[000:00:00;00] ah hello, welcome to world important. competing interest and power politics have existed as long as nation states came into being spurring the development of diplomacy on the one hand and viewing arms races on the other. every now and then, especially in european politics. diplomats and generals get sidelined by demagogues who dance on portraying adversaries as not just do political competitors, but rather as neural degenerates or even civilizational interiors, i'll be back to the era of her mention in european affairs. well, to discuss it, i'm now joined by a professor of russian and european politics at the university of canada. has a separate,

great to see. i'm going to talk to you. thank you very much for being available. my pleasure. profess aqua in your recent article. you mentioned that the current ukrainian saga reminds you of the cuban missile crisis, which marks its 60th anniversary of this year. and in both cases, genuine concerns were mixed up with postering and advice escalation. and i see the relevance of this comparison when it comes to russia strategic interest. but when it comes to the west or the united states, in particular, it isn't just as i did this, then surely significant as it was back in 1962 with the placement possible placement of the soviet missiles in cuba. the cuban missile crisis is been repeated, but in a sort of slow motion behavior. and the larger context is important and i'll come

back to the cuban issue. and the larger one is that i argue that we are back a cold war and a cold war 2. and just as the cuban missile crisis in october 1962 was as it were, the moment to turning moment when both sides, moscow and washington, all of the leaders understood that this conflict needs to be managed to else will go into a hot will to 3rd world war similarly, that's why today as well, it's a moment of shock, a moment recognition that actually we have all have sides have to change. but what you said about that the beginning about the demonization of both sides. that is a typical behavior of cold war is that when you're not just involved to what you say, great power politics, but it's actually more existential. you are black and white, many came good against evil, correct me if i'm wrong, but i think back in 962 and before and after that both sides recognize that

security is a sort of 1st and foremost, systemic a structural issue rather than a moral or emotional one and that security achieving security. it takes a lot of painstaking work, a lot of very technical negotiations about where what kind of weapons in what numbers should be located. and i would argue that most people still insist on the quantitative approach, whether they're west, wants to trade in very emotional times. you know, this for made in the ukraine should not be given to the russian bully, we should not succumb to russia's blackmail. do you think that's intentionally manipulative or did the west indeed lose the ability to look at security strategically in terms of rational objectives without passing moral judgments? first of all, i want to say that the west is a bit divided on this and then they find god off. there's sort of new code will

behaviors. it is the anglo saxon countries, your k united states and australia, interestingly enough, and some influence in germany, ross, a movie reluctant to pose it in quite such stock. not just a geopolitical strategic terms, but indeed ethical moral terms 1st. and 2nd. yes, this is again a reflection of the failure after 1909 to have a stablished. what you suggest is an indivisible piece order. what are the west seems to have had, is a 30 year young just like great in a sense they had before cuba. and that you know, of unprecedented dominance. and why this is portrayed in such starkly cold war, many can black and white terms, is because this 30 year young is coming to an end suddenly come to the shock to understand that russia was no longer going to accept that you know, this endless expansion and they go back and use this policy strangely enough,

is you know, gorbachev in policy, it's a yells in policy and put it. and his successor is to say that security is indivisible. that is the 2nd leg off that whole how think a paris charter is timble as down a declaration, all of these declarations. but the west has been focusing on one aspect that each country can choose, its own security alliances. whereas both most kind of course, beijing, because interesting enough beijing, china has actually quite said the west must take into account your security concerns, is it's indivisibility. and that's what we're failed to do for 30 years. and like in cuba, that we simply have now a moment of awakening realization that you have to we have to go back to the negotiating table. the russians have a long complained about the existence of double standards. but i think what we are increasingly hearing back from european leaves is that these are the double standards are justified, morally justified,

because the west is on the right of history. and, you know, for me as a person who was born in leningrad with all the painful history on that city, at the hands of a certain western european power. you know, i kind of how, how, you know, hearing certain until mentioned connotations in these type of rhetoric, meeting, western leaders, western decision makers, understand how these sort of moral discourse is perceived here in russian. because whatever you think about and you know, his, you know, he's a strategic thinker, you cannot deny that. but his family history, his all personal history, is also rooted in certain events in russian history. and i think he's genuinely sensitive to russians being portrayed of being treated as one to mention. absolutely. one of his speeches about 15 years ago, he said that russians are treated as if they're barbarians who've just come down

