ah, hello, and welcome to cross talk where all things are considered on peter level in terms of security and defense, europe stands at a crossroads. should outdated cold war air structures be maintain like nato in over reliance on the u. s. or should europe define and shoulder responsibilities for its own defense? and what about russia? ah, to discuss these issues and more, i'm joined by my guess when decent in oslo, he is a professor at the university of se or norway as well as author of the book, great power politics in the 4th industrial revolution. and here in moscow we have maxine schwarzkopf, he is the director of the center for advanced american studies at moscow state institute of international relations. hi gentlemen, crosswalk rose in effect. that means you can jump anytime you want and i always

appreciate it again. let's go to glen 1st here and you know, glen where does, where does your stand right now? because, you know, it's 30 years after the cold war. we still have nato, but we have a lot of the cold war agreements like on missiles and defense and things like that are either been ordered or being reassessed, but this isn't the cold war here. nato is not interested in, in negotiating. missile treaties are not interested in pan european security arrangements. mean it seems to me from an outsider, looking in europe, is kind of stuck it, it cherishes what was, but it doesn't seem to work forward in the present your thoughts. i green, it has to be point out that we, we were working towards the pan european security architecture for many years. and so the main breakthrough happened in 1975 was the helsinki courts introducing the concept that the european security should rest on the concept of one side should

not expand their security at the expense of other side. so indivisible security of this agreement was important for pan european security calls to play the foundation for negotiating them of the cold war in 1089. and this was then further developed in 1990 with the charter, paris for new york. and then finally, by 1994, it was created a common european security institution, which also is the and again, the key principle throughout this whole time, europeans secured our agreements was always the concept of indivisible, security. however, then in the 1990 s, russia became severely weakened and this is when effectively in the west. we realized though, we don't actually have to listen to them anymore. and this is when we began to expand nato, and that has to be a point to how that made the expansion is. therefore, in violation of the principle of indivisible security of breaching every single time european security agreement, we've had it, which has been the foundation for stable europe. and this is why predictably,

the stability of europe is pioneer beam as basis now collapsing again. we're going to break the agreements. this charity will no longer be there. well, let me maxine, but this is not the 19 nothing. d's has the 2nd decade of the 21st century and rushes saying no and, and what we get from european security structures, primarily nato, is that there's a, i was going to say inclusive, but actually it's an explicit denial of brushes on security interest. and this is the, the conundrum that we're in right now because russia saying you have to respect our security too. but nato's it. but we're only, it depends the alliance will, you know, i want to ask both of you. i've never heard of any defensive lines. the constantly is expanding at the expense of others. go ahead back. see, i think there is a broader understanding here in moscow that when we say, you know, it's really for america press in europe and therefore there is little

incentive for moscow to sheet any security arrangements on bilateral basis for being nations and rather gaps, washington, to talk about this issue seriously, if i were to continue kind of a, you know, timeline to decline provided i think ever since the breakup of the soviet union in the end of bipolar system. there were 2 major milestones in russia supposed to need one actually, you know, 1290 nice. when there was this honeymoon promissory, as mosque wanted to be great in this, you atlantic security juice and was talking about discovery has fewer insecurity structure and did not work out. and i think it ended with speech by president in 2007. you know, the new wave of the me to russia, russia west relations for more conflict with georgia. regular liter mentioned other

things and eat in the crisis unit. great. in 2014, our seems to was the 3rd wave of major conflict between russia to particular that is now i fear, i really don't want for anything bad to happen, but i hear it very much. looks like it's going to be pitching in some other major kind of 3rd crisis. well, you know, like in class, i mean, you started out with these, these pan european, the security structures. mean, why wouldn't that be in europe's interest? i mean, i, and i don't understand it. i mean, if you're everyone is recognizing of the security interests of all others, isn't that the best of all possible worlds? because we're in the exact opposite right now. we're only one block of country security is to find the others are denied. i mean, i, i don't understand what, why think europe is so against this. go ahead. no. and then this is the problem. this is the security dilemma. if you deny the opponent security,

they will have to act in the way which undermines your security. so. so this all and what we have this monitor now in the west where we say we, we can't do that. that's exactly what put in one spot. but then we, we should be doing that if we allow russia top security and then we can have a stable european security architecture. so again, i think we close ourselves a bit too much in ideology from the 1990s. and now when we talk about the basic foundations of european security agreements, such as, you know, don't expand the security of expense, or we now refer through it us. no, no, that would mean accepting a russian stair of influence. so russia should not be allowed to tell you what to do and effectively what we've done. this was shifted the narrative because what all pan european security agreement state is that the security blogs have certain responsibility neighbor shouldn't offer a membership to ukraine. but instead of made of frames or russia, the nice ukraine, the right to accept this membership of the problem is

