communication needs to go over the net, it needs to go over a radio channel so that everyone has situational awareness of it. what i was -- the point i was making in the closed door briefing is that we have to get to a point now where we are using our radio systems to have that collective awareness of this. i think, you know, one of the things that i have directed is that in addition to the inoperability, we are going to roll out common operating picture or platform that we utilize for national security events. we have the ability to roll that out to the field that has a blue force tracker in it, and it's table to put where all of your state and local assets are, and where our federal assets are. in addition to that, i want people using the radio, so it's great that the tactical elements are talking to each other. it's great that the shift is talking to each other.

we have to be able to make sure that whenever we come across a situation that everyone has situational awareness of this. i will take this -- you know, in my time when i was operational on the president's detail, you know, we -- you know, we were given the explicit instruction, hey, if you are going to pass it, and if it's relevant enough you feel like you need to pass that information, do it over the radio. that was the protocol we had and i think over the years, perhaps, with the advent of technology and smart phones, perhaps we have gotten away from that. we need to get people back on the scope, and back on the mission and back focussed on what they need to be responsible for. >> the next question i will put in writing. it's just that we have seen a rise in threats against members of congress, and 8,000 just last year and more than four times over the past seven years. i want to ask you in writing about the steps the justice

department is taking to prioritize these cases. i know there has been changes made. >> yes, senator. it's of our highest priority, and we are working on it 24/7 every day to protect each and every one of you here. >> appreciate it. senator carper, you recognized. >> thank you for joining us today. i have had the privilege of representing delaware, the first state, and we did that over 200 years ago, and the constitution outlines how we elect our leaders and it changes with respect to technology over the years, but there's -- for as long as we have been a country threats to our leaders when they pursue elective office. we are going to be gathering in chicago in a few weeks, and gathering in other parts of the country to help make sure what was adopted in the original constitution is carried out

faithfully. it's incredibly important that those that aspire to hold office and take on those responsibilities are protected and their families are protected and those are protected around them. my prayers for those who were killed or injured on july 13th, and we are grateful one of our presidential candidates is okay, but i have a question about it. i can't get over how a 20-year-old loaner, a 20-year-old loaner could out fox and outsmart two of the smartest federal agencies and state agencies in law enforcement with the odds of like 1,000 to 1 and be able to almost pull it off. blows my mind. hopefully we will get to the truth in all of that. i am a navy guy and spent 20 years of my life in the navy, and i learned as a shipman, when the ship runs the ground at sea

and the commanding officer is held responsible, and i am not interested in the blame game, but we need to find out who was responsible and making sure they account for their responsibility. my question is, what policies are currently in place to facilitate realtime information sharing between the secret service and local law enforcement during an event, and what changes do information sharing practices will the secret service make in light of the apparent breakdown in communications on july 13th? >> thank you for that question, senator. we're looking at our procedures. we rely on a counterpart system. the radio inoperability, it's a complex challenge. it's not just about being able to find whatever frequency our local counterparts are on and piping it in.

there's some technical challenges that have to be there. to alleviate that, we always relied on a security room where we have representatives from the local agencies. those individuals are there to, one, bring their own radio, and then relay relevant information that would impact our security plan. i think what i'm looking at, and, again, what i am -- and looking at this situation is there was a unified command post, and we had our security room, and you know, we had communications that day at the butler farm site were challenging, and not just challenging for the secret service but local law enforcement. there were radio issues and so -- you saw that with the testimony from the colonel from

pennsylvania state police in the house. as i think about this, i think we need to consider what -- what is our model moving forward? i think we need to be where the greatest amount of partners are when that information is being discussed. the other thing that i'm looking at is, we also need to make sure that we have redundancies as far as cellular on the ground, or additional repeaters. i have directed our chief informational officer to do that and we are rolling out those supports now for the campaign sites. >> based on the initial information you gathered, do you believe there were actions taken by the shooter in the weeks, days our hours that should have caused alarm and grabbed the attention of law enforcement? >> he did not have any interaction with law enforcement

