detainees were lying. other times the cia acted on false information, diverting resources and leading officers or contractors to falsely believe they were acquiring unique or actionable intelligence and that the interrogations were working when they were not. internally cia officers often called into question the effectiveness of the cia's interrogation techniques, noting how the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate information. it reports new officers of them questioning the claims, but they were marginalized and not presented externally. the second set is that they

provided extensive inaccurate information about the program and the effectiveness to the department of justice, the cia inspector general, the media and the american public. this conclusion is somewhat personal for me. i remember clearly when director hayden briefed the intelligence committee for the first time on the so-called iets at that september 2006 committee meeting. he referred specifically to a tummy slap among other techniques. he presented the entire set of techniques as minimally harmful and implied in a highly clinical and professional manner. they were not. the report demonstrates that these techniques were physically very harmful and the constraints that existed on paper in

washington did not match the way techniques were used at cia sites around the world. a particular note was the treatment over the span of 17 days in august of 2002. this involves nonstop interrogation and abuse 24-7 from august 4th to august 21st. and included multiple forms of deprivation and physical assault. the description of this period first written up by the staff in early 2009 while senator rockefeller was chairman is what prompted this full review. the descriptions go far beyond that. they provided inaccurate

justifications while the legal counsel was considering the legality of the coercive techniques. in those communications to the department of justice, the ci acclaimed the following. they would not be used with excessive repetition. they would have an opportunity to provide information prior to the use of the techniques. they were to be used in progression starting with the east aggressive and proceeding only if needed. medical personnel would make sure that interrogations wouldn't cause serious harm and they could intervene at any time to stop interrogations. investigation interrogators were carefully vetted and highly trained. and each technique was to be used in a specific way without

deviation and only with specific approval for the interrogator and detainee involved. none of these assurances which the department relied on to form the legal opinions were routinely carried out. important information was with held from policy makers. for example, foreign intelligence chairman bob graham asked a number of questions after he was first briefed in september of 2002. the cia refused to stonewall him until he left the committee at the end of the year. the cia in coordination with white house officials and staff initially with held information with the interrogation

techniques from secretary of state colin powell and donald rumsfeld. there cia records that colin powell was not told about the program first. there were concerns that, and i quote, powell would blow his stack if he were briefed. source e-mail from john rizzo dated july 31, 2003. cia records clearly indicate and definitively that after he was briefed on the cia's first detainee, the cia didn't tell president bush about the full natu nature of the eits until april of 2006. that's what the records indicate. they similarly with held information or provided false information to the cia inspector general during his conduct of a

special review by the ig in 2004. incomplete and inaccurate information was used in documents provided to the department of justice and as a basis for president bush's beach in 2006 in which he publicly acknowledged the cia program for the first time. in all of these cases, other cia officers acknowledged internally, they acknowledged that information the cia provided was wrong. the cia also misled other cia white house officials. when vice president cheney's council asked cia council general scott muller in 2003 about the cia's videotaping, the waterboarding of detainees, he

deliberately told them that videotapes, quote, were not being made. he did not disclose that videotapes of previous waterboarding sessions had been made and still existed. source e-mail from scott muller. there many, many more examples in the committee's report. all are boumted. the third set notes the various ways in which cia management of the program from the inception to the formal termination was inadequate and deeply flawed. there is no doubt that the detention interrogation program was by any measure a major cia undertaking. it raised significant legal and tell us issues and involved

significant resources and funding. it was not however managed as a significant cia program. in the custody of the first detainee, the cia had not identified and prepared a suitable detention site. it had not researched effective interrogation techniques or developed a legal basis for the use of interrogation techniques outside of the rapport building techniques where official policy was at that time. there is no indication the cia reviewed the own history. that's just what held gerson was saying in 05 with coversive

interrogation tactics. as the executive summary notes, the cia engaged in rough interrogation in the past. the cia had support a letter to the intelligence committee in 1989 and here is the quote. inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers. that was a letter from john held gerson, cia director of congressional affairs dated january 8th. >> you are watching "andrea mitchell reports." as senate intelligence chair, the outgoing chair, dianne feinstein continues to outline the conclusions of the democratic majority's 5 1/2 year investigation into what they

