oil embargo an economic war the strong reaction is the latest in a series of intensifying military and diplomatic responses by tyrol and the growing pressure from western powers over its nuclear project. up next peter lavelle asked his guest if boris yeltsin was a key history maker or just in the right place at the right time. if you can. follow him welcome to cross talk i'm peter lavelle boris yeltsin was he a great man who made history or was he merely a product of his time opinions differ widely don't know when denies the important role he played in creating our present crosstalk continues its series on the collapse of the soviet union twenty years ago. and.

to cross talk yeltsin's russia i'm joined by dmitri barber chair in the studio with me he's a political analyst at ria novosti news agency in washington we have donald jensen he's a resident fellow at the center for transatlantic relations and in london we go to alex proud day he is director of russian and eurasian studies center at the university of oxford all right gentlemen crosstalk rules and in fact that means you can jump in anytime you want well the reason why we're doing this we're doing our series here on cross talk on the collapse of the soviet union twenty years ago and twenty years ago on june twelfth one thousand nine hundred ninety also became the first popularly elected president of the russian soviet federated socialist republic all basically the beginning of the demise of the soviet union that would follow later in the year dimitri. let's look at that time twenty years ago and how the soviet union unraveled how much was yeltsin involved with that unraveling of the soviet union people talk a lot about going to charge but what about yeltsin at this time well i think there

are two parallel process that's going on which should not be mixed up there was the process of democratization and i think it was yeltsin storrow for the first time in russian history and man came to power almost election against the will of the government that was an achievement as for that collapse of the soviet union it had begun long before the. it speeded up back in one thousand eight hundred nine already there was a lot of talk about it and by one thousand nine hundred and the process was almost complete i would you mind your that in march two months before the election. seven republics fifteen did not take part in the referendum on the reform of the soviet union so the process has already gone very very much fault and yeltsin of course when the soviet union was just virtually collapse and in some one thousand one thousand vonne he didn't shed tears he started building the russian federation of

the you think it's the attempt if i go to you in washington from a russian perspective in two thousand and eleven that was the good yeltsin ok the else and they did the right thing ok because right now in two thousand and eleven most people in this country are very pleased that the soviet union is gone there's still a small minority that regret it but yeltsin was seen as a great banner to bring the end of a system that wasn't working for the people anymore so yeltsin twenty years ago what kind of character do you sense some to be. i have some looking back i'm very contradictory figure both i would almost say heroic but certainly someone who displayed tremendous political courage and i would note in passing that. with the most commas and the ultimate was ahead of even the us government and the outside observers and moving forward were a lot of people and most notably the first president bush seemed to indicate they wanted to preserve the soviet union albeit in a more reformed way but you ask about yeltsin i think he was in many ways one of

the most politically courageous people i've ever been around and i was in moscow at the time as a diplomat but also he was a tremendously contradictory contradictory figure whose career has to be separated into a number of phases not all of in not all of which he performed admirably alex in to you in london let's speak up a little bit let's have mr yeltsin as president of the of russia the first president of russia how do you see his the beginning of his reform process because this is where people start disliking yeltsin then and very much to some extent hating him today i'm talking about the liberalization of the economy. before i come to that can i say that i agree absolutely with the fact that he's a larger than life historic and historical leader who has huge pluses and huge minuses and this goes with his economic reform program as well you remember that in

one thousand nine hundred nine when handing over to putin yeltsin reflected on his own contribution to russia and he for started by saying of course the great achievement was we broke with communism broke as you just wanted to know the command economy into broken to a liberal market capitalism but then he added an apology and he apologized for the fact that he was along with others so naive to think they could do it all in one big breakthrough exact breakthrough politically breakthrough economically breakthrough socially and if you break through you break things and ended up with a lot of inequality a lot of corruption a lot of the things that yeltsin i don't think would have wanted i remember meeting him in that in the two thousands and he sincerely came over as someone who was a big populist leader concerned with people's welfare and he reflected that it was a sheen with so many poor people still in russia after all he tried to do so the economic change was necessary whether it could be done in one big leap but whether

it would be better done in small stages is a very very big question demon what do you think about that in the studio here more ideologically driven a theory driven in the early years because as our pointed out i mean it in a lot of people now is that the the russian economy contract a deficiency percent at one point during his administration and i like to point out to my audience here the great depression in the united states the u.s. economy contract a twenty five percent so if we can put that magnitude out there well i think it was not an ideological president and if you listen to his speeches if you read his speeches now he never said the word capitalism. or the word socialism that was not quite he style i mean i remember him saying in one of his interviews back in the eighty s. that people are tired of ideology people just wanted to live better and they wanted more economic freedom and he gave them economic freedom in one thousand nine