a nice way for natal. effectively make itself a 3rd party. and so instead of being the main instigator of instability in europe, it says i should putting it on the sideline thing. i know this is a conflict. 14, for example, russia, ukraine is trying to curb it's sovereignty and we're just standing on the sidelines standing up for security and rights and you know, the do, the, this usual stuff. so i think it, i think with that the europeans realize that this con, continue bug. i think you 1st to long made or up to cells in this ideology, which we can get away. i don't the best i can stay with you, glen. i mean, i, you know, the, making the claim that russia is, is staking a sphere of influence. but is that exactly what nato under the leadership of the united states is doing? it staked out it's sphere of influence and is even saying it will expand that fear of influence even further. you mentioned ukraine. i mean they're, they're, they're, um, they're, they're accusing a one side who is doing something when they're doing it themselves. keep going, glen. well,

this does seem like projection because in 2014 right before the nato countries to part of the, the cool in ukraine. and ukraine and russia, they came to the ear and they pledged like an hour begged to come up please. let's find the trilateral agreement between you, your korean and russia. so no one has exclusively influence over ukraine, like just to partner between 3 entities and a no more series of incidents. and you said no, no, that's not acceptable. so, so you're, you're right to buy a, trying to draw ukrainian to nato. it's affecting the making and putting it under us serve influence, which goes against the whole concept of multilateralism wished upon european security architecture was supposed to be based upon so, so no, it is, i think we, we really, we corrupted the language for to, along to the extent of it, it doesn't make any sense or it, maxine, i finding also an oddity that, you know, the, the, it seems to me that it, nato desires insecurity because an insecurity gives it a reason to expand it. they,

we have to secure this, we have to secure that we have to expand, we have to, we bring in more members, but the more they do that, the more they created a very unstable environment. i mean, they're doing exactly the opposite of what they claiming to do. go ahead. maxine, no, what is the matter for all this market? you know, the frequently see that a liberal, like a market driven economy, you don't have to get involved because there's this invisible arm of the market that does the space. and, you know what happens in reality that monopolies get to a control most of the market. so i think in politics in similar fashion, you know, when you see, you don't have to go because, you know, states make their own free choices. so you don't have to tang crating back to you, asian, you more or less is to say their own is their sovereign nation. i think there is a serious degree of tenderness. you know, when, obviously,

you know that there are different or political movements of pressure on this governance and that is done disguised as sovereign choice to join nato or some other was from your organization that is obviously not interested in russia in sturbridge, the russian well ill a glen will also will speak to that because um, you know, lately when you say you start out talking about han europe, ian security, mean you, you, you, guardy gave the historical reference in 2014, 2014 written in basically saying, you know, we every one needs to sit down and look at every one's others interests and then the, the west said no that we, i don't want to use victoria newlands words on this program. we're a family program, but you know what she said about the e u in ago shading a, a settlement that would be a continent would accommodate everyone in ukraine?

well, the problem with the nato frames all its strategic interest in the language of value . so for some of these power in just and by, by saying these are all values, just seeking to found democracy, whatever it makes, very problematic. because if you make a basic fundamental argument that you know us, a stable security architecture needs to respect. but this year to both sides, then suddenly this has been completely new, meaning in this ideology made because now you're saying, oh no way we want, what process demanding is something compromise on their values. so russia seek sphere of influence. we seek democracy. so this is the whole concept of compromise and diplomacy and goes out the window. but again, that is the reason why it was such a demand for this on the all this because nato itself changed. i often make the point that nato could be a source of stability does have to dismantle nest, to go back to what it was, which was the status quo power. he wasn't defensive alliance and just sitting there . but what happened in 99 is to began to expand and also invading other countries

without the you, amanda has wrote, this is what made it became a revisionist, our natal would go back to its original mission. just sit there so that a scope power to go back to being defensive, aligns them. it could be a source of stability. mike's point about that might actually not the endure anymore, because no one is threatening to made nato. so if it's not offensive lines, it would lose its purpose and it might not last. well he, it also, if i can chime in before we go to the break here, there's about 5000 um salaried employees in brussels that work for nato. this is a very lucrative a career for many, many people and not to speak of the army producers as well. this is a good gig or you can use the word grift. i'll leave it up to the viewer to decide . all right, gentlemen, i'm going to jump in here. we're going to go to a short break. and after that short break, we'll continue our discussion on european security. stay with our tea. ah ah,

with a happy hey, a allowable a by then coffee or she home. either by then is or shift the wall or a 1st none more with multiple

multiple engines or mom can connect to so that keeps off your health. but it shows a single source. you say yes, i can put a b who it man a lab with how i did something then say do like a a command maybe, maybe maybe with can oh, failure to allow markets to reflect to market forces has resulted in