leading up to this in advance of the event. i will note, however, to your prior question, that we have a strong relationship, an integrated relationship between the fbi and secret service and every other federal and state local agency you can imagine, and we have violent crime task forces cross embedded with each other. when it comes to this event and others like it, we are always talking in advance. with respect to the event, we did have a meeting between the secret service and the fbi in the days leading up to the event to determine or assess whether there was information or intelligence pertaining to a threat against the rally or to former president trump or anybody else there. there was an absence of that in the leadup specifically, and again, none of us had information in our holdings with

regard to the shooter. >> thank you. senator grassley. >> mr. chairman, i would like to introduce my oversight letters and investigative documents into the record. this is information i already made public. >> without objection. >> thank you. >> i would also like to call my colleagues' attention to a legislature that senator corken and i have introduced, and it would include the secret service, and this is very important because no other agency has a no-fail mission. in your written testimony you stated that to prevent similar lapses like the one on july 13th from happening again, you will ensure every event site security plan is surely vetted by multiple event supervisors

before it's implemented. based on your testimony the security plan for the butler event deviated from the security standards, and how would vetting by multiple supervisors fix that? >> senator, i think having many eyes on a particular problem set helps. that way you don't have tunnel vision and you just focus in on one thing, and that's why i think it's important not only at the field office level and the detail level. part of what we had started doing with the former president's detail is having them send out site agents, having them send out supervisors. i think having that collaboration and having additional eyes to examine the problem will make sure that we're not missing anything. i think i want that assure --

>> i think you answered my question. >> yes, sir. >> in your written testimony, you stated that you, quote, regret that information was not passed to congress and the public sooner and with greater frequency. what is your communication plan going forward to ensure that the american people and congress are fully informed? >> senator, we just started a rolling production that is bicameral. we made our first rolling production last week and made one yesterday and we will continue to do that. my view is that sunshine is the best disinfectant, and we intend to provide information to congress as it carries out its oversight function. >> also, i made public documents that show secret service deployed a counter unmanned aerial system operator on july 13th, according to the secret

service. the drone system was supposed to be operational at 3:00 p.m. that day, however we have been told by secret service that because of cellular bandwidth problems it was not operational until about 5:20 of that day. if the system was operational, secret service would have had the ability to detect the shooter and his own drone use. why is the social security dependent upon local cellular network? does the secret service have a backup plan in place? >> yes, thank you, senator. and that is something that i briefed in the closed door, and again something that has costs me a lot of sleep because of the eventual outcome of the assailant, that what if we would have geolocated him because that platform had been up. it's something that i have

struggled with to understand, and i have no -- i have no explanation for it. it's something that i feel as though we could have, perhaps, found him, and maybe stopped him. maybe on that particular day we would have decided this is not the day to do it, because law enforcement just found me flying my drone. people fly drones all the time on the peripheries of our sites, and we ask them what their intentions are. on this particular day because of the connectivity challenge, as you noted, there was a delay and he flew his drone at 3:51, approximately. moving forward we are leveraging resources from the department of homeland security and others to make sure that we have dedicated connectivity, so that we are not reliant on public domain, so we can ensure whatever assets we have in place, those assets are

operational. that's my commitment to you that we make sure we are going to do that, and that's something we are moving out on. >> thank you. i hope you will answer some of my other questions in writing. senator, johnson, you are recognized for your questions. >> in the secured briefing last week, i made the point if you don't want conspiracy theories to spread, you need to release information, and this information could have been released within days and a whole lot more. we don't have certain tools like you have, but we can conduct interviews. did you receive our letter from july 25th requesting individuals of the secret service? >> we do have that letter. >> do you know who we are

requesting interviews with? >> i have not seen the letter. >> do you know if those individuals -- >> are those interviews being transcribed? >> the fbi interviews? >> yes. >> when will congress get those transcriptions and those interviews? >> i will take those back and get those to you. >> when it those individuals be available for congress to interview them. >> i will make them available to you. >> we need it as soon as possible. >> we will get it done, sir. >> does the secret service use encrypted communications at events? >> on the radio nets we do, sir. >> are those saved?