hundred eighty two the problem was that of course people were poor and the only ones who were to reach an influential were criminals or some form of body boss us so obviously they benefit from this privatization more than in every direction but unfortunately i think it was a global tendency if well look the world was tremendously unjust during all of the ninety s. and it continues to be unjust now it's built on some really wrong premises which have little to do with the real liberalism and with real capitalism they wage wars thawed by local hopes it in the seventeenth or eighteenth century or that there be some people who say that yeltsin in the russians around him and took the idea of a market market economy too seriously because you got rid of you know you privatized the family jewels that actually created wealth in this country and all the rest of it just fell apart i mean and in the process i go to you don on this one one of the one of the biggest criticisms to this day is the creation of

oligarchy that controlled so much of the economy and the and this is exactly the inequality the demon here was talking about and it still plagues this country today there's still a concentration of wealth in this country and it comes from yeltsin there are. i very much agree i think that if he and others have talked about talked more about strengthening the rule of law i think russians probably would be a lot happier today about what happened in the ninety's and and problem i'd even be wealthier today just to go back to a point that that demand out said which i agree with which is whether he was a man motivated by idiology i think in many ways he was motivated by instinct to sit around moscow and say well he was a democrat he's a democrat but he doesn't really know what it means and we watched this tremendous churning in society and it was very difficult to understand sometimes what yeltsin did or worse not thought he was doing particularly after ninety one when when you

had to build a state and this this witness of institutions when it's in the rule of law i think is something where i would fault him very seriously alex what do you think about that because it's very interesting is because in the two thousand the argument was made that the state had to restructure the government had to restructure the state because the else had allowed to do deteriorate so badly and have the so much of the economy captured into private hands i mean it this is one of the things that went wrong and maybe would not intentionally but i mean the eventually this is the russian state was no longer serving the purposes of what it was supposed to do and this is the legacy of that that that follows the olson to this day. right i mean i think two things come out of that one is that yeltsin came out of a heavily state apparatus dominated system the communist system he reacted against that wanted to give people the freedom the liberty to be creative and make society themselves but i disagree a bit with dmitri but no ideology no explicit ideology but

a culture of seeking panaceas believing that there are solutions out there which will fix things within maybe five or ten years and that's part of a sort of russian cultural heritage seeking marxism combining it with russian characteristics then he'll see in seeking broad based capitalism giving people like gaidar free rule rein giving to buyers handing out and believing it's a belief that if you allow people the opportunity to be entrepreneurs to grab the assets to make things work that everything somehow will be positive sum game and that wasn't the case and therefore you don't need the state you don't need to regularize redistribute manage in the old command system so it was a typical spend you don't swing from over come on over state of education to undeceive occasion if you want an undermining mr to sions and a free for all and liberty as we know has enormous costs for most people who haven't got the energy to fight for their rights let me ask you this i mean that's

a nother. accusation made against yeltsin is he was such a pendulum person he would go to such extremes if it was for on the democrat democracy issue the economy issue defense security i mean first he braced the west by the end when you look at the cost of zero experience yeltsin felt that he had been betrayed by the west but that there was that pendulum i don't agree with this because it was not yeltsin it was the west they changed it to russia. in one thousand nine hundred one the west was applauding russia and unfortunately the country was collapsing. and then in the end of the nine just when russia tried to say something the west suddenly became very critical so it was not yeltsin which changed it was their digital that or the west that changed us for it here my i think there were again two very distinct process. yeltsin was a democrat in the early ninety's by the end of the ninety s. he was a different person talking about their political system it were it became very

difficult to access hear him much more difficult then to access gorbachev and then to wait yes there were all kinds of weird people around him who had absolutely no legitimacy including an authority to base was never elected by anyone. so basically people when they made demonstrations in support of yeltsin one thousand nine hundred one what they wanted was kind of their social democratic you won't believe this point of the router and regular continue our discussion of the legacy of boris like yeltsin stay with. you. steve. white stream cascading from mountain slopes the view is mesmerizing.