call is torture, enhanced interrogation of detainees under the bush administration. we go back to the senate floor. >> interrogations themselves or ever operated detention facilities. as the cia captured or received custody of detainees through 2002, it maintains separate lines of management at headquarters for different detention facilities. no individual or defense was in charge of the detention and interrogation program until january 2003. by which point more than 1/3 of detainees identified in our review had been detained and interrogated. one clear example, a flawed cia management was the poorly

managed familiarity referred to in the report bite code name cobalt to hide the actual name of the facility. it began operations in september of 2002. the facility knew few formal records of the detainees -- they kept few formal records of the detainees housed there and untrained cia officers conducted frequent and unsupervised interrogations. using techniques that were not and never became part of the cia's formal enhanced interrogation program. the cia placed a junior officer with no relevant experience in charge of the site. in november 2002, an otherwise healthy detainee who was being held mostly nude and chained to

a concreed floor died at the facility in what is believed to be hypothermia. by the cia officer was inspector general, cia's leadership acknowledged they had little or no awareness of operations at this specific cia detention site. some senior officials believed erroneously that enhanced interrogation techniques were not used there. the cia in the june 2013 response to the committee's report agreed that there were management failures in the program. but asserted that they were corrected by early 2003. while the study found that management failures improved somewhat, we found they persisted until the end of the program.

among the numerous management shortcomings identified in the report are the following. the cia used poorly train and non-vetted personnel. individuals who are deployed in particular interrogators without relevant training. due to the redactionses to the report, and it's a clear fact. they are problems of a serious nature. these included histories of violence and abusive treatment of others. it should have called into question their employment with the united states government let alone their suitability to participate in a sensitive cia action program. the two contractors that cia allowed to develop, operate, and

assess the interrogation operations conducted numerous inherently governmental functions that never should have been outsourced to contractors. these contractors are referred in the report in special pseudohim ins. swag art and dunbar. they developed enhanced techniques that the cia employeded temploye employed. they had the most significant detainees using the techniques including the waterboarding of abu, khalid shaikh mohammed, and al nashiri. they provided the official e val yaugdss of whether detainees's psychological states allowed for the use of the enhanced techniques, even for some

detainees, they themselves they had interrogated. evaluating -- >> we have been watching chair dianne feinstein highlighting the conclusion of the devastating majority report on torture against detainees after 9/11. the key takeaways, enhanced techniques were deemed not effective. extensive inaccurate information was given to policy makers and management of the program was inadequate and deeply flawed, i point many do not contest in the early stages. the program far more brutal. the report said they acknowledged to lawmakers and the americans. he served as deputy director of

cia. he joins me now. you were first appointed deputy director under bill clinton and a 32-year veteran. you object to what you claim is cherry picking by the senate investigators. i want to give you a chance to have your say. >> i think what they have done here is go through 6 million pages of do you means and find the things that support the case they want to make. as i had a brief opportunity to look at it, it seems to me that's the principal flaw in the methodology. also i think there two other major problems with the report. they never interviewed any of us who had anything to do with this program. i know the chairman cited transcripts, but they had an opportunity to talk to people who upon ran the program. many were not under investigation by the department. they passed that up. no serious reporter or historian would do that.

the next big problem is they don't know how analysis works. they will take a case and say all you learned from this detainee was a name of someone. it turns out that that's what you need. that's the piece of information that fits with something else that creates a picture and allows you to take down an operation. >> the briefing that they gave to reporters early this morning on an embargoed basis not to be release and when i asked that question, they said that the same information and the same dots could have been connected without the torture techniques. >> i read that and i hesitate to use that term. we were trying not to torture people here. let's go to your point. they will find reports somewhere. for example, take the second wave attack on the united states that we prevented. they will find a report that said, and this is a case from the report. they will say well, at some