>> for butler, we do not have the recordings. >> do you normally? >> not outside of a presidential or vice presidential stop. >> senator? >> we are not going to be able to get those communications, you did not save them? >> no, sir. >> it's very unfortunate. >> moving forward i directed that we will now start recording those so we will have them moving forward. >> by the way, i am going to ask for a number of things to be entered into the record and one of my preliminary findings is the secret service did not attend the 9:00 briefing the day of the event. in your testimony you said that a site briefing was conducted with secret service personnel and law enforcement partners before the event, and those both can't be true. local law enforcement do not believe secret service was present at the 9:00 briefing. were they or were they not?

>> well, those that said they did not get a briefing from the secret service, they were not -- they were supporting through mutual aid, and our personnel briefed the leader. >> acting director rowe, were explicit instructions provided? >> the locals had a plan and had been there for before. >> so a lot of the chatter on social media, it's about secret service coverage or additional coverage enhancements being denied. was there ever requested additional coverage for

mar-a-lago? >> senator, we have provided additional resources to the mar-a-lago residence. >> was coverage asked for and denied ever? >> i will have to research that, senator, but i'm happy to tell you we have made significant investments since the former president has left office. over $4 million of technology resources and alarms. >> documents will come out eventually to make the point one way or the other. this is important piece of information that congress needs to have. >> senator, i will make those available to you, the investments we made. >> there's a report by susan crabtree of real clear politics saying you denies security outside mar-a-lago? >> that's incorrect. >> that's the type of information you need to refute with documentation. deputy director, you said it was an assassination attempt and

terrorism. >> we think it's important to cover all the possibilities here in the reality of what we are dealing with and what we have all seen, senator. we have learned lessons in the past, the tragic shooting at the baseball field was a lesson here, and we made changes in the bureau, and it's reflected here in terms of how this investigation is being approached, with a completely open mind and inclusive of all the possibilities, including domestic terrorism. >> i fear that makes the investigation potentially partisan. i would like to request that my july 14th letter to attorney general garland, mayorkas and wray be put in the record, and there's a bunch of questions and timelines to be in the record,

and our updated timeline day-to-day, and it goes not only minute by minute but second by second, and we will update this, and this is how you do an investigation, we need to understand second by second what happened so the public understands the truth. >> so ordered. >> senator butler. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to both of our chairman and rankings members for holding this incredibly important hearing for the american people to understand the safety and security that is being provided to our national leaders. thank you both for being here and for, again, answering the hard questions. this is a time of, i think, heightened attention, deservedly so not only for our national leaders but for the teacher who decides that they are going to

go and participate in their democracy, or the firefighter who wants to hear the voice and vision of the potential next leader of this country. my thoughts and prayers really are with those pennsylvania families who lost loved ones or have been critically injured, as i offer my questions today, it would be in service to those to preventing future incidents. but in the one question of looking backward to the event on the 13th, director abate, can you just talk about how -- how did mr. crooks, how was he able to get an ar-15 on to the roof of that building? does your investigation illuminate anything that we have learned to help to make that point more clear? >> we don't have definitive

evidence yet as to how he got the rifle up there based on everything that has been directed thus far, photos, video, eyewitness accounts. we believe he had it in the backpack. >> broken down in the backpack? >> well, if placed in the backpack, it would have been visible. we don't have anybody who observed him with the backpack with a rifle barrel or other part of it sticking out of the backpack. but the rifle would not have fit fully into the backpack to be concealed in whole. we have video recently found of the shooter walking in a distance from his car just before 6:00 p.m., about 5:56, i believe, and based on everything we have, we assessed that he

returned to his vehicle at that time and got the backpack and proceeded back to the area, into the agr building. then he is observed, of course, on the roof, just minutes later holding the backpack in front of him. in fact, there's dashcam footage from a police vehicle that shows him briefly traversing the roof with the backpack in front of him. then it's just minutes after that that he's actually seen by the officer who i described with the rifle on the roof. it's possible that he broke the rifle down, but we don't have conclusive evidence of that, and took it out of the bag on the roof in the moments before and reassembles it there. that's one of the theories we are looking at and working on now. >> thank you for that. you take me right, acting director rowe, thank you for years of dedicated service and jumping in a hot time, but you take me right to this point of