from the trees. and of course, this is again, i'll go back to the issue. it's a, you know, a lot of personalities involved. but ultimately it's a systemic issue about how the cold war ended. i keep going back to back because it really is, this is what this class is over. you can now they are. so could they, you know, the, the russian troops and the one side of the military exercises on the other side is all about the sense that we have a system, the western old or if you like the liberal international order, which is democracy and human rights. and all good stuff, and the point is, is that the russian vision is not opposed to it by the image is simply saying that there were 2 piece orders at the end of the cold war. there was the global 12 year transformation will have to establish a framework in which you actually can feel comfortable. whereas the liberal idea puts, rather than emphasizing geo politics or security or realist, nationalist interests. it's all about the over emphasis on principles which will

support. but it has to be politics all about a balance between values and interests. and by over emphasizing values, you actually undermine the interests of all concerned here, among the advice escalation before and looking it from a tactical rather than strategic perspective. some analysts in moscow speculated that we're putting out those ultimatum style denies and massing troops on rushes, western borders allowed moscow to make west pay attention to the issues. did it concerns that weren't even considered as deserving attention? only year ago, starting and dialogue on security principles in europe. isn't that a small break? so in and of itself? yes, no, absolutely. i can quite understand that argument. and again, that's why cuba is important by planning to put michelle's on cuba. they actually

built the u. s. to negotiating table, and of course, it was a success for the soviet union. the jupiter missiles will be the 2 on from turkey, and a promise was given not to invade cuba again, like to buy pigs the previous, you know? yes, why you could argue that till advised is that yes, the door has been opened to negotiation now to the issues which have been waiting both yell saying why go bunch of yeltsin and put in. but you know why till advised . it's that it's not, some of the door was opened, the door was smashed down, and so maybe a more delicate way, opening that door may have been better advised, but then you'd say they would, you refusing to open the door? so the only way to get it was to smash it down. i understand that argument that the door you misplace one way or another for in order for the talk to continue. it requires some sort of for the both sides to have certain degree of negotiating skills and certain conception of a level playing field given that after you know, for the last 30 years the,

what i know it's vision to be accepted and complied with. no questions asked, do you think there's a skill set where these negotiations to continue rather than you know, go on with value teaching, media, family and etc. all those delirious skills that the west is so good at practicing? yeah, no, absolutely. and compared to those leaders, i'm thinking of jack kennedy and robert kennedy in 1962, who in many studies have shown just how intelligent and of course they resisted the military. talk of the defense secretary at the time. mcnamira was actually, you know, advising that we can't put up with this. we need military action. and of course, in washington today, there's hotheads who actually saying that as well. so absolutely do they have the skill set? the responses to russia,

security trinity ideas develop delivered in december. they answer from nato showed a completely inadequate response. it was highly, i do apologized. and of course, it completely closed the door to a possibility of negotiation. however, the u. s. response was actually far more nuanced and it so i actually think that biden, despite his own personal inclinations as somebody who has been at their head, had the u. s. foreign policy for shaping it. for many, many years he had he met with putting in june 20 last year for the geneva negotiations. and of course because they went no way. that's another reason why gosh, has continued bashing or the door with its force mobilization. and they, on that this response actually does suggest room for negotiation and maneuver. so the diplomatic us answer was, you know, obviously disappointed, rushing all sorts of ways, but it's kept the door, the door is still open. i think there's

a huge positive assign. this is american response, also include a langley weapons into your crane and increasing and you know, military contingent in europe, the western media and i, filled with reports about the imminent war. and i think even though those people in moscow who used to dismiss it as deanna just part of the american a muscle flexing it or the political postering. then getting a little bit nervous, especially taking into account the temperament our, the political temperament of our ukrainian neighbors. how likely is that an open confrontation at this point? do you think they could be a, why not big war, but still a war at 1st the u. s. response actually did open the door to the band on a deployment of still like massage and so on. in your thing, but obviously the, what they would call the defensive weapons is being rushed in by the anglo saxon

powers. don't forget that germany refused to allow britain overflight rights over. so it has to go over the baltic and denmark. there's a huge military industrial, complex number, communist eisenhower wound against a military industrial complex. and of course, it's only got more powerful. so biden in opening, keeping the door open for negotiation. it is by didn't, it's not blinking the secretary of state or jake sullivan. the i national security advisor. it is binding personally, whoever you are them. but of course, as you say, even zelinski, the president of your claim is saying that there is no immediate theater, 5 full scale. so no, and the, the idea of an invasion is very much a london washington thing. it's not a european stance apart from the poles and the bunker publics, of course, the, the usual suspects. so the situation is extremely dangerous. an idea for russian invasion, i've always said it simply, you know,

nothing is excluded but extremely unlikely. if any action did come in defense, it would be using long, long range track weapons and so on. and, and another thing to remember is that ukrainians have over a 110000 forces on its side of the border. and of course, in part the russian, semi mobilization is to prevent a sudden attack on the dung. best of the sort. as a bi shad against the territories of armenian occupied it, you're not going to come back. so the military situation is extremely dangerous and has been for the last 10 years and getting worse so military exercises on both sides. planes flying within inches of each other. so an accident is just waiting to happen. well, what is also waiting to happen is a little break. we have to take it right now, but we will get back in just a few moments. and ah

ah ah ah mm oh look forward to talking to you. oh, that technology should work for people. a robot must obey the orders given by human beings accept where's that shorter is it conflict with the 1st law?

