which side will have the strongest appeal figures including a former prime minister, condemn reports that the country soldiers tortured and murdered dozens of afghan civilians. we heard from people in kabul, who say they want justice policies, not the solution. no afghan foreign powers to control the country. don't think geez enough. but french catholics rally against a ban on religious gatherings during the lockdown amid a surge in cold cases. one worshiper pointed to disturbing historical parallels in french history. this isn't the 1st time that going to mass has been considered

illegal, or the churches have been locked. or that going to mass could be considered a crime. and rescuers from countries including russia help refugees to return and rebuild their homes. but many find it. i've got nothing to return to there's a full news program coming your way in just under 60 minutes. but right now let's get ready for a little and welcome across your all things are considered. what can we expect from a bygone ministration when it comes to russia as things and today,

relations are ever brought bottom biden's orbit is replete with hard liners in neo cons with a long record of foreign policy failure. could relations continue to get worse to discuss this and more i'm joined by my guest. michael o'hanlon in washington is a senior fellow and director of research in the foreign policy program at brookings, as well as author of beyond nato, a new security architecture for eastern europe, also in washington. we have brian becker, he's the executive director of answer coalition. and in moscow we cross to maxine should go, he is an expert at the russian international affairs council originally crossed out rules in effect. that means you can jump in anytime you want and i always appreciate it. ok, let me go to maxime 1st here in moscow. by all accounts, we're going to have a, by ministration end january. now given the background of the russia gate hysteria

hoax and the antipathy and really deep hatred of russia in the american political class and particularly the media here. what is, what is the kremlin expecting in january when it comes to american foreign policy towards your country go ahead. 1st of all, i think the relationship between the united states and russia would have continued to deteriorate anyway, regardless of who would end up in the white house. and especially seeing the acts that stations are peter, listen, our viewers to by and ministration on to on to particular issue as long as you mentioned, mention in your introduction, the intersection is filled with people with, with all kind of long, long record deep criticism to put it very mildly explores russia and, you know, ideas on military interventions, but most importantly, i think, given that they do, the united states is divided now politically and ideologically and socially. what unites them pratik,

the administration under the biden. and under my rule is that they think that democracy at home and abroad is in danger. you know, it's under pressure from what they call the populists inside the west and or elsewhere. it's very leaders outside the west and latin or putin is clearly, you know, sitting up on both accounts of someone, someone to tackle. so i expect it'll be a lot of pressure on moscow over in a human rights actors and things like this. and the 2nd goal and wish makes people in and policymakers and in moscow particularly, you know, critical or, you know, here's the most of what may be expected. is that under a truck, it was the that the following that the world war 2 united states policy was been based upon 2 pillars, you know, predominance and litter ship and truck kind of maintained the predominance component ones into how the united states strong militarily economically. but you kind of doubled down on what is perceived as litter ship, you know, in his view, kind of not willing to, to carry the burden for,

for the allies. and i think under the administration, you would see the 1st 2 to reinforce american standing on both the leadership and predominance and russia. here is again, maybe viewed as a particularly a challenge. so if you give me in this area, you speak like a diplomat. what? cave? one thing in a diplomatic words. michael, how, how do you see it? i mean, is it by just going to revert back to the policy that obama had? and because a lot of people around biden are people who are around obama. ok, and i think it's very fair to call them hardliners and the neocons ratings. greatest fear, thanks for having me back on. it's nice to be with you again and friends in russia and around the world. you know, i'm a little more hopeful in the sense that there are a couple of reasons i'm more hopeful. one is we actually aren't talking nearly as much about russia. and as you say, russia gay as we had been, i think that 19 has taken over

a lot of the oxygen in the room. the donald trump presidency, which as you know, is very controversy over here. whether you like him or not, it was controversy. understand how the issue has been a little less in the front and center. secondly, i don't think the biden team would see any great benefit to having a showdown with. i mean, people have lowered expectations, of course, of what this relationship can be. but it doesn't mean that they really see an opportunity for a 0 sum competition in america's favor. the places we are presently locking horns, which are largely in eastern europe and the broader middle east are areas that by and i think we'd like to minimize is engaged in because there's no real benefits at hand in getting more involved in those places. and the last point i'll make and other way i don't dismiss any of your concerns, i'm just trying to give a little bit of a, of a sort of slightly more hopeful spent. i don't know if bill burns, for example, will have a role in this administration, the former deputy secretary of state, but he's well regarded in the democratic party circles. and i'm not sure if you had