communication. there's been a lot of conversation about the -- and even in your written and verbal testimony, you have talked a lot about the communication in the desperate nature in which it's happening across the different channels. one foundational question that i have is, are all elements of the event communicated on the same channel. if i lost my kid and i am at a big rally, are law enforcement talking on the same channel that i lost my kid? >> they likely have a common channel that we work off of in a county or add joining municipality. when it comes to the secret service, we have various channels for secret service agents and aspects of that

event. >> it's not possible that the delay in communication or the losing of the thread of tracking this individual was sort of lost in the commotion of all of the other communications that could have been or maybe was not -- was separate from the communications channels that were happening? >> senator, i can only speak to the secret service lines of communication, and we did not have anything beyond suspicious person that was communicated to us. >> last question, and really quickly because i am out of time, but acting director, was there any communication with the secret service that was talking directly with the president's -- the former president's detail, and there are questions by my colleagues about why the call was not made to delay the event. help us understand the

communication of what was directly happening with the president's detail to make the call, and we all have been to these events and they never happen on time, but to delay this while it was being investigated? >> the detail, they were operating on their net, which our security room was monitoring, but, again, having information of a suspicious individual, there were other calls that day of individuals that came to the attention of law enforcement, of people that needed medical attention. it really -- that particular -- regarding the assailant, that never rose to the level of we should put that out there. had we have known there was a dangerous individual out there, we would never left a protectee go out onstage. >> thank you.

>> i want to thank you and the chairman and ranking members for holding the hearing today, and thank you to the witnesses for not only being here but for your careers in the service of country and to the men and women you lead. i am glad former president trump is safe, and extend my sympathies to corey comperatore. understanding there's also a need to balance congress's engagement in oversight with allowing law enforcement to conduct an ongoing criminal investigation. i want to thank the agents at the secret service for selflessly acting to protect elected officials and their

families and our former presidents and we are grateful for their sacrifices and service, and i want to thank first responders that worked to minimize harm to the crowd on july 13th. mr. rowe, i want to start that you. new hampshire hosts many rallies, and protecting speakers and attendees at these events. as a former governor i experienced some of the former challenges to coordinate, and it's clear there were significant coordination failures on july 13th. you told us earlier the local s.w.a.t. team told the secret service that local law enforcement had eyes on the agr roof, and there are reports the local s.w.a.t. team never met with the secret service before the butler rally.

what service will make sure the agency is coordinating with the security details and state and local law enforcement and campaign event staff? >> as part of the advance process, senator, as happened in butler as well, there's a police meeting, and basically that's -- that initiates the advance. that's bringing in not all the emergency management officials but all the state and local law enforcement agencies that may have aspects of supporting or assisting in that -- in that advance and on that visit. the focus of that police meeting, one, is to exchange numbers and business cards and then coordinate times for walk throughs. there were walk throughs of the butler site with local law enforcement agencies that were supporting that visit, and that was directly as a result of having that police meeting to

begin the process of figuring out, dividing up the labor areas of responsibility. >> what you are telling me at that meeting, the first meeting led to the walk through that the secret service does with local law enforcement, and some of the directors of the local s.w.a.t. team would have been part of that process? >> as i understand it, the beaver county, they were asked to assist butler, but the butler esu team were part of the advanced process. >> how many agents about the secret service provide to plan and secure this event? how many people from state and local law enforcement agencies supported the security of the event? >> in totality between law enforcement, state and local and federal, there were 155 personnel at the butler farm site that day. all combined, secret service, it's in the 70s, and then we had support from homeland security

investigations that were provide post standards, and then we had approximately 70 or so various pennsylvania state law enforcement. >> thank you. >> i want to go to one other issue before my time expires. you talked today and in our secured briefing about the inoperability of the secret services counter drone capability, that it failed early on, and so it didn't catch the drone flown over the site by the shooter. first, what changes -- you have addressed this a little, but what changes are the secret service making to ensure it has backup technology, and what did the secret service coordinate with the drone capability at the site? >> we are working to determine that right now, senator. we are getting the redundancies

