i hope not my aim in writing the book was to answer the question we all americans and russians began the post cold war era in one thousand nine hundred nine thousand nine hundred ninety nine hundred ninety one with very high hopes that russia would become part of a larger euro atlantic european community europe whole and free from vancouver to vladivostok yet twenty five years later after the war in ukraine started we're again divided in europe and the relationship is very hostile of suspicious. neither side no one wanted this and the book is an attempt to answer how this happened now correct me if i'm wrong but the main argument of this book is that's what happened in ukraine in two thousand and fourteen and what transpired since was essentially the result of russia not having a meaningful place within the european security institutions i wonder if it's a bit larger not just russia's place within the security institutions but generally

russia's place in the world and the disagreements that both sides had with regards to that question of what place should russia take in the world when i think i focused on europe and there may be issues and complaints having to do with other regions the world but europe i think has been and the near abroad vision is that a visual has been most important to russia since one thousand nine hundred ninety and remains one of russia's key interests if i read the foreign policy concept correctly. the point is that structurally indeed it would to a large part as nato and the e.u. expanded and more and more decisions were taken in nato in the e.u. russia had less opportunity to participate in the formulation or the taking of key decisions. and in that sense i recognised that russia had had a complaint that needed to be addressed since sometime in the last complaint i think according to you it's

a series of complaints that have been voiced repeatedly and repeatedly ignored or dismissed well by some they've been ignored and dismissed i if i could put it very oversimplified because the history i believe this is complex is complicated but i think in this case this is a case i look and i say i can understand the complaints from moscow but i think the means chosen to express those complaints were unfortunate and counterproductive let's talk about some of those means in the. russian thinking that idea of place russia's place in the world is very tightly linked today space the space russia occupies and crimea in this regards was a very peculiar case because territorially it wasn't russian in two thousand and thirteen and two thousand and fourteen but geo politically it was russian as a seat of the russian fleet for several centuries when you look at the

crimea case from that perspective wasn't it an accident waiting to happen regardless of whatever security arrangements you have in europe well i think it was more a problem that we thought we had solved but apparently came back again there was a question when the soviet union dissolved in one nine hundred ninety one should crimea. is russia with ukraine or go to russia because not everyone was happy with khrushchev action in one nine hundred fifty four transferring crimea from. there were votes in crimea moreover there is there was a long negotiation within the c.e. that i remember that resulted in an autonomy agreement for crimea within ukraine by the late one nine hundred ninety s. the ukrainians were so happy with this that they were showing it to foreign diplomats like me as an example for or elsewhere by two thousand we thought.

we knew there were some discontented people but the question seemed resolved apparently it was not well i think one of the reasons it wasn't result because those agreements that you mentioned address the territorial status of crimea but they did not address the geopolitical status of crimea the military status of crimea would it be possible under any circumstances for you to imagine that russia would simply say that from now on we do not want to have access to the black sea russia investigated moving the headquarters of the black sea fleet. and that the conditions at novara sisco were not ideal for this they signed a. lease agreement with the ukraine and extended it in a rather controversial action new korean parliament in two thousand and ten more controversial among the ukrainians and so there was a legal arrangement and legal status for the russian fleet and russian military

presence inside ukraine in crimea that was in place well before two thousand and thirteen two thousand and fourteen and was recognized by the rest of the world it was moving ukraine territorial and i think that a lot of westerners had a real problem with as you mentioned for many in the west. russia's takeover of crimea was pure and it's a sion but i'm sure you know that for many in russia it wasn't just the land grap it was some extent. the only means of avoiding a major strategic loss it was either a gain of a territorial or a loss of a major strategic capacity of the status quo by that time was no longer an option do you think the western decision making makers at the time and distant the kind of conundrum that russia and the kremlin faced and that to some extent i would argue the western decision makers pushed on russia well i think your your question

presupposes what the new provisional ukrainian government was going to do in the state i mean where very away very well there were there were there were statements they they weren't necessarily official statements decisions and not been taken look i understand the fears that some in russia had after the events of february of two thousand and fourteen but understanding does not mean agreement or approval and the consequences of it for what many western leaders or leaders of other countries in europe central. east and west fought about this and what they perceived of possible future for them i think was very counterproductive for european security as a whole for you in russia to judge whether it was productive or counterproductive for russia the question of whether it was counterproductive or productive i mean i think everybody would agree that it was very detrimental to russia itself on the public relations on foreign policy front but on this strategic front i think many

in russia would argue that there was no other solution and the best way of averting something like that would just be not putting russia in the situation when it had to choose make a very quick decision about why they wants to lose an access to the black sea or whether it wants to play by the western rules and stay in good graces of western policy while i can agree with you that there were several points in two thousand and thirteen where i think negotiating and including russia in talks of some sort about what an association agreement for ukraine with zero opinion would mean for russian interests might have averted the crisis that ensued from november of two thousand and thirteen on. putin at valda and two thousand and thirteen gave a fairly clear statement to romano prodi of russia's issue interests involved here