this beauty brings deaths at a speed of more than four hundred kilometers per. step in babylon sure. if they shoot something inappropriate for a public they can easily be shot by x. casualties of war ok. i wish it would never happen but it has happened. in a war a t.v. camera becomes an unnecessary what destroys their own safety all foreign nationals including journalists and inspectors should leave america and it's clear for thousands with such witnesses i got it on my site. where many lobby checks to. churches nurses shooting on our.

and it. was. welcome back to the talk here about the mind you were talking about russia's first president boris yeltsin. but first here's a brief report on yeltsin's contentious legacy. in recent russian history few personalities remain a spoiler rising as boris yeltsin twenty years after the fall of the soviet union yeltsin is still seen in the west as the politician who ended communism and ushered in a new area of personal freedoms and western style capitalism but sure the anything you learn just better perceived from a distance especially history i think we still need more time for the emotions and

troubles to give way to serious analysis of what to take tannic figures used in really was in a moment that later became one of russia's most iconic yeltsin with genuine popular support helped to stare down an attempted coup in one thousand nine hundred ninety one yes we declare illegal all of the craze decisions by the state emergency committee in the us and in the western world yeltsin was seen as a reformer and a leader who could compromise he was embraced as a friend and told he was treated as a peer and when he died in two thousand and seven some of the warmest eulogies came from western leaders he stood up for freedom and democracy and openness he really believes that russia couldn't go back to communism or back further to extreme rationalism praise from abroad yes. but yeltsin sharpest critics were in the new country that he helped bring into being russia in theory yeltsin supported a market economy but the reality was western inspired shock therapy and crony

capitalism russia's economy went to. freefall and the russian ruble had to be devalued choice during his time in office for millions of russians this was yet another time of troubles. yeltsin played a critical role in ending communist rule the us president he ordered the army to tackle mutinous parliament he then ran through constitutional reforms that extended his powers as president at the expense of parliament and few can forget the brutality of the first chechen conflict by the end of his presidency yeltsin like so many russians at the time became wary of the west i told near to the americans the germans don't push us toward military action otherwise there will be a european war for sure and possibly world war. there's no doubt that boris yeltsin is an outstanding historical figure you know it may take decades for the russians themselves to find a consensus about a name that changed russian and world history forever. for crosstalk martin.

ok alex and i think go back to you in london. in the studio brought up a very interesting point about how russia looked at the west and the west looked at russia during yeltsin's tenure how do you assess that i mean was there a pendulum there where there misperceptions on one side or both sides. i think they were misperceptions on both sides russia expected the west to applaud the end of communism the introduction of a post communist purportedly democratic regime and it. expected the west to give lots of money to support the regime in to stabilize the transition to market democracy but the west responded to russia's soft liberation by appearing to be fairly mean it wasn't the best of economic conditions the big marshall plea marshall plan number two as it were didn't come about and russia

became more and more disillusioned about real partnership with the west but the trouble with the russian foreign policy we were back to before the discussion is that rhetorically there was a lot of protest about nato expansion and nato militarism and european like a friend in the us but in actual fact the actions were pro western until the late one nine hundred ninety s. it was the combination of the bombing of course of war and preceding that the economic crisis the banking crisis and the crash that brought about a real disillusionment not just with the with the west among the leaders of russia but also among the new liberal middle classes and i don't know what years you were a diplomat in the one thousand nine hundred and russia but what did you see i mean were the russians expecting too much from the west or the west just thought well that you know the cold war is over we won i mean you know they'll find their way on the i.m.f. you know you have a liberal economic system and everything will just be dissed jim dandy but we know

it wasn't i mean what were the perceptions and misperceptions during your tenure here. well there were a lot of misperceptions i want to say first that i agree with alex that that yeltsin change the west changed but i would also say that that russia changed i think the west expected a kind of a breakthrough to a larger version of maybe what pole or the czech republic is today and that simply was never in retrospect going to be the case second the west i think it's important to recall the rest championed the one nine hundred ninety three constitutional reforms that gave a much stronger presidency to yeltsin then have existed before and as a consequence to some extent we better what we now criticize as a super super presidential regime but i want to go back to ninety one i think that there is a lot of misperception about what happened in ninety one where as i and many others thought it was a democratic breakthrough i think there were a lot of impulses there populism anti soviet ism and frankly russian nationalism