point a foreign intelligence report told you that there is going to be a second wave attack. >> after 9/11. >> what else did you need? that's all we had. what does that mean? who is responsible for it. we went to the detainees and i can take you through the details and the short version is yes, there is such a plot and i can't run it because i am in captivity. i know who would. a fellow in pakistan. we find that guy and indeed he is training 17 people to come here in an operation. we didn't know that. their mistake is to think that it is simpler than it is. >> one of the cases they cited, he was giving up information including the name of khalid

shaikh mohammed and his code name in the al qaeda operation under bin laden before he was interrogated. it was only after he gave up the name that he was subjected to 2 1/2 weeks of 24-7 waterboarding. 83 instances to the point where he passed out and had to be revived. something that the cia did not disclose and was disclosed by notes taken by the medics. >> that's a complicated case and i can't drill down into the details: in the period that was described before enhanced interrogations, he was receiving techniques that were at that time to be standard like sleep deprivation. they were later declared enhanced techniques. he provided an enormous amount of information including, for example, a photographic

identification after interrogation. one of the 9/11 plotters was someone who led us to khalid shaikh mohammed, the architect of 9/11. you will find different views on this. >> senator feinstein is describing the conditions in detention centers described as a dungeon, code named cobalt. it was in afghanistan. >> the cia led several detainees to suggest that they would not leave alive and he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box. that's the cia cable from caution 12, 2002. according to another cia cable, officers also planned to cremate him should he not survive his

interrogation. source cia cable july 15, 2002. after the news and photographs emerged from the united states military detention of iraqis at abu ghraib, they held a hearing on the matter on may 12th, 2004. without disclosing details of their own interrogation program, the cia director testified that cia interrogations were nothing like what was depicted at abu ghraib, the united states prison in iraq were abused by american personnel. this was false. cia detainees described as a dungeon were kept in complete darkness, constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. the u.s. bureau of prisons

personnel went to that location in november 2002. according to a cia e-mail told officers they had "never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory-deprived." the source is cia e-mail, sender and recipient redacted, december 5th, 2002. throughout the program, multiple detainees subject to interrogation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia and attempts at self harm and mutilation. >> still on the floor after more than an hour. she just mentioned you and said there was misleading information from you directly about the

conditions in some of these facilities. i want to give you a chance to respond. >> she was comparing what the cia program was. there is no comparison. abu ghraib was a break down in the chain of command among low level military people. everyone condemns what happened. this program was carefully designed, legally approved on four occasions by the justice department. briefed to these committees at a time when they were enthusiastic about it. at one point when we stopped this, we did stop this program when the justice department obviouslied a little bit in their opinion. i recall senator rockefeller saying don't be risk-averse. that was the as months fear we were dealing with at the time. this program was briefed to the white house. we didn't hide anything here. abu ghraib was a different situation we all find appalling. >> let me ask you about that.

what they told us today when we were up there for the briefing and i want to get your response, the briefings to the republican and democratic leaders as well as the intelligence committee chairs and house and senate majority and ranking, those eight people were given cursory briefings and not told the details and the president of the united states himself, george bush was not told until the inspector general said in 2006, you should tell the president. i don't know whether he was briefed by the national security adviser or the vice president verbally, the cia memos don't indicate that george bush was fully briefed. the white house legal council in great detail and our assumption has been and there is evidence to demonstrate this and the president was briefed by them. he said as much in his memoire

and your other point was -- >> that the full committees were not briefed. >> yes, the full committees were not briefed and that was at presidential direction. i think one of the things that if there was anything i regret, it's that we didn't brief the full committees. we didn't have permission because of the covert action programs. we were directed to brief the intelligence leadership. i can tell you these briefings were detailed. we did not hold anything back here. they were free to ask any questions they wanted to ask and answered in detail. >> i know that your colleagues have along with you posted something on the "wall street journal" website which is a long rebutt rebuttal. suggesting that the senate intelligence report on detention and interrogation is a missed opportunity to deliver a study