. unfortunately i don't think this warning was sufficiently considered but once you get to the events that followed it you know i can't i find it very unfortunate and find it hard to agree with the course chosen now you argue in your book that this new rig division of your of that we are now observing has been largely on in time that it's the result of many misguided decisions on both or perhaps even more sides and the father danica here in strategy and i think many in russia would find it hard to accept. even if there weren't any explicit r.c. kill a death policy to disadvantage russia wasn't that still an implicit bias that was shaping the western decisionmaking well no i don't think i know there were individuals you can find but you can find individuals i met them in russia in the ninety's and the two thousands who didn't want to have anything to do with us as americans even know there were there was

a policy of cooperation with us in many fields so. i think we tried to make it work and i think there were bad decision for the i think there were also decisions taken that we simply did not expect some of the effects the that came from them and put us on a path that it was hard to move off of the it ended up somewhere where we really did not wish to go if if there is a point where disagreements became sharper and more difficult for russia was as the e.u. and nato expanded and got into the near abroad and became more active in the near abroad from the very beginning the near abroad was especially important place for russia in the ninety's when this found more acceptance in the west the western countries actually. accepted and cooperated with the russian peacekeeping operation for example enough. after two thousand and three two thousand and four you don't

find this in the attitudes of nato e.u. countries towards russian involvement and up to see isha so there's a change on on both parts russia become sharper and more defensive as the e.u. and nato become closer and more involved in this area and i think from my perspective of having worked there with this this was the single greatest point or region of disagreement between russia and the united states and its allies i often hear from your american and european colleagues how russia hates the liberal democratic order and i personally find it extremely perfect indistinct because what russia hates is not so much that people democracy but the vac lists and sometimes very bloody foreign policy that the west allows itself on dead the banner of a liberal democracy do you think that may have figured in russia's decision making and russia over nato moving ever closer to its borders and nato having.

discussions with neighborhood countries not the democratic factor not the night eligible factor but the simple security factor russia fearing nader and fearing that it will bring the same logic. and leave that to be partially sewing in afghanistan closer to russia there may have been some concern on that and certainly nato geographic reach and expeditionary military capabilities were not there in one nine hundred ninety but by two thousand and ten were considerable so there was a big transformation in nato. many westerners are not as conscious of but then again what was nato a threat to russia russia cooperated with nato and i remember putin after being elected to his third term went to the duma and defended offering. an airbase in

russia and then the trend that we're going to see you know you have this saying in russian keep your friends close but keep your enemies even closer i don't think putin referred to us as an enemy of nobody in that like you always are very serious out of this thread i thought i know but i know i mean the cooperation of russia with the united states on afghanistan listed a long time into a period where and i've myself was visiting the ministry of defense here in two thousand and eleven and asked military colleagues from russia if they perceived any military threat from europe and their answer was no but i mean i think when you talk about this from the like that you know you're talking about nato as an institution but i think what russia has also observed is western countries sometimes acting extremely approach mystically because i mean and put inside that on a number of occasions they didn't have to push what happened in ukraine so much there were elections coming anyway yannick office would have lost those elections but

there's a perception i think in the kremlin death whenever an opportunity arises the west just cannot how. regimes that it doesn't like for the sake of a bigger kaos well i think there's also a perception among some in the kremlin that the west prompted the demonstrators to come out and i don't believe that's true we did support and american politicians individually and some by policy supported the demonstrators and in this sense be became partisan in that but you know they they are there are there have been other support put in support of young a call bichon two thousand and four i remember him campaigning for unocal that so you know that this this this is a complicated question i think in general some colleagues in moscow over emphasize western involvement and under emphasize the ability of local populations to mount protests themselves just as some in the west may overestimate