show your identification. we should be very careful about artificial intelligence. appoint obviously is to place a job with artificial intelligence. real summoning a robot must protect his own existence with oh and well, come back to work with richard club, professor of russian and european politics at the university of canada. for just a 2nd. in the beginning of our conversation, you mentioned the principle indivisibility of security. that the russians are insisting on,

which is essentially an idea that no country should enhance and security at the expense of another country. but when we look at russia, a country that occupies a quarter of the european land mass, it's pretty clear that it security interest somewhat larger than let's say the security interest of mel estonia, georgia, or even mid sized european states. and it's not only a matter of security, it's also a matter of responsibility when it comes to, let's say, the fight against terrorism, or they fight against the infectious diseases. you know, russia is usually expected to intervene when things go awry. and as i do, for example, in conflicts on defending, not only income and government, but also western substantial western investments in that country recently. why do you think the west has such a big difficulty accepting that russia would have a certain area of not only influence,

but also responsibility in this part of the world. indeed, again, when has to come back to the post cold war settlement where there was no decision, no, no framework for behavior of their so called post soviet space. and going from the beginning, there was a sort of a neo containment policy. is that the fair russian imperialism coming back? so you call it responsibility and leadership? and i think that russia as the, the major power, just like united states in its own region in china, to educate. and it's part of the world has responsibilities. but this was never counted by the western powers because of that vision of a liberal, international order, which is like a universal monro doctrine. it means that it can be no regional spheres of influence. even regional phase of security weren't allowed. because that would, by definition, infringe this universalism of the west. but now all of that model is being

challenged. and as you say, russia does have yes possibilities. in addition, as a permanent member of united nations security council says not just regional, but oh, even global responsibilities. why hasn't been so difficult for the west york 2nd? because i haven't understand why they would have, if you, let's say, 30 years ago after all the transfers associated with the end of the cold war in the collapse of the soviet union. but now these, the united states doesn't have the means or the design. you involve itself in every part of the world. they just withdrew from afghanistan because they don't want to waste their resources. they do, they really want to be a sort of a global policeman. let's say in catholics or energy, just not even in georgia or your brain when things go awry there when they run a different russia to deal with it and pretend i interest as wow, yes, it to paternity. but the phrase would then be, they would say, is that they can be no challenge to the soviet international. soviet independence

of countries that you can move in because it's done. of course, there's a part of element of double standards because as we saw interventions and serbia 1999 it up late to libya and so on. but yeah, the, the idea of russia as the regional head, human or older maker is not been accepted. that is why the western powers of nato absolutely refuses to engage with a collective security tito organization which was involved in because x down as an organization. so you're fuses to give space. i think that's of course one of those big elements on the agenda today. and it will be helped of course, by the guys of china, which is also finally moving from a unit polar world to a multiple in a world. but it's very painful purses for those in washington and london to understand that this, like some russian common day to say, 0500 year period of western dominance is coming to an end. so there's a lot of civilizational cultural issues involved as well as security factors. now

speaking about the collapse of the soviet union, which i mentioned before, last year, mark, 30th anniversary of this historic event. and there is an burgeoning debate here in russia, an analyst about that of the solidity and resilience of the state of the former soviet republic that deal a t. t exist us self deficient, responsible independent states who can take care of all the issues that may happen on dietary, to be the terrorism. on the spread of infectious diseases. what, what have you. we've seen a succession of crisis in on base territories, starting with georgia. ukraine gets done armenia and now potentially it's a i said it's natural growing pains. do you think the map of this region is still not set in stone?