of important questions the committee has given us instead of the one-sided study marred by fact and interpretation and a poorly done and partisan attack that has been the most to protect america after the 9/11 attacks. one of the rebuttals that has been posted. the ci, a called them a crucial pillar of counter terrorism methods to capture terrorists, hoping to thwart thoughts and advancing analysis of the target. we agree. we have no doubt that the cia's program saved lives and played a vital role in weakening al qaeda. when asked about the value of detainee information and whether he missed from the one operator, he told members i miss it every day and we understand why. that's part of the response. you say it was done properly. the details indicate there were two psychologists and

subcontractors paid $80 million and they didn't know about terrorism and the culture or the language. they devised these techniques and made $80 million. it was poorly run and not well managed and not good analysis. one of the prison operators and chiefs kept calling and saying give me more information. let me ask to you respond to that. john mccain is taking the floor. >> a convict response to that would be i'm not sure i trust what's in this report. people need to read the rebuttal. they are clinical and carefully done. i can give you example after example from this report of where they distort the information. for example, in an e-mail. they talk about cia officers being afraid to criticize the

program because they are not getting information they want. if you read the e-mail, they are lamenting the fact that we stopped this program because we now may miss a lot of information. the problem is committee is up against is this. in a sentence. people at the cia who work with this program know it worked. how do you think we captured all these terrorists. >> they say that's not the case. let me go to the floor and to speak on a subject that is important to him having been tortured for years in hanoi. >> how they comported with the most important values. i commend chair woman feinstein in the policies i hope we will never resort to again.

i thank them for persevering the opication for many members and officials in two administrations and from some of our colleagues. the truth is sometimes a hard pill to swallow and causes difficulties at home and abroad. it is sometimes used by enemies in attempts to hurt us. the american people are entitled to it none the less. they must know when the values that define our nation are intentionally disregarded by our security policies, even those policies that are conducted in secret must be able to make informed judgments about whether the policies and the personnel who supported them were justified in compromising the values. whether they served a greater

good or as i believe they stay in our national honor and did much skmarm little practical good. what were the policies? what was their purpose? did they approve it? did they make us safe or or make no difference. what did they gain us? what did they cost us? the american people need the answers to the questions. some things must be kept from disclosure to protect clan destine sources and methods, but not the answers to these questions. by providing them, the committee empowered the american people to come to their own decisions about whether we should have employed such practices in the past and whether we should consider permitting them in the future.

this strengthens self government and stature in the world. i thank the committee for that valuable public service. i have long believed as a reasonable person would define it, especially and not only the practice of waterboarding, a mock execution and exquisite form of torture. it is used for shameful and unnecessary and contrary to the a kergssertion assertions, it produced little useful intelligence to help us track down the perpetrators of 9/11 or prevent new attacks and atrocities. i know from personal experience that the abuse of prisoner who is produced more bad than good intelligence. i know they offer intentionally

misleading information it they think the captors will believe it. i know they say whatever they think the torturers want them to say if they believe it will stop their suffering. most of all, i know the compromise is that which most distinguishes us from the enemi enemies. our belief that all people and each captured enemies possess basic human rights protected by international conventions the united states not only joined, but for the most part authored. i know too that bad things happen in war. i know in war good people can feel obliged for good reasons to do things they would normally object to and recoil from. i understand the reasons that govern the decision to resort to these interrogation methods. i know those who approve them and those who use them were

dedicated to securing justice for the victims of terrorist attacks and protect americans from further harm. i know their responsibilities were grave and urgent. and the strain of their duty. i respect their dedication and appreciate their dilemma. i dispute that it was right to use these methods and was neither in the best interest of justice or the security or the ideals we sacrificed so much blood and treasure to defend. and the abuse of prisoners motivated by sponsorship of the detainee treatment act of 2005 that prohibits cruel or

degrading treatment of capture combatants and whether they wear a nation's uniform or not and passed the senate by a vote of 90-9. subsequently, i successfully offered amendments to the military commissions act of 2006 which among other things prevented the attempt to weaken common article 3 of the geneva conventions and broadened definitions in the war crimes act to make the future use of waterboarding and other enhanced interrogation techniques punishable as war crimes. it was considerable misinformation disseminated about what was and was not achieved, using the methods in an effort to discourage support for the legislation. there was a good amount of information to credit the use of the methods for the death of osama bin laden and there is i fear misinformation being used to prevent the release of this