moscow's hand in something or underestimate the west sensibilities for not a very thoughtful policy let's put it this way mr hill we have to take a very short break now but they've all been back in just a few moments states and. nobody could see coming that false confessions would be that prevalent in this population a problem for the bridge books any interrogations out there what you'll see is threat promise threat promise threat lie a lie a lie the process of interrogation is designed to put people in just that frame of mind make them one comfortable make them want to get out and don't take no for an answer don't accept their denials he said there are ways to cooperate send

a statement then i would be home by that. the next day there's a culture are on accountability and police officers know that they can engage in misconduct that has nothing to do with all the gun crime. because there's survival guide up stacy just like malls and stores simply travel the service. he shoots knows they're going to get a pass. good says a repatriation scheme will get the rest to seven years. still if the separate cars tries to report. welcome back to worlds apart with william hale global fellow at the wilson center

and the author of no place for russia mr hill in your book you claimed what happened in crimea and what transpired later on in the ukraine in two thousand and fourteen and later changed the post cold war security order that existed in in europe for two decades and the new order is still undefined what are some of the forces some of the trends some of the factors that may shape the evolution of this new order the questions remain first of all what is russia is relationship with those european countries and the united states going to be i mean the chief one but along with that given events that have occurred twenty fifteen and since then what is the future of the european union just what what will a merge from breck said from the refugee issue and from european discussions

of their internal governance and finally after the election of president trump what is the u.s. is future what are its intentions about its presence in europe which has been there since one nine hundred forty five i have and we don't know the answer to any of those questions and the others will pursue some of those questions. you mention in your book that. the russians on a number of occasions proposed the creation of the european security council the idea that was dismissed at the time but more recently were heard from the chancellor of germany angela merkel a similar idea the security council for the e.u. a framework that will still exclude russia but do you think that is something that could lead us. to the right direction well i think we need some forum. we meaning all of us the united states europe and russia some forum in which representatives can gather and have

a full voice in order to debate questions of european security and take decisions with which all of the participants are going to be content in which they will observe the question is what will this be do we reform leo aceee do we start from the beginning and build some new party new new organization should this be done in the context of the un all of us see in the early one nine hundred ninety s. was structured in the un context this is something that i think european countries and the united states and canada need to get together and discuss because the system we can we started to construct in one nine hundred eighty nine ninety ninety one is no longer working and we're back to a divided europe so we need to look at ways that we can get out of this and that division line i would argue exists not only bit in russia and western europe but to some extent it's already being built it's been the e.u.

and the united states european pronouncements for more security south sodomy for a european army i think they're clearly triggered by the change in the white house but the quick my question to you is whether you think the europeans are still hoping to kind of wait don't they'll trump out or should we take them as a real substantive change in the european security pose i don't think the europeans have made a decision on that on what how long or what sort of direction the trumpet ministration is going to continue in and what they want to do with this what what i see from my perspective i participated in some very sharp negotiations with our european allies in particular friends. beginning of the one nine hundred ninety s. where there was deep disagreement over whether european europe should have a separate security organization and military force or whether this should be done in the context of nato it took over fifteen years to resolve this question finally

resolved with the berlin plus and then with the lisbon treaty in two thousand and nine which has a formal relationship between nato and the european union but it seems what's happened over the last couple of years may have opened this question or a successor question to this opened it up again you mentioned this tension between the united states and france and i've heard some people say that. we may see another episode of that coming mr trump reacts very angrily. pronouncements for an independent european army and i think on some level it's pretty understandable because if that idea were to be realized france as a major arms supplier as the only nuclear power of remaining within the e.u. would be the main benefactor of that it would not only be the bad drop of that new army but also the main supplier which may disadvantage the united states economically de thing. we can see that rivalry for the rights to provide

security for europe emerged it's been the united states and france i don't know where the personal dynamics between presidents trump and mccrone is going to go and . i'm not sure that this is what i do know from having worked closely i've had french students every year for several years of work closely with the french over a long time the french have been close allies we don't always see eye to eye but this is because the french are very self-reliant they're very capable and they have their own strong views at times and sometimes we have to settle differences between us we've always been able to. do this but part of the french worry has been from the end of the cold war that the united states this is oversimplifying but the united states may not always stay in europe and europe needs to be able to defend itself so it should have