a bifurcation in the economy where the most corrupt are rewarded for committing crimes. j. p. morgan being a prime example. and if you have morals or ethics, you're penalized. if you're not out there still stealing alluding, then you're going to be almost not to america today. it's just that a welcome back to cross stock were all things are considered on people bill, this is the home addition to remind you. we're discussing european security a goes go back to maxime here in moscow. at the very end of the 1st part of the program, glenn pointed out nato and it's, it's, is changed. it is now much more in tune with values. can you explain to our

audience? because i don't understand what do so called values in geo political interests and security have with each other because i don't think they have anything to do with each other. and i think that's the problem. go ahead, maxine wirelessly. i mean, there's always this horrible dilemma and we can debate how manufactured the dilemma really is joe politics and strategy of the political military organization. but actually under the cold war, there were a few problems and few ways to we could have the ball, but you know, if you wanted to preserve, like i mentioned in the beginning of our problem, the american military presence in europe. the only way it could have the state was to enlarge in terms of territory and, you know, accept more members and also kind of enlarge politically, try to know and don't more political areas. but most importantly, there's gotta be

a common enemy because any political military organization has to plan. and so i think in making ladies idea that elias was to protect democracy, this lobby was bombed, didn't really play well. and then, you know, all the sudden there was this notion of that need to have to be fighting international churches and all these resources respond to that mission. but that, you know, rational threats. so a was backed into the 4 of the major policy that enabled the requisition to accept members and saying what the problem must wrong some time ago? was it break down or something like that? not the nature is brain dead, keep going. yeah, this is zach. the say, you know,

it was brain dead and in order to get it back in life it needed an enemy. and the idea. busy busy of the united states to have china, to bring china to european here as the enemy didn't really play out quite well. because a lot of european nations changed money and wanted to get, you know, deals with china and economy technology and russia. frunner liaison really well. and all the small faces that come with all his work, some of the seas bring their own historic traumas to the agenda and united states. and that plays well i think the major transatlantic agenda contain and to turn rush, well the and glen i it at the end of the day it's all about a reason for the united states to say in europe. ok. i mean, because, and then they, of course we need that. we have the enemy that was already mentioned there. moscow . ok it's, it's very, very convenient. but it's kind of laziness of the mind. i mean,

it is not really looking at the, the, the geopolitical realities of the present because in europe, in its current security format, with nato. i mean, it's going to push up against russia. a conflict is always possible when they do that. but it, that's what nato is going to be. it's constantly going to be searching for monsters to slay, and that inherently is unstable. but the americans are perfectly fine with it because at the end of the day, a lot of people will probably disagree with me. but they need the u. s. does it really low cost at the end of the day? and so they how they have a unsinkable aircraft carrier on the western part of the region, continent and at low cost. they can um, project power. and that's what it really gets all down to. and again, as i said at the very end of the 1st part of the program, you can't dismiss the in the arms manufacturers and budgets and things like that. i mean, it's quite cynical, but i think you know, most the time in g politics, the most cynical thing is the most obvious thing. go ahead,

glen. well then this was a key discussion to how to worse them of the cobra. good. much made this argument several times as well that if the u. s. and the soviet union would end this confrontation, they would have to recognize that will come at the cost of power as well. that is because the whole, the system which gave us so much power was structured according to this mutual confrontation. and this is one of the reasons why when the soviet union collapsed, us did not have to do so. it's security architecture instead, as you pointed out, they had an incentive to use a nato as a hedge, a monic tool, which means to keep europe divided because it, because in a year divided and you have the russians which become marginalized and less of a role. and then you have the rest of the europeans who become dependent on the united states for security. so for again, i think that's where we also the interest between the u. s. changes at some point because they even have to recognize that by keeping the continent divided in this

way and not having independence being secure. 6 secure architecture, the continental be divided, we can become less and less relevant in the world. so we want to look at their own problems now, but for the us, again, this is the, you know, how the company becomes dependent on the us. the other half is the marginalized. so i think am i, i think it's, we would need the reforms, but to have the reforms, we need to address the challenges which, which were, which were being discussed seriously 30 years ago. but today, and we use this same jargon and you know, a democratic slogan airing actually talking about the it could be clean, i mean, it, if you, if europe is, is being used as a hedge, a monic tool that i agree with that. but this in europe limits options, i mean, because of its dependency. i mean, again, you know, we have 30 years after the cold war. the u. s. is, is a dictating what europe security policy should be. certainly they're trying to do

it with energy here. i can see how it makes europe stronger. it more dependency makes it more irrelevant. can you address that real quick? yeah, no, i agree, but you'll have to see that you have changed his tune a bit like now that you're talking about strategic told me away from us. it's talking about european sovereign. i don't think it can be achieved by the only bit rate. you have a lot of fraud saying, you know, the europeans need their own army, which that means it implies less relies and they don't less influenced by the u. s . i think and there are a lot of, there are people who are noticing that this is a very often but in order to have peace in europe, when do need to keep, the americans are so close friends, but the not this dominant relationship. well, i'm a maxime. could it be any other way? i mean it's very messianic. the with the, the american approach here. i mean they, it's either had gemini or nothing. i, i, i don't, don't see partnerships are they, they use that language all the time, but it's not a partnership of equals. it is,