support disputing the findings and warning about the security consequences of their public disclosure. with the report's release, will the report's release cause outrage that leads to violence in some parts of the muslim world? i suppose that's possible. perhaps likely. sadly, violence needs little incentive in quarters of the world today, but that doesn't mean we will be telling the world something is will be shocked to learn. the world knows we waterboarded prisoners and subjected them to various other types of degrading treatment. it knows we use secret prisons. those haven't been a secret for a decade. they might use the reidentification as an excuse it

attack americans. they hardly need an excuse for that. that has been the life's calling for a while now. it might come as a surprise not just to the enemies, but to many americans. how little these practices did to aid or efforts to bring our culprits to justs and i to find and prevent terrorist attacks today and tomorrow. that could be a surprise since it contradicts intelligence officials on the record and in private that enhanced interrogation techniques were indispensable in the war against terrorism. i suspect the objection of those same officials to the release of this report is really focused on that disclosure. torture's ineffectiveness. we gave up much in the expectation that torture would make us safer. too much. obviously we need intelligence

and we need reliable intelligence. it produces more information than actionable intelligence. what the advocates of cruel methods have never established is that we couldn't have gathered as much from using humane methods. the most important is from using conventional methods. i think it's an incult to the many officers who acquired good intelligence without hurts or degrading prisoners and we can't win this war without such methods. yes, we can and we will. in the end, torture's failure to serve the intended purpose is not a reason to oppose its use. i often said and will always maintain that this question is

not about our enemies. it's about us and who we are and who we aspire to be. it's about how we represent ourselves to the world. we made our way in this cruel world not by strictly pursuing our geopolitical interests, but by exemplifying our values and influencing other nations to embrace them. when we fight to defend our security, we fight for an idea and not for a tribe or twisted interpretation for an ancient religion or a king, but for an idea that all men are endowed by their creator with inalienable rights. how much safer the world would be if all nations believed the same. how much more dangerous it can become when we forget it

ourselves even momentarily. our enemies act without conscious. we must not. this executive summary or the committee's report makes clear that acting without conscious is not necessary. it isn't even helpful in winning this strange and long world we are fighting. we should be grateful to have that truth affirmed. let us assert the proposition that it is essential to our success in the war that we ask those who fight it to remember at all times, they are defending an ideal of how to conduct their relations with others and even the enemies. those of us who give them this duty are obliged by history and our nation's highest ideals and the many terrible sacrifices

made to protect them by our respect for human dignity to make clear, we need not risk our national honor to prevail in this or any war. we need only remember in the worst of times through the chaos and terror of war when facing cruelty, suffering and loss. that we are always americans in different stronger and better than those who would destroy us. madam president. >> senator john mccain, the incoming armed services chair and someone from his years as a pow in vietnam in the hanoi hilton understands of what he speaks when he talks about what happens to prisoners when they are tortured. joining me now, another vet nam veteran who suffered and a medal of honor recipient. former nebraska senator bob kerr

whoa served as vice chair in the late 1990s and joins me now. senator, your thoughts. you know this issue so well. you of course worked with john mccain and our fellow vietnam veteran. >> that was a great speech. the actions made in 2005 and 2006, it's the policy of the united states. my objection to the report and i participated to examine intelligence failures and the first was in the minds. the second was 9/11. they were very, very critical attacks for failures and there was a lot of pressure to blame

the democrats. in both cases they resisted and as a consequence, they had an impact on the congress. it was a bipartisan vote. particularly with the intelligence, that's a danger. i regret that. maybe john mccain's speech can get the rs and the ds back together. we don't need another controversial debate on something as important as this. second there is no recommendation. in both cases we made specific recommendations. particularly in this case where we are dealing not with the threat we had in the cold war, but a threat that makes it exceptional difficult to get the intelligence we need to keep the country safe. >> is the failure and the partisanship the way they are