a chance to read his book yet the back channel, but it's a very sophisticated view of the u.s. russia relationship, which may be more critical of certain russian officials than, than some of your listeners may prefer. but it's not devoid of sort of a broader historical perspective on russia and its pride as a nation, its rights as a nation and how we have to rethink the u.s. russia relationship going forward. so someone like bill burns has influence, but i'm a little more hopeful as well. that will hopefully it's not susan rice. brian, let me go to you, let me read some words from the, from joe biden here on the campaign trail. this is from the spring here, we must impose real costs on russia, parents, violations of international norms, norms, really, an stand was russian civil society, which is bravely said no time and again against president vladimir putin's apostrophe authoritarian system. that's the mindset of the next president is going to be dealing with russia, not all in my mind. it's a, it's a bit hard to say,

although i agree with you, generally speaking, i mean, think about when, when the biden obama team came into the white house in 2009, the 1st one, the 1st absolutes, do have hillary clinton go. and when that big red button robin said, let's press the reset button. and it was clear that the obama and the obama biden ministration were hopeful that there would be an improvement in u.s. russian relations. in other words, it's not an existential ideological orientation. on the part of what's changed is the political atmosphere in the united states since 2009, such that anyone who speaks up in favor of an improvement in u.s. russian relations will be tarred as some, some kind of puppet, for putin or, or a proxy for the kremlin and so i think the language on the campaign trail may well reflect this general atmosphere,

such that biden can't say anything about the improvement of relations. the real issue is why did the relationship deteriorate? why did we go from that big red reset button to immediate sort of degeneration or devolution in the relationship? and i think there's 22 issues there. one is what happened in syria, where russia came in and made it clear that the russians would like their position on libya, where they abstained at the u.n. . they were going to make a decisive intervention. this say no, we're not going to allow regime change to be taken to take place against the us, a government. and then of course, the coup d'etat in february 2014 in ukraine, which was considered by russia. now actually to be hyper aggressive on the part of the, of the, of the obama administration. and because russia stood up and said, no look, crimea is not created, be turned into a nato base. that will was considered to be a cardinal sin. the question is,

for biden, in the team, do they accept the fact that russia actually has legitimate national and regional interests and will they accept that or not? or do they want to continue down this path of hyper aggressive demonization? maybe perhaps because america needs big enemies like china and russia to justify the looting of the national treasury, which is actually what's going on by the continued increase in military spending. you know, max might seem we already heard it from brian here. i mean, when i, when i look at american foreign policy makers in the media, there is this run for, or i don't, the top that russia has no legitimate security interest of its own. it's almost taken as a given. and i find it so bizarre because everything, every country, every nation state has interest in it will obviously pursue it. but russia, when it tries to pursue its, it is somehow some kind of rogue character on the international stage. i mean,

do you find that frustrating? i do find it frustrating a limit to govern what bryce said and kind of go back to what michael's talking about. i think that what my whole brian described actually under obama, the real issue was, would on a very negative trajectory. and this crisis that you described, syria, you're crazy, are still there. and you know what michael says, c.u.z. is more optimistic outlook for what may come next for us. fresh relations. i'd love to side with him, but i just don't see any objective grounds for, for this optimism. simply because i do really, of that. russia may be a lesser of a domestic issue for the united states for now. now that the democrats control the white house, but i think russia will return to where it has been ever since pretty much 2008, if not earlier, as a key geo strategic adversary for the united states. and can i take people like

tony blinken or michelle flournoy who may be you know, all occupy positions? somebody defense secretary national security advisor one day when the lincoln, for instance, the biden team should revise. what he sees was the major blunder of the obama administration, which is serial policies will lead a lot of syrian opposition groups down. and, you know, when people in moscow hear this use, the question is, what do we make of? it doesn't mean that the united states is there, went back to, you know, reinforce, it's not to do anything, anything constructive, but just to know play game up. denial of the michael, michael, do you think that maybe by an illustration is going to take another swing at regime change in syria because we're always told it because of the of the russians. ok, i mean is this, are we just going to have a reset back to 2016? go ahead max and you raise an interesting question, but i've heard tony blinken talk about this as well. and my interpretation of where