a capability that it can draw on and the french have been the strongest in this train of thought. and this may be now coming up again in europe as some pronouncements of the trumpet ministration have raised doubt about the u.s. the devotion of the u.s. to nato i should say this is now all still at the level of statements because the actions are still nato new u.s. and nato allies are still acting very much together but it comes out of it's been a constant argument since the end of the cold war and i suppose it'll always be there because there's that natural for the united states to be in europe forever well i mean on some level it's very beneficial economically and if you go to much of welcomed it. because of conditions at the time and eventually some time whether it's a century or two centuries a thousand years in the future it will change but it hasn't right now and that's so

we're dealing with. an argument on a tendency and a worry but it hasn't gone much beyond that in my perception now for us russians it's very hard to figure out what's going on and it made it because in the one had to be going to witness this. the americans and the europeans bickering over an eight hour expenses but on the other hand you they have intensified their exercises alongside the russian border used to work for an aide to write or advise me i've been yes worth in the context not formally in nato staff but yes definitely from your understanding who is calling the shots at nato right now it's not it's no longer trump the trumpet ministration right one may. nato. i mean nato operates by consensus. and it's very it is still it is pummeling france is a complicated to explain how you know the u.s. has great influence in nato but when you talk about the u.s.

officials you're not talking about the white house or is it some other. day i was a large bureaucracy and there are ministers from the u.s. and nato staff from the u.s. speak also because large portions of u.s. policy are supportive of nato. in the trump administration many official senior officials in the trump administration are supportive of nato we in the u.s. have always complained about europeans not paying enough i have a very close friend who sat behind jr diplomat larry eagleburger who later became secretary of state who complained to the europeans in one nine hundred seventy one that they weren't paying enough have been present when we have told the europeans they should pay more and we're still telling them that. you know. different americans evaluate this differently personally i think for us nato is

a bargain now since the events in ukraine russia's security posts hast changed dramatically partially because of its intervention in syria partially because of the development of a new generation of weapons i think russia feels far less insecure of these of the nato now than it was let's say five six years ago do you think the russia of two thousand and eighteen presents the same problem for nader as it was let's say in two thousand and fourteen maybe the russia prison presents a different problem because i don't think we are fully sure of russia's intentions i'm not terribly worried by all of the capabilities. although i have colleagues who might denounce me for that russia was always right the russian military deteriorated terribly at the end of the soviet union and russia was always going to

rebuild its military because a country the size of russia needs a competent military you have an enormous border you need to provide for its defense this is natural the question is how can we the united states and russia construct a relationship where we are both confident of the intentions or more confident of the intentions of the other so that we're not worried right now i mean i think the situation is still although it's good it's not good at all it's still not anywhere near as bad as it was during the cold war when the level of military confrontation was much higher but we need to start talking with each other about the systems we're building where we put them how we operate them how to create transparency and confidence it's not that we shouldn't have weaponry but it we should make sure that our counterparts understand why we have it and when and where we would use it and that that's something that we need to work on now. we are starting right now would

not be too early well. very out forward looking. let's leave it here i really appreciate you coming into the studio and sharing some of your insights minutes thanks very much for having me i encourage our viewers to keep this conversation going in our social media pages and hope to see you again same place same time here in a while the part. pranking

gave america a lot of job opportunities i needed to come up here to make some money i could make twenty five thousand dollars as a teacher or i could make fifty thousand dollars a year in trucks or chose to drive a truck people rush to a small town in north dakota was among the employment rate of zero percent like the gold rush is very very similar to a gold rush but this beautiful story ended with pollution and a lot of people have left here i don't know too many people here anymore just slowed down too much they lost their jobs got laid off the american dream is changing that's not what it used to be. and it's a tough reality to deal. so what we've got to do is identify the threats that we have it's crazy confrontation let

it be an arms race. spearing dramatic development only closely i'm going to resist i don't see how that strategy will be successful very. time to sit down and talk. when i go to camp sundown to get for people that can. and they're like so vampires. this is like a safe house i guess they don't have to talk about what they go through with us because we understand her daughter katie was diagnosed with a very rare sun sensitive condition if i get sunburned i heal she doesn't feel patients when they have problems with the doctor talk to some of the brains that are actually shrinking inside the still gets flicker in the brain still small. the pain is indescribable it's. feels like

a really really bad chemical burn but it goes through your skin in your muscle all the way down to the bone. there is no relief. we're not to sure this is just. subscribing to rob people also get all rocky colds and for just twelve euros fifty per month. david honestly mr paul used the words have the cards for him differently then there's a chance they may have been prevented.