these days or the failure of the majority who feel they started out with republicans working with them. they had a strong vote, 14-1 to launch the investigation back in 2009. is it a failure of the overall system now in washington? >> i don't think it is. senator mccain criticized colleagues. when you get down to the final chapture of putting a report together, it's easier if you do it as one party. particularly in the committee where you oversee $87 billion, you constantly have to resist that temptation. whatever the objection is to, you have to meet them at least halfway because if you don't, you end up with a partisan report and i think the credibility is not as great as otherwise. there is not a single recommendation in this report and i think it signals one of the problems that the committee had. you didn't have republicans on board and as a consequence you can't make recommendations about how to change policy. perhaps his speech will help get

the rs and ds back together. so they can make recommendations and prove the quality of humage intelligence operations. >> senator bob kerry from nebraska. >> also you have guys running drones. dianne feinstein supports the use of drones. what happens if there is another investigation that said these guys violated international law as well. i can't interrogate him, but i can drop a drone on him. there is something incompatible with the positions. >> important points. senator angus king, an independent from maine who caucuses with the democrats and member of the intelligence committee. >> pay i want to compliment you

for showing such large segments. that doesn't often happen. our viewers often get little capsules and comments from people like me. that was a service to the public to put the bulk of the two speeches on the air. i want to go back to mr. mclaughlin who you had on earlier. there was an important slight of hand. he talked about the program and detainee program producing intelligen intelligence. nobody is disputing that. what this report is about was did the torture produce the actionable intelligence and it goes through an incredible detail of each of the cases. he asserts and the prior cia folks years ago assert with certainty it produced intelligence. when this report was submitted to the cia last winter. their response came back. you know what they said?

it's unknowable whether it produced actionable intelligence. in other words, it migrated from certainty to unknowable. that speaks volumes. the public will have a chance to make decisions here. the report is going to be released and the cing incia's r will be released and comments and there will be a lot of information. the real issue here is john mccain really hit it on the head. are we a country that will condone the torture. it is inconsistent with the values and our history. we put japanese soldiers on trial for war crimes for waterboarding. the second question is, does it work? what i came to this committee late, i wasn't involved in the early investigation. i joined in 13. i looked at this with fresh eyes. one of the most influential things to me as i decided and wrestled with whether or not to

release the report which by the way, there risks. it really came down to the input i got from former interrogators from the military and the cia who said it doesn't work. there is no proof and it's a propeganta bonanza for the enemies. ultimately i guess the final point is all of this firm storm in the last few days that you have seen from people that have said it worked, it wasn't really torture. we needed it to catch bin laden. that underlines the experience of releasing this report. if we don't get this out there and have this conversation, it will happen again. that's the most penitentiary part of this and why i voted to release it. all that is standing between doing it again and not doing it again is an executive order that barack obama signed in january of 2009. the next president could erase that with a stroke of a pen and

would be back to waterboarding and doing things that as john mccain said are counterproductive for the country and don't produce actionable intelligence and a stain on our national character. >> i want to ask you one question that won kerry raised from the same committee. he said what is the justification for supporting drone attacks that take out civilians and other so-called collateral damage that means uninvolved people. >> number one, there is a huge amount of factual briefing that the committee and the leadership and the executive had. one of the fundamental problems was the cia officials and i ought to pause to say the cia is full of great patriotic people. this is being characterized as the cia program. it was within the cia, but not

everybody. it was a small number of people. in any case, these various programs we are running in counter terrorism are carefully reviewed and believe we are getting the facts, but they were not getting the facts before. they testified that they were using tummy slaps. that was how it was characterized and turns out it was a lot more serious. i think you can when people invent euphemisms and enhanced techniques instead of torture. that's like a sudden lead poisoning instead of shooting. there was something going on here and in the report is a very revealing quote from a cia official who said we need to keep this information from colin powell because if he learns about it, he will blow his stack. they knew they were doing something they shouldn't be doing. >> angus king, independent from