tony is coming from. i've known tony for 20 some years. he's a very humble guy, and when i heard him talk about syria, it was more to criticize the united states early east as much to criticize the united states as to criticize russia. in the sense that tony knows, this was not a stellar accomplishment of the obama administration. anything at all that happened within syria. and you can be critical of russia's policy and also be critical of america's policy. i think that's where tony blinken would put himself also. i think he knows enough to know this is just simply not worth going back to. i mean, what are we going to do? a restart, a civil war that's already been the most tragic of the 21st century. whatever your take on why it got so bad and who is most at fault, there is no good to come from starting it over again. you know, i see no reason to think you would you think that by ministration to do the right thing and remove troops from syria, which are there uniquely under international law. i'm not sure that's the right thing. as long as we don't know how to vouch for the well being of the syrian kurds . so i think with,

we'll try to do is see if there can be some kind of that autonomy arrangement that protects those northeastern syrian kurds. and if they can get that, then i think they would be content to leave. that would be my best guess. ok. right . and it's all about the kurds. ok. they fight. but i mean there's, there's plenty of resentment that they've lost after this huge effort. they lost in syria and they want their revenge. it seems clear to me 30 seconds. go to you, brian. before we go to break, i don't think there is any revenge. i think i might go on that. i think the civil war has basically ended. there was a military victory for the assad government. it's egg on the face of the united states, but it's not the central issue for the united states. syria is for american foreign policy. something of a side show, not, of course for the syrians. so i don't think that this is going to be the dominant issue going forward. i don't think well, talk about we'll talk about many issues. when we come back here gentlemen, we're going to go to a short break and i think that's, a break. we'll continue our discussion, the u.s. russia relations stay with r.t.

keyser apart many, many times because game theory will jump to the sovereign level and you have global hash wars. countries will need to strategically geo politically get into a big point. and this is what's happening in the united states right now with all those in the bull, but at least the 2 big city, bright lights, huge opportunities and many dangers are going to be restricted to blatantly to it's also a city where up to $300000.00 crimes are committed every year for the movie must win, but it will get you most need still to the reserve least one police officer 200

residents in russia's capital cost on the wish to me that i will not go up boysen for the trip because i'm going to most welcome to cross now where all things are considered, i'm peter loyal to remind you, we're just discussing a by foreign policy towards russia.

when i was going back to maxine makes, what could the united states and russia work on? i mean, when we have a divided opinion on this program so far, i don't think that the biden ministration is going to break with the past. you know, hating russia, hating putin, pays a modicum of dividends. stepping out of line. there's huge penalties here. so what can the u.s. and russia were going together with this soviet union, ideological photo of the united states? those 2 entities did accomplish many things together. go ahead, measure it, right? i think hold our skin troll. and the proliferation of the start treaty is one thing when people frequently mention when they talk about any potential for cooperation between the 2, between moscow and washington. and obviously, you know, well geithner will come to office sue weeks before the start treaty expires. so he promised an automatic proliferation of the treaty,

so that may be an optimistic note. that said, however, if we kind of hunch, flip the coin and look at it differently. this will pretty much exhaust the if we construct this agenda for us, russian relations in the early or early next year or so after the prohibition of the treaty, you don't really have anything substantial to talk about. now you, you know, you may have 5 years or 3 years when you're dependent, not on one for a long. the treaty may be prolonged for us to discuss, you know, concrete matter. solve the treaty, me think about, you know, other armstrongs related issues, but. 2 i would think that united states will still want to f. china in the treaty and russia will continue. other things like the open skies treaty that now russia, you know, pressure on the europeans to provide some guarantees that you know, american aircraft are not going to fly over the russian territory. tons of things flaws you have in the bite. in this regime, people who can very critical of russia's own kind of record keeping with the, with this arms control deal. so there is deep, you know,

