that they actually are underestimating the influence of the former members of the national congress party that are backing burhan. they feel that he would be on their side. and even though their the regime at least is opposed to the islamists so to speak, they are underestimating the strength and the role of the remnants as we call in sudan of the national congress party. here again we want to talk about the final important source of patronage, and that is the vast wealth of the national congress party and its members. much of that wealth actually is in other countries, other bank accounts. this is why discussions of targeted sanctions against these two generals i believe is going to be extremely important. it's already on the table in

congress in the united states. folly: okay, kholood, thoughts about this, he says targeted sanctions against these two generals and he also said something interesting that sudan cannot be led by either of these two generals. if not them, then who or what? >> i mean, no one here wants either general to rule, that has become -- that was always crystal clear. the pro-democracy movement has been pleading with the international community to heed their call for a fully civilian government. when burhan and hemati inherited the state from ahmed bashir and started the sort of domino effect that lead us to where we are, the face sort of resistance from pro-democracy groups at every turn and it was the political process and the political agreement preceding the clashes on saturday that really tried to embed military rule into sort of a future

political dispensation. that has been outright rejected by many people in this country and there is a sort of idealism i think within the international community that perhaps these generals could be reformers and perhaps they could somehow and against all odds midwife a civilian democracy in sudan but everyone in sudan already knows that that's not possible. so for me it's a question of i think alternatives will emerge. i think we're in this conflict for a while and as this conflict continues, we will see civilian alternatives emerge. but what is crystal clear right now is that neither one of these generals, even if one of them were to win militarily, will have the legitimacy after this level of conflict in khartoum to be able to govern. so there's absolutely no stability to be found from either one of them successfully coming out of this. folly: mat, your thoughts about this? what do you believe is the way out of this current impasse and who do you think, coming back to our initial question, who do you think is best equipped today to

mediate a successful resolution to this conflict? >> listen, the way out of the current situation i fear isn't going to be as easy. and this is something that the global community in particular western countries have brought about themselves. i think failing to pay sensitive and adequate attention to sudan and being receptive to the nuances of the country and also the demands of the pro-democracy movement, they have in a way through their miscalculations, and i think through their own time frames of interest accelerated confrontation here between two generals. and the reality is war is always easier to prevent than to stop. that said, i would echo kholood's thoughts and recommendations and calls here that it has to be a coordinated effort. and while there might be a rush in hand or for chinese interests -- russian and or chinese interests here or the u.s.

whatever it might be, i do think actually that in sudan, maybe it's the optimism in me, that unlike you know previous crises or conflicts you know that have erupted over the last 10 to 12 years -- i namely think of you know for instance syria or ukraine, where the security council's been so fundamentally polarized -- i do think that there are maybe a shared incentive here to contain the crisis. i think we need to think right now in smaller steps and that should be pressuring to get the immediate ceasefire, opening up humanitarian corridors, and prioritizing civilian protection. and i do think obviously the security council will be important, because you're going to have larger partners that are larger countries that are tied to also having relations with egypt and the emirates as well while they are u.s. partners. we understand global alliances are getting more blurry by the day. and to have that pressure and

just that the cohesive and coordination there especially with chinese interests, with the belton road, they don't want to see this expand. then i think there would be a possibility to rein these countries in. these are the countries that are backing these generals. and it's a sad reality that they they need to be reeled in and be cooperative in order to put out the fire that they put gasoline on to begin with. folly: khalid, i'll give you the last word, because we're almost coming to the end of our program. your thoughts about how we end the current impasse and what happens if this conflict doesn't end swiftly? >> yes, first of all, i want to echo what my colleagues have said, particularly with respect to the first step being dealing with the humanitarian crisis. and there is great deal of experience in terms of pushing towards and continuing to push towards the ceasefire and humanitarian corridor. as my colleague said, i do think that we have to focus, and these regional countries international actors have to focus not only

about in the past, what they got out of sudan, but what what they have to lose. and i'm including even the european union in terms of the issue of immigration from sudan let's say to europe. every country, every region that has been involved directly in this conflict has a great deal to lose. i think that a more coherent kind of cooperation among both regional external actors is extremely important. and here i would reference not only the middle east countries, but actually kind of post-conflict african countries like sierra leone and liberia, and that is the deep complex -- deep conflict we have seen in a transition to civilian democracy. i think that that model is important. and here i mentioned the african context because the regional players, the african countries who have the most to lose and may not necessarily have the greatest leverage must be included as an essential part of the solution because of their experience in the african continent from actually transitioning post-conflict societies into a civilian democracy. folly: regional african bodies

like egad and the african union must be included. thank you very much. thank you. we're going to leave the conversation there. thank you to all three of you for such an insightful discussion. mat nashed, kholood khair, and khalid medani, thank you very much once again. and thank you, too, for watching. you can always watch this program again anytime by visiting our website at aljazeera.com. for further discussion, go to our facebook page, that's facebook.com forward/ajinsidestory. -- facebook.com/ajinsidestory. and of course, you can join the conversation on twitter. our handle is @ajinsidestory. from me, folly bah thibault, and the whole team here in doha, thanks for watching. bye for now. ♪

♪♪♪ [singing in cantonese] [singing in cantonese] bill birtles: it was the pro-democracy movement's anthem of hope. that somehow, the will of millions of hong kongers would prevail over the might of beijing. ♪♪♪ [singing in cantonese] [singing in cantonese]