maine, thank you very much. i want to talk about "the insider's" perspective into the torture report. i am joined by jeremy bash and the differently defense. he is a member of the team that oversaw the operation that killed osama bin laden. and the professor at the center for studies at george and senior fellow at the brookings institute who served for 28 years including the deputy chief center at the cia. first to you. you under leon panetta had a deal with the fallout after president obama two days into his presidency issued an order stopping the program. >> here's why officers at the agency who are serving at the headquarters and all over the world, they were serving at this hour in oust ear conditions. they are experiencing whiplash. this program was developed when

he was captured off of a roof in pack tan in late march 2002. at that time between the twin towers were in a rebel heap at ground zero and members were saying this has been a colossal failure. we need more human intelligence. get everything you can to find out if more attacks are in the works. the agency admits today that it was unprepared for this mission. it had no information to form the basis of what became a vast body of knowledge. they are correct. the bottom line is we shouldn't need to use the techniques ever again. there is a difference between oversight and hindsight. how does the ci adjustify what happened? was it the context at the time? you were there after 9/11. >> the context of the time is

very important. what we all as americans and members of congress and the public have to recognize is that the mood on this situation changed drastically from the aftermath in the first couple of years after 9/11 to the way we view them now. it's something contrary to the valleys. one thing i haven't heard from people on any side of this issue and from the hill is an open acknowledgement that indeed our priorities and our mood has changed. now we are seeing a lot of statements being made that don't recognize that. and people were not briefed about what was going on. how do we know what we are told today is accurate. >> the big argument in the ro room -- so the question that is

bewildering people and some ways angering them is how do we know their actions today are not going to be vilified in some report, 5, 7, 10 years down the road. this is very challenging because in some respects, the things we were asking the officers to do today are a lot more signific t significant. >> i want to ask both of you about the destruction. he has been critical about the legislation that came out of that.

are not only is it against his advice, but his own boss at the time told him not to do it. that was a huge mistake and it was also unnecessary. i whang jose would say is hey, if those videotapes got out, it would inflame terrorists all over the world. i sort of agree with john mccain. the terrorists don't need an excuse to be inflamed and attack us. the fact that james polly and other victims that, doesn't explain about guantanamo and argue for or against guantanamo. those terrorists should be condemn and vilified. >> what do you think the mood at langley is and the morale factor of people in the workforce as they do fight these battles against terrorists.

>> there is apprehension about the whole situation about the enhanced techniques where you had legal opinions from the justice department and directions from the white house and oversight whether it was the gang of 8 or someone else on the hill. with the changed moods, you have the strong feeling of people at the tail end being left holding the bag so to speak. whatever judgment we may all make and i'm on the anti-torture side myself about these issues, that is a separate issue from how individuals are held accountable or an individual agency may feel jerked around by the changing public moods. >> paul pillar, we thank you so much. thank you for your service. jeremy bash as well. here is the report with my team that just published it off of the website of the senate select committee. it's available to be read. we will put it on our website.

we are pouring through it and we have been for several hours. this is the result. $40 million, 5 1/2 years. this is now been released to the american public and only the summary. there 6,000 odd pages from 6.2 million documents over the past 5 1/2 years. that does it for this edition of "andrea mitchell reports." we will have much more reaction to the torture report tomorrow and throughout the day here on msnbc. follow the show online and on facebook and twitter@mitchell reports. my colleague ronan farrow has what's coming up next. i imagine it is more on this breaking developing story. >> exactly so, andrea. we have everything people need to know about the report and the impact it is having. a big exclusive you won't want to miss. the lawyer that you probably know is the individual being described as the first to be held at the black sites and

subjected to these enhanced techniques that everybody is talking about today. we hear from his team what his reaction is and what his effect on him of exactly what the cia was doing at the sites. an interesting look on weather the obama administration is conducting these practices and whether they are retaining the legal right to do so with the former state department lawyer. that is all after this break. to help spread some holiday cheer. before earning 1% cash back everywhere, every time; and 2% back at the grocery store. thank you! even before they got 3% back on gas, all with no hoops to jump through, a couple was inspired to use their bankamericard cash rewards credit card to throw the ultimate ugly sweater party of the season. that's the spirit of rewarding connections. apply online or at a bank of america near you.

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