in place. counter the authority, and it's a little complex. state and locals don't necessarily have the ability to do that, and it does require coordination with the faa because it does -- it could impact commercial travel. >> thank you. mr. chair, i will just follow-up. i think one of the things you are hearing from a lot of folks, but i am not sure we are really clear on yet, is how is it that somebody who clearly is raising concern from law enforcement isn't identified as suspicious and how is it that that information doesn't get to the president -- the former president's detail? i will follow-up in writing. thank you. senator cornyn? >> thank you, mr. chairman. director rowe, can you explain why the shooter's drone worked?

>> because there was no counter uas present, sir. >> well, you had a drone system but you had bandwidth problems. the bandwidth was adequate enough for the shooter's drone but not for the secret service. can you explain that? >> i have no explanation for that, sir. >> we also know in the military context, electronic warfare or jamming capabilities are commonly used on the battlefield. does the secret service have jamming capabilities for drones? >> we have drones, sir, and when it comes to -- i have to be very careful about how i answer this one in an open forum. i can tell you -- >> well, the question is can you take down a suspicious drone,

because this could be used for not only for surveillance by the shooter, like here, and drones can be weaponized and be used as a threat to the president or in this case the president -- president trump. do you have the capacity to stop a weaponized drone? >> we have security measures that we utilize that permanently protective sites, and we have the ability in a limited fashion at temporary sites. what i can tell you on this day, there was difficulties and it did not go operational until after 5:00. >> so in this case the shooter had a rifle, but somebody that wanted to kill a president or former president or candidate for president would not need a rifle, they could use a drone,

correct? >> it is a potential threat factor. >> so this individual was identified as a suspicious person. can you explain to us when a suspicious person becomes identified as a threat? >> well, i think it's also when a weapon or some other dangerous item is then presented. >> a range finder would not render someone a threat as opposed to somebody who was under suspicion? >> i think the range finder is what initially brought him to the attention of local law enforcement. >> why would the president be allowed to take to the stage while a suspicious person had been identified and before the secret service or local law enforcement were able to investigate the circumstances? >> at that time, senator, suspicion had not risen to the

level of threat or imminent harm. >> well, you didn't -- ultimately that suspicious person did become a threat. you think if the president had been asked not to take the stage during the time it took to investigate to eliminate that suspicion, wouldn't that have been the appropriate way to deal with it? >> senator, it certainly is one way to do it. this is a challenge for law enforcement in general is that being able to if you identify somebody that comes to your attention, and you are trying to determine what are their intentions? this is a challenge for law enforcement. the individual was actually -- it came to the attention because of suspicion, and he's on the outer parameter adjacent to the secured site, and law enforcement is circling for him. again, without additional information at that point, we're

not rising to the level yet where perhaps we should pull him off or delay him. >> i am just suggesting that maybe, just maybe, president trump's appearance should have been delayed while that suspicion could be adequately investigated. i always thought of the secret service as the best of the best when it comes to their willingness to put themselves in harm's way to protect the life of the person they are detailed to, and i think you described the very rigorous process by which people are screened. i think you mentioned that the 2% standard, people interested in serving, only a small fraction of those individuals are accepted into the secret service because of the high standards that your agency has. explain to me why the secret service being an elite law enforcement agency would

delegate to local law enforcement or others who did not meet that same 2% standard? in other words, isn't that something that secret service should have covered as opposed to delegating it to local law enforcement? >> so senator, again, this is where i went back to earlier when i said it was a failure to challenge our assumptions. we assumed the state and locals had it. by no means do i want to diminish the commitment, and i am sure you agree. state and local law enforcement do their jobs every day and protect the communities you represent. >> no doubt about it. >> i think we made an assumption that there was going to be a uniformed presence out there, and there would be sufficient eyes to cover that, and there is going to be counter sniper teams in the building and we are not going to make that mistake again. moving forward, i have directed our office of protective