that in a moderate form which which blended together with the pro so-called pro democratic forces so ninety one i think was misinterpreted then once that was misinterpreted a lot of what we saw go on that in the following decade was i think underestimated in misinterpreted as well you know it's very interesting is because you think in retrospect that the that the west wanted russia to disagree invented self and it's in a western image because that's what it sounds like when you go back and you know it because it's it's the triumph in does them of winning the cold war and russia looks at it in a very different way it collapsed the soviet union itself would want to do it wanted something different it wasn't a defeat but russia is still even the mainstream media still treated as a defeated power and well i think that's the problem russia was treated as a defeated ball and in that sense the west has shown that fenty i would say i think it characterizes the whole beaded of the ninety's level fantasy the west would not

think would not invent a new russia and. allied state or even a neutral state it returned to the old ways of treating russia with suspicion we just usual you know there was nothing new i asked for one thousand nine hundred and i can tell you're. in july in one thousand nine hundred one. government delegation came to russia and they came to what was their head of the soviet government and they said we stayed on you we don't believe these democrats we think you are a serious person a few people remember that i am going to do and i think it shows you are the level found at the time again alex go ahead jump in here like a friend is a year but it's very difficult to get this. great sense of this russia wanted to be treated in the early one nine hundred ninety s. both as a cove victor a victor against communism sort of self imposed to victory and therefore be treated

as a partner and also to be given this kind of economic aid which would be expected of a defeated pearl a defeat of perjury in a war so at that one of the same time they wanted to be treated as equal victors and also to be bailed out and helped to recover as defeated powers and that was a very difficult pair of conceptions to get people's minds around in the west done when you think about that that's a very interesting thing here is i'm very interesting paradigm it off worst of all i should i should tell dimitri that i did not write those comments to me honestly at the time. i think i have very much agree with alex and frankly i know the person what the perception in russia is as being treated like a defeated power certainly i think in policymaking circles in washington that was not the case even if it maybe appear about way to people in russia they basically thought that russia would end up relatively quickly i think being like us and that with us

a lot of the trouble that happened in the following decade at least for some people in washington what was the summit. a surprise the second point i would make is that russia itself. was ambivalent about the soviet past about its own past and that made it much more difficult to craft a policy. in one way or the other political or economic to move russia and the way we tried we wanted it to go and the fact that because the russians themselves were uncertain about which way they want to go dimitri i mean in and we look at it in retrospect now. after his presidency was it a missed opportunity i mean was really wanting to be. a partner of the west and that we just wasn't simply in braced i think he wanted to be able the west and i think it's very unfortunate what happened there was a lot of misstep but you need this you know moment and sort of move in in russia. and america and the europeans just didn't recognize that and some were more me they

didn't believe it and when they finally believe that russia started to set in the you know the moment and still when you know but i don't really seriously i mean i mean we look at the one thousand nine hundred six presidential election i mean it was amazingly fraudulent but everybody in the west wanted to ignore all of the fraud he won he won reelection ok we don't know exactly i mean i haven't gone back in on the empirical evidence myself but i mean just supporting him and not what he was trying to do the democratization of this country its economic reforms they just wanted to base everything on yeltsin hoping that he would do the right thing what do you think about that alex not a systemic change but it on a person. yeah well first of all leaders of states always want stability first and foremost because stability equals security for them so yeltsin was a symbol of some degree of stabilization and stability that's why they backed him but they did like in the early ninety's magination and we mentioned lack of

imagination before but the biggest like of imagination was on the international stage had there been an imaginative sitting down with russia at that time said let's to redraw the european security system let's end an expansion of nato for inertial bureaucratic safety first reasons and let's look at the ways in which we can structure russia in on an equal founding basis russia always wanted to be a founder member of something new rather than an adjunct junior member of something old that was an opportunity missed and by ninety ninety five ninety six that almost gone because they told started expanding so russia was let down in a way from a lack of imagination the same time russia let itself down by not having a unified strategy of any kind the voices coming out of moscow yeltsin say one thing one remember we went to warsaw and so poland could join later if he wanted then the arena on that second time around there were several voices and the most important voices among them were the corporate voices who were pro western pro western economic. research has been here gentlemen we've got run out of time and we

certainly can all agree that yeltsin would lead a revolutionary life many thanks to my guest today in the studio here with me in london and in washington thanks to our viewers for watching us here r.t. see you next time remember crossed our plans. to. close has been too don't you stop. plays to the most ambitious football. club in the world. now our g. goes to the far east where the timber industry affects the legendary siberian tigers where the ancient native community loses its way in the modern world. and

where the country's mineral wealth starts its way across the ocean. and well come to the bars creature russia close up.

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