i'm not even implying that russia would come and take all with them. i'm just asking specifically about the ability of those a can tree or stage to exist in all the house. absolutely. so this 30 a pair says, since the disintegration of the soviet union is still continuing, some people say that slow motion collapses continuing. oh is too much to is taken much longer to build nations and states in the region. this is where jackson's i day of negative sovereignty is important, where they're only sovereignty. is that given by outside, by the international system was internally these countries are divided and unable to establish genuine polities. i think ukraine is one of those. and we've seen this since 2014, the enormous division between these 2 models of statehood one which is pluralistic, ingenuous and encompassing it's multiple identities. and the other one, which is this guy, the new nationalist, exclusive of vision, which is why this crisis, today's,

at the intersection of the crisis of the post cold water and the crisis of statehood in particular in ukraine. but as you say, some of the other central elation states and of course, south caucasus as well. so russia surrounded by a whole stack of unstable state. and of course, the whole region across it is tensions. and, you know, when you say afghanistan come outside and elsewhere, so it's a very dangerous part of the world. and as you say, russia is the most powerful state in that has certain responsibilities, but obviously not to infringe the sovereignty of the states. and yes, has no intention of doing so. if we look at the soviet subsidies to former soviet republics, if i'm not mistaken, the largest amount per capita when to georgia, where is the biggest receipt in absolute terms, was ukraine and goals of the states? now nurse, very visible animosity towards russia,

and i'm pretty sure that the russian leadership is quite aware of that. when you hear that put in was nothing more than 2 mean corporate ukraine or george a did believe it is absolute nonsense. this was the here clinton line of to the announcement of the what was going to be the your ation union. you action economic union. she said during the famous speech in dublin, we know what protein wants and which is as it was to create the soviet empire. and we know how to stop it. well, i've been trying to stop at this imagination since the beginning. so no potent came to power. one of his 1st things he wanted to go all the way through was to stabilize existing borders to actually build up the domestic sovereignty of the states. yes, democracy human rights. an important element of that. but also states capacity just a simple ability to govern your space in a reasonably effective manner. you claim, for example, today has a lower g d, p per capita, than it had an independence in $1009.00 to $1.00. it's a fuss. and so in many ways,

if you actually was to invade, to take it over for, to have responsibility for a country which cannot manage, it's a phrase in a humane and democratic manner, the extremely hostile population, disability infrastructure, lots and lots of problems. many rationalists argue that taking over ukraine, taking responsibility over ukraine, would be the worst thing to happen to russia, that it would be a major blow to its own ability to develop itself and be a strong great power. do you agree with that? that would be suicidal or russia, it would be absolutely suicidal it would be equal. and perhaps even far, far, far worse than the soviet invasion of afghanistan in december, 1979. which of course, pigeon ski another strategy site, they deliberately pulled the soviet union into that fatal mistake. and a sum strategists in washington today, no doubt would like to see, gosh, make this huge mistake because, you know,

an invasion is unthinkable quite apart from the loss of life and quite apart from the fact that you communion people, the people over directional people overwhelmingly peaceful all they want is to develop and live normal decent human lives. now he put in, i mean, also argues that men get, romans is the only way to go. and i wonder if that's really the case because they had of ukraine security council. i like, i like seen denila a few days ago, warren, that in the west where to continue pressing or pressing rather you grants, you comply with immense agreement and it's great times it could is stabilized deciding as the stable act as it is already from within and i think there is a certain kernel of truth and that because if we remember distinction back in 2013, it was the sudden you try on the issue of the integration with the european

union that led to the uprising and the, you know, very, very passionate reactions from the ukrainians it's i to do you think the misc agreement as, as good as it may be as a satisfying, as it may be to the outside powers? do you think the ukrainian society can digest it now after pouring acid in it for so many years? no, it can't, but still it's the only way forward. so in a sense, we have a, an impossible program. the only way forwards is not a way forwards. the, the means containment, as you say, it hasn't the and i will say that their responsibility lies to some of the members of the normandy format, france, and germany. in particular, because on many occasions, anglin merkel refused to put pressure on care of the meeting in december 2019 after zalinski was elected. don't forget, he was elected as the piece candidate with overwhelming majority. if you can, people reflecting what i say, the majority of your opinions won't piece,

and i know that it's quite clear yet what happened, even as they were meeting in france. i was put in a lensky people these the, the neo nationalists, as i call them this, not call them fashion. let's not call them anything extreme. these are just neon nationalists who have a very limited vision of your current state and they were mobilizing already. and if they, so you could say this out to a guy twin radical right wing is holding ukraine, nation and state hostage. and so, you know, earlier on those in the dung bass showed opinion poll showed they were happy to return to canyon sovereignty. as long as they could have a level of mistaken culture or tone political autonomy. today, you could say, what do the people of it? don't bass weren't nearly over 650000 now have russian passports. so it's, it's, it's got even more of a tangled and difficult issue. but you know, at least within the mens format they may well build

a normandy format to have negotiations. i also think united states should join it because ultimately european powers have shown themselves to be ineffective and unable even to stand up to the normative principles in ukraine, where we see a tax on the russian language and culture. where's the european response to that? well, professor, like what we have to live in there, thank you very much for being with us today. my pleasure. thank you. thank you for watching hope to hear again next week on wells apart. ah, with ah,

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