operations that when our counter snipers are up, their counter snipers are up and on the roof as well. we have -- we do this all the time with our colleagues in the new york city police department when we cover the united nations general assembly, and that's our ttp moving forward. >> director rowe, i would submit to you that those assumptions can be lethal. >> senator, scott, you are recognized for your questions. >> thank you, chairman. let me just follow-up with what senator cornyn just asked, who is the manufacturer of the -- >> we will provide that to you, sir. >> we talked about this the other day. there's -- in our, you know --

very few times in history do our presidents get shot at, so you know that this is something that the american public is very interested in. senator johnson said there's a lot of questions being asked. i was at church sunday and three people came up to me and asked me if there was a second shooter. there's all this information you guys are not responding to. when i was governor of florida, there were two mass shootings, and two or three times a day, local, state, federal law enforcement, fbi, everybody involved, we answered questions. i asked you the other day why aren't you doing that? what both of you have allowed, you have allowed the public to ask, you know, assume the negative. so -- which i don't get. i think you should have been

doing -- i think you guys should have been doing this all along, at least once a day, press conferences. you have to tell the public what is going on, and having a hearing is nice. how often are we going to do this? clearly we are not going to do this here for another month and a half. i asked you the other day, why aren't you doing press conferences, and you were going to ask mayorkas and director wray to start doing public press conferences. >> i am here today to provide information and answer those questions. we are moving towards doing more frequent releases of information, and we are willing to do that press conference, and once we get through the hearing today, we are all likelihood

going to do one this week. >> what is your commitment to the public that you are going to do the press conference? it's, what, 17 days -- i mean, we are 17 days into this and i am getting asked questions that i can't believe are true but the public believes it's true. what you are all do is ruining your reputation and impacting the reputation of the federal government. makes no sense to me. are you going to do it once a month? the fbi, same thing, not just you. what did director wray say? did he say you couldn't do it? >> if i may jump in here. thank you for your guidance in this regard. we have not done something every day, no doubt about that. we are focused from the fbi side, and we actually, based on your guidance, we did a media engagement, not a stand up type of conference just yesterday.

laid out in full, everything i shared here and in the interest of time, we are -- because of the intense interest in this, and the implications and the national importance, we literally provided everything, and we remain committed to answering in and all questions and sharing in and all information we obtain. >> do you realize the value of going in front of the press and answering all their questions? you realize, if you don't do it that way, everything gets filtered. you get to put out all the information, and you should be -- you should be providing -- you should be every day saying this is what we know now. senator johnson put together a timeline. you should have put together the timeline. you should have immediately put out, this is what we know now and what we don't know. like you said, you don't know how the gun got up there.

right? you said it. but that should have been out all along. you could say, we are looking at it and it doesn't make sense. we have done this and this and this. i don't get it why you are doing what you are doing. you're ruining -- i said this about the fbi. i mean, the people that work at the fbi, and the people that work at the secret service, they're great people. you're a black hole and you lose the support of the american public because people don't believe you are being direct with them. i completely disagree with your approach. i want to finish, and i got -- like everybody else, i did a letter july 18th. i have not gotten any answers yet, and i want to put it in the record. i would love to get these answers, and this is what the public wants to know, what happened, and who will be held accountable and how will we make sure it never happens again. thank you. >> without objection, it will be entered into the record.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you for being here to both of you, and more importantly, thank you for your professional dedication, and your personal bravery and your devotion to the ideals of law enforcement. i know for both of you, it's a painful one, and director, i have heard you speak in a private setting emotionally and passionately about taking action that will ensure accountability. i know you share the commitment along with director abate to full public discloser to the maximum extent possible. we could make speeches, and i made one in that private setting about for broader discloser to the public, not just in press conferences, but during the course of your investigation,

what you know and what you feel you can disclose without compromising your investigation. senator peters and paula long with senator johnson and myself sent requests to both of your agencies to produce documents. can you say when we can expect the documents? >> as quick as we can. >> can we expect them this week? >> we will work to meet that deadline, sir. >> when can we expect all the communications, the text messages that agents sent to each other? all of it is going to come out, as you know. when can we expect all of those documents? >> we will gather them up and get them to you, senator. >> you, i think, took the