divide and also distrust. and you mentioned, you know, the wrapper between this audience and americans. and you remember, and all of you remember, i'm sure they do reconcile and they're going to have to trust. but verify. i think honor by the industry in the long local the slogan, don't trust an reverify as far as arms control are, are concerned. so i'm pretty, pretty pessimistic on that account as well. may go further than the arms control. plus you have this initiative by trump on the modernization of american nuclear arsenal. militarization of space. and i think these things are there to say, even though you know, there are talks that biden the stray, she may cut the defense budget and spend it on climate change for answers are all the matters. i think it's still, you know, given that there's been an attempt on carly one to stray, she's going to retreat american commitments to transit to foreigners. there might

be again, a new kind of mentions for confrontation between the 2 countries. even even though it may have been a small remote michael, it's talk about what you know, what can be done. i mean, i brought up the example of the soviet union in united states and they were focused for maybe what we call the cold war here. but they still worked on agreements to their mutual benefit. and historically speaking, arms control agreements, people kind of like ok, i mean if you know you, people on the fringes, a don't like them here can, can these kind of things be done? also, i want to reiterate counterterrorism and climate change. can these things be done in isolation and this we lation ship just, you know, laser focus on those things here and not touch the rest of the toxic relationship, but i think it's going to be toxic for at least another generation. how i think that is possible, as long as things don't get worse in other domains at the same time. so if we had an intensifying confrontation, somehow in the broader middle east,

somewhere it would be hard to simultaneously pursue even a modest arms control agenda. but if we can sort of just more or less stabilize the competition, so to speak, not end it and not agree on everything, but just not see things deteriorate from libya to syria, to elsewhere. maybe get some cooperation on iran. maybe get some cooperation on a new start. maybe china simply signs on to say they're not going to build up their arsenal. they don't have to be a full party to the treaty. but they could make some kind of an attach statement that would bring them in some broader sense, but allow the focus to stay on the u.s. and russia. and then peter, as you know, one of my big concerns is the security architecture for eastern europe. and here i think what the best concept that i can come up with is to get some of the wise men and women on both sides, like on our side, sam, non military, people who have a thoughtful perspective on russia who understand a little bit of russia's history, its view of itself as a great power in eurasia, and have them talk with some of their counterparts in russia and start to sink

about how we could build a new security architecture concept without bringing the government in right away because it's going to be too much if not all the russians have been proposing this since the year 2000. ok. i mean, it's the russian side that has been saying this year that at the same time, you know, it's like, it's a unit party when it comes to form homeless being. and then you still have these voices, you know, we have to bring in georgia. we have to bring in ukraine into it, into nato, who knows, maybe armenia as well here. that's, that's a one way conversation. you know, brian, i have to be convinced, i have to be convinced that you seem to downplay the syrian, the situation. i think they can be easily ignited again at low cost for the united states and a high cost for russia and a high cost per syria and the region just to be intentionally keeping in a quagmire. and i'm quoting a famous policymaker quagmire. all right, also in ukraine. ok. more arms, the ukraine. the point isn't it?

what's to stop the biden ministration in and the people that have it out for russia and it's very clear the public record is very clear. just so you know, this keeps still going. the, the efforts of destabilization in ukraine in syria here. and for them it's a low cost and it's a headache for russia best. that seems to be the overall theme that i get from these people disagree with me. no, i don't. i actually don't disagree with you and i, i don't mean to actually say that syria is off the table as a flashpoint or renewable for intensifying hostility. but it may not be quite, even if it's not what's with driving us policy now, is really the new pentagon doctrine. the new pentagon doctrine was adopted as a consensus position without any substantial debate. i mean, just think of it, we went from the war on terror identifying except as the principal enemy to

identifying major power conflict as the top priority for contingency, plenty budgeting, prioritization, in terms of military plans. the adoption again, without consensus that the outer space treaty of 967 should be essentially scrapped, in the u.s. should adopt a position of gaining absolute supremacy and dominance in outer space. the new high ground for the next wars. i mean what's going on in the arctic? i mean, we have, the pentagon is driving us policy here in the pentagon doctrine is actually sort of an altar at which all of the politic it's genuflect. and as a consequence, biting whether it's into the lincoln or michelle floor, know it or susan rice, whether somebody's a little bit more liberal or a little bit more hardline. i don't think that really matters. i think it's the pentagon doctrine, which is to prepare this country for a conflict with china and russia, even if they don't want