it's a hedge, a monic and, and, and rushes on. the short end of the stick here. let me ask you, and maxine, i mean, what in russia for russia, from russia's perspective, what would a pan european security structure look like? because the russians have offered it over the last 20 years, a number of times. can you explain? can you explain to me with a leon, security would look like 1st and foremost, it would be your duty or russia happily would be your orders respectful of russia, national interest and security concerns. and that extending nature to most soviet state outside holdings, crane, georgia, and others in particular are the, obviously some of the red lines and must always and will have all looking at them as for anything other than that, i think must again, again,

negotiated to be just that these things don't matter, but if you're looking at it and again, here in moscow, i could see there's a lot of the sense that whatever us do or some medical or could you monitor interest medication. but also that could be the case that the american political lead, last strategic force 5, any indeed and their interest to me in china and russia is anything about them or an interest. but if you're rushing, you know, a trauma on the red lines in terms of security, it is exactly the type of reaction. and then you don't have to be surprised why all of a sudden russia, instead of being part of the solution, is part of the problem. that seems pretty much put me in a plan. they tragic thing here. i mean, a has words matter. words have impact here,

and, you know, i see this inability to se seriously and honestly negotiate because you have been graded. you're the opposite side. so much russia gate obviously didn't help. we were all worried than russia gate would bleed into policy. it certainly has under the binding ministration. you have a lot of the b team from obama. they still have scores to settle. i'm thinking and someone like victoria, you and jake sullivan. people like this. and even, even if it became of absolute necessity to have negotiations, they can't because they can't on ring the bells of the rhetoric that they've been using for a good part of a decade. now address that issue. well, obviously the ross has been demonized so far. now, we don't even talk about russia, we talk about it. so there is no discussion about russia secured the interest personality, you know, what is the thinking and assuming that it's also serving,

so it strikes. but it also has been said though, that the key problem now exactly is because instead of having to go to the main loyalty has to be to nato natal called is the key, the key money that goes on and on again. and there's also the prospect of stability in europe, for example, you know, the simple things like in the non proliferation period and, you know, mobile spreading nuclear weapons. they have very clear rules themselves. so nuclear, the states, but this is the u. s. put in germany and you can reference and belgium italy, netherlands, turkey and, but it says, all this is made nuclear sharing. so it's okay. that makes nato a role military block, say, most of the treaty was supposed to prevent 1st strikes. you will find the 972, all the or p and a post, the americans withdrawing from 2002 but wants to meet natal asset that they're being federal. we have to have the natal solidarity. 6 so now the world for it,

and now we just talk about how paranoid rush heaping with faculty, the same argument arguments, but there being only a few years earlier and he's the same with the i'm f treated america, luckily, withdrawal as well when he's maple solidarity. so we all have to repeat the montrose. no, actually it was the russia who was being the mileage right. let me ask you a quick question. what are we in here? of all the treaties that you just mentioned? russia initially the withdrawal of any of the no, no rush, so follow the grid a, a, b, m i. and so it's, it's, but again, it will, but these are your b and or global security institution. but the problem with our loyalty is always primarily tomato, like a military book in a loyalty from security. that's what we're we heard on this program here. that's all the time we have, gentlemen. i want to thank my guest and i'll slow and here in moscow, and i think our viewers are watching us here at r t. c in exxon. and remember across cycles,

ah ah, i mean with the city delegated, and as you want to talk to, we stand together. we'll continue to stand together against russia even in germany . some of the areas that we doubt this made a note of cds as chunky dawson about their ability to influence other nations, france b, u. k. and even latin america and other countries in ginger than they knew where to high from cycle polluted with members of your household. please, please, please, please. we are to continue to fight with justin to russia. must not

be allowed in germany. or yeah, through common leave it so so also being out in office the yes actually indian 80 the innovation mrs. guns until sunday. mm mm. and i make no certainly no borders. i'm just like to tease and perish as a merge. we don't have a charity. we don't on the back seat whole world needs to take action and be ready . people are judgment. 2 common crisis with oh, we can do better, we should be better. everyone is contributing each in their own way, but we also know that this crisis will not go on forever. the challenge is great, the response has been massive. so many good people are helping us. it makes us feel

very proud that we're in it together. ah, our new german language channel, our t d is embroiled in a legal dispute as europe's media regulator, questions it's broadcast license, marty's management stresses the license was obtained in full compliance with european law. russia publishes a list of proposals to nato for maintaining security with the country's deputy foreign minister saying the ball is now in the alliance's court when it comes to de escalation. also we dig into disturbing revelations that the.