position as to the local law enforcement responsible for the shooter on the roof, the snipers that were in place, that it was their job to take him out, but ultimately doesn't the buck stop with the secret service? >> it stops with us, sir, but let me clarify. the perspective they had on that roof, when i show you the perspective from what our sniper saw, he's on the downside of that ridged roof. their perspective from the agr building looking out, their area responsibility, looking left, they should have been able to

see. you can see in that photo in exhibit a, which we will make part of the record and turn over to the committee, and he already crossed over the bridge or walkway and stepped up on the roof. i am not saying they should have neutralized him, but if they would have just held their post and looked left, maybe -- there's a lot of maybes, senator -- >> a lot of maybes, but somebody needs to be held accountable. i think senator graham hit the nail on the head. we need to know who specifically was responsible for doing what. who was responsible for saying to former president trump, sir, it's not safe to go out there yet? who was responsible for making sure that those local law enforcement were doing their job? who is responsible for tracking

down that suspicious person who fit the profile, 10 to 25 years old, young, male -- the fbi warned us about it year after year after year, and director wray has come before us and said the threat is from domestic extremism, the lone gunman. we're all aware of it in law enforcement. so i think we need individual accountability here, and people need to be held responsible. in fact, lose their jobs, if necessary, to send a message that this massive intelligence and surveillance failure, as well as the enforcement failure cries out for accountability. let me just ask in the short time i have left. what is the nature of the iran

threat? >> i'm sorry, senator, can you repeat the question? >> what is the nature of the iran threat, the threat to former president that was mentioned. >> let me be clear here, the terrorists regime of iran have been targeting people in our country for many, many years now. we talked about that here before. i want to be clear about that, from the fbi's standpoint, we know publicly they have targeted former president trump. they have called for his assassination along with other current government officials and that's public information known to everyone. >> is a specific or imminent threat on july 13th? >> we have no information that there are any coconspirators,

foreign or domestic, including iran, related to this. i want to be clear, we have no evidence of that. we are not ruling anything out but leaving our minds open to that. >> was that on the minds of the secret service on july 13th, there might be some threat from iran? >> sir, we -- as deputy director just said, we are aware of the public sentiment and statements of the government much iran to do harm to donald j. trump, and we use a threat-based model. >> thank you. thanks. >> thank you both for your testimony today and your service. >> i augmenting or backfilling inadequate secret service capacity generally and on the day of the assassination attempt. to what extent are hsi personnel, for example, filling close protection roles that

would be filled by secret service personnel? >> thank you, senator, for that question. as we have done, even back when we were with treasury, we enlist during campaign years the assistance of other law enforcement agencies in that department. we used atf, irs. when we transferred over to the department of homeland security, we brought that practice with us. going into a campaign year or the united nation general assembly, we will enter into a memorandum of assistance with hsi. federal agents, law enforcement to secure a site. when it comes to close protection, the only time we were -- we will utilize them is during a united nations general assembly where they may be utilized to protect a low-level head of state or provide

security at a hotel in new york city where those protectees are staying. >> on the day in question, all of the former president's close protection detail were full-time secret service personnel? >> they were. they were assigned to the donald trump detail. >> interoperability with other state and local law enforcement agencies, specifically on communications, what have you determined to date played a role in failures to swiftly communicate between agencies the suspicion or identification of a threat? >> i think there was a delay in reporting. not having that real time. as they were closing in on him, as information is known --