a war. the whole tendency in trajectory is towards confrontation. that leaves little room for people who are advocating for reconciliation or rapprochement to, or detente, or finding points of unity so such that if there's an arms control agreement or the us returns the pairs climate talks, i don't think it's going to fundamentally alter the new orientation of extreme animus and hostility towards russia, even if it's not all of the atmospherics, that's going to continue because that's the pentagon doctrine, which drives us foreign policy. no, i want the part from that, you know, actually in the waning days of visit ministration here and i'm sure you're well aware of it is that trump has been fighting tooth and nail to get american troops out of afghanistan and, and iraqi air. and, and i'm kind of echoing what bryant is that here, that the, the pain, the pentagon's going to do what it wants to do in respect of what the president

apparently wants to do, that should send chills down everyone's back because it doesn't matter what the president did not if they say joe biden might have friendly tweets. ok, but i'm not agreeing with brian. the policy isn't going to fundamentally change. and i'd like to point out, you know, if i can just say personally as an american living in russia for 22 years. i've come to the conclusion, maxine that the u.s. and russia don't have to be friends, but they certainly should never be enemies. these go through, i equal that sentiment actually double down on the argument in syria and ukraine in particular in any other regional conflict. obviously, i share the view that so there is little self interests. as far as american national interests are concerned for the united states in syria or in ukraine for that matter. neither syria nor ukraine heard about syria and ukraine. in my view, it's really about truth as we in moscow see it is that we're most wallace makers

and moscow says it is very, it's about so you know, the vision and washington that russia is in challenging american literature. then standing in the international arena and as one senior official from the obama national security council remarks speaking in moscow, i think it was 2017 that it simply would not, not react to russia's actions in syria because it would set a dangerous precedent. say for china to challenge an american sending in the index if it were to sell east asia. so there has to be action against russia on these theaters if only to sustain and reinforce american standing in the world. and i think given that the american position is weakened over the past few years, so they'll be a significant effort to get us back in the game. and you get pretty much kind of all wind in the old and new bottles which say michael, you and you've been on this program many times. and i think you and i would both agree that there's a lack of trust. how do we get around?

it is it up a long time period? how? how do these 2 countries regained some trust? one minute to you, michael, go ahead. i think you begin with people who are not sitting in the oval office and the kremlin. i think that expected biden putin are going to be buddies, is unrealistic. there's too much water under the bridge. there are too many fundamental disagreements. what you begin with are people who care about the relationship and understand a little bit about each other's country. and that's why i talk about people like sam nunn and bill perry, and then you begin to develop an agenda off of that. the beginning of the con,, station is not. how do we solve issue x. y. or z.? the beginning of the conversation is to take a bigger view, a longer view of how we got to where we are. so that's the best i can do, but i would make that more than just some small little, you know, occasional dialogue off. you're on the side, i would make sure that both sides report back to their leadership in the congress and you know, and from london white house,

i would make sure that russians were for 2 americans and vice a versa, and try to elevate. i have a dialogue about the my 1st dialogue will end on the point where i want to thank my guests in washington, washington, and most i want to thank our viewers for watching us here. are you seeing next time? remember during the vietnam war, u.s. forces also bombs neighboring laos. there was a secret war. and for years, the american people did not know how much the mouse had rebound country, per capita, all human history, millions of unexploded bombs still in danger. lives in this small agricultural country, jordyn wieber thing going on. you cannot tap that thing even today,

kids in laos full victim to bombs dropped decades ago. is the us making amends for that tragedy in laos? what help do the people need in that little land of mines newly elected us presidents invariably, vell to steer the country in a fresh, bold direction. this time though, things may be a bit different, at least on foreign policy. joe biden has promised to reengage with allies and restore the us his position as leader of the democratic world. now, will the biden administration befall him on the global stage? will we see a new approach or a return to the old ways.