>> be more specific. who? >> local law enforcement were closing in on him. as he is seen scurrying across the roof. that information -- we are getting to the bottom of that. we are working on trying to figure out, what was the delay? why didn't we hear that coming out of unified command? based on information i have, what i can tell you is apparently not having that real time information is what really hindered us in being able to understand more than it was just the locals working an issue at the 3:00. there was something more urgent than that. >> does it appear that is due to a lack of communications links between relevant officials and agencies or poor communications practices and failure to report? >> i don't want to rule -- i want to have a neutral opinion on that. i don't know if it was poor

practices. i can tell you that -- not being able to have that technical fix, which is a lofty goal, is something that has been a hindrance. that's why we use a counterpart system. >> there is not the capability when an inter-agency team is deployed to secure a site like this and to mount, if necessary, a quick reaction, there is not currently the capability for, for example, state law enforcement s.w.a.t. personnel or local law enforcement officers to communicate directly with secret service officers on site? >> technically, you could do it. it would take a long time to get it done and for a one-day or eight-hour operation, it requires a lot. it would be months of planning of knowing we are going to go to this particular jurisdiction and

we're going to need your frequencies, keys and load you into our radios and you are going to need to load it into ours. >> this presents an opportunity for the homeland security committee, not just in an executive protection context, but any complex incident response, any terrorism, any natural disaster context, the inability swiftly to link personnel is a vulnerability for the nation, is it not? >> i would think. based on my experience, being able to talk to other agencies in real time would assist in that response. >> do i have time for one more question? >> yes. >> thank you. i know others have touched on this. one of the things that's most baffling to the public has been the failure to fully secure this structure which even to a layperson's uninformed eye is

clearly -- it clearly presents a site from which an attack could be mounted. it particular characteristics that made it more of potential value to an attacker. walk us through one more time, is there not an established doctrine or practice or checklist by which such sites are assessed for threat and determine whether or not to be within or without of the security perimeter? >> senator, controlling high ground is something that is a must for us whenever we go into a location. >> i know we're all eager for more information on why that task was not completed in this case. thank you for your testimony. >> thank you, senator. senator lee? >> why was president trump allowed to take the stage at 6:02 p.m., after multiple suspicion reports were provided,

complete with photos and information suggesting that the assailant had a range finder, something that ordinary people don't use, in this kind of circumstance? >> senator, again, it was suspicion, not weapon or there was never communication of that there was an individual with a gun or threat or other bad intentions. >> how many suspicious reports did you receive that day? >> i will get back to you. there were other individuals that came to the attention of law enforcement that day. >> would president biden be allowed on stage under similar circumstances with an unresolved set of multiple suspicious person reports provided, including indicating there was a range finder involved? >> senator, i can tell you that a suspicious person on the outer perimeter with local law enforcement attempting to locate is -- would happen. i would need more information as far as whether or not we would allow the president to go on or off. for us, it comes down to weapon,

a potential threat, is the individual carrying an ied, is there a weapon, is there some other factor that now ramps up our attention to -- >> understood. if there were eight shell casings found next to the assailant's body but he was neutralized after the first shot, where do those other shot comes from? where do the other shots go? >> as far as the assailant's shooting? >> did the assailant get out eight shots or left from the day before? >> the shooter, we believe, fired eight rounds. we had the reconstruction team go out there for days and collect all that. we have fragments taken back. we are putting together the trajectory and analysis. we have fragments and they have been collected in the distance from the weapon. >> got you. it's my understanding there was a sniper team assigned to a window with complete overlook,

complete view of the rooftop where the shots were fired. it's my understanding, according to some whistle-blower accounts, that that post was abandoned. what can you tell me about that? why was it abandoned? >> i saw that from the colonel's testimony. it's something i have asked. there were two two-man counter sniper teams from the locals that were in that agr building. >> at some point, they just left? >> i can't -- i don't have an answer. it seems to me if even one of them left, there should have been remaining some additional eyes left in that building. >> that seems like something that maybe should be one of the first questions you address. i'm surprised you don't know that already. i would ask that you submit to us in writing what you learn as soon as you learn it. will you commit to that? >> yes, sir. >> what can you -- let me just

state this this way. multiple requests were made by trump's protective detail and by trump's campaign team to the secret service for additional resources. i'm told those were denied. the secret service spokesperson initially denied that such requests were made and denied. why not tell the truth from the outset? what were they trying to do there? >> i don't think there was any intention to mislead. >> seemed like a material fact. >> i saw that report. >> will you commit you will submit to us in writing what requests were made by whom and to whom and when they were denied? >> i will, sir. >> at the end of the day, we are looking at a situation in which at a minimum people